

## EMERGENT HUMAN NATURE





EMERGENT HUMAN NATURE  
*A Symbolic Field Interpretation*

BY WALTER COUTU

*Pennsylvania State College*



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FIRST EDITION

**FOR** *Ruby Katherine Gerhardt*



## FOREWORD

*By Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr.*

In 1941 my colleague Miss Ruth Gallagher and I had occasion to publish a brief monograph\* in which we sought to describe what seemed to us to be the important developments in social psychology during the decade of 1930 to 1940. In our appraisal, work in social psychology was characterized by a marked acceleration of a shift in theory and method from atomistic static analyses of attributes of persons and groups to an orientation and approach which could be called interactional. This trend required theorists and research workers to explain any given behavior as a functional part of a specified dynamic system of interacting elements. According to the emerging conceptions, the behavior of persons and groups could not be explained as the outcropping of the attributes or "nature" possessed by them but as parts of an interactive process in a "field" or situation of which they were component parts. The trends we noted did not, of course, originate in the 1930's. They were already established in some quarters well before that time, but the period studied seemed to show a particularly rapid shift of theory and method in the direction indicated among students both of personal and of group phenomena.

On the basis of this appraisal we suggested that the following decade would witness a further acceleration of this shift. We also predicted the appearance of at least the beginnings of a more coherent system of concepts and methods which would enable social psychologists to deal with intra- and inter-personal behavior and intra- and inter-group behavior in the same theoretical framework.

In view of the foregoing remarks the reader will readily understand why it is pleasant for me to introduce the present work by Dr. Coutu. For in this book we have a genuine attempt at a systematic treatment of human social behavior in its individual and group manifestations within an explicitly interactional

\* Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. and Ruth Gallagher *Developments in Social Psychology, 1930-40*. New York: Beacon House, Inc., 1941, p. 58.

theory. In doing this, the author performs a valuable service even though his formulations may prove to fall short of being definitive.

The point to be emphasized here is that after admitting its faults, the work represents a substantial contribution toward the goal of an adequate social psychology theory. It is a stimulating and constructive treatment and will well repay careful study.

No one, the author least of all, would contend that all or even most of the ideas in this book are original with the author. The chief contribution of the work inheres rather in its attempt to draw together many partial formulations into a more comprehensive system. In doing this the author has found many places where earlier conceptualizations had to be improved upon. In addition to the contribution of integrating these various ideas, the author has made many significant contributions of his own including his proposals with reference to the identification of behavioral units of analysis, a situational field theory of motivation; the conception of personality as a dynamic system; the process of selective responsiveness of the person, the nature of meaning, the nature of social integration; and the basis of individuation in social interaction.

These virtues alone are sufficient to merit high praise. But there is another which may be even more important than all the others. Social psychologists have become increasingly embarrassed by the fact that they are not yet able to deal adequately with personal and group phenomena within a single conceptual framework. Some progress in this direction has been made, to be sure, but we have not yet advanced much beyond the formulations by G. H. Mead. In the present widespread interest in what is called group dynamics we are accumulating many concrete observations about social interaction in its interpersonal and intergroup aspects, but adequate theoretical formulation lags behind observational and practical technology. In Dr. Coutu's work we have a provocative first approximation at such an integrative theory which marks genuine progress and comes at a most appropriate time in the development of social psychology.

## INTRODUCTION

Among the great traditions that have directed man's thinking about himself, two have been particularly significant in the West, one is associated with Aristotle, the other with Galileo. The Aristotelian tradition holds that the behavior of all things is determined by their nature. The Galilean tradition holds that the behavior of all things is determined by the conditions under which it occurs. This book is a social psychology in the Galilean tradition.

Our contention is that the *conditions under which* human behavior occurs are primarily meanings, for the most part common meanings. In this sense we may think of this book as a logic of symbolic interaction. Until recently the main trend in the sciences of human behavior has followed the Aristotelian tradition with the result that students of behavior have sought to discover and measure all sorts of segmental behaviors, attributes, or traits which were assumed to "exist" regardless of conditions. The methodologies and research techniques by which such knowledge has been gained have been ingenious and admirably suited to quantification and precise measurement. But as precision increased, research techniques seemed to be increasingly applied to less significant and segmental "elements", the *person* began to recede from view, and we were left in possession of beautifully precise data on relatively isolated bits of behavior. John Doe was lost in a welter of attributes, and interpersonal relations were lost in the race to collect entities presumed to be "characteristic" of people or of something called "human nature."

Some twenty years ago signs of a new trend began to appear, and it is our belief that this book is a product of that trend.\* The new trend showed increasing emphasis on social interaction, on analysis of dynamic processes, as against the more static attributes or entities. Human behavior was coming to be interpreted as

\* The old and new trends are well described in the brilliant little monograph by Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. and Ruth Gallagher: *Developments in Social Psychology 1930-1940*. New York: Beacon House, Inc., 1941.

occurring in, and as, a system of inter-related interacting influences in recognizable social situations or "fields." The behavior of "people" was more and more explained as functions of dynamic processes related to specific situations rather than as expressions of attributes "possessed" by human "organisms." The shift was from the Aristotelian to the Galilean tradition so fruitful in the more exact sciences

The earlier trend had resulted in the segmentalization of "knowledges" about human behavior to the point where behavior study had come to be hardly more than a series of more or less related topics. The new trend seemed to portend a movement toward synthesis and the emergence of an integrated system for social psychology, a system competent to describe and analyze in the same vocabularies the phenomena of both individual and group in terms of intrapersonal and interpersonal behavior.

This book is presented as a beginning in that direction, it is an attempt to synthesize in a systematic heuristic form some of the more advanced contemporary thinking about human behavior in the fields of social psychology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, psychiatry, and semantics. It is a first attempt to incorporate in a systematic manner the great contribution of George Herbert Mead. It is also a first attempt to re-interpret Mead in terms of field theory and operationalism. The book purports to be an integrated conceptual formulation for social psychology in a form which synthesizes the situational or field approach with the symbolic interactionist approach. The viewpoint is therefore field-centric rather than organocentric or environmental. It is a descriptive analysis of how man perceives, makes judgments and choices, thinks, and otherwise behaves and comes to behave, as a social being; it is a study of "the person in the body."

The general point of view is based on the proposition that man always behaves in accordance with what the situation means to him. The meaning of meaning is therefore an important aspect of the work. Meaning is defined operationally, and meanings are propounded as the exclusive stimuli to what is termed specifically *human* behavior. Much space is given to the selectivity of behavior, and an attempt is made to isolate the mechanisms of selective response (choice) in a formulation called "a theory of selectors." Selectivity, treated as a function of specialization, is



systematically analyzed as a limiting factor in behavior, thus forming a dependable basis for prediction.

All human behavior is here postulated as being *in some degree* a deviation from (or approximation to) some social norm; and meanings, as the stimuli to human behavior, are postulated as derived from such norms from which they deviate as continuous variables. The older psychologies have accounted for these deviations (individuation) almost exclusively in biological terms. Here we give for the first time a number of specific mechanisms for a social or interactional basis of individuation. Since all human behavior is here postulated as a necessary resultant of the personality operating as an energy system in symbolic fields, the idea of an isolated act is rejected as not conceptually intelligible. Every act whatsoever is held to have a history, and the nature of this history is identified. The historicity of social fields is likewise postulated, and the social process is defined as a sequential configuration of related fields.

In view of the preceding remarks it will be understood why emphasis is given to wholeness as against atomistic concepts, to Galilean as against Aristotelian thought forms, to dynamic processes as against static entities and attributes, to continuous variables as against discrete variables and dichotomies, to empirical methodologies as against entelechies and conative phenomena generally. Great effort has been made to isolate the specific behavior mechanisms operating in a given type of behavior and, where possible, to define operationally such phenomena.

Anyone who attempts to make a systematic dynamic formulation on the basis of present knowledge, theory, and methodology will quickly discover inadequacies in the English language. English is well designed for the conceptualization of entities and attributes, and of Aristotelian concepts generally. But, unfortunately, these easily lend themselves to reification. Our attempt to describe and explain behavior in terms of verbs rather than nouns has probably not succeeded in all instances. We have had to use nouns, for English is not congenial to dynamic concepts and processual thought forms. As a help to the reader numerous warnings are given against the danger of reification.

With reference to the nature of "truth" or "fact" this book takes a strictly pragmatic and relativistic position. Fact is defined, after Henderson, as a "statement about phenomena empirically

verifiable in terms of some conceptual scheme" Every truth is thus a creation of some conceptual system and is relative to the system which creates it. Truth is measured in terms of adequacy for a purpose. As for the relative value of the many systems of thinking throughout the world—philosophical, religious, scientific,—the only criterion we know is the Biblical injunction "by their fruits ye shall know them."

Some readers may feel that the book gives too little emphasis to the "organism," that is, to the biological and constitutional factors in human behavior. The traditional chapters on physiology with diagrams of the nervous system have been omitted because we believe that these have no place in a *social* psychology, however necessary they are for psychology. Our thesis is that since meanings exclusively are the stimuli to human behavior, *anything* that affects, determines, molds, or modifies a person's meanings is fundamental to social psychology. Our discussion of "somatic selectors" in Chapter IV and elsewhere provides the framework for research on the place and function of the constitutional factors. To the extent that they affect a man's meanings in any situation, they affect his behavior. It remains for empirical research to determine how this takes place, and to what extent under various conditions.

Finally, some readers may feel that the book lacks sufficient illustrative material. It was thought that to include more would seriously interfere with the logical development of the thought. In a work now in preparation we shall apply the principles of this book to a formulation of the structure and dynamics of personality, and a third work will be concerned with a detailed analysis of the concepts of normal and deviant behavior. The present book is not dependent upon either of the others, but the others will be based specifically upon this one.

WALTER COUTU

*State College, Pennsylvania*

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## EMERGENT HUMAN NATURE





## Chapter I

### BEHAVIOR IS TENDENCY

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The universe is the enveloping matrix in which occurs that system of space-time relationships which we call nature. Man is an integral part of this universe, a fundamental aspect of nature. Whatever man is or does is nature working. When we study

the human being we are not studying man as against nature, but nature in certain of its aspects, one of which is the human aspect. This we call human nature

Nature is not a perfect system, its various aspects are not perfectly coordinated. Apple blossoms are often killed by frost, and lightning kills men and other animals. Man is the aspect of nature that can take notice of such occurrences and pass judgment upon them. He has done so. He has not liked such happenings, and has called them "errors." This was one of his first great inventions. This ability to step back and look critically at other aspects of nature led man to feel that he was something separate from, possibly superior to, nature. This is perhaps one of nature's greatest errors. It is at the root of all the problems of human nature as we shall discuss it in this book.

Let us for convenience think of the universe as composed of two kinds of phenomena, the relatively static and the relatively dynamic. We may think of the surface of a globe, or of the earth, as being relatively static. A man can start at a given point, go around the earth, and return to the same point, traversing nothing but the surface of the earth, whether land or water. This static kind of phenomenon is continuous, and a man's movement is also continuous. Whether he continues in the same direction or not, some kind of movement always occurs, either by him or in him. Movement never stops while he lives, regardless of how long his journey takes.

This manner of thinking enables us to say, again just for convenience, that continuity of the relatively static phenomena of the universe is called "matter," while continuity of the relatively dynamic phenomena of the universe is called "process" or motion or behavior—a sequence of related occurrences. But whether we start out to study the static or the dynamic aspects of the universe, whether we want to study matter or process, the whole is far too large for analysis. We cannot put the earth on a desk and study it, nor can we put the man's trip, as process, on a desk for analysis. No known way exists for examining either of these wholes as wholes. If either of these phenomena is going to be studied, it must be broken into units of some kind.

*But there are no units of any kind in nature.* To the unaided eye, everything is either matter or motion, continuous stuff or continuous motion.<sup>1</sup> Units are devices for dividing these continuities.

<sup>1</sup> Actually, if we go far enough back by reduction, we find nothing but process, motion. All human experience is made up of various types of action,

into "parts" that can be manipulated. Hence, if we are going to study these two kinds of phenomena, we must find units somewhere. Since nature does not provide us with such units, we shall have to decide what we mean by units, and then borrow some or make some for ourselves.<sup>2</sup>

## 1. The Nature of a Unit of Measure

Man is usually surprised when he first realizes that nature is indifferent to his need for units of various kinds and provides him with none. On the other hand, this condition could be flattering, since the task of providing units was left to man himself. Every unit of description in the entire universe is an invention of man. And there are thousands, perhaps millions of such units.

A unit of measure is a mental construct, a symbol, a response, an act, a way of behaving toward something. Finding they had to adapt themselves to this continuous stuff called the surface of the earth, men developed the mental constructs or concepts "meter," "centimeter," and "kilometer," and "mile," "foot," and "inch." These particular units are length-responses which men re-enact whenever they wish to measure distance. But these partitioning devices do not exist in nature, nature is continuous. Miles, feet, and inches are human responses which men have agreed to use when they want to be sure that any two of them are talking about the same amount of space or distance, or a certain amount of continuous, unbroken surface. A mile is not a slice of nature, but a way of acting toward a socially defined extension of space.

A unit of measure, then, is a definition, and like all definitions or specifications is arbitrary in the sense that it may be represented by any graphic or verbal symbol, provided only that those who use it agree on its meaning. Americans may quarrel about how big a tax is, but never about the length of an inch.

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and nothing else. Because there are so many kinds of action or motion, the idiom of language and practical necessity lead us sometimes to believe that they are something else. Motion, action, is the fundamental "stuff" of the universe. All things are made of it, but for practical purposes we have to talk of matter.

<sup>2</sup> The fact that there are some highly stable, relatively uniform occurrences in nature does not make them units; they are units only when man agrees to use them as such—light years or the seasons for example. Units are always parts of a conceptual system.

The function of a unit of measure is thus to indicate common, accepted ways of looking at things—in the above cases, distance. Units are forms of behavior used as devices to standardize people's behavior toward some aspect of the universe. When a person makes the noise "pound," he has acted or behaved in a way which enables him to see a certain amount of something. When other people want to see the same amount, they act in the same way, that is, they make the same noise. "Pound" then becomes a standardized response giving assurance that all are looking at, and behaving toward, the same aspect of the universe in the same way. Units of measure are symbolic acts or symbols designed to standardize our responses, to unify our behavior toward certain aspects of phenomena.

When we are studying the kind of phenomenon called matter or stuff, the problem is not a difficult one. In the present instance we can easily see that units of measure are arbitrary, invented mental constructs and social definitions, socially accepted as devices to standardize our responses toward some aspects of some continuous whole.<sup>3</sup>

Difficulty begins when we talk about that other kind of phenomenon, motion, process, or change, which is also a continuous whole. A unit of (for) matter is a form of behavior toward that matter, but a unit of process or behavior is a form of behavior toward that behavior or process. Consequently, when man invents mental constructs to measure or define certain aspects of the continuous phenomenon called process, the nature of a unit of measure seems more difficult to grasp.

The static "stays put," as it were, while you apply your concept, that is while you measure it. But the dynamic is movement, change, or behavior that does not "stay put." Here is one cause of our difficulty in understanding a unit of motion or behavior. Another cause of our difficulty, and a more important one, is that practically all people are so accustomed to thinking in terms of highly standardized behavior units (like minutes) that they seldom realize they are using *units of (for) a continuous process*; hours, habits, and volts seem to exist "naturally."

Most people have no particular need to think of a human life as one continuous act from birth to death, one continuous process.

<sup>3</sup> Some illuminating remarks on this way of thinking may be found in George A. Lundberg: *Foundations of Sociology*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939, p. 67 and other pages. Throughout the present work I am greatly indebted to Lundberg.

But this manner of thinking has great advantages. A person does not stop acting or behaving for a fraction of a second between birth and death. Each person's life is one continuous process—one whole act. Since the phenomenon is continuous, it has no units nor does nature supply any, and we must therefore invent or borrow some concepts which will make us see parts or segments of this continuous process. These segment-creating units will be just as arbitrary as those defining (measuring) distance. Unable to talk about, and otherwise adjust to, an individual life process as a whole, we have had to divide the process arbitrarily into segments or parts, and to call these units "acts." This unit lacks the precision-desirable for most scientific purposes, since the symbol "act" refers both to so large a segment of the whole as "he went on a vacation," as well as to so small a segment as "he looked at his watch." Both are "acts."

Furthermore, if one were to be technical, and research requires this at times, it would be difficult to tell exactly where or when an act began or ended, for the life process does not stop before death, it merely changes direction. The idea of process, however, and even the unit "act," suggest that a unit of behavior must be a change or a movement of some kind. When one is studying human behavior, however, some acts, or parts of acts, are not easily observed. They take place, as it were, behind closed skins, and cannot be seen without special training and special "instruments." Some of these "instruments" are themselves concepts like "mind," "guilt," "ambition," and "habit." Some parts of every act are more or less private, but are nevertheless segments of the total ongoing, continuous process.

Even an elementary course in human behavior introduces one to some of these instruments or symbols which point at (indicate, define, specify, measure) "parts" of this ongoing process. A few of these symbols are reflexes, faculties, ideas, tropisms, sensations, wishes, images, affects, psychical systems, attitudes, habits, and tendencies. These symbolize—point to—different type-parts of the total action process called life. It is difficult to see (we lack the necessary concepts) how any human "act" could occur without involving to some degree the private behind-closed-skins aspect of the total process, yet some learned men say that science cannot deal legitimately with these private "unseen" aspects of behavior. No doubt these men assume that "someone" has "seen" an electron.

Units like inch, pound, quart, hour, idea, and act are not units

of something, but units *for* something. They are not substances, entities, or pieces of something; they are mental constructs, concepts, symbols, or standardized responses to be directed at something, to be applied to something, either stuff or process. We are so accustomed to seeing a piece of something when we ask for a pound of butter that the piece rather than the pound seems to be the real unit. Consequently we have difficulty in applying a unit to process, for no piece of process bears witness to the unit. To say to a storekeeper "I want a quart *for* milk" would, of course, be awkward as well as inaccurate, for if one wants a quart *for* something, one should go to science or to a table of measures, not to a storekeeper. A quart for milk is not the same as a quart for dry stuff, a pound for butter is not the same as a pound for (measuring) money or gold.

Perhaps this little exercise will help us see that a unit for any purpose is a human response of some kind, and will help us to understand Lundberg when he says "The immediate datum of all science is a human response"<sup>4</sup>. We need to keep reminding ourselves that units are mental constructs, acts, and forms of behavior, not pieces of stuff.

## 2. In Search of a Unit for Action

When we consider the title of this section and relate it to the last sentence in the previous section, we find that we are searching for an act to measure other acts. It will not be just an ordinary act; it must be a symbolic act, a mental construct in terms of which we can discuss and measure other behaviors.

### SOME UNITS TRIED AND FOUND WANTING

$S \leftrightarrow R$  as a Central Unit.

The symbol  $S \leftrightarrow R$  has long been used to represent a generic unit of behavior. Why must we search for a unit for action when this highly respectable unit is already at hand? One answer is that in some quarters this unit is no longer highly respectable for some purposes. The symbol  $S \leftrightarrow R$  has lost respectability because stimulus-response as a unit of behavior does not adequately represent

<sup>4</sup> Lundberg: *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 217 and Chapter I.

human behavior—indeed, it probably does not *adequately* represent any kind of behavior, since the behavior of every phenomenon in the universe is in some degree selective. The main consideration here, however, is that in the minds of many people the symbol  $S \leftrightarrow R$  is associated with what has been called “crude” or “radical” behaviorism, primarily of the Watsonian type.

While this school of thought is (or was) not as crude as it has been described, the impression remains that the radical behaviorists thought of the stimulus (S) as referring to some bio-physical or physico-chemical occurrence, inside or outside the body, that this occurrence operates automatically in a one-two relationship with the object stimulated, and that the response (R) of the stimulated organism follows immediately and mechanically. All this implies that the stimulated organism responds without any selectivity on its part; that the response is “mechanical” rather than “selective;” and that the organism is a purely passive agent in this process, responding to the physico-chemical nudge in much the same manner as a frog’s severed leg twitches in response to an electric shock (but not to an electric light). Even the layman now recognizes that this does not describe what goes on in human behavior.

Another, and more pertinent reason for not using stimulus-response as a central or generic unit in analyzing human behavior is that we wish to use it to represent the kind of behavior described above, the frog-leg type of behavior—organic or somatic. While stimulus-response will serve for that purpose, it is not strictly adequate even for that type of behavior, for even a severed frog leg is selective, it will not twitch at the barking of a dog nor at the five o’clock whistle. But we will use the symbol  $S \leftrightarrow R$  to represent organic behavior, even for human beings. This book divides the behavior of human beings into two general categories: the somatic, and what for the moment will be called the “human.” The symbol  $S \leftrightarrow R$  will represent the former, and the symbol  $S \leftrightarrow M \leftrightarrow R$  will represent the latter kind of behavior. In the latter, “S” stands for “sensation,” “M” stands for “meaning,” which is the person’s response to that sensation and which in turn becomes the stimulus for the person’s further response, “R.”

We used to be taught that no one ever experiences pure sensation. Light or sound waves supposedly impinged upon our sensory equipment; we immediately interpreted the sensation and gave it a meaning. Sensation and its interpretation were thought to occur

simultaneously, and the two simultaneous phenomena were together called perception. But now that man has developed concepts which enable him to see and measure a hundred-millionth or less of a second, perhaps we may think of sequences of phenomena. When light waves impinge on a man's retina he may quickly say "tree," or he may say "damn," especially if he is driving at night.

To repeat, then, the sequence is as follows: 1) light waves (S) impinge on the retina, 2) interpreting the object from which the light is reflected, we may quickly say to ourselves "tree" or "cow" or "beautiful," that is, we interpret the sensation, give it a meaning (M), 3) this response (M) then becomes 4) the stimulus to further behavior (R). Selection occurs between the "S" and the "R." In this book great significance will be given this selective function. The concept is further developed at the end of section 4 of the present chapter and in Chapter IV.

#### *The Concept "Attitude" as a Central Unit*

A familiar unit in sociology and psychology is the concept "attitude." Why not use this as our central unit? It will be used as a unit in this book, but not as the central unit, for at least two reasons. In the first place, "attitude" is more or less tied to the concept "value" and authorities cannot agree whether attitude-value refers to two things or one.<sup>5</sup> In the second place, opinion varies widely about how "attitude" is to be defined. W. I. Thomas would go so far as to have it include habits, traits, and any response whatsoever. We must have a unit representing greater consensus.

#### *"The Act" as a Central Unit.*

Since behavior is action, why not use the individual act as our central unit? This is the unit used by the late George Herbert Mead, to whom this book owes a great deal. "The act," says Mead, "is the fundamental datum in both social and individual psychology when behavioristically conceived, and it has both an inner and an outer

<sup>5</sup> Some writers insist that it refers to one phenomenon. e.g., J. F. Markey, *The Symbolic Process and Its Integration in Children*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1928, p. 162. Other writers insist that the concept refers to two phenomena. e.g., W. I. Thomas, in H. Blumer: *An Appraisal of Thomas and Znaniecki's The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, New York: Bulletin 44, Social Science Research Council, 1939. Blumer holds to the unity theory (p. 25), while Thomas holds for duality (p. 83). Znaniecki abandons the concept altogether and substitutes "tendency" (p. 39). From the enormous literature on attitudes one may cite E. Nelson: "Attitudes: I, Their Nature and Development," *Journal of General Psychology*, 1939, vol. 21, pp. 367-99. Nelson lists twenty-three concepts of attitude up to 1939.



phase, an internal and external aspect"<sup>6</sup> Like the units cited above, this one has its advantages and disadvantages, but the latter outweigh the former For one thing, the concept becomes immensely complicated in Mead's thinking,<sup>7</sup> and is perhaps more useful to philosophy than to science.

Part of the purpose of this book is to make its contents available to educated people generally, as well as to students of behavior. Mead's concept seems far too involved for this purpose Further, more, despite the quotation from Mead, an "act" is, for most people, what they see, and many authorities are annoyed by the suggestion that anything but the "external phase" is of concern to science. Finally, the "act" does not give an immediate connotation of continuity or of relatedness to past and future, but appears to refer to an isolated, static phenomenon It lacks dynamic connotation, being related to event rather than process Appearing to live for the moment only, it does not carry the idea of disposition or predisposition, even though this interpretation would not be true according to Mead.

What is being sought here is an overall generic unit that will be equally applicable to both of the behavior categories presented earlier, the somatic and the human The concept "tendency-in-situation" provides us with a more adequate unit.

### 3. Tendency-in-Situation as a Unit Process

#### THE MEANING OF TENDENCY

As the title of this chapter indicates, all behavior of every kind is assumed to represent tendency in some form and to some degree. Tendency-in-situation is the general generic concept of this book, and the term is used to include all other behavioral units on all levels. Although the term is presented as the hyphenated expression "tendency-in-situation," later it will be reduced to another form. We will gain some advantage if, for the moment, we discuss the term part by part

<sup>6</sup> George H. Mead *Mind, Self and Society* (E. W. Morris, ed.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939, pp. 7-8. See also Mead's *The Philosophy of the Act* (ed. by Morris and others), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

<sup>7</sup> See especially G. H. Mead: *The Philosophy of the Act*, pp. 3-23.

*The Definition of Tendency*

"Tendency" is defined as "a probable behavior," and so defined, it must be treated as a continuous variable. Tendency is an inference based on observation of type-acts, a statistical concept based on the frequency of the behavior which specifies the tendency. Even in popular speech people customarily say, when they observe that a person frequently acts in a certain way "He has a tendency to act that way." Tendency, then, is an inferential unit for action based on the assumption that the behavior of the individual can be described statistically. The concept is justified by the well-authenticated knowledge that treating the behavior of self and others statistically is precisely what people do "informally" in their day to day adjustments to one another throughout their lives. By "informally" is meant "without formal statistical procedures." Probably every person has many times in his life said of a friend or an enemy "he has a tendency to look out for himself," or a tendency to do something else. That people have observed tendencies is the commonest human experience; it is verifiable knowledge without which there could be no friendship, no enmity, no society, no human life at all. The purpose of this book is to state a theory of human behavior in terms of this knowledge.

*Examples of Tendency.*

In defining a tendency as a probable behavior we assume that the act which specifies the tendency is a socially conditioned process of a measurable degree of probability or stability under stated conditions. A person is conditioned to act in a given way in a given situation. Such an act may be a habit, bent, mental set, neuromuscular set, attitude, propensity, inclination, or impulse—all of which specify tendencies in given situations. A tendency thus represents acts which are of sufficient similarity in direction and magnitude to be recognized as of a given type, and such acts occur in situations sufficiently similar to be recognized as type-situations.

In much the same manner in which physicists use the concept energy, we may think of tendency as stress or pressure of a given direction and magnitude under stated conditions. When one hears a statement of another person and says "I am inclined to agree with that," one is announcing a tendency. The term thus covers all forms of readiness. If a person acts in a given way in a given situation, probably he will act in a similar way if that or an equivalent situation presents itself again; and if he acts in much the same way

again, the probability of his acting that way in the future in such situations is greater than the probability of his acting in some other way. Any act will, to some degree, predispose a person's future acts in similar situations.

This way of thinking leads to the application of the mathematical theory of probability to human behavior and likewise explains why *tendency* is here defined as a probable behavior. In mathematics "the theory of probability" is a highly conventional and rather rigorous form of behavior. Suppose we ask a person to perform some task one hundred times under prescribed conditions, and we observe that under these conditions he does it one way seventy times and another way thirty times. On this basis we feel reasonably justified in saying that if he were to perform this task again under the same conditions, the *probability* is that he would do it the first way about seventy times out of a hundred, or about 70% of the time. Continued observation of the behavior under the stated conditions will increase the predictability of the behavior in terms of probability.

### THE MEANING OF SITUATION

When we say that a person has an attitude, we have not made a complete statement because an attitude, like all tendencies, has direction; it always occurs in relation to something. Likewise, one does not merely have an attitude toward something, but an attitude toward something in some *context of behavior*, in some situation. Since the process could not possibly occur except in some situation, tendency is herein always treated as a function of the situation, meaning that the tendency varies with the situation. The situation, then, is an integral part of the tendency. It is not something necessary to, but separate from, tendency. There are not two things here, but one, tendency-in-situation.

A mode of thought is becoming evident which . . . tries to determine the predisposition, not by excluding so far as possible the influence of the environment, *but by accepting in the concept of disposition its necessary reference to a group of concretely defined situations.*<sup>8</sup>

Words and phrases like "field," "context," and "social setting" are equivalent to the concept "situation," but the present work will

<sup>8</sup> K. Lewin: *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company; 1935, Chapter I, pp. 40-1. (*Italics mine*).

consistently use the words "conditions under which" interchangeably with the word "situation."<sup>9</sup>

### *The Definition of Situation.*

At this early stage of our discussion we shall have to be content with a tentative definition: a situation is the total configuration of relevant behaviors and stimuli involved in an adjustment problem. For any one person the situation is *for him* those components of the configuration to which he is at the moment sensitive. Situation is difficult to define because, like the term "act," it is a segment of an ongoing process, and discussion depends on how big a segment one is talking about.

Every event that ever occurs in the universe, whether it be the action of men or some other aspect of nature, occurs under certain conditions, and science as we know it today could not have developed if the *conditions under which* phenomena occur had not been given a central position in scientific conceptual systems. Yet, there are well-known students of human behavior who sometimes imply, and sometimes assert, that certain tendencies "exist" or occur "regardless of the situation." But natural phenomena do not just occur whether they are the behavior of electrons or of human beings, they always occur in a configuration of conditions, and this configuration of conditions is here called "the situation." This concept is central to the thought and method of the more exact sciences and of this book.

### *Examples of Situation*

Again we shall have to be content with something vague until we have developed, in the following chapters, concepts in terms of which intelligible examples can be given. We shall at present have to be content with "use-meanings" instead of definitions. For example, everyone continually *uses* the term in such expressions as "the international situation," "the political situation," "the strike situation," and "the financial situation." In a recent broadcast a speaker discussing labor-management relations said: "Now, let's go over all the facts and see just what the situation is." In preparing for a recent camping trip a member of the group said: "O.K., we've got the equipment laid out, now, what's the food situation?" Recently the writer was asked to speak in a small community on a controversial subject. The person inviting him to speak remarked:

<sup>9</sup> See Lewin: *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, p. 29, where he discusses the concept "situation" in relation to Aristotelian and Galilean dynamics.

"Before you say yes or no, let me tell you what the situation is in this town." A child with emotional problems was taken to a counselor who said to the parent: "Tell me the child's situation as you see it."

Practically everyone *uses* "situation" in this vague manner, but part of the purpose of this book is to provide a way of thinking that will enable us to delimit the concept, and give more precise definition and example.

*Tendency-in-Situation.*

If one were to see a chemical in a laboratory and were to say to a chemist. "What will that chemical do?," the chemist would have to name certain conditions in order to answer the question. He would have to say that under such and such conditions the chemical will probably do thus and thus. The important implication of this is that the *conditions under which* the chemical behaves are an integral part of the behavior as well as of the statement of the behavior. For human beings, likewise, the configuration of conditions, or situations, is not only an integral part of the statement of behavior, but of the behavior itself.

To indicate that this is a practical and not an academic point in the understanding of behavior, we may use some homely illustrations. We all know that iron filings have a tendency to move in relation to a magnet. That a person should say that filings have this tendency when no magnet is present would be incredible. One knows that one of the *conditions under which* this tendency appears is the presence of a magnet. What could be the meaning of such a statement as "iron filings have a tendency to move in relation to a magnet regardless of whether a magnet is present"? The statement is not meaningless, for, says Lewin, this was the position of Aristotelian physics, according to which "the vectors which determine an object's movements are completely determined by the object. . . . The tendency of light bodies to go up *resided* in the bodies themselves. . . ." <sup>10</sup>

Modern physics holds a different point of view.

In terms of human behavior, the Aristotelian concept is the equivalent of the now discredited social-instinct theory of man's behavior, a theory which assumed that tendencies exist as entities in people, and which saw everything in the man. The situation was irrelevant. Today this is a popular theory in accounting for

<sup>10</sup> Lewin: *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, pp. 28-9. (*Italics mine*).

the behavior of minority groups, Negroes and "Mexicans" (U.S. citizens) for example. Everything is in the people—the situation and the *conditions under which* they live are assumed to have nothing to do with their *behavior*.

As another illustration, few people would immediately challenge the statement that a ball has a tendency to roll. That this is false may be demonstrated by placing a ball on a flat table and watching it. A ball has a tendency to roll only under certain conditions, the conditions being the position of the ball in relation to an inclined, unobstructed plane. The tendency *in* the filings and *in* the ball are analogous to the "trait" *in* the personality as propounded in conventional thinking.

Let us now consider a common human tendency, the tendency to imitate. No one imitates every one he sees, nor every behavior he sees, and a person who, as we have heard, "always imitates" a certain other person, does not do any such thing. There are certain *conditions under which* he imitates.<sup>11</sup> One of these conditions is that he *know how* to imitate the act in question; another condition is that he receive the stimulus to imitate; and another, that the situation in general be appropriate. Furthermore, he does not imitate everything the other person does, *but only those acts which his own tendencies-in-situation select*, and which all other conditions of the situation permit. A boy may like to spit like a famous baseball player, but he does not and probably will not do so in bed, or when reciting before his class at school, or while passing cakes at his mother's tea. *The situation is the immediate determinant of all behavior*. Chapter after chapter will insist that the function of the science of human behavior is to investigate the *conditions under which* behavior takes place, to standardize these conditions conceptually, to make generalizations on this basis, and to determine the *probability* of a given behavior under these conditions.

At this point we should cite another of the several reasons for not using Mead's "act" as our central unit.

An act is an impulse that maintains the life process by the selection of certain sorts of stimuli it needs. The stimulus is the occasion for the expression of the impulse. Stimuli are the means, tendency is the real thing.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> See J. F. Brown: *Psychology and the Social Order*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company; 1936, pp. 91-3.

<sup>12</sup> G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 6.

While I am in complete agreement with Mead's idea of selection, the statement that "tendency is the real thing" seems to say that tendency is a kind of entity *residing* in the organism, and that the occasion or situation as stimulus merely releases something that already resides in the organism. In the unit *tendency-in-situation*, however, tendency is no more the "real thing" than is situation, for tendency does not exist except in situation. One can discover no tendency in iron filings, balls, or people except in situation. It would be difficult, in any case, to think of occurrences as "existing," and even more difficult to think of occurrences, that is, behavior, as appearing apart from some situation. This will become increasingly important and central as the discussion develops.

### WHAT TENDENCY-IN-SITUATION DOES NOT MEAN

In defining or delimiting a concept, the negative as well as the positive specifications are often helpful. In the present instance negative specifications may be given in three ways. In the first place, the term "tendency" and the ideas associated with it have no kinship whatsoever with "vitalism." When we say that a tendency is *established in behavior*, we can demonstrate only that a given behavior is conditioned to a given situation or type-situation. Concepts such as "vital urge" and "entelechy" are foreign to this work. No such entities are presumed to *exist as structures in the organism*. Tendencies will be said to *occur* rather than *exist*, and they will be said to occur as probabilities *established in the behavior structure*. No provision has been made here to accommodate little men operating inside us to make us act as we do. Except for exhibition purposes there are no known gremlins in this book.

In the second place, tendency is not to be thought of as a *cause* of behavior. Tendency *is* the behavior. In many discussions of human behavior, a habit is spoken of as if it were an entity existing somewhere which might at any time cause some behavior appropriate to the habit. In this book, habit *is* the behavior to which the symbol "habit" refers. The position here taken is that of G. A. Lundberg. In discussing the mechanisms called tropisms, reflexes, habits, folkways, customs, mores, and institutions, he says:

We are not under the delusion that we are describing mysterious entities of some sort *with an independent existence apart from the behavior which constitutes them*. Nor do we use these categories as *causes*

of behavior. We use such categories rather to designate certain types of *uniformities of behavior* under certain conditions. A description of the conditions under which the behavior takes place is still the *sine qua non* of scientific explanation.<sup>13</sup>

In the third place, the word "tendency" does not refer to the type of instinct which a few years ago was employed to account for man's social behavior. This book does not represent an instinct theory.

#### 4. The Tinsit as a Unit Process of Action

We must now engage in an operation which, to many social scientists, is frequently a source of embarrassment, and which is sometimes thought of as foolish or even flippant. I refer to the coming of new terms to represent units and other concepts, a practice which is almost a daily occurrence in the more exact sciences. Both in speech and in writing the term tendency-in-situation is a long and clumsy name for a unit. In my own writing I have observed an increasingly strong tendency to abbreviate the expression with the symbols T-in-Sit. Since, as indicated earlier, units of measure are inventions, arbitrary symbols for standardizing people's responses to certain phenomena, for purposes of economy I abandoned the hyphens in the above symbols, thus shortening the expression to TINSIT, while continuing to include reference to all the important elements.

Tendency-in-situation will hereafter appear in the form of *tinsit*. Grammatically, tinsit is used in the same manner as tendency, as, for example in "John has a tinsit to get angry when teased about girls." *To name a tinsit one must name the situation of which it is a function; one thus avoids the fallacy of conceptually separating the tendency from the situation in which it occurs and of which it is a function. The significance of this will appear in almost every section of the book.*

Every type of act or mechanism earlier referred to as a tendency will hereafter be referred to as a tinsit, whether it be habit, mental act, attitude, disposition, idea, impulse, trait, or any other behavior. Tinsit is defined as a *probable behavior in a given situation*, or a behavior of a given probability under stated conditions.

<sup>13</sup> Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 174. (Italics in first sentence are mine).



The *tinsit* is an inference based on frequency of a given behavior in a given situation, or on frequency of type-response in a type-situation, or on frequency of related responses in type-situations. It thus involves the application of statistical operations to the study of individual, as well as group, behavior.<sup>14</sup>

### THE DANGER OF REIFICATION

Although there is nothing mysterious about the unit *tinsit*, one must be cautioned against the danger of reification in the use of any symbol, especially a noun. A unit must have a name, and a name is a noun. A noun usually refers to something that exists, and this reference tends to occur even when we are dealing with abstractions. Thus one tends to confuse *that which is symbolized* with its *symbol* and comes, through reification, to think of habits, traits, and attitudes (that is, *tinsits*), as things "causing" behavior.

This chapter has the unusual title of "Behavior is Tendency." The reader may ask "Do you not mean, rather, that behavior is the *result* of tendency?" The answer is an emphatic "No." This question is an example of reification, the reification of the concept "tendency," and reveals a distinction between "tendency" as one thing and the behavior resulting therefrom as another thing. But to us, "tendency" is not something that exists and causes the behavior, the tendency *is* the behavior which the term "tendency" symbolizes. There are not two phenomena here, but one. "Tendency" is merely the noun that refers to that probable behavior. If we were to use the verb "tend" instead of the noun "tendency," then we should say "John tends to get angry" instead of "John has a tendency to get angry," and there would be no danger of reification. But as Professor Woodworth says: "We forget that these nouns are merely substitutes for verbs and go on hunting for the things denoted by the nouns, but there are no such things, there are only the activities we started with."<sup>15</sup>

Why, then, do we not use only verbs? Because we are seeking for a unit, and names are nouns. Hence "*tinsit*" is not something

<sup>14</sup> There appears to be significant support for this point of view in F. H. Allport "Teleonomic Description in the Study of Personality," *Character and Personality* (1937), vol. 5, pp. 202-14. See also Wilbur S. Gregory: "The Application of Teleonomic Description to the Diagnosis and Treatment of Emotional Instability and Personal and Social Maladjustment" *Character and Personality* (1945), March-June.

<sup>15</sup> Cited in Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 11.

which exists and from which behavior results; tinsit is the actual probable behavior we are talking about. The behavior is the tendency. The organism is such that under certain conditions, in certain situations, it tends to behave in certain ways. We call these ways "tinsits."

### THE PROPERTIES OF THE TINSIT

The tinsit has many properties, two of which are those of a vector quantity: direction and magnitude. The *direction* of a tinsit specifies that-in-relation-to-which it moves, that-in-relation-to-which the person behaves. Direction thus defines the act, as in "attitude-toward-democracy" and "love-of-beauty." *Magnitude* is a continuous variable which measures the intensity or strength of a tinsit as observed in a given situation. A third property of the tinsit is *stability*, a continuous variable measuring the frequency with which the tinsit appears in a given or type-situation. Stability is not to be confused with magnitude. This caution is prompted by the custom in popular speech of such statements as "John has a strong tendency to argue." What is usually referred to in such a statement is not intensity but the frequency (dependability) with which John may be depended upon to behave in this way. For our purpose, the term "strong" is properly used in saying that John has a strong temper, meaning that when he becomes angry, he tends to be violently so, even though he may not become angry easily nor often.

Since stability is a measure of frequency, it depends upon the frequency, or stability, of the social situation of which the tinsit is a function. One does not have a tinsit to dislike oysters while singing hymns in church. Stability, then, refers to the degree of probability of a tinsit under stated conditions. In the paradigm "John is very likely to show a tinsit of violent anger at the boys when they tease him about girls," "very likely" refers to stability, "violent" refers to magnitude, "at the boys" indicates direction, and "when they tease him about girls" names the situation. The entire statement names and locates the tinsit.

A fourth property of a tinsit is *commonality*. This property, together with the others discussed, is a continuous variable; all are measured on a scale and are always thought of in the frame of "more or less." A fifth property of the tinsit is *form*. Behavior of

any kind and of any thing is always a release of energy, and energy is always released in some form—heat, light, sound, or some other form of motion. The “forms” of a tinsit are not shapes, substances, or entities, but forms of motion and types of behavior. Their primary classification in this book is two-fold, *somatic* (organic) and *personic*.

*Somatic Tinsits* This concept refers to all forms of behavior which pertain specifically to the body or soma, behavior generally referred to as organic or somatic. Such behavior includes all operations of the physiological processes, respiration, circulation, digestion, etc. all movements of the neuro-muscular and skeletal structure. Some readers may at first have difficulty in thinking of such behavior as tinsits rather than general tendencies, because they are not accustomed to relate such operations to situations. This difficulty may be examined by referring to the example of the iron filings. “Do iron filings have a tendency to move in relation to a magnet when not moving in relation to a magnet?” By analogy, it might be asked “Does the heart have a tendency to beat while not beating, the stomach to contract when not contracting?” These types of behavior, like all kinds of behavior, occur only under certain conditions, in certain situations. One of the conveniences of the concept tinsit is its applicability to behavior on all levels and to phenomena of all kinds, to every aspect of the universe. It is useful to, and cuts across, all sciences.

*Personic Tinsits* When one is studying the behavior of human beings, one immediately encounters a form of behavior very different from that of any other aspect of the universe. There is, as it were, *a person in the body*.<sup>10</sup> The most difficult problems arise in the attempt to understand this person, or the configuration of probable behaviors which we herein call the person. To represent this behavior I have chosen the term *personic*. This term will merely be introduced for the present, analysis and explanation of the concept will appear in Chapter II and in most of the following chapters. Indeed, the main objective of the book is an understanding of this extraordinary phenomenon. Personic and somatic behaviors are distinguished from each other by the order of the stimuli to which they respond. Stimuli of the order  $S \leftrightarrow R$  will be said to acti-

<sup>10</sup> As an indication of the commonality of this thought, several years after this was written a book appeared with the title *The Person in the Body, an Introduction to Psychosomatic Medicine*, by Leland E. Hinsie, M.D. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1945.

vate somatic behavior, while we shall say that personic behavior is activated by stimuli of the order  $S \leftrightarrow M \leftrightarrow R$ . Stimuli of the order  $S \leftrightarrow R$  will, for us, represent bio-physical or physico-chemical occurrences; stimuli of the order  $S \leftrightarrow M \leftrightarrow R$  will represent symbolic phenomena<sup>17</sup>

## 5. Tinsits Emerge in Interaction

### A CONCEPT OF THE STRUCTURE OF INTERACTION

The heading of section 5 contains three technical terms. The first, *tinsit*, has already been introduced; the second, referring to the process of *emergence* is, like *tinsit*, a structural part of the third, *interaction*. Interaction is a key word in contemporary social psychology, but despite its ubiquitous usage it has escaped the discipline of precise specification. For purposes of this book, therefore, the concept *interaction* is presented as involving four subsidiary processes: emergence, selective response, role-taking, and inter-personal integration.

#### 1) *The Concept of Emergence*.<sup>18</sup>

The term *emergence* will gain in significance as we proceed, for it is central to the point of view here presented. One section cannot state its implications, but the concept must be introduced at this point.


*Emergence and Process.* Much of the study of human behavior, as distinguished from the kinds of behavior studied in the more exact sciences, has been handicapped by the traditional use of more or less static concepts. Dynamic concepts are more helpful whenever we wish to study any kind of movement or change. Certainly human behavior is of this nature. Men can see or perceive only what their concepts enable them to see and perceive. Only dynamic concepts will enable us to develop the "feel" of the nature of behavior.

<sup>17</sup> Personic and organic do not constitute a dichotomy in the sense of paired opposites; they constitute different levels of behavior.


<sup>18</sup> This work deprecates the complex paraphernalia involved in the meta-physical labyrinths of emergent evolution. A glimpse of this extraordinary form of behavior may be had in William McDougall: *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*. New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1929, pp. 195-223. The present work takes the neonate as given, and begins there.

Fortunately for us, the concept of process is ready at hand. Let us think of the universe as one continuous process which, for our immediate purpose, is to be thought of as having no beginning and no ending. To enable us to visualize this abstraction, we may think of the first heavy black line in Figure I as representing this timeless, ongoing, continuously becoming, endlessly dynamic, changing sequence of complex configurations of occurrences which we call the universe. Without beginning or end it goes on forever. If we want to think of a beginning or an end, we are compelled to go to some conceptual system other than science, some system like theology or metaphysics, the limited conceptual system called science cannot, at least thus far, handle such problems.<sup>19</sup>


**Universal Process**




**Social Process**




**Group Process**



**Situational Process**



**Individual Life Process (John Doe)**



**Unit Behavioral Process (Tinsit)**




Fig I A Gradation of Processes

If we were to trace the causes of things we should be compelled to go back along the process, back and back, and we could probably never find the ultimate cause or causes. All we can see is what is in front of us, although we do have some knowledge of what has occurred previously, and some vague ideas (or hopes) about what is yet to occur. Men may sleep at night, millions of men may die; civilizations may emerge and disappear, species of animals may emerge and become extinct; the earth and the planets may emerge and often change their shape, on the surface at least, and the stars may emerge and disappear—but the process never stops.

Let us now imagine ourselves holding a huge magnifying

<sup>19</sup> Science is a conceptual system (a system of concepts), and like other conceptual systems (theological, political, juridical, and aesthetic) it is highly restricted and limited in what it can do. Other conceptual systems may legitimately conceptualize a beginning and an end to the universe, or anything else, if to do so serves the purpose of, and is consistent with, that system. The value of any system is measured by its adequacy for a purpose.

glass over the first bar in Figure I, seeing a series of somewhat smaller lines representing smaller processes within this larger process—lines representing various physical processes, and one like the second bar in Figure I, representing the continuously emerging *social process*. Presumably this represents an enormously complex configuration of endlessly becoming or emerging configurations of configurations of configurations of all the successive behaviors of human beings (just to keep it simple) and all their cultures and societies emerging, interacting, and disappearing with countless others following in the same eternal social process. We know nothing of its beginning and (for science) nothing of its end. Presumably it began in the beginning and will end in the end.

Each of the countless billions of human beings born into this world emerged somewhere along this black line, merged well or badly, and in due course was projected centrifugally at a tangent (let us say upward), as other countless millions emerged to go through, and along with, and as part of, this eternally moving continuity. Let us now put the second bar of Figure I under the magnifying glass and examine another complex of lines each representing one of man's thousands of groups. All of these lines represent processes too, for every group is an integral part of the social process: cultures, nations, races, regions, states, cities, social classes, sex groups, age groups, occupational groups, neighborhoods, congeniality groups, families, religions, and the countless other groups of man, past and present, coming and going, on and on and on.

If we now in turn put the third bar in Figure I under the glass we shall see that every one of these groups, emerging, changing, becoming, passing, represents a vast configuration of configurations of an endless sequence of emerging social situations of every conceivable variety. These countless situations are group properties, or properties of permutations of groups, integrated configurations of interacting human behaviors, significant and trivial, long and short, good and bad, strewn with hope and sorrow, love and hate, fear and grief, and joy and despair. Not for a moment does any human being free himself of these situations; never does he manage to flee from a life situation. The best he can do is move from one situation into another, day and night, year after year until he dies.

Narrowing our search for something we can handle adequately, we put the fourth bar under the glass and again see a vast

configuration of lines each representing an individual life process called John and Joe and Mary and Jane. Each is a continuous configuration of action. Not for a moment does any individual stop acting from birth to death. To live is to behave, and a man's entire life process is one complete, continuous act or action process. The fifth bar under the glass shows another vast configuration of action processes called tinsits, becoming, appearing, emerging, and changing from birth to death.

The above examination bears close resemblance to reality, and it gives one a sense or feel of the dynamics of process and emergence. In the examination we can see the nature of configuration, of relatedness, of integration, of interaction, and of the historicity of every act. Every act and every person in every situation in every group in the entire social process finds significance in relation to the whole universal process. Time is a dynamic *gestalt* and everything emerges in and from it.

*Behavior as Emergent.* A behavior as an emergent means that it must necessarily, as a resultant integration, come out of other related behaviors already established in one's behavior structure. A behavior appears or occurs in action, as action, because life is a continuous process, and because of the relatively stable configurations of symbols which direct and control the process of living in a given society. Every act emerges as part of a configuration which has itself emerged out of previous configurations of acts. Every act emerges from similar previous acts in similar situations. Every act is a special case of a tinsit.

Behavior as an emergent is illustrated by contemporary concepts of invention which regard inventions as degrees of improvement in devices or techniques already known, and not as completely new or "unique" events. While every act is to some degree a new phenomenon, no act is completely new; it is, as it were, made of old parts more or less. An act is new only in the sense that it is an emergent, but we therefore know something about it before it occurs. It has a degree of probability in appropriate situations and can be predicted in these terms. "Emergence," says Mead, "involves a reorganization, but the reorganization brings in something that was not there before."<sup>20</sup> This something new, a continuous variable, is of the greatest significance in personality study, for it represents change, the fundamental principle of all dynamic systems.

<sup>20</sup> G. H. Mead. *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 193.

A second, and very closely related, idea involved in the concept of emergence is the idea of wholeness, configuration, or *gestalt*—the idea that every act is supersummative. Whatever occurs does so as part of a configuration of relationships, as part of a synthesis no part of which is exactly the same as the synthetic whole. This is usually stated in the form “a whole is more than the sum of its parts.”

*Examples of Emergence* The most hackneyed example of emergence is the emergence of water from the configurational relationship of  $H_2$  and O. Water is neither one of these components, yet when they are properly combined, water emerges. Another example on the physical level is the following

Suppose I am making a stroke in a quick game, such as tennis or cricket. How I make the stroke depends on the relating of certain new experiences, most of them visual, to other immediately preceding visual experiences and to my posture, or balance of postures, at the moment. The latter, the balance of postures, is a result of a whole series of earlier movements, in which the last movement before the stroke is played has a predominant function. When I make the stroke, I do not, as a matter of fact, produce something absolutely new, and I never merely repeat something old. The stroke is literally manufactured [emerges] out of the living visual and postural “schemata” of the moment and their interrelations.<sup>21</sup>

Two examples of emergence on the symbolic level may be taken from the work of Professor Blumer cited earlier.<sup>22</sup> Blumer gives a critical appraisal of the sociological study *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* in which the authors claimed that the human document (letters, diaries, etc.) is the nearly perfect instrument for studying attitudes. With this in mind, the authors advertised for, and collected, hundreds of personal letters written by Polish people in Europe and America to and from friends and families. These letters make the reader feel that he is living with these Polish people. The authors of the book present the letters together with a series of theoretical analyses to explain the nature of attitudes. Blumer tries to show that the theory developed in the study did not emerge from reading the letters, but existed as tendencies of the authors of the book before they had read the letters;

<sup>21</sup> F. C. Bartlett. *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology*. Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1932, pp. 201-2.

<sup>22</sup> Blumer. *An Appraisal*, p. 39.



that is, the theory was not derived inductively from the human documents Blumer comments as follows.

Generally, with respect to the authors' use of letters as human documents, it may be said that the letters considered by themselves are not very meaningful, it is also clear that the theoretical analyses, if left to stand by themselves, would be formal, abstract and rather dogmatic. The merging of the two does yield [as emergents] a concreteness and appreciative understanding that cannot be stated either as a mere illustration of the theory, nor as an inductive grounding of the theory.<sup>23</sup>

From the merging of two types of phenomena, a group of letters and a group of theoretical analyses of peasant life, come the properties or characteristics "concreteness and appreciative understanding." Blumer's point is that these emergent properties are not present in the separate parts from whose merging the properties "e-emerged." These emergents are, of course, forms of human behavior, and this is the important point. "Concreteness and appreciative understanding" are not "qualities" inherent in the letters and analyses, they represent relatively new ways of responding to these "parts," relatively new ways of acting under new conditions and relationships. After reading both the letters and the analyses one can make responses one could not make before. There is no way of summing up two sets of phenomena like these in the sense that we sum up a column of figures. The expression "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" has a highly technical meaning which tends to be destroyed when handed down and repeated.

In connection with Blumer's work, another case of emergence appears. A few pages earlier than the remarks cited previously, Blumer says that the letters referred to as human documents do not individually answer or meet the "rigid application of scientific canons" but that "while the letters *taken separately* fall down before the application" of these canons, "taken collectively they fare much better." The properties (capacities for calling out human tinsits) which these letters possess in configuration are, then, emergent properties not evident in the letters (parts) taken separately.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Blumer: *An Appraisal*, p. 39

<sup>24</sup> If these two illustrations of emergence appear to the reader to be too academic, he may be assured that there are many others in the following sections and chapters.

Every act, as an emergent, is effectively related to the configuration of which it is a part and to the configuration from which it has emerged. The tinsit, then, does not exist, it emerges in, and as, action. It is a phenomenon of behavior, not of psychology; it is not an entity and has no "existence" except in action, if one may speak of action as existing, and it is a configurational, not an isolated, phenomenon. Any act or tinsit emerges in appropriate situations as a part of the ongoing, continuous life process, situations themselves emerge in and as a part of the ongoing, continuous, social process; the social process in turn emerges in and as a part of the continuous process known as the universe.

We may say, then, that tinsits emerge by virtue of three primary considerations: the history of the individual life process of which they are a part, the history of the social process of which they are a part, and the nature of the configuration of relations, or situations, of which the person is a part and in which the integration occurs.

## 2) *The Concept of Selective Response.*

The second process in our concept of interaction is that of selective response. By the time our discussion reaches Chapter VI it will be necessary to examine the highly significant fact that the venerable cause-and-effect ideology is becoming inadequate for many phases of human behavior study. One of the important reasons for the passing of cause-and-effect thinking is the discovery of selective response. Cause-and-effect terminology has been imbedded in the language of the West for many years, and people have applied this mode of thought in attempting to account for human behavior. The general practice of educated and uneducated alike has been to think of the "effect" as something occurring in, or to, a purely passive object acted upon by the "cause." If a person had done something, particularly something unpopular, one sought the "cause" on the assumption that the person was a purely passive instrument responding mechanically to something called the "cause."<sup>25</sup> Whether justly or not, this type of thinking was imputed to the radical behaviorists.

In the concept of interaction, however, we propound the idea that behavior—all behavior, human or otherwise—is *selective*. This means that the "effect" is due to the action of the thing affected as

<sup>25</sup> This way of thinking led to great confusion and consternation when students realized that it was in direct conflict with free will.

well as to the action of the "cause." Something takes place in the person (or thing) affected, and this "something" becomes a selective factor in causation. When a person is stimulated to action, when his tinsits are activated, what occurs in him before he acts (overtly or otherwise) is as much a part of the cause of that action as is the so-called "stimulus." As is evident from the formulation  $S \leftrightarrow M \leftrightarrow R$ , both stimulus and response are part of the person, two phases of the same action. "Interaction," says Lundberg, "is a word employed to denote a reciprocal or interdependent behavior between or among any number of components in a situation."<sup>26</sup> Interaction refers to our daily give and take. An expression common in our society is "we can take it, and we can dish it out." In many respects life is a matter of "taking it and dishing it out." Our job in trying to understand human behavior is to determine what is given and what taken, by whom, under what conditions, with what results, and to whom, for this is interaction.

*The important point here is that "taking it" and "dishing it out" are dynamic processes of interaction, both the person who gives and the person who takes undergoes change in the process, and each behaves selectively.* Life is a continuous process of "taking it and dishing it out," when we discover what "it" is, what we are "taking and dishing out," to and from whom, under what conditions, with what results, and to whom, then the perennial question "why" in human behavior may be answered and we may understand interaction. Then we shall know that we *are* what we *do*.

"Behavior," says Preston, "is doing something about something."<sup>27</sup> Everyone who has lived much knows that when we do something about something we do something to ourselves and to each other. The "something" is not the same for all people, because each responds selectively to the universe about him.

### 3) *The Concept of Role-Taking.*

Interaction is based on *role-taking* which is here assumed to be an exclusively human phenomenon, at least on a language level. "Taking the role of the other" is a concept made prominent by George H. Mead, and, while the term will be discussed later in detail, we may say at this point that it refers to our use of the tinsits of others in our own behavior toward them, that is, in interaction.

<sup>26</sup> Lundberg. *Foundation of Sociology*, pp. 218 ff.

<sup>27</sup> See the delightful little book by George H. Preston. *Psychiatry for the Curious*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940.

we assume the relevant tinsit of the other person, rehearse it within ourselves, and then respond to our own rehearsal.

*Listening is Behaving.* If we hear another person talking, we understand him by saying over to ourselves what he is saying while he is saying it. Usually people do this quickly and easily and call it "listening." Listening is "doing something." Frequently a person will interrupt a conversation or lecture to have a point cleared up, which means that he was not able to repeat to himself what he heard and respond to it satisfactorily in the time allotted. Bartlett, in his research on memory, observed that when his subjects were shown certain figures or designs to be redrawn from memory, the subjects immediately gave the object some name or verbal description which later served them as an anchor for perception and recall.<sup>28</sup> This process of giving an abstract drawing a name as a frame of reference is apparently the same kind of phenomenon as the process here described as "listening."<sup>29</sup> An event to become an "experience," at least at the conscious level, must be verbalized. Knowledge has been called "verbalized experience." Listening is a complicated and subtle form of behavior, but a person can learn little from the speech of another without, at the time, saying the same thing over to himself. One of the chief sources of error in learning is that a person sometimes hears or sees a message but says it over to himself differently.

Few people are aware that they repeat to themselves what they hear and read and see while they are hearing, reading, and seeing it. Some people, however, actually move their lips while reading. This is an exceedingly significant and clever phase of interaction, and is one of the means by which people change and mold each other. It is one of the chief ways, if not the *chief* way, in which we become products of each other and of our groups. This is symbolic interaction on a high level.

We develop emotional attachments to, and detachments from, each other by using each other's tinsits and responding to them as our own. In this way people develop common tinsits, or as we should prefer to say, from this process common tinsits such as folkways, customs, and traditions emerge. As we learn to think and

<sup>28</sup> Bartlett: *Remembering*, pp. 18-20, 43-4, *et passim*.

<sup>29</sup> Bartlett calls this "naming" process "effort after meaning" (pp. 20, 44, 315) and says that ". . . it is fitting to speak of every human cognitive reaction—perceiving, imaging, remembering, thinking and reasoning—as an *effort after meaning*" (p. 44).

act as others do, they become part of us and we of them. Perhaps the most accurate performance of this type of interaction is that between lovers, and they, by common admission, become one. One person frequently says of another, "he brings out the best in me," indicating fairly clearly that in social interaction what people do to us is not as important as what they induce us to do to ourselves.

Only in the physical sense do people do things to us. What we resent in others is what they stimulate us to do to ourselves. What we love in others is of the same order. The phenomenon of human interdependence probably emerges from this phase of the interactional process making it unnecessary to postulate an "instinct of gregariousness." This process probably accounts for the Freudian concept of ambivalence, for the interactional situation is an integration of differential preferences and of differential (selective) patterns of attraction and repulsion. Fundamentally, role-taking means verbally anticipating the expectations of others and adjusting one's own behavior selectively as a result.

#### 4) *The Concept of Interpersonal Integration.*<sup>30</sup>

Social interaction in the present context is not merely a series of reactions among a group of people nor an aggregation or sum of the behaviors of various people, interaction involves the *integration* of the behavior of different persons in specific situations. An interpersonal, as well as an intrapersonal, four-fold process of interaction consummates an integration of interrelated behaviors of different persons in a situation and constitutes the structure of interaction. Meetings, conversations, interviews, discussions, and all other social situations are *integrations* of all the relevant attraction-repulsion insights of all the participants ("integrants") in the configurational context called the situation. The interactional situation is the crucible in which differential preference patterns and differential attraction-repulsion patterns emerge and become the mechanisms for the assignment of situational roles and other social expectancies. These statements are generally in agreement with George H. Mead's "social act".

I wish . . . to restrict the social act to the class of acts which involves the cooperation of more than one individual, and whose object as de-

<sup>30</sup> For the enlightening term "interpersonal integration" we are indebted to Harry Stack Sullivan. See his "Some Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry," *Psychiatry* (1940), vol. 3, pp. 1-117, especially p. 46. In the present work integration, like all other concepts, is assumed to be, and is treated as, a continuous variable; it is a matter of degree and subject to measurement.

finied by the act, in the sense of Bergson, is a social object. I mean by a social act one that answers to all the parts of the complex act, though these parts are found in the conduct of different individuals. The objective of the acts are then found in the life process of the group, not in those of the separate individuals alone.<sup>31</sup>

Since all *human* acts involve the behavior of other people whether others are present or not, the significance of a person's act emerges from a social context. When others are present we find necessarily, in greater or lesser degree, an immediate interpersonal integration of behaviors resulting in Mead's and Sullivan's concept of the social act. Any such act is a functional part of the social process. Perhaps Mead's idea of what Sullivan calls "interpersonal integration" is best illustrated by Mead's well-known concept of "the game," in this case, baseball:

If we contrast play with the situation in an organized game, we note the essential difference that the child who plays in a game must be ready to take the attitude of everyone else involved in that game, and these different roles must have a definite relationship to each other. . . . If he gets in a ball nine he must have the responses of each position involved in his own position. He must know what everyone else is going to do in order to carry out his own play. He has to take all these roles. These responses must be, in some degree, present [probable] in his own makeup. In the game, then, there is a set of responses of such others so organized that the attitude of one calls out the appropriate attitudes of the other.<sup>32</sup>

From our point of view all social situations are more or less like the game. The persons involved are not merely an aggregate, but an integration, because of the processes of emergence, selective response, and role-taking. What any one person does in a given situation is to a large degree contingent upon what the others do and upon what all of them are expected to do.

The preceding description of a four-fold process is a prelimi-

<sup>31</sup> G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 7, note 7. L. S. Cottrell, Jr., refers to the social situation as a "... reciprocally related system of social selves. A social situation is always constituted in such a way that the behavior of any part of it can be understood only by taking into account that part's relation to the rest of the system. . . . The conception of the incorporation of the acts of the other as well as of the self—the importation of the social act—is of central importance. This process is perhaps basic to all social integration." See L. S. Cottrell, Jr.: "The Case Study Method in Prediction," *Sociometry* (1941), vol. 4, pp. 358-70. Quotations from pp. 359 and 364.

<sup>32</sup> G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 151.

nary statement of the concept of interaction as used in this book. Whenever the term interaction is here used with reference to human behavior, the term symbolizes a concept involving this four-fold process of *emergence*, *selective response*, *role-taking*, and *interpersonal integration*. The first two are here assumed to be characteristic of all phenomena in the universe, the last two, of human behavior only. On this basis human nature will later be defined as symbolic nature.

## 6. Probability and the Situation, or Prediction vs. Prophecy

In section 4, *tinsit* was specified as a probable behavior in a given type-situation. *Tinsits* are not things or entities, but inferences of relatively stable dispositions of some ascertainable frequency, and therefore of some degree of probability under stated conditions. *Tinsits* represent potential energy which under appropriate conditions may become kinetic. Potential energy always represents behavior of some degree of probability under stated conditions. The above inference is no more "begging the question" than is the inference of gravity. We might speculate about what gravity, or any other referent, "really is," but the study of human behavior, or any other behavior, need not wait upon the resolution of that metaphysical problem.

Defining *tinsit* as "a probable behavior under stated conditions" implies that the probability of its being aroused is contingent upon the occurrence of the appropriate conditions,<sup>33</sup> that is, contingent upon the occurrence of the type of situation of which the *tinsit* is a function. Human *tinsits* are seldom if ever functions of, or activated by, only one specific situation. In the course of interaction they may become more or less integrated and generalized to a plurality of situations, even to a plurality of types of situation.

If we know certain of John's tendencies-in-situation, we can say with some degree of assurance that John will tend to exhibit behavior B in situations of type X, but we cannot, merely by knowing John, say with any assurance that John will exhibit behavior B. That would be prophecy. A science of behavior is concerned with prediction, not prophecy. A knowledge of some situation, or *con-*

<sup>33</sup> If we were able to know the conditions perfectly we would not need to think in terms of probability.

*ditions under which*, is the only possible basis for prediction in any of the sciences. By knowing, through study, what John will probably do in situation of type X, we can control John's behavior by controlling the situation. Even the uneducated person does this daily, even hourly. If we were to call John a liar, *under certain conditions*, the probability is about 90% that he would strike us, so we are careful not to call him a liar under these conditions. We thus predict or anticipate his behavior and, by controlling the situation, control (in this case, prevent) John's behavior.

When Dottie is planning a tea to honor her friend Mary she scans the list of potential guests and hesitates about including Louise because Louise has certain known traits that make it probable that she will not be agreeable to this group in this kind of situation, and inviting Louise might cause trouble. Dottie probably does not, in this situation, go through some abstruse logical operation to solve her problem. The solution is simplicity itself: Louise will be invited to Dottie's next party, and no trouble will arise at this one. By this reasoning, Dottie invites Sarah instead of Louise.

These simple examples represent the principles of all exact sciences. The difference between daily behavior and scientific behavior proper lies not in the principles involved but in the rigidity with which the significant conditions are controlled and the accuracy with which both conditions and results are measured and communicated to others. Science is highly formalized common sense.

Professor Gordon W. Allport has given a friendly nod to folk wisdom encased in the proverbs of all ages—knowledge which might well be taken as working hypotheses for significant investigations. Allport says, however:

These empirical generalizations affirm tendencies, *not facts*. It is, for example, said that bodily strength tends to make men courageous; not that it always makes them so, it will do so only if no counter-influence intervenes.<sup>34</sup>

That is, it depends on the conditions or the situation.

Allport's statement raises the question of *facts*, and of what constitutes a fact. As stated in the introduction, this book follows the definition given by L. J. Henderson that a fact is *a statement*

<sup>34</sup> G. W. Allport: *Personality, A Psychological Interpretation*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1937, p. 86. (*Italics mine*).



about phenomena empirically verifiable in terms of some conceptual scheme.<sup>35</sup> Since, as Allport indicates, the proverb names neither the conditions under which the statement is true, nor a conceptual system in terms of which it can be verified, the proverb "affirms tendencies, not facts"

Had the proverb used the conceptual scheme which includes the concept *tinsit*, the proverb would then have stated the conditions under which the behavior might be expected with some degree of probability. For *tinsit*, defined as a-probable-behavior-in-a-given-situation, is a statement about phenomena empirically verifiable in terms of probability. *The probability of a behavior does not have to be 1.0 or unity before a tinsit becomes a fact*. The probability of a behavior of any phenomenon does not have to reach certainty before it becomes a fact, if such were necessary, there would be little or no science of any kind. Tinsits are the facts of all sciences, tendencies are not

When a *tinsit* is regarded as a behavior process definitely functional to a situation or type-situation, change in the situation may change, of conceptual necessity, the direction of a person's behavior or call out some other *tinsit*. Scientific laws (meticulous working-hypotheses) state the *conditions under which* the behavior involved may be expected, and the degree of probability under these conditions. A scientific law is a *statement about phenomena*, and the enumeration of the conditions under which the behavior occurs is an integral part of the law. Any significant change in the situation may be expected to arouse other *tinsits*; this is verifiable common sense as revealed in our daily adjustment to one another.

For example, we may say that the general (usual) tendencies of people toward criminals in America are aggressive and contemptuous under general or usual conditions, but not in the presence of a person threatening with a gun. The latter represents a change in the general *conditions under which* most of us live most of the time, and the changed conditions arouse an appropriate tendency. We miss the point to say, as people usually do: "Oh, well, in such a situation I would just be expedient and would not tend to behave aggressively toward him—that's common sense—but that would not be my real attitude toward criminals"

<sup>35</sup> L. J. Henderson "An Approximate Definition of Fact." *University of California Studies in Philosophy*, 1932, cited by T. Parsons *The Structure of Social Action*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937, p. 41.

On the contrary, this person by his own words has stated that this is his attitude toward criminals in that *kind of situation*. General attitude means the attitude one generally, in most situations, takes toward criminals because one's general situation is one in which no criminal is present with a gun. What is revealed by this example is that a person has more than one attitude toward criminals, but he carelessly speaks of his general or usual attitude as if it were the only one. He is unknowing when he says he would "just be expedient." Every attitude which is appropriate to the situation is expedient. The general attitude is also expedient in general (usual) situations.

Let us use this example to clarify what we mean by "prediction vs prophecy." We are all familiar with the phenomenon of prophecy in the Old Testament. The Bible tells us that to prophesy is to foretell a future event regardless of any situation and, with the child-like honesty of that great book, we are told also that the way to discover a successful prophet is to wait and see whether the event prophesied eventually occurs—an infallible test. Now this is very far indeed from what is meant by scientific prediction. For example, if we should say, referring to our previous example: "On next Thursday afternoon John will temporarily abandon his general attitude toward criminals and adopt a more expedient one," that would be prophecy, and we could wait and see. If, however, we should say, "If John should, under appropriate conditions, be threatened by a man with a gun, the probability is about 90% that John will not express his *general* attitude toward criminals but will indicate one better fitting that situation"—that is scientific prediction, subject to test and verification. It is a statement of probability based on a knowledge of John's past behaviors in comparable situations.

What is frequently taken for a changed tendency is really evidence of a new situation and a different tint. A significant experience may or may not change one's general attitude toward criminals, but no tendency can be changed without a change in the situation. Lest the reader think that this is laboring a point unnecessarily a remarkable statement may be cited from a scholarly work by a prominent writer:

As in any science, *prediction* is one of the goals of the psychology of personality. It is axiomatic that prediction can proceed only by virtue of prior *generalization*. But what *kind* of generalization? All the gen-

eral laws of human behavior taken together cannot possibly tell the psychologist what his best friend will do come Christmas. Such prediction is possible only from knowledge of the individual alone.<sup>36</sup>

We may contrast this extraordinary statement with that of another prominent scholar:

If all the laws of psychology were known, one could make a prediction about the behavior of a man only if in addition to the laws the special nature of the particular situation were known.<sup>37</sup>

Now the book in which these two quotations appear is highly critical of those who insist on the importance of the situation in the study of any phenomena. But to tell "what one's best friend will do come Christmas" would not be prediction, it would be prophecy, and all the "knowledge of the individual alone" will in no way change it into prediction. No *conditions under which* the behavior could be predicted are named in the statement; no situation is given except "Christmas," which is not one but a thousand situations.

"With reference to problems of prediction, it can be safely asserted that predictions are always made with reference to some type of context, though many such references are ambiguous and implicit. It is our contention that the more explicitly the prediction is referred to a specified context the more accurate the prediction is likely to be."<sup>38</sup>

If an airport stores thousands of drums of helium gas alongside a deflated balloon, all the world's physicists armed with all the knowledge and laws of gases, motion, and balloons will never be able to say that this gas, or any gas, will lift this balloon or any balloon "come Christmas." This can be predicted only on the basis of some specific situation, some conditions, such as that the gas be put into the balloon and the balloon be free to rise. All the geologists on earth, armed with all the knowledge and laws of geology,

<sup>36</sup> The name of the book in which this statement appears and the name of its author are withheld for reasons to be given in Chapter XII. Briefly stated it is this: whenever making a strong negative criticism of an idea or of a way of thinking, I wish to emphasize that I am criticizing the idea, not the author nor his book. This practice is in accord with the principles of behavior presented in this book.

<sup>37</sup> K. Lewin: *Principles of Topological Psychology*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company; 1936. Quoted from the book mentioned in the previous footnote. This quotation appears 21 pages earlier than the previous quotation.

<sup>38</sup> L. S. Cottrell, Jr.: "The Case Study Method," p. 362.

will never be able to predict that copper deposits will be found in Montana "come Christmas" unless they first visit the state and study the earth's structure and the prevailing conditions and then relate those conditions to the *conditions under which* copper deposits may be expected in some degree of probability

All of one's knowledge of "the individual alone" would add nothing to one's ability to "predict" what the individual will do "come Christmas" except in relation to some rigorously stipulated conditions, some situation in that enormously complex configuration of situations called Christmas. The point of view in this book rigorously directs one's thinking toward the necessity of investigating the conditions under which the behavior occurs as a method of understanding behavior, whether it be the behavior of electrons, crystals, dogs, or men.

## INTERLUDE ONE

### *The Situational Approach and Contemporary Mass Frustration*

This book offers the reader from time to time an opportunity to apply some of the principles analyzed in the text, an "interlude" to help allay fatigue and to help both the reader and author keep our feet on the ground

Many people are greatly disturbed about man's future in the atomic age, and many thinking people are disturbed because the more exact sciences have hopelessly outstripped the science of human behavior. What, they ask, must we do to be saved? If I may presume to give an answer, it is this: man must learn to think situationally about human behavior. The following may serve as a non-academic and thoroughly practical example. My only caution is that the reader keep his eye on the *method* in what follows, that he avoid the luxury of attempting to figure out whether I am a conservative or a radical.

As a practical example of the importance of giving *the situation* a central place in the structure of one's thinking about national and world affairs—that is, human behavior—and of thinking in terms of *insits* rather than some vitalistic "tendencies" I cite some typical American behavior.

At several periods during the most horrible war in history our American society was torn and battered by problems of production. The nation experienced strikes, work stoppages, absenteeism on an appalling scale, shortage of housing and recreation, enormous accident rates, and rising tides of juvenile delinquency. Everyone seemed frustrated, and the air was full of abuse and displaced hostilities. The press, appropriately serving a population bred on free will concepts of behavior, was determined to find some segment of the population to blame, and raking one segment after another over the coals, finally put the blame on something stereotyped "labor."

Government agencies and industrial firms made studies of worker absenteeism and invariably found that the majority of workers had very good and logical reasons for frequently staying

away from work. War industries had sprung up in out-of-the-way places, frequently in small towns, and millions of workers were uprooted from their homes to take jobs in these new plants. Great masses of population were moved almost overnight into incredibly crowded places which lacked housing, transportation, schools, hospitals, and many facilities the workers had been accustomed to. The absenteeism was almost always due to the frustrations, confusions, and general chaos of emergency conditions.

Labor unions, encouraged by government, were growing rapidly and were increasingly staffed by green, inexperienced leaders attempting to control inexperienced, undisciplined new members who had high wages but few of the ordinary conveniences of modern living. Millions of these workers were far from home and friends, in strange places among strangers, crowded into shacks and rooming houses where food was frequently unattractive, in mushroom communities without any means of recreation or education or worship—not even a place to spend the high wages they were earning.

Even under the best of conditions, war involves so many sudden changes, dislocations, deprivations, inconveniences, fears, and frustrations that our whole population was jumpy and crotchety. Under such conditions people trained from childhood to seek unitary, single causes for social happenings were quick to follow the press in naming “labor” as the scapegoat for all their ills. They argued that if the boys on Guadalcanal could be brought home, while the factory workers at home were sent to the jungles, we should accomplish full production and our fears and frustrations would vanish. The “boys over there,” they pointed out, did not enjoy an eight-hour day, nor did they receive high wages with time-and-a-half for overtime.

Now what was the structure of reasoning here? Highly characteristic of popular dichotomous thinking was the assumption that we have two kinds of people in our beloved country: one kind is loyal, patient, devoted, sacrificing, and selfless; the other kind, selfish, greedy, pampered, lazy, and disloyal. Presumably Selective Service managed to get all of the first kind into the armed forces, and all of the other kind somehow went into industrial production. Obviously, so the reasoning went, if we could bring the first group home, they could and would produce relentlessly and with joy and singing. What was to be done with the second group? This reasoning was enunciated by public speakers: factory workers were to be

sent to the battlefields where they would fight because they would have to fight, a condition, presumably, that did not apply to the first group

This type of thinking pays no attention whatever to the *situations* in which these two groups were behaving—the *conditions under which* they fought, lived, and worked. But the conditions, particularly the social psychological conditions—the situations—of these two groups hardly resembled each other. The men in the armed services lived, worked, and fought under a powerful regime of military discipline and training supported by age-old traditions of patriotic mass endurance of hardship and danger under strict and trained professional leadership supported by institutionalized social compulsions. The workers in the emergency war plants had no such emotional support in social compulsions, leadership, discipline, and traditions; and as they had always been, their tasks were without glamor, excitement, or a spirit of dedication. Receiving relatively high wages, they were accorded no such social recognition as the armed services enjoyed. They had not only their usual frustrations, but more of them on a higher level of intensity.

That the public and press completely ignored these differences is evident from the fact that the workers at home were blamed as men; the *conditions under which* they worked were assumed to be of no significance—the whole problem was assumed to be in the men themselves, a typically Aristotelian way of thinking. Presumably if there was any situation, there was only one—war, and war was assumed to be war whether one was at the front or in an emergency industrial plant. But even an amateur social psychologist knows that the situations of these two groups hardly resembled each other in any respect.

Since the end of the war every college has been overflowing with hundreds of thousands of ex-G.I.'s. Invariably they tell how their attitudes changed to conform with those of the group and situation in which they happened to find themselves. Attitudes, like all other traits, are functions of situations and vary with situations.

What is responsible for the popular type of thinking here condemned?<sup>1</sup> Those who most decry the failure of the social sciences are frequently most adamant in their refusal—their *inability*—to think situationally about matters close to their own predilections. This is probably due to defective education, which in turn

<sup>1</sup> Notice that it is the type of *thinking*, not the *people*, here condemned

is due to defective social psychology at the centers of learning. If social psychology is to follow the outmoded Aristotelian line that everything is in the man, that the situations in which he behaves are irrelevant, then nothing is left but the medieval concept of free will, unitary causes, blame, scapegoats, brickbats, and continued social frustration.

This wartime experience is in no sense an isolated phenomenon. The whole structure of western thinking is saturated with this inadequate type of reasoning.<sup>2</sup> Even in normal times our population is broken into large numbers of segments each of which at times throws at the other segments every conceivable form of invective: capitalists and employers are called economic royalists, greedy and selfish exploiters, and corrupters of the body politic; workers are called "reds," "radicals," "socialists," "lazy feather-bedders," and "irresponsibles"; New Dealers are called "reds," "bureaucrats," "tax-eaters," and "crackpots"; while other groups are called "niggers," "sharecroppers," "dagoes," "wops," "kikes," "hunkies," and "okies" and are constantly blamed for one social event or another.

All this has a degree of youthful exhilaration, but we pay dearly for it in social inefficiency and frustration, and probably also in the appalling incidence of what are called the degenerative diseases—heart failure, ulcers, coronary thrombosis, nervous breakdowns, neuroses, and psychoses.

What is so exasperating in all this to the student of behavior is that despite the exorbitant price paid in social inefficiency, ill health, conflict, and violent emotion, the causes or conditions which give rise to the disorganization are in no way changed or improved; by ignoring them, nothing constructive is accomplished.

We had no physical science of worth until Galileo refused to seek the causes of the *behavior* of physical phenomena in the *phenomena alone* and sought the causes in the *conditions under which* the phenomena occur. Then he studied the phenomena under those conditions, and physics developed. Physics had to drop Aristotle as excess baggage, and our belief is that there will be no social science of worth until we do likewise. In a society which seeks to solve its problems by stoning scapegoats, everyone will eventually be a scapegoat for someone else, and nothing will be solved.

<sup>2</sup> The first chapter of Lewin: *A Dynamic Theory of Personality* gives an excellent concise analysis of the difference between Aristotelian thinking (the kind here criticized) and Galilean (the kind here proposed).



## Chapter II

### PERSONALITY IS A SYSTEM OF TENDENCY

- 1 *The Meaning of System*
  - A *The Relativity of Integration*
  - B *The Relativity of Complexity*
    - Table 1 *Tinsits of Various Degrees of Complexity*
- 2 *The System is Emergent*
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  - C *Why the New Word "Personoc"?*
  - D *The Nature of Human Nature*
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#### 1. The Meaning of System

The word "system" implies integration, organization, interrelation, interaction, and interdependence of parts, and in personality, as here presented, these parts are tinsits or action processes. Personality, then, is an organized arrangement of tinsits, a system of probable behaviors under stated conditions.

Every concept in this book is assumed to be a continuous variable, which means that *system* is a matter of more or less. All tinsits operating more or less as a unit are here considered to constitute personality, which implies that the personality is a structure of a wide variety of interrelated occurrences under varied conditions. This last sentence should not be interpreted as implying that the personality is an *entity* that *exists* somewhere, for the personality is a system of probable behaviors, a system of probable occurrences, and a system of probabilities, always, of course, under stated conditions.

These interrelated tinsits, as parts of a system, necessarily influence each other; they interact selectively within a relatively stable whole. This means that they limit each other both positively and negatively; they both facilitate and inhibit each other in appropri-

ate situations. This interaction as system ("within" the system) is a continuous, unending process during the full lifetime of the person, for the system itself is a continuously *emerging* process, a continuous process of becoming. The term "system" is widely used in our culture in both professional and lay circles and has much the same connotation in all sciences. Writers, however, frequently speak of personality as a *pattern* of responses, and while this is quite proper, people tend to get from this use an unsatisfactory sense of something static. Possibly they do so through an association of "pattern" with dress and machine design. Many people in our culture, however, think of "system" in more dynamic terms because of established common tinsits associated with the economic system, communication system, banking system, and many other systems such as those of the railroad and school, all of which are thought of as systems of functional relationships.

The term "system" is generally intended to convey a more or less immediate sense of the dynamic (changing) so that one may, without too much difficulty, think of personality as a sequential configuration of probable occurrences, something which occurs rather than exists. One encounters little trouble in thinking in this way of other functions of the organism such as digestion, respiration, circulation, and elimination. *Personality, too, is a function of the organism under certain conditions.*

The stability of a tinsit is here taken as a measure of its relationships to the system, for system gives a tinsit stability. When a tinsit does not attain a minimal "good fit" in a system, either the tinsit or the system is impaired to some degree. This does not mean that the personality is a perfect system, but it does imply a degree of integration, organization, interrelatedness, and interdependence of segmental processes or parts. Personality is here thought of as an organized arrangement of probable behaviors under stated conditions. Under other conditions personality might occur as less a system, less organized, or as we say, somewhat disorganized.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> An extreme depressive phase of manic-depressive psychosis is conceived as system by reduction to a lower level, below the personic level. See the excellent discussion of unity in G. W. Allport *Personality*, Chapter XIII and p. 40. See also Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 355-7, J. F. Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order*, p. 61; and Lewin *Principles*, and his *Personality*, p. 63.

## THE RELATIVITY OF INTEGRATION

Integration is the way in which components of a system behave in relation to each other and to the whole. This way of behaving, like all ways of behaving, is a function of the situation. When one is asked whether or not the personality is a perfect system or a "true" system, a valid reply is the question "When?"—meaning "under what conditions, in what kind of situation?" Integration is a word symbolizing a kind and degree of behaving which the parts of an arrangement exhibit in relation to each other and to the whole as an emergent. Integration, then, being behavior, is something that occurs rather than exists, it is a process.

For those students of behavior who like to think of "traits" as existing, integration is also something that exists, but even for them integration is a continuous variable, it exists more or less. One of the many texts in social psychology states.

Though every person may represent a distinctive combination of traits, these traits may not always [in every situation] be organized as a system within him affecting his every move. Few people are so well integrated [in every situation] that they possess a unified pattern of psychophysical dispositions directing all their actions.<sup>2</sup>

In other words, a system of any kind does not have to be perfect to achieve the status of system. A system out of order is still a system.

Presumably in situations in which a system registers zero integration, no system is occurring. It is not a question of a dichotomy (system-not system) but a question of degree of integration observed as efficiency-in-situation. Adjustment is a matter of degree-of-efficiency of the system as related to some situational (social) norm. Integration is thus an inference based on observed frequency of related traits in type-situations.

According to one writer:

Three main conceptions are included in the term "integration." The first is the dynamic or change-aspect involved in the coming together or the emergence of a new or different organization, coordination, or configuration.

<sup>2</sup> Daniel Katz and R. L. Schanck. *Social Psychology* New York. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; 1938, p. 392

The second is the continuity and causal aspect, in that the emergence is from or out of previously existing correlations and processes and is dependent on these

The third is the unitary aspect, i.e., the emergent or configuration constitute some sort of functional unit or working whole. A coordination and division of labor are indicative of this aspect.<sup>3</sup>

These three characteristics of integration are, in the present work, assumed to be continuous variables, all are a matter of more or less and therefore amenable to measurement

Different experimental designs use criteria of degree of system appropriate to their objectives, but generally speaking, integration is inferred from consistency of behavior in related situations as well as from smooth operation in a given situation. Consistency (expected behavior in given situations) is a function of system. One's ability to know others, or one's self, is dependent upon consistency of behavior in related situations. Indeed, one's ability to predict behavior *constitutes* knowing another person or one's self—even to the point of knowing one as consistently inconsistent.

Yet this phenomenon is relative, a matter of more or less at different times and places, which is to say, in different situations. *Integration is thus a function of the situation*. Sometimes, under certain conditions, integration occurs in high degree; under other conditions it occurs in low degree. A few years ago the Pulitzer prize photograph showed a man standing on a street corner in an utterly dazed condition, his wife, whose body was lying at his feet, had just been killed by an automobile. Here was a momentarily low degree of personic integration. A few moments later the degree of integration had increased to a point where the organism could again exhibit its property of acting as personality with a reasonable degree of efficiency.

Although integration may be thought of as a general state or condition (involving a long sequence of tinsits at a general level of efficiency), integration is for the time being best thought of as *occurring*, or emerging for specific purposes. Perhaps a person "completely lost" in a task approaches a state of perfect integration. Integration is an emergent behavior. By the process of integration every tinsit affects every other tinsit of the system to some degree although not necessarily equally nor even perceptibly. The in-

<sup>3</sup> Markey: *The Symbolic Process*, p. 114.

fluence of one tinsit upon another is relative, and the degree of dependence of one tinsit upon another is relative—to the situation. The personality itself *and all its parts* operate as continuous variables depending upon the nature of the situational context.

The "parts" referred to in the previous sentence are of course tinsits, but tinsits seldom operate as separate phenomena, except perhaps in dreams and some pathological conditions. They operate as constellations and as larger or smaller configurations of constellations. The personality as system is perhaps most realistically thought of as a system of systems—or even as a system of systems of systems of systems. One may go back by reduction in this manner until one arrives at a hypothetical lone tinsit, the smallest operating unit in the personality.

It would be strange if some of these larger or smaller systems within the whole were not in conflict for longer or shorter periods under various configurations of conditions, in various situational fields. Likewise we assume that larger or smaller systems within the whole vary considerably in the relative weight of their influence on the whole and on other systems within the whole, at different times and under different conditions.<sup>4</sup> Only the most relevant tinsits or systems of tinsits emerge in a given situation, the total system (the whole personality) could not emerge in one situation or even in a few. A whole personality can hardly be known even by the person himself. To know a complete personality one would have to know not only all that a person has done but also with a high degree of probability what a person would do in all possible situations. We know ourselves and our friends *more or less*, better in some types of situations than in others.<sup>5</sup>

If we think of the individual life as a continuous unending process, the situation operates as a kind of window through which we view the passing parade. At a given time one witnesses but a segment of the dynamic totality. The totality itself cannot be known and cannot be symbolized. We know it only as it emerges in given restricted situations. This suggests both the practical

<sup>4</sup> This is in conformity with Lewin, Freud, and others. According to J. F. Brown. "Lewin agrees completely with Freud that the person [is not unitary] is made up of systems (regions) which vary in their communicability and in their differentiation." J. F. Brown. *Psychology and the Social Order*, p. 312.

<sup>5</sup> This point of view throws some light on the difficulty of the ideal which the Periclean Greeks set for themselves in their motto "Know thyself."

necessity and the danger of stereotyping, a secondary type of adjustment to anonymity.

But fortunately nothing practical can be gained in knowing a whole personality. What we want to know for scientific purposes, and what everyone seeks daily to know about himself and others for practical purposes, *and with remarkable success*, is this: "What is the probability that John will do so and so in such and such situations?" To the extent to which we know that, we know John, for knowing John means little else.

System, consistency, integration—these are continuous variables between people and between different situations for a given person. The degree of integration which is *normal* for a given situation or type-situation is strictly a social definition and varies greatly among cultures and groups of all kinds, places, and times. The system is a system of probabilities, and is itself a probability. The personality is the probable personality.<sup>6</sup>

### THE RELATIVITY OF COMPLEXITY

People who speak in terms of dichotomies tend to resist the idea of continuous variables. They think of consistent-inconsistent, integrated-unintegrated (or disintegrated), and simple-complex. No doubt this way of thinking saves a great deal of wear and tear on their discrimination processes. But how consistent is "consistent"? How integrated is "integrated"? How complex is a "complex" personality? We are dealing here with serial concepts and continuous variables. The norms for such variables are here strictly social norms or social definitions related to type-situations.

The complexity of a system is related to integration, but the two are not the same. Everyone probably knows people whose personalities seem relatively simple and others whose person-organizations seem highly complex. But no personality is uniformly complex in all situations. Sweethearts and parents frequently cannot understand their loved ones, even though they seem simple enough most of the time in most situations. In most situations the rural, primary-group personality is likely to be relatively more simple than the usual urban, secondary-group personality. But even the most simple personality organization cannot be known

<sup>6</sup> At one stage in the development of this book its title was *The Probable Personality*.

completely. No one knows anyone "like a book", but we all know some people better than others, and we know everyone better in some situations than in others. Only a small fraction of the tinsit-structure of even the simplest personality emerges in any one situation. But whatever tinsits do emerge, and how many of them emerge, depends upon the nature of the situation being integrated—that is, upon the nature of the relationships (legal, blood, etc.) of the interacting persons, the time, place, and duration of the situations, the types of interaction expected by social definition, the types emerging in fact, and the general quality of the process of the situational integration.

Situations likewise vary in complexity, but even a relatively simple situation will exhibit the emergence of numerous tinsit-systems in a given person, and almost any interaction will involve a constellation of situations. How well one person can know another depends not only upon the relative complexity of the personalities involved but upon the variety of situations in which they interact. To know another person adequately—as a prospective spouse, for instance—one must interact with that person in the widest permissible variety of situations, allowing the emergence of the widest possible variety of constellations of tinsits.

Probably no tinsit ever emerges as a single discrete phenomenon, although for analytical purposes we must speak as if it did. This enables us to indicate that not only do personality systems vary in complexity, but that tinsits themselves vary widely in degree of complexity and generality. Some tinsits are highly specific and some very general to the situations to which they are functional. Some are relatively elaborate in organizations, some relatively simple. The items in Table 1 are put in alphabetical order to avoid any possible controversy over any functional classification that might be used. In the absence of adequate research we cannot be certain just which of these tinsits are more complex than just what others, nor to what degree. We may assume, however, that "beliefs" are more complex than "drives," and "conscience" more complex than "habits."

Table 1 lists some tinsits which man has in common with other animals (e.g., aversions, bends, drives, reflexes, and tensions), and some which are exclusively human (attitudes, beliefs, and opinions). Some are on the organic level (instincts and reflexes), and some on the personic level (fears, hopes, and ideals). The result

of using the term "tinsit" for this wide range of behaviors is to broaden the term, which then becomes useful for purposes of comparison with the data and concepts of other sciences on various levels of behavior. Thus the movements of electrons are tinsits, as are the chemical-physiological processes of man and other animals, as well as the personic processes of individual personalities and of social groups

TABLE 1. TINSITS OF VARIOUS DEGREES OF COMPLEXITY, AND  
ON VARIOUS LEVELS OF BEHAVIOR

Action patterns	Goals	Prejudices
Adjustment behaviors	Habits	Prelim adj sets
Adjustment mechanisms	Hopes	Preparatory sets
Ambitions	Ideals	Prepotent drives
Attitudes	Ideologies	Propensities
Aversions	Imbalances	Purposes
Beliefs	Imperatives	Reaction tendencies
Bents	Impulses	Reflexes
Compulsions	Inclinations	Sentiments
Conscience	"Instincts"	Stresses
Crazes	Institutions	Strivings
Customs	Interests	Taboos
Desires	Legends	Tastes
Dispositions	Mental sets	Teleonomic trends
Doubts	Motives	Tensions
Drives	Mores	Traditions
Fads	Myths	Traits
Fears	Needs	Tropisms
Feelings	Neuro-musc sets	Urges
Fixed ideas	Opinions	Values
Folkways	Predilections	Wants
Gestures	Predispositions	Wishes

This list is not intended to prove anything, it merely represents a relatively small sample of the tinsits found in nature. Even this small number, however, suggests the wide variety of situations in which man normally integrates his behavior with that of others. The variety of tinsits of a person or group is necessarily limited by the variety of available situations of which they are functions.

Some of these forms may seem unlike behaviors (e.g. doubts, folkways, goals, hopes, legends, and needs), and others not neces-



sarily related to situations (e.g. drives, ideals, propensities, reflexes, and traits) But from our point of view all of the items in Table 1 are forms of behavior, and no behavior ever occurs except in some situation From birth to death man is never for a fraction of a second free from a situation of some kind, he moves from one situation to another in a continuous process from birth to death. *And his behavior is always in accordance with what he believes the situation to be in relation to himself*

Obviously some of these behaviors occur in many situations, even in many types of situations Some are highly specific and some highly generalized, crazes, fads, fears, fixed ideas, and needs are more specific than attitudes, conscience, ideals, mores, and sentiments. If behaviors were not functional to situations, presumably they would operate twenty-four hours a day or not at all, in accordance with their own caprice or "autonomy." We say that John "is ambitious," meaning that he behaves ambitiously in many, but not in all, situations—perhaps only in achievement situations involving his levels of aspiration, and perhaps only in certain types of them

This discussion of the relative complexity of systems of tinsits and of "individual" tinsits may give the impression that tinsits do things, but we must emphasize that the person, not the tinsit, does things, or tends to do things, and that the person has a tinsit to do this or that in this or that situation We must avoid the seductive tinsit to reify concepts.

## 2. The System is Emergent

The earlier statement that, from our point of view, personality as system is never observed as a whole, is based on the property of emergence as a process. Emergence is always a function of a contextual situation. The whole could not possibly emerge in one situation nor even in all the cases of one type-situation *What any observer can ever perceive of the system in a given situation is only that segment of the process which emerges in that situation.*<sup>7</sup> The personality in any situation is, for the present work, the constellation of tinsits that emerges in that situation. The personality of the moment, as judged by consensual empirical observations, is

<sup>7</sup> An observer may, of course, by projection, "see" emergents which are not available to the perception of others.

what is emerging at the moment. All such moments constitute a continuity to the extent that the personality is behaving as system.

Whether the process observed can be described by the words "universe," "society," "personality," "tinsit," or by the words "maturation," "growth," or "mind," the nature of process permits only one segment of it to be observed at a time, only that segment which is co-terminous with the momentary situation in which it emerges. It is a temporal phenomenon. To illustrate a "segment" of a process, we might imagine ourselves observing a parade on Armistice Day. The parade is miles (or hours) long, but from where we stand in the crowd we can "see" only about thirty feet (or twenty seconds) of the continuous process occurring in front of us. That thirty feet or twenty seconds is all we can "see" at a time—and we may consider it an artificially created segment of the parade. What the parade is *for us* at any moment is what we can "perceive" in the situation, but even the situation is constantly changing, moving, emerging, and disappearing. For us, all the rest of the parade, all the other "segments," are potentialities and probabilities so that at any moment the parade is a system of probabilities constantly emerging as process.

The words "see" and "perceive" are placed in quotation marks to raise a question in the reader's mind. What one sees or perceives may not be exactly what everyone else sees, what a person perceives in any situation is dependent upon his past experiences, his biases, memories, and expectations. One sees what one is disposed to see, but regardless of the nature of perception, a person perceives at one time only a segment of a parade, or of any other process.

When we return, we tell our friends that we have seen the parade, and of course we did in the sense in which we can see *any* process, even a motion picture. Any act is such a process, a segment of a larger process called personality, which in turn is a segment of a larger process called group, which is a segment of a larger process called society, which is a segment of a still larger process. Each process is a continuous emergent in a process larger than itself. A situation is likewise a segment of the larger social process and involves more than one tinsit; it involves all the tinsits related to, or implied in, that situation, even though many of these tinsits belong to different people integrated in that situation.

In any situation enough of the process called personality

emerges to indicate what the personality is like *in that*, or *in that kind of*, situation. The word "enough" in the preceding sentence may be dubious. What one *does* know of a given personality in a given situation is that segment of the personality that emerges there and then, regardless of the extent one's "seeing" is dependent upon projection and imputation from previous situations.<sup>8</sup>

What is so wonderful in our minute by minute daily experience is the apparently remarkable fact that what *almost always* does emerge in self and others is *what self and others expect to emerge*, and *almost always* that segment is the one we expect to emerge again in similar situations—"in all probability." People seldom fail in such predictions. Too frequently the student of behavior forgets this. In his daily round of behavior he is as busy as the next man in successfully predicting the behavior of self and others, but he calls this prediction "anticipation." The process of emergence makes possible great numbers of accurate hourly predictions by every normal person in society. Society would otherwise be impossible.

### THE USE OF STEREOTYPES

Emergence is one of the important factors in the genesis of what are called stereotypes. Because a relatively long time (many situations) is needed to see and know a process as elaborate as a personic system, this time element becomes a handicap in the highly impersonal secondary societies of urban areas and even in primary groups. City people live in the midst of enormous populations, and no one can hope to enjoy the intimate type of continuous primary-group relations with any but a very few people. Anonymity and impersonality are almost the keynote of human relations in our cities. There is neither sufficient time nor opportunity to learn the complex processes of the hundreds of people one must deal with on the street, in business and the professions, in schools, churches, political parties, and in the hundreds of organizations characteristic of cities.

We are thus compelled to judge people—"whole" personalities—by the momentary segments which emerge in fleeting periods. To judge a person by one or a few tinsits in one or a few situa-

<sup>8</sup> This point raises the question of the importance of the concept of consensus which is discussed later.

tions of short duration and of highly limited scope necessitates the development of concepts of pseudo-types of personality called stereotypes. Hence, without adequate knowledge of another person we tend to call him charming, superficial, pushing, criminal, "go-getting" or extrovert, and if we can, by virtue of some small segment of his behavior, place him by reference to some imagined group, we call him Jew, "nigger," honest, crooked, "damyankee," communist, radical, or reactionary. One has to place a person to adjust to him, and to do this quickly the stereotype is a handy, if dangerous, device. The stereotype aids in adjusting to anonymity.

An experienced clerk in a city department store will type a customer in less than a minute. Since the observation of a small segment of the process called personality is a reasonably good basis for predicting a similar future segment *in similar situations*, the clerk in a specialized department of a store is frequently highly accurate in stereotyping. The danger comes in using stereotypes in more generalized situations and applying them to a whole personality. Thus emergence has its disadvantages as well as its advantages. We often find it too slow for accurate adjustments in a fast-moving, rapidly changing, urban industrial civilization; yet this very slowness is one of the bases of stability. It makes for change plus continuity, novelty plus predictability, growth without mutation, and progress without apparent movement.

Emergence suggests more than supersummation; it suggests something coming out of what "is already there," that is, out of acts which have previously occurred, indicating that all learning is an extension of what is already known. Nothing completely new can be known, the novel is but an extension of the old, change is a reorganization of what is already established in the behavior structure: relatively new combinations of relatively old behaviors. From our point of view everything in the universe is an emergent; tinsits emerge as acts; constellations of tinsits emerge as habits, attitudes, and traits; constellations of constellations emerge as system; the whole system is constantly emerging and being integrated as system in a continuous dynamic process of becoming. Mind, self, society—all are emergents at different levels of complexity.

Perhaps all of this may be summed up in four statements. The concept of the personality as an emerging phenomenon is intended to communicate the following propositions:

1. The personality is a property of the organism, but a property that emerges only in action. The system is not postulated as something behind, and independent of, the behavior which constitutes it. The system emerges in, and as, action, if the organism were to stop behaving in the way we call "person," there would be no personality, for nothing would be emerging.<sup>9</sup> With this interpretation in mind one should find little confusion about the relationship between the organism and the personality, between the organic and the personic. Personality is not, from this point of view, the organism, but like digestion and respiration, a property or process or function of the organism, it is the organism's acting in a certain way. Footnote 9 (below) indicates various conditions under which we may observe the organism with a small degree of this property.<sup>10</sup> The organism, as part of every situation, represents an important series of determinants under certain conditions, but one must not confuse the personality with its determinants, which include other phenomena besides the organism—the weather, for example. Personality has no flesh and bone, it has no mass. It is motion, action, behavior, and function of some degree of probability.
2. Whatever behavior emerges does so as part of a system and emerges in, as, and from a system of tinsits already established as the structure of probable occurrences called the personality. Emergence does not mean, however, an inevitable "unfolding from within." The person is only one set of components in a situational field. Positions here repudiated are those of the biological (Aristotelian) determinist who sees "everything in the man," and also those of the cultural determinist. The notion is widespread that the infant is born with the elements of personality, and needs only time for traits and characteristics to unfold. Experience leads one to believe that this dangerous attitude is

<sup>9</sup> This contingency need not be thought of as limited to the phenomenon of death. It occurs in the pathologically introvert, as in extreme cases of manic-depressive psychosis and in surgical (and recreational) anesthesia. A person lying still in sleep reveals no personality, any personality that we "see" in the prone form is projected by the observer as memory (This is, of course, true when the person is not sleeping, too.) We may state as a hypothesis that dreams represent detached tinsits operating separately, not as systematic integrations, sleep being the kind of situation in which these tinsits can occur in this way. Possibly when these tinsits are sufficiently coherent they activate the personic system, that is, awaken the person. Possibly children's wish dreams are temporarily disengaged tinsits which in system have been unduly stimulated during the day (so, too, of problem and terror dreams). Under such conditions individual tinsits may be activated, awakening the person only when they are vigorous enough to implicate and engage or induce the system. The Freudian gremlin called the censor may be thought of as the limen or threshold for such involvements.

<sup>10</sup> Whether this function or property is ever completely absent, that is, not occurring at all while the organism lives, is probably an academic question.

common to a large number of school superintendents, principals and teachers, lawyers, judges, policemen, and the populace as a whole. The idea is indicated in statements that Johnny is a born thief or a born criminal, that Jews are naturally "pushing," and a white man is "naturally" superior. The inference is that certain stuff comes in the package, if it is good stuff, it will make a good man, if bad stuff, it will make a bad man.

The position taken in this book is that the infant is born with greater or lesser potentialities, and from the ethical point of view, neutral; *whether or not and to what degrees* these potentialities develop (emerge *as* *transits*) depends upon the kind of social interaction he has during his lifetime, for all emergents are resultants of interaction. Intelligence is a social (interactional) phenomenon, and its possible limits, a biological phenomenon. But intelligence is a type of *transit*, not a *sprite*, it is a way of behaving. "Intelligence" as such does not exist, there is only more or less intelligent behavior, or a capacity for it. And this capacity can be lost if not developed early in life.

3. The concept of emergence is intended to communicate the idea of function as distinguished from structure. The idea that the person is a dynamic, changing, ongoing, continuous process involving growth, learning, integration, disintegration, trauma, regression, and other forms of change.
4. The idea of emergence enables us when observing behavior to "see it steadily and see it whole," as a system of behavior. We cannot understand a man's behavior by removing his legs or examining his liver or poking his glands or abstracting his "traits" from their situational context. But associated with the concept of emergence is an expression which can easily make the concept ridiculous: "The whole is more than the sum of its parts." This expression is sufficiently vague to warm the hearts of those kindly people whose mystical tendencies are aroused in the presence of cloudy statements. This supersummative idea of emergence does, nevertheless, discourage the practice of looking for a man among his parts or for the personality among its parts. It suggests the rather prosaic fact that we respond to a person's parts differently from the way in which we respond to the person. The man who originated the term "emergence" used it to differentiate between emergents and resultants, as he liked to think of them. For example, if we mix 100 dried beans and 100 dried peas we have a mixture of a sort, the sum of which equals the whole—200. This man was happy to call this a resultant. If, however, we mix two chemicals of the proper sort, under proper conditions, they merge, and a new compound *e-merges*; the man called this an emergent, and stated that the whole, in this case, is more than the sum of its parts.

We do not make this distinction between emergents and resultants, and we use these terms a great deal in this volume, emergents are resultants and resultants are emergents. But if the chemical example helps one to see *system* as an emergent, we shall be happy too. System emerges by virtue of the merging and integration of tinsits.

### 3. The System is Personic

#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The validity of any concept must be judged by its adequacy to perform the task assigned it. The validity of the concept *personic* as introduced in this book must be judged in such terms. This judgment can be made only if a clear statement of the task assigned the concept is given. In the first chapter the concept *tinsit* was introduced to refer to *all* forms of readiness at all levels of behavior of all phenomena in the universe. The term thus cuts across all the sciences and to this extent simplifies terminology.

In introducing the term *personic*, however, the intention is to delimit, mark off, some kinds of tinsits from others, to include some, to exclude others. If personality or the personic system includes all tinsits of all phenomena at all levels, one might just as well say that the personality is the universe. The tinsits which the concept *personic* eliminates from consideration include all somatic, organic, segmental behavioral elements on the physiological and anatomical levels. These involve such physiological tinsit systems as the nervous system, endocrine system, vegetative system, all segmental tinsits such as reflexes, all behaviors of organs like heart, lung, liver, glands, and all peripheral, skeletal, and muscular systems as such. The personic excludes all strictly physiological and anatomical aspects of all body functions and sustaining systems like those of respiration and circulation.

Professor Blumer, in the publication cited in Chapter I, says of Thomas and Znaniecki:

Perhaps the outstanding obstacle to an unqualified testing of their theory is that which plagues most of social science, i.e., the absence of definite guides or rules which would enable one to ascertain positively that a given datum is an instance of a given concept and so deserves its application.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Blumer: *An Appraisal*, p. 61.

In an effort to meet this rigorous specification, two such guides or rules are given here to determine which data are subsumed under the concept *personic*, and which are not.

1. Personic *excludes* any structure, system, or segment and the behaviors of any structure, system, or segment for which the *impersonal* pronoun "it" may be used as reference. Personic *includes* all structures or systems of tinsits and all isolated, detached, or "lone" acts or tinsits, if any, for which the *personal* pronoun is the proper symbol. For example, if one's heart starts jumping, we may say *it* started jumping. That is segmental behavior. But if the *person* "jumps to conclusions," we say *he* did it, or *she* did it, or *we*, or *they*, or *I*. That is behavior of the person and is personic. This is a very rough and ready test and is not satisfactory for exact purposes, for in popular speech one says *he* breathes, coughs, sneezes, and eliminates.

2. A second guide or rule provides a more accurate test. Personic tinsits are to be recognized and determined by the order of stimuli which activates them. In the first chapter two such orders were suggested, those represented by the symbol  $S \leftrightarrow R$ , and those represented by the symbols  $S \leftrightarrow M \leftrightarrow R$ . Behaviors induced by the first type of stimuli are not personic, those induced by the second type are personic. For us, the study of personality is the science of personics.

#### PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PERSONIC STIMULI

If the second test above is to be used, we must elaborate the formula  $S \leftrightarrow M \leftrightarrow R$ . We may say that personic tinsits have two general types of *direction*: a direction toward objects and behaviors of the physical world, including human bodies, and secondly, a direction toward *persons*, personic systems, including self, to which one responds as an "other." Stimuli to behavior of the first direction are stimuli of the order  $S \leftrightarrow R$ ; stimuli to behavior of the second type of direction are stimuli of the order "M," that is, *meanings*. This may be expressed by converting  $S \leftrightarrow M \leftrightarrow R$  into the form  $S \leftrightarrow \cdot M \leftrightarrow R$ .

As an example let us consider the following: Light, a phenomenon of the physical world, is reflected from an object of the



physical world, such as a tree, and impinges on the retina. We represent this physical stimulus by "S," which is here called the *primary* stimulus "As soon as" this happens I am compelled (if accurate) to say "tree", that is, I interpret "S," giving it a meaning, "M" "M" is therefore a personic response and is represented in the formula as " $rM$ ," and is called the primary response From this point on, I may no longer respond to "S," for " $rM$ " takes its place, and my behavior is now activated and directed by " $rM$ " as stimulus, therefore we represent this by " $rM_s$ ," since it is the second stimulus in the series, or the secondary stimulus Any further response I make is a response to " $rM_s$ " and is represented by "R," the second or secondary response<sup>12</sup> *Hereafter whenever reference is made to personic stimuli, the reference will be to " $rM_s$ ," the secondary stimulus, unless otherwise stated*

The implications of this phenomenon are of enormous significance to the symbolic interactionist For example, when we respond ("R") to another person we are actually responding to our own response ("M") as stimulus, that is, we are actually responding to ourselves From our point of view this is the most amazing and important phenomenon in the whole realm of human behavior, and is what we called role-taking in our discussion of interaction This central member of the formula represents selective response, also a phase of interaction Selection comes in between the old  $S \leftrightarrow R$

<sup>12</sup> We do not suggest that this is a perfect representation of all that happens between "S" and "R", but it serves for all but the most complicated behaviors. While this phenomenon can probably be verified by introspection, experimental evidence of it may be found also in many studies of perception For example, in Bartlett *Remembering*, p. 33 he indicates that when a subject named a figure (gave it an interpretation) which he was asked to reproduce from memory, the subject proceeded to draw *what he had named* rather than the figure he had been shown. One of the abstract figures the subjects were asked to draw from memory looked like different things to different people Some called or "named" it a "pick-axe," or a "turf-cutter," or an "anchor," etc, and each subject drew on paper whatever he had *called* the abstract drawing, not the drawing itself. The person who thought the figure looked like a pick-axe drew his idea of a picture of a pick-axe In other words, when a subject sat down to reproduce the figure he had been shown, that figure ("S" in our formula) was not his present stimulus, the present stimulus was rather the object represented by the *name* (meaning) he had given it (" $rM_s$ " in our formula) The reproducing, in this case, is represented by the "R" in our formula. Bartlett calls this naming process "effort after meaning" (p. 20)

## WHY THE NEW WORD "PERSONIC"?

Despite what has been said about the term *personic*, we must face the reality that we find in our society, if not in all societies, a tinsit of great magnitude and a high degree of commonality which operates as resistance to the acceptance of new terms and the ideas which they represent. Although new terms are coined almost daily in and for the more exact sciences, eyebrows tend to rise at the appearance of new terms in the social sciences. New words often lead people to suspect the validity of *that which* the new words refer to. Let us see, therefore, if a further justification can be given for the introduction of the term *personic* and the concept which it symbolizes.

The word "person" is a Latin derivative with a long history and many meanings. The Latin equivalent of the Greek suffix "ic" is "al," and when the latter is affixed to "person," we have the word "personal" which has several meanings. One meaning of "personal" refers to that-which-is-not-public-or-general, that is, "personal" refers to something which pertains to a particular individual. But we are not concerned with that meaning here. We want a word which will refer to a certain type of behavior or an organization of a certain type of behaviors. This organization or integration is "the person in the body," and the behaviors to be referred to are the behaviors of that person. We want a word, a new word without prior meanings, which will refer exclusively to the person instead of the body. *In other words, we do not want our concept of personality to refer to that-which-distinguishes-one-person-from-another, nor to that-which-is-characteristic-of-a-given-person,* in an exclusive sense. The word "individuality" already serves that purpose. *Personality* in this book is not synonymous with *individuality*.<sup>18</sup> Hence we take the Latin derivative *person* and add the Greek suffix "ic," meaning "pertaining to," and we have the new word "personic" meaning "pertaining to the person," the whole person, as distinguished from its parts, and as distinguished from the organic and somatic processes. Thus *personic* refers to the per-

<sup>18</sup> Individuality, as used here, is a term describing the degree to which a given personality deviates from some social norm. A more complete definition appears in subsequent pages.

son, but not to any particular person. *Personal* distinguishes properties of one person from those of another person, *personic* distinguishes the person from the soma. *Personal* refers to a particular person; *personic* does not. *Personal* isolates a person, with a name, among all persons; *personic* isolates the person, as a process or system of processes distinguishable from the other processes called the body.

The sole reason for separating, by abstraction, the personic from the organic and somatic is to permit greater freedom of analysis and to see by comparison the relationships between the different types of phenomena represented by the different processes of the organism. *The purpose of the separation is not to divorce the person from the organism, that would be nonsense. The personic is to be thought of as one of the processes of the organism, just as respiration, digestion, and circulation are processes of the organism, but on a different level.*<sup>14</sup> All processes of the organism are related to each other and affect each other in many ways under various conditions, but we do not, for example, do violence to the organism or to the process of respiration or elimination merely because we abstract those two processes for purposes of analysis. So also we do not do violence to the organism or to the personic processes or the somatic processes merely because we abstract them from the whole for purposes of analysis.

Human behavior is impossible to understand without a knowledge of how the various processes of the organism affect each other on the same level of operation and on different levels of operation. Under certain conditions the personic affects other processes of the organism, and *vice versa*; but the stimuli and behavior as such must always be on the same level, and there must, for this reason, be transformations from processes of one level to those of another. No organic stimuli can affect personic behavior without first being transformed into personic stimuli (meanings), and *vice versa*. Personic stimuli are meanings, more or less conscious, on a scale; organic stimuli are physico-chemical or bio-physical events.

<sup>14</sup> In view of my basic principle of accepting no dichotomies, it should again be stated that personic and organic do not constitute a dichotomy in the sense of paired opposites like good-bad, high-low, and introversion-extroversion. The terms personic and organic represent different levels of behavior.

The personic system, personality, is by definition a system sensitive to personic stimuli exclusively.<sup>15</sup>

### THE NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE

The neonate (newborn) begins life in society as an adequate and competent, though not self-sufficient, system of tinsits. But this system is 100% organic. The stimuli to its behavior are exclusively of the order  $S \leftrightarrow R$ , that is, its stimuli are bio-physical or physico-chemical events. The neonate is presumed to have no mental life, nor does it have a well developed organization of peripheral somatic behavior. Its motor actions are not well coordinated, it wriggles and squirms largely without direction. Its tinsits are exclusively somatic tinsits. Hence we frequently read that the neonate is not a person, has no personality, is not "human"; it is a wonderful little animal with remarkable potentialities which may emerge later as personic tinsits under certain conditions.

If these "certain conditions" appear, the neonate does not remain long in this birth-condition. Almost immediately it begins to exhibit its potentialities for becoming human. It begins to be conditioned to signs and then to symbols, it begins to learn on the personic level, little by little, with accelerating speed; it begins to respond to stimuli of the order  $S \leftrightarrow \text{r.M.} \leftrightarrow R$  as well as those of the order  $S \leftrightarrow R$ . It begins to respond to *meanings*. Emerging in this remarkable organism is a superimposed system, or better, integration, of a relatively new phenomenon in the universe—a new kind of process—the symbolic process.<sup>16</sup> The personic system begins to emerge and to assume mastery over the original system, to both the delight and the sorrow of all concerned.

Something has begun now to emerge which was not "there" before; the baby now "has" something it did not "have" before; something now begins to occur that did not occur before. This *something* is first a collection, and later a system, of personic tinsits.

<sup>15</sup> This subject cannot be developed further in this volume but it receives considerable attention in the volume now in preparation, under the general headings of "Personosomatic transformation, displacement, and dominance." The position is taken there that when an organic or physiological process is activated by a stimulus of the order  $S \leftrightarrow \text{r.M.} \leftrightarrow R$ , (for example, by an idea, as when one is nauseated at the thought of eating snakes) the organic tinsit (nausea) is considered a personic response and part of the personality.

<sup>16</sup> See Markey. *The Symbolic Process*.

When sufficient personic tinsits have emerged to facilitate adjustment to the most frequently recurring and necessary situations for its groups, when sufficient personic tinsits have emerged with sufficient frequency to be called a *system*, there emerge what we call the beginnings of the personality. At this point the neonate is no longer referred to as *it*, but as *he* or *she*. The person has emerged in embryo *with* and *as* the personic system, and is duly honored with the personal pronoun.

The child now begins to live more and more on the symbolic level. He gradually begins to behave personally toward his own personic behavior as well as toward his own organic behavior. And he behaves toward these behaviors in the same manner in which he behaves toward the same behavior of *other* persons.

When the child is able to behave in this way toward his own rudimentary personic system, his *self* has begun to emerge. It emerges in the images of the other significant selves with which his own system is implicated. A person has come to inhabit the body in the form of a personic behavior structure or system; and he and others will forever refer to it as the person. This person will demand and receive the honor of the personal pronoun. This is what it means to be human. This is human nature. Human nature is personic nature which is fundamentally the ability to communicate with self and others by the use of symbols, in other words, the ability to participate in the symbolic process.<sup>17</sup>

## HUMAN NATURE AND COMMON TINSITS

The above definition of *human nature* is not standard, this is probably the only book in which this interpretation appears. A sincere effort should be made to justify new terms and new concepts, particularly when they modify traditional ones. The experience of the past as embodied in traditional usage is deserving of respect, but this is not the same as slavish adherence to concepts which have become inadequate for new insights.

<sup>17</sup> Whether or not other animals can communicate to some degree in symbols may be a moot question. Considering this ability as a continuous variable, the extent of this ability in that-which-is-born-of-woman is so much greater than the same ability in other animals that the difference amounts to a difference in kind. No other animal "can make that statement." The relationship between the symbolic and the personic is discussed in Chapter VIII.

The testing of several thousand students has provided us with a reliable knowledge of what the average person means by the term *human nature*. The popular conception is that human nature consists of certain inherited behavior structures called "instincts" which run the gamut from simple reflexes to such weird imaginings as "it-is-human-nature-to-want-to-get-ahead." The majority of interpretations revolve around such ideas as acquisitiveness, ambition, desire for children, jealousy, selfishness, and self-preservation.

One sees immediately that these behaviors fall into two main classes: behaviors highly characteristic of all or most animals and culture traits. An accepted practice in social psychology in the West is to equate human nature with "cultural nature." LaPiere and Farnsworth, for example, define human nature as "the socially typical attributes of the individual's personality." According to these authors:

To the extent that the socialization processes work effectively, they develop the organic potentialities of the human animal into patterns of behavior that are typical for the members of the social group. These socially typical attributes of the individual's personality constitute his human nature. . . . Japanese and Americans have, in other words, different human natures. Earlier students endeavored to find norms of behavior that would hold true for all mankind throughout all human history. But no specific pattern of action that has any such universality has yet been discovered. When we get beyond broad generalizations, such as that human beings eat and that they take care of their offspring, there is nothing that can be said of mankind as a whole.<sup>18</sup>

Although reasonably precise, this definition does not isolate what is common-human, indeed it seems to claim that nothing is common-human. Consequently, precise reference requires that one speak of American human nature, or Japanese human nature, as the authors suggest. Professor J. F. Brown is largely in agreement with Professor LaPiere and Farnsworth in denying such universals and suggests that the term *human nature* be discarded. "From the standpoint of field theory," he says, "there is no such thing as human nature independent of the existing structure of the social field."<sup>19</sup>

From a purely practical viewpoint, it would probably be better to preserve an expression so well established as *human*

<sup>18</sup> R. T. LaPiere and Paul R. Farnsworth: *Social Psychology*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1942, pp. 147-8.

<sup>19</sup> J. F. Brown: *Psychology and the Social Order*, p. 259. Chapter XIV is impressive.

*nature* if it can be defined with sufficient precision to isolate something useful to science. Human beings are not exactly like everything else in the universe, and even the celebrated man in the street is not likely to confuse human beings with other forms of life. If the term "human nature" is to be made useful for scientific purposes it must refer to something which meets at least the following specifications: it must refer to 1) that which is associated specifically and exclusively with the human animal as distinguished from other animals, and 2) that which is, and has been, common to the human animal everywhere and always.

Such specifications are presumably implied in the common expression "human nature does not change," meaning, of course, that it does not differ from time to time nor from place to place. Despite the denials cited above, one action pattern of the human being apparently meets the two specifications stated, namely, the ability to communicate in symbols, the ability to communicate on the symbolic level. Only man, and he everywhere and always, has used and uses a true language, a true speech in a language with syntactical rules and principles of structure. By virtue of this capacity man alone can have a culture.

Therefore, *we define human nature as the ability to communicate on the symbolic level or conceptual level.* Obviously, this definition requires that we follow its logic wherever it leads us, and it leads us to say that whatever may be the inborn capacity or potentiality of a form of life, that form is not human unless, and until, it has the ability, not merely the potentialities, to communicate. This eliminates from the human level 1) all infants, 2) all that are born of woman but without the potentials for such communication, and 3) all that are born of woman *with* the potential but which, for one reason or another, have been unable to develop it into an *ability*, as, for instance, Feral Man.

*Common Tinsits.* Common tinsits are what is popularly believed to be "social instincts" but which are, in fact, culture traits. And these popularly conceived social instincts are largely what the average person in our culture believes is human nature. In this popular idea of human nature we have a blood-brother of the old instinct theory. The further one goes in trying to analyze the concept, the closer one approaches the current lists of basic needs, motives, drives, and instincts. The popular concept of a universal human nature is a logical precipitate of theories of biological de-

terminism which masses of people still hold in a confused sort of way, jumbled and mixed together with elements of the romantic-individualistic complex, stereotypes about free enterprise, individual initiative, open classes, equal opportunity, and the democratic process—a confused conglomeration of half-truths, hopes, and fears

In a careful investigation of student thought patterns, the popular concept of human nature turns out to be no more than a complex of common traits which one finds in groups of a given culture. These culture traits, or common traits, are so common and so visible that they appear to be the natural ways of doing and thinking, which, of course, they are, for any particular group but not for all mankind. No doubt some traits are very common in many parts of the world, because of the diffusion of culture traits and the fact that while ways of interacting are tremendously varied, they are nevertheless limited in specific situations.

From a social psychological point of view, the popular concept of human nature is an extremely dangerous device. Almost every form of prejudice, bias, ignorance, and discrimination in every field of behavior and in all conditions of life, from race to poverty, are popularly explained and justified by either (or both) of the popular contradictory terms "free will" and "human nature." When our friends commit an indiscretion we attribute it to human nature; when our friends are successful and prosperous the exercise of free will is considered responsible. When those whom we dislike commit indiscretions, free will is believed to be operative; when they are successful and prosperous, we attribute it to corruption or luck. If a whole class of people remains in poverty, generation after generation, and if people wish to assume an attitude of benevolent superiority toward them, their condition is assumed to be due to human nature; if people wish to hold them in contempt, then their condition is said to be due to free will. No doubt medieval Christians in Europe and New England were sure that to burn a heretic was human nature, but to be a heretic was a choice of free will; and the burning heretic probably returned the compliment by reversing the formula. Free will and human nature as popularly conceived are two philosopher's stones by virtue of which one can always be right no matter what happens. But man is far too dangerous an animal to be in possession of any device which will lead him to believe that he is always right.



Human nature, as popularly conceived, is a confusion of biological and social processes. What is generally assumed to be human nature is in reality social nature. The social process is the same in all human societies, but its products are different in all societies to the extent that the *conditions under which* the process operates are different. Nevertheless the products are not "unique" in different societies, the differences in the products of the social process represent points on a continuum, they differ more or less, and they resemble each other more or less. To recall that a book printed in one language can be translated into any other language with more or less accuracy indicates that people the world over do have many common experiences, which is to say, common meanings, which is to say, common personal insights. Of course, some meanings of some societies are practically incomprehensible to the people of some other society, as, for example, to Americans, the complex familial organizations of some nonliterate peoples, or the ease with which, in some societies, children are adopted by one's friends, merely as a friendly gesture and without emotional repercussions in any of the persons involved. In our culture this would probably be considered "inhuman," that is, unethical by *our* standards, and therefore "uncommon."

Little in the biological processes is exclusively human, and much in the social interactional process is not exclusively human. One factor, however, is exclusively human—the symbolic process and the use of the significant symbol which language makes possible. This, which is fundamental to the social process, together with those distinctive features of the human organism which make it possible, are what constitutes human nature, so far as the present work is concerned. But this very process makes for man's great diversity of adaptation to almost any type of situation in any culture. Hence it may seem paradoxical to call this human nature, for while it does not itself change, human nature is nevertheless the very agency which makes personality and social change both necessary and possible. If the symbolic process is human nature, human nature is the mechanism of change as well as of stability.

The human insight to behave symbolically is, of course, a common human insight; but by *common insight* as used here, we usually refer to such phenomena as folkways, mores, traditions and customs which are common insights of specific groups. Such terms symbolize common tendencies which a plurality of people exhibit

under certain conditions in some degree of probability, and which are among the group-typical behaviors which some social psychologists call human nature. But they are here called common tinsits to differentiate them from what we call human nature. Common tinsits thus have to be referred to the sociological group to which they are common. As we shall see, an essential function of a sociological group is to unify—to make common—the “M” in  $S \leftrightarrow_r M_g \leftrightarrow R$ .

## Chapter III

### THE PROBLEM OF DELIMITING THE SYSTEM

- 1 *Are Personalities Similar or Different?*
  - A *Unique and Uniform Operationally Defined*
  - B *The Fallacy of the Unique Personality*
  - C *The Fallacy of the Unique Act*
2. *Personality Includes the Entire Person's System*
  - A *The Nature of a Concept*
  - B *A Person is What He Does*
  - C. *Our Use of the Concept Personality*
  - D *Total vs Partial Definitions of Personality*
  - E *The Definition Used in this Book*
3. *Every Act Has a History*
  - A *An Act is a Special Case of Tinsit*
  - B *Historicity and Uniqueness*
  - C. *The Logical Basis of the Historicity of the Act*  
*The Theory of Imitation*
- 4 *Can Person's Systems Be Classified?*

Teaching experience is an imperious teacher for the teacher. In the present instance such experience has taught that it is unwise at this point to proceed immediately to a definition of personality. Despite the point of view presented up to now, the Western mind, so thoroughly conditioned to Aristotelian thinking, finds it difficult to grasp the nature of a definition.

Consistent with Aristotelian thinking is the ubiquitous, dichotomous frame of reference called "hereditary-environment." So thoroughly is American thinking molded in this form, that by the time a person has reached the age of twenty, the mold has hardened to such a degree that he has great difficulty in changing. As derivatives of this way of thinking, the sociologist's thought-systems have traditionally tended to emphasize the similarities between people and similarities in their behaviors, while the thought-systems of the psychologist have traditionally tended to emphasize individual differences.

### 1. Are Personalities Similar or Different?

If the reader has been sufficiently inoculated with the point of view of this book, he may reasonably be expected to consider the above question foolish, for it is just that. Nevertheless, one group of writers in the field of personality study lays great emphasis on the similarities among people, while another group lays equal stress on their differences, and these points of view have actually become sources of controversy.

Those who are primarily interested in the similarities between people, and who stress the point, must come to see people as practically uniform. In the armed services we put uniforms on men and drill them, not that the enemy will know at whom to shoot, but in order to make the men as uniform as possible. We then group the men into *regiments*. This whole process is called regimentation. Some writers lead one to believe that all Masons, or all Jews, or all Negroes are alike—some even intimate that all people of a given culture are alike; and of course such writers are correct—to some degree.

If, however, one is primarily interested in individual differences among people, then this bias, instead of the other, helps one to select attitudes, and to determine what, in this respect, one sees in people. The armed services emphasize uniformity, but in our society we have other configurations of common traits which are dedicated to the proposition that all men are different. Such are exclusive clubs, fraternities, sororities, and social classes. Writers who hold this point of view lead one to believe that all men are different, and they, too, are correct—to some degree.


No two finger prints are *exactly* alike, and no two people are *exactly* alike, therefore, some writers suggest, every man is unique. At times such thoughts are comforting; at other times, in other situations, they are frightening. One would probably feel uncomfortable going down the street in "unique" clothes, yet no two suits are *exactly* alike. An endless argument, with endless qualifications ensues, each group trying to prove one side or the other of the dichotomy: unique — uniform.

#### UNIQUE AND UNIFORM OPERATIONALLY DEFINED

The key word to help us out of our dilemma is the word "exactly." No two people are "exactly" alike, that is, "in all respects."

But this implies that people *are alike in some respects*. The question, then, is one of more or less, similarity and difference are phases of a continuous variable. Since definitions are not made in heaven, and since "unique" emphasizes individuality stretched nearly to infinity, and since we are talking about personie behavior, not merely individuality, when speaking of personality—for these reasons we define unique and uniform operationally by Figure II

Figure II  
Scale of Similarity



Classroom experience teaches us that if we use this definition much emotional energy will be conserved. The two concepts "unique" and "uniform" represent hypothetical points on a continuum measuring similarity. We say "hypothetical" because anything measured, specified, or defined by unique = 0 on a scale of similarity could not be known for the simple reason that we would have no symbol for it. Learning is an extension of something already known; the "new" is integrated in terms of the "old." To conceive of something totally unlike anything else in the universe is impossible. The position 100 is also hypothetical because anything defined by uniform = 100 on a scale of similarity could not be differentiated from other members of its class and therefore could not be known as an individual.

For practical purposes we speak of similarities or differences depending on the direction of our interest or purpose at the moment. For scientific purposes we regard "uniform" as a term describing phenomena some of whose attributes or properties are located toward the upper area of a scale of similarity; and we regard "unique" as a term describing phenomena some of whose attributes are located toward the lower area of the same scale. When we speak of a series of similar acts or uniformities as constituting a tinsit we refer to acts which are more rather than less alike, which are similar within a range of deviation or tolerance, on

the assumption that for scientific purposes "*a difference that makes no difference is no difference.*"<sup>1</sup>

### THE FALLACY OF THE UNIQUE PERSONALITY

What do these operational definitions do to one's conventional thought patterns? Let us go to the literature of personality study to see what can be made of such definitions. First we shall consider the idea of the "unique" *systems* of tinsits, or the "unique" personality, and secondly, the "unique" tinsit or act of the individual personality. Almost all students of personality use the expression "the unique personality," and we choose an example from a book already mentioned.

*The outstanding characteristic of man is his individuality. He is a unique creation of the forces of nature . . . The person, who is a unique and never-repeated phenomenon, evades the traditional scientific approach at every step.*<sup>2</sup>

Certain words in the above quotation have been italicized by the present writer. These words are abstract generalizations representing *classes* of phenomena or events. The author of the quotation also states on page 4 that "A 'class' . . . is a question-begging concept, for it in turn is an abstraction designed to cover common occurrences." One of the italicized words above is "man." This refers to no particular man but to man as a class. Apparently, then, even the "unique" can be put into a class with other "unique" things of *the same kind*! But if a thing were unique, there could be no others of the same kind unless we say that two unique phenomena are alike in that they are unlike each other. This is hard on one's nervous system. The italicized words, then, show that the unique cannot be known, for it cannot even be thought about, and therefore not talked about, without the use of symbols, which are general abstractions called class-concepts or "question-begging" concepts.

That the person is "never-repeated" exactly is true of every phenomenon in the universe, whether man, dog, rat, monkey, crys-

<sup>1</sup> For this delightful slogan I am indebted to J. F. Brown. *Psychology and the Social Order*, p. 56, who attributes it to Professor H. Feigl. I should like to extend the slogan for the benefit of the other end of the scale—a *similarity that makes no difference is no similarity*.

<sup>2</sup> G. W. Allport: *Personality*, pp. 3 and 5.

tal, thunderstorm, winter, summer, chicken, or any other thing. In Washington, D.C., one will find block on block of "identical" row-houses, but no two of them are duplicates if one looks closely enough. Manufactured or "machine made" things are said to be duplicates, but the microscope will show them to be different in many respects. But "*a difference that makes no difference is no difference.*" So it becomes a question of more or less of something, a matter of emphasis in some area of the similarity continuum. *What one emphasizes depends upon the job at hand*, and we are in complete sympathy with Professor Allport's *purpose* in this instance, which is to criticize and offer a counter influence against the practice of "atomistic" research, the study of isolated segments of human beings, and the practice of looking for the individual among his parts.

Many younger readers of Professor Allport's book are discouraged by the remark that the *person* "evades the traditional scientific approach at every step," and they are led to doubt the possibility of making a science of the study of human behavior. If by the words "traditional scientific approach" Professor Allport means the traditional practice of studying isolated segments of human behavior, then we agree with him that the *person* does evade this kind of scientific approach. But the study of segments is by no means the only scientific approach, and certainly not the method for the study of the person as a whole.

"The outstanding characteristic of man is his individuality" means only that the author of the statement prefers this method of looking at man. But those who have other interests and purposes might with equal justification say that the "outstanding characteristic of man" is his grasping tendency, or his hand, or his brain, or his use of language, or his binocular vision—or a hundred other things. For many purposes of social psychology a man's outstanding characteristic is his similarity to other men in numerous significant respects. To separate a group of students on the basis of *similarity* in getting a grade of "A" is at the same time to separate them on the basis of a difference compared with those who get a grade of "B." One always uses both similarities and differences, two phases of the same thing, but one may emphasize one phase more than the other under certain conditions. To make a dichotomy of these terms results in controversy as futile as the old controversy about inductive and deductive reasoning, also two phases of the

same thing. Dichotomies are the happy hunting ground of controversy. In this book we are interested in both similarities and differences in men because man cannot be studied in any other way, nor can anything else. Difference is but a low degree of similarity, and similarity is but a low degree of difference.

Finally, the practice of treating personality as solely the equivalent of individuality creates difficulties. Individuality is an important phase of study, but it is always a matter of more or less. The reader will find that almost every book that regards personality as synonymous with individuality will lament the use of popular expressions such as "Jack has lots of personality." These authors object to "lots" because everyone has personality, and personality is not a quantity. But such authors are themselves in conformity with this popular practice, for it is quite legitimate to speak of more or less individuality. Individuality means deviation from some norm or norms, and people do differ widely in this respect. In the present work individuality refers to deviation (from some norm or norms) in the direction of unique = 0. Commonality means deviation in the direction of uniformity = 100 on a scale of similarity. No "correct" way to define personality exists, but if "personality" is going to be taken to mean "individuality," then we think it better to use the latter term which is understood as a continuous variable by even the uneducated. At some points in our study we, as everyone does and must, emphasize similarities, and at other points, differences.

### THE FALLACY OF THE UNIQUE ACT

The previous topic concerned a frequency distribution of personalities, but the idea of the unique act concerns a frequency distribution of acts in a given personality; the same principles apply here also. No two acts of a person are "exactly" alike, and some writers make a great to-do about such an obvious fact. They might with equal profundity say that no two acts of a person are *completely* different. If every act of a person were unique or completely different from every other act, we could not know ourselves or anyone else, nor could we adjust to each other in a society; nor would there be any continuity or consistency in personality. *The acts of a person in type-situations resemble each other on a scale of*



*similarity*, and all of us daily categorize or type such acts in order to live together at all.

The single, lone, isolated, unique act is as fallacious as the single, lone, isolated, unique personality. In either case such a phenomenon could not be known. All the concepts of this book are oriented around the concept of process. The life of each individual person is thought of as one continuous process or act. For purposes of study this must be broken up into arbitrary segments also called acts, and an "act" is as large or small a segment of the total process as is demanded for a particular purpose of analysis and study. "John-went-on-his-vacation"; "John-fell-in-love-with-Mary", "John-looked-at-his-watch", these are all "acts."

Every act is a segment of a total process and an integral part of that process, or system, and therefore is not unique. Every act finds its direction and meaning in reference to the person's apperceptive frame of reference in a given situational context, and therefore could not be unique. Every act as an emergent is to some extent new, but of necessity it emerges from what has gone before in similar situations, and therefore could not be unique. Every act has been more or less thought of or rehearsed, at least in type, before it occurs, for a person cannot do what he does not know how to do, and he therefore must have done it before, in some degree, explicitly or implicitly. Therefore it could not be unique. No act could be *completely* new, or *completely* different from all other acts, a totally new or different act is inconceivable.

. . . in general it is clear that new habits cannot possibly be built except out of old ones. The organism can never make a new response in a strict sense, a response utterly different from the responses made on a reflex basis. If the new act consists in the integration of disparate acts previously present, the integration depends upon a genuine biological unification. New habits are not plastered on piecemeal, they are assimilated into the dominant pattern of a going concern.<sup>3</sup>

Every act has a history, long or short, significant in terms of more or less. A process is a sequence of *related*, not *unique* events.

The following statement from a well-known psychiatrist is instructive in this regard:

At this point I wish to say that if this series of lectures is to be reasonably successful, it will finally have demonstrated that there is nothing

<sup>3</sup> G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb. *Experimental Social Psychology*. New York: Harper & Brothers, revised edition, 1937, p. 166.

unique in the phenomena of the gravest functional illness. The most peculiar behavior of the acutely schizophrenic patient, I hope to demonstrate, is made up of interpersonal processes with which each one of us is, or historically has been, familiar. For the greater part of the performances, the interpersonal processes of the psychotic patient are exactly of a piece with processes which we manifest some time every twenty-four hours.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. Personality Includes the Entire Personic System

In the first section of chapter I in our discussion of the nature of a unit of measure, we suggested that people can understand one another only to the extent that they use concepts which have for them a standardized or common meaning. If the reader is going to understand the author, we must approach the ideal of having identical meanings for the terms or symbols used.

We are about to examine a concept of personality; but we would not have the reader approach the discussion with the attitude that he is going to be told what personality "really is." No definition of personality is given in nature, nor, so far as we know, in divine revelation. Some years ago Chief Justice Hughes of the United States Supreme Court referring to a disputed point of interpretation of the Constitution remarked, in effect, that no one knows what the Constitution "really is," for it really is almost anything. "The Constitution," he said, "is what the Supreme Court says it is," and I should add, "in a specific situation." In another situation the Constitution may be just the opposite, as has been demonstrated on several occasions. We should say the Constitution "really is" the kind of tints it induces in a given Supreme Court in specific cases. It is not, however, a matter of *mere* opinion—but a *consensus* of informed, competent persons. The Constitution is the behavior it arouses. The Constitution *is* what it *does*—to the Justices.

## THE NATURE OF A CONCEPT

"Personality" is a word; it points to a concept, and a concept symbolizes certain "ways" of acting toward "something." The "ways" are intellectual types of behavior; and the "something" is

<sup>4</sup> Sullivan: "Some Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry," p. 7.

"human behavior." "Personality," then, refers to a conceptual interpretation of the phenomena of human behavior. Since we can look at these phenomena in many ways, no one can say without qualification that there is a "correct" way and an "incorrect" way. Consequently we define "personality" (state the concept we refer to) to suit our convenience, in accordance with historical usage. The usefulness or truth of the concept will be determined by its adequacy in describing what we wish to portray.

While the concept personality is not given in nature, action is given, since we are born as organizations of living protoplasm. If the word "personality" survives, it will be because it refers to a concept which is adequate for a purpose, but our guess is that the term eventually will be abandoned in technical usage, for reasonable doubt exists about its ever coming to refer to a standardized concept. We shall define the term for our purpose, that is, state our concept, so that the reader will know what we are talking about, but we do not mean to imply that this is what personality "really is," for we do not believe in that kind of truth. A concept *is* what it *does*, and a man is what he *does*. In this book the word "truth" is synonymous with "adequacy for a purpose." For one writer to say that another writer's definition, or concept, "misses the point" and does not get at what personality "really is," exemplifies confusion of a symbol with what it symbolizes.

As our earlier discussion of system suggests, we postulate a variety of unit processes called probable behaviors under stated conditions; we postulate their occurring as if woven together into an interrelated, relatively integrated, relatively stable whole. Thus we are enabled and directed to observe in interaction the emergence of a system of probable behaviors which we arbitrarily call personality. One cannot find or see or observe anything closely corresponding to this phenomenon in any of the individual tinsits, but at some point in the process of integration of many tinsits a whole emerges which could not have been predicted *precisely* from a list of hypothetical separate tinsits. A concept *is* what it *does*.

We can see that a concept is not something given in nature, but an arbitrarily invented mental construct applied to nature to mark off stretches or segments of a continuous process for study. In this sense the whole, here called personality, becomes a unit of a larger situational or social process. Such mental constructs are used by man to aid in the ordering and understanding of the natural

phenomena of social interaction. They are constructs used as tools for unifying perceptions of phenomena and for discovering new relationships between such phenomena. If we can manipulate phenomena so as to demonstrate that they are to a satisfactory degree representative examples of this concept, we shall consider our operations reasonably successful.

### A PERSON IS WHAT HE DOES

People are known, judged, and adjusted to, on the basis of what they do, and what they induce others (through role-taking) to do to themselves. That this was recognized ages ago is indicated by such folk responses as "actions speak louder than words," "birds of a feather flock together," and "handsome is as handsome does." At various times I have informally tested this concept by asking hundreds of college students from widely different sections of the country to participate in informal experiments. The assembled subjects were told that they would be asked a question to which they should respond in writing immediately and without asking any questions. They were instructed to think of someone of whom they were very fond, and then they were asked: "What is he (she) like?" The question was repeated in reference to someone for whom they had a marked dislike. After a few minutes rest and discussion of irrelevant matters the subjects were asked to reply to: "What are you like?" Study of the results indicates that less than 10% of the descriptions contained any reference to *appearance*, that is, any description of the person's body, dress, beauty, or ugliness. What constituted a friend, an enemy, and a self was, in overwhelming proportion, *what the person does*. Actually, from the point of view of role-taking, it is what the other person induces one to do to one's self. Accordingly what we like or dislike in people is what they do (to us); and one's concept of self is also, apparently, based on what one does, how one acts, rather than how one looks or what one supposedly "is."

People seldom realize how badly they are misled when they speak of a person as "being" honest, "being" forthright, "being" aggressive, instead of speaking in terms of *acting* honestly, *acting* in a forthright manner, or *acting* aggressively. The *is-ness* (essence) derived from the former ways of speaking (of using forms of the verb "to be") are in large measure the source of man's trying

to find out what personality (or gravity or energy) "really is" Such habits lead one to believe that people "are" of dichotomous kinds (good-bad, bright-dull, extrovert-introvert). We believe every one "is" more or less all of these, that is, *behaves* in such ways more or less, in different situations, and that no man ever lived who behaved honestly or extrovertively or aggressively or in any other way, in all situations in his life. The saints are renowned for their guilt tinsits, and Robin Hood was a "good guy" from some points of view.

One conventional approach to the study of personality is this "The personality exists, the best scholar is he who best describes what it really is" But our approach here is as follows "We study human behavior, whatever we discover emerging as a relatively stable integrated system we call personality."

### OUR USE OF THE CONCEPT PERSONALITY

The usefulness (truth) of a concept must be determined by its adequacy in fulfilling the task assigned it. What is the task here assigned the concept "personality?" As Talcott Parsons says, "The concept 'personality' is to be regarded as a descriptive frame of reference for *stating* the facts of human action"<sup>5</sup> I should add to this the concept may be regarded also as a frame of reference for *discovering* such facts. Having said this, we must recall our definition of what constitutes a *fact*. Professor L. J. Henderson defines it as "an empirically verifiable statement about phenomena in terms of a conceptual scheme"<sup>6</sup> Now we can proceed to state the task assigned to the concept "personality" The concept is to be used 1) to discover and state the nature of the referrent of the concept, and 2) to discover and state the factors which determine and shape the referrent of the concept. By "referrent" is meant that-to-which the concept refers, that-which the concept symbolizes. We are definitely interested in the second proposition because we hold that these factors constitute the *conditions-under-which* the personality emerges as a continuous process. In social interaction a person is never "shaped," "molded" or moved by any phenomenon *until* it becomes a part of him. Indeed, he is shaped and changed

<sup>5</sup> Parsons *The Structure of Social Action*, p. 746

<sup>6</sup> Henderson: "An Approximate Definition of Fact." Cited by Parsons *The Structure of Social Action*, p. 41. Parsons here gives an illuminating commentary on the definition, emphasizing that a fact is a proposition *about* phenomena, not the phenomena themselves.

by its becoming a part of him and in the *process* of its becoming a part of him.

This work hopes to demonstrate that behavior is not the result of some skin-bounded entities nor of some vague phenomenon called environment, but that behavior is the resultant of a processual concept of interaction. Behavior is the result of behavior—of self and others.

### TOTAL VS. PARTIAL DEFINITIONS OF PERSONALITY

If our purpose is as stated above, then the concept personality must be defined in such a way as to direct our investigations and analyses toward that end. As a means of clarifying the definition to be used we shall examine some others. For those who prefer a well-developed conceptual formulation for social psychology it is embarrassing to grant that there are probably as many as one hundred definitions of personality.<sup>7</sup> One of the problems in social psychology is to account for this remarkable behavior of the experts themselves.

One of the *conditions under which* students of behavior have failed to standardize their responses to the term "personality" is the tradition (common tinsit) of the profession to think of personality as something less than the entire system of the person's behavior. The common tinsit of the profession is to *exclude* from the conceptual formulation whatever the particular investigator believes to be *not characteristic* of the person's behavior. One of the *conditions under which* such a tradition has developed in the West, as Kurt Lewin has brilliantly pointed out, is the prevalence of Aristotelian thinking which sees lawfulness only in high frequency of occurrence.

Many writers object to the "total" type of definition.<sup>8</sup> They say that this definition includes too much to be useful as a guide for research. Such writers maintain that they are interested in habits, attitudes, and traits, and that these three categories "constitute

<sup>7</sup> See G. W. Allport: *Personality*, chapter II. In this indefatigable survey Professor Allport discusses fifty definitions, from the early Greeks up to his own. LaPiere and Farnsworth. *Social Psychology*, pp. 147 and 471, cite a study by C. A. Gibb in 1940 which displays 66 definitions, and of course these authors, like Professor Allport, the present author, and most others, add their own.

<sup>8</sup> This is sometimes called the "omnibus" type, but "omnibus" has had at least one radically different meaning. See G. W. Allport: *Personality*, p. 347.

practically all behavior anyway" One might discover the nature of the residue if all writers—or even two or three of them—would exclude the same things For purposes of comparison several well known definitions are given below. The first two are examples of "total" definitions, the rest may be called "partial" definitions.

1. Personality is the sum total of all the biological innate dispositions, impulses, tendencies, appetites, and instincts of the individual, and the acquired dispositions and tendencies <sup>9</sup>
2. A man's personality . . . is his system of reactions and reaction possibilities *in toto* as viewed by fellow members of society It is the sum total of behavior trends manifested in his social adjustments <sup>10</sup>
3. By personality we mean technically the qualitative pattern of individual traits By *traits of personality* we mean the quantitative variations in physique, mentality, attitudes, etc., between individuals <sup>11</sup>
4. . . personality is the more or less organized or integrated ideas, traits, attitudes, frames of reference, and habits built up into roles and statuses which revolve around the central concept and sense of selfhood or ego-system <sup>12</sup>
- 5 With the exception of a few traits, personality may be defined as the individual's characteristic reactions to social stimuli, and the quality of his adaptation to the social features of his environment <sup>13</sup>
6. *Personality is the concept under which we subsume the individual's characteristic ideational, emotional and motor reactions and the characteristic organization of these responses* Characteristic in this definition means that the conduct in question is more a function of the individual than of the immediate stimulating situation Thus we would exclude from personality behavior which is imposed by the exigencies of the present situation <sup>14</sup>

The first two definitions represent a type which has been criticized for containing too much for research. Possibly this criticism arises from the practice of thinking of personality as an entity that *exists*, rather than as a system of probable occurrences under stated conditions Obviously no one investigation can examine the

<sup>9</sup> Morton Prince: *The Unconscious* Quoted in Katz and Schanck: *Social Psychology*, p 390

<sup>10</sup> J. F. Dashiell *Fundamentals of Objective Psychology*. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928, p 551

<sup>11</sup> J. F. Brown *Psychology and the Social Order*, p 239

<sup>12</sup> K. Young: *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*. New York F. S. Crofts & Co., Inc., 1940, p. 181.

<sup>13</sup> F. H. Allport: *Social Psychology*. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924, p. 101.

<sup>14</sup> Katz and Schanck *Social Psychology*, p 391.

whole personality in either case, but the total definition has the virtue of giving one a feeling of assurance that there are objective boundaries to one's general area of investigation

The first definition includes behavior on the physiological or organic and somatic level and is unacceptable for the conceptual formulation in the present work. Number two is to my mind one of the most adequate definitions ever offered, and is not used in the present work only because of the desire to use consistently the terminology presented in this book. The third includes physique, which is not behavior, and the definition pertains to individuality which, according to the present work, is only a phase of personality, not its entirety. The fourth definition is an excellent one and is in general agreement with the present work. Definitions five and six are probably the most "characteristic" definitions, the characteristic being the "characteristic tinsit" to exclude what is not "characteristic," and the characteristic use of the word "characteristic" as a discrete variable. Number five does not tell what is excluded, but number six attempts this by what is, in our opinion, a logical fallacy.

"Characteristic" definitions suggest that some behaviors are not included because, somehow, they are not "characteristic" of the individual. But how is one to know whether a given behavior is characteristic of a person? At what point in a frequency distribution does "characteristic" emerge? Is not "characteristic" another case of more or less? Our bases for denying the unique act imply that every act is in some degree characteristic of the person, but not necessarily significantly so for all purposes of investigation. We must avoid this dichotomy (characteristic-noncharacteristic) and replace it with a serial concept or continuous variable. Our position is that *all* personic behavior is *more or less* characteristic. The word "characteristic" is for the present work synonymous with stable, which is a continuous variable. Behavior that is usually called characteristic we refer to as highly probable or highly stable. All personic behavior falls into "probable behavior" and belongs to a system of probable behaviors. If all of the individual's personic behavior is relatively characteristic, we cannot logically leave any of it out of a conceptual system which purports to account for all human behavior.

Limiting personality to what is characteristic in the usual sense, that is, "most characteristic," is one of the chief *conditions*



*under which* such an amazing number of definitions develops. Scholars have been unable to agree on what is characteristic, and probably men will never agree on any dichotomous concept "Characteristic" allows every man to write his own ticket, a condition that was true also of the old instinct theories by which every writer made his own list of instincts and each list was supposed to be right. If one were to add up all the elements in all partial definitions of personality one would have a total definition, just as, if one added up all the instincts in all the old lists, the sum would cover all human behavior, and the sub-personic as well. Hence we take the position that in dealing with a personic system no justification can be made for leaving anything out, except what is other than personic.

We may illustrate our point by definition number six, which is one of the few partial definitions to provide us with an exclusion clause as a step toward precision. However, the definition violates the proposition that personality is part of the situation by postulating two elements, personality *and* situation, as separate phenomena. We regard personality as a behavior structure, and behavior never occurs except in a situational context. Therefore personality never occurs except in situations, and to separate personality and situation is to do violence to logic.

This practice of separation raises two problems which are beyond solution except by a different conceptual scheme. The first is that the investigator is compelled to attempt to determine the *relative importance of each*, that is, the relative importance of the imaginary separate entity called "the personality" as against the relative importance of the imaginary separate phenomenon called "the situation." This problem is insolvable from a field theory viewpoint because as stated it is logically fallacious, and is Aristotelian thinking at its worst. The second problem raised by this separation of personality and situation is that of scientifically establishing a conceptual basis for the control of behavior. Within my purview only three known conceptual devices for the control of human behavior exist, namely, the situation (the *conditions under which* the behavior occurs), free will, and deity. If, for example, a "trait" *exists*, why does it not operate twenty-four hours a day every day? What controls it? For the vast majority of people the obvious answer is free will, but this answer rules out the possibility of a science of human behavior. In *all* sciences the behavior of *any* phenomenon is conceived of as being controlled or determined by the *conditions*

*under which* it occurs. The third device, deity, although thoroughly legitimate and respectable, is not a scientific device, and the latter is what we are seeking

Let us now return to the problem of using "characteristic" as a discrete variable. During World War II a general officer slapped a soldier's face, and the event almost became a political issue in the United States. The general, we are told, had never done such a thing before, therefore practically every partial definition of personality would conceptually exclude this act from consideration as personality behavior because it was not "characteristic" of the man. Characteristic, according to this way of thinking, must mean frequent. But how many times would the general have to do something like this before one could judge it to be characteristic of him, two, four, six, or eight? "Characteristic" is a vague word when treated as a discrete variable.

We believe that every act is an integral part of the personality and has a history whether it be a crime, a dream, a philanthropic act, a marriage, or a truancy from school, and that every act is an index of some tinsit or constellation of tinsits, and is in some degree characteristic of the person.<sup>15</sup> Our interpretation of the slapping incident is that the officer had probably felt like doing this many times, in certain types of situations, but that only in this particular situation were all the components in the interactional field such that their geometric sum resulted in his doing it. If we had the instruments to measure the components of that situational field and the conditions under which the event occurred, we could isolate the *relevant* conditions, and on that basis calculate the probability of his doing it again in similar situations. If we could ever ascertain the *exact* conditions, we could predict this behavior in terms of something approaching probability = 1.0 or certainty. This we do not expect to do; but such precision is less common in even the more exact sciences, and for practical purposes it is not necessary.

### THE DEFINITION USED IN THIS BOOK

It should now be clear why the heading for section 2 refers to the "entire" personic system. All *but* the personic is excluded from our conceptual formulation of personality, but *all* of the personic is included. This postulates law and order for the so-called

<sup>15</sup> See Appendix I.

single, isolated, or "unique" act. The definition in the present work is this.

Personality is the emergent system of personic tinsits to which reference is made by the personal pronouns

Every act, whether it occurs only once or frequently, must be ordered in this system as conceptually intelligible, and may not be thrown out *a priori* as not "characteristic." A given event must occur under certain conditions, a combination of relevant conditions must produce the resultant. Since situational analysis has not developed to the point where these combinations of conditions have been isolated for various type actions, we do not yet know, for all forms of behavior, when the relevant combination of conditions is present in a situational field. We can classify situations on the basis of some similarities, that is, situations of considerable similarity do recur but since the combination of relevant conditions for an act of a given type has not been isolated with sufficient exactitude we have to deal in terms of probability on the basis of the apparent similarity of the recurring fields.

Probability, then, is based on the likelihood of the presence of relevant conditions when we see situations as similar. This is why precision instruments are so important in science, they give us greater efficiency in isolating the relevant conditions and thereby increase the visibility of the relevant conditions. In social fields it often *looks as if* the relevant conditions for certain behaviors are present, but we cannot be sure since we cannot adequately isolate them with precision instruments.<sup>16</sup> In a given situation we may say, "Well, this situation looks as if the proper conditions for act N are present, and although I am not certain, I'll bet on it, I'll give certain odds on it."


In section 3 of Chapter II we used an exclusion clause and a test-device in attempting to delimit personality more accurately—to isolate more accurately the phenomena subsumed under our concept personality. Conditions relevant to the occurrence of an act lie hidden in the situational-field structure, presumably one of

<sup>16</sup> Precision instruments in the social sciences are not microscopes, micrometers, and calipers, but schedules, tests, scales, statistical devices and conceptual formulations of many types used for isolating relevant factors. See G. W. Allport: *Personality*, Part IV, for an excellent review. See also Young, *Personality*, Chapter XI, or any standard work on social research.

the tasks of social psychology is to discover and isolate them so they can be recognized, marked, measured, and communicated.

The term "personic" does not refer merely to that which distinguishes one person from another, nor to that which is "characteristic" of one person as distinguished from another, these are covered by the term "individuality." Considerable attention will be given to the subject of individuality in this book, and we shall treat it more systematically in a work now in preparation. The place and nature of individuality is suggested in Figure III.

Figure III  
Personality Continuum  
Degrees of Commonality of Tinsits



The scale in Figure III is the same as that on page 71 of this chapter which was used to define unique and uniform operationally. We are dealing here with the same phenomena. Our point of view is 1) that all men have some tinsits in common (for example, communicating in language symbols), 2) that everyone has a great many tinsits in common with a great number of other people of the same groups and in different groups (all American men wear trousers and short hair; all Republicans usually vote Republican); 3) many people have some tinsits in common (for example, Protestants generally object to attending Roman Catholic Church; some Republicans and some Democrats vote together in Congress); 4) going on down the scale in the direction of unique = 0 we find increasing instances of tinsits which fewer and fewer people have in common (traits, idiosyncrasies, and quirks).

All of this suggests that any behavior of any human being can be placed somewhere on this scale, and that for specific purposes of investigating behavior and for placing or categorizing people in terms of behavior patterns, every person can also be placed on this scale or measured by it in relation to some behavior constellation, large or small. We might subject John Doe to a battery of tests and find that in certain types of behavior his tinsits tend to fall on the upper areas of the scale; in that sense he measures high in common tinsits. Another set of tests might indicate that in other types of

behaviors he deviates greatly from other people, or from the social norm, and that here his tinsits tend to fall in the lower areas of the scale.

We see that personality, as defined earlier, is made up of two *general* types of behavior as regards degree of commonality with other people—and we call these two general regions individuality and commonality. I must here frankly state that while I consider both of these regions important for science, for employment, for marriage, and for all forms of social adjustment, yet my bias is that for most practical purposes of investigation and social adjustment, the region of commonality appears the more important. No doubt most of the really beautiful applications of scientific techniques have involved the lower region of this scale, in the measurement of individual differences. My bias is also that while such studies have been legion, ingenious, and precise, yet they have given us empirically verifiable data (facts) on atomistic and segmental behaviors without revealing sufficiently significant material concerning the person, the personic system, namely, John Doe, in the constellation of situations which we call his life. Studies of individual differences have told us little about John Doe's groups and how they constitute his common tinsits, the upper region of the scale, which is the field of social psychology proper. The lower end of the scale more properly belongs to psychology.

The upper region of the scale appears to be the more significant region of social adjustment and maladjustment, of individual and group neuroses, conflicts, ambitions, persecutions, and charities, on all social levels from the family to race relations and even to international relations. It is not that we love the lower end of the scale less, but that our age has a greater need for knowledge of the upper end of the scale.<sup>17</sup> By using this scale conceptually we can define individuality operationally as that complex, constellation, or system of behaviors of a person which falls in the lower region of the scale, and commonality as that which falls in the upper region. The person, the personality, is thus the entire personic system represented by the whole scale. We may state as hypothesis that the *social* nature of behavior tends to increase as we go up the scale.

So great has been the emphasis (in the West) on individuality

<sup>17</sup> This is convincingly demonstrated by Kurt Lewin in his posthumous volume, *Resolving Social Conflicts*. Harper & Brothers, 1948.

as the phase of behavior most worth studying, that the vast area of relative uniformities has appeared almost irrelevant. But men want to know themselves and their fellows—what they do, the conditions under which they do it, and the enigma of their behavior, as groups and as individuals. They want to know how this highly stable, recurrent, dependable structure of behavior is placed and kept on a plane of high probability, how they get into difficulty, and what a difficulty is, how they change, develop, and become something else, how and what they fear and hope, how and why they play, fight, work, sacrifice, envy, become exalted and dejected, follow the crowd and flee from it, why they have friends and enemies, are alternately kind and brutal, pray and scoff, feel pride and guilt, love and hate; why they feel that they choose freely but often suspect that they do not, why they are Methodists, Catholics and atheists, democrats, communists, and monarchists; and how these identifications determine their perceptions, and therefore their behavior, how some men can lynch others, and kill with and without social approval, why in some situations they give all, and in others take all, why in some they are irritable and in others they have the imperturbable patience of a mousetrap.

Men want to know the *conditions under which* all these behaviors occur and what the probability of these occurrences is under what conditions. This kind of knowledge will never come from studying only individual differences. If social psychology is to make a serious and creative contribution in our time, we must measure relative uniformities and the conditions under which they may occur, with some degree of probability, in all areas of behavior. Then the truly significant differences will appear.

### 3. Every Act Has a History

The reader is probably aware that the idea in this section heading has already been suggested several times. In lectures and class discussions the idea has raised many questions and furrowed brows. For this reason a short section is now devoted to the historicity of the "act." If there is anything radical about the section heading, it is probably in the bluntness of the statement, for most people in their daily lives behave *as if* they assumed that every act has a history. If John Doe acts, then it is John Doe's act, an act emerging in, and from, the personic system called John Doe.

*Every act is an integral part of a person's system and can be understood fully only in terms of that system* This follows logically from the thinking introduced so far, for the system, as process, gives meaning and significance to its segments. An act as a segment of an ongoing process would be meaningless if wrenched from its context in the process, just as a word would lose its meaning if taken out of context. Words, too, are acts.

What we have is the impression of a process whose intelligibility involves the determination of the parts of the process by the whole. If we know a process that is going on, then that whole will give meaning to the different stages of the process.<sup>18</sup>

Furthermore, the scope of any act is much broader than this, an act has a history not only in the individual life process, but likewise, in degree, in all the larger group and social processes of which it is a part. Any human act, that is, any social act, is part of a larger social act, and its history is bound up in the history of the total social process. For example, one's last murder, or suicide, is an index of a tinsit to commit murder or suicide, even though one's friends may be surprised when the behavior is observed. One's last murder or suicide is assumed to be a tendency which only *one situation* has aroused to overt completion, but which, at least in type, had been begun, rehearsed, thought about, many times. We do not refer to the legal concept "premeditated," nor do we mean that the person rehearsed that particular murder (or suicide), but that he had thought about the idea of murder many times. Probably even the most devout and effervescent revivalist has pondered the joy of murdering the devil, and even, perhaps, himself.

In a culture like ours, with its highly frustrating competitive life in political, economic, social, status-seeking activities, with movies, press, radio, and literature devoted to dramatic violence, it appears impossible for anyone to go through life without at some time having had such thoughts (tinsits) even though no situation has appeared adequate to arouse them to overt action. Probably very few persons in our culture have gone through childhood and adolescence without persistent thoughts of suicide, patricide, and matricide. The vast industry of "murder for pleasure" represented by the "whodunits" is not without significance. Such tinsits are very common, but our society has implanted also in us other powerful,

<sup>18</sup> G. H. Mead: *The Philosophy of the Act*, p. 636

competing tinsits which inhibit the outward expression of these violent tinsits. Many a child has many a time murdered his parents, the law responds only to the "last" or consummatory act.

Hitler was unquestionably murdered by an incalculable number of people "in their hearts." The margin between "in their hearts" and "in public" is measured by the history of the tinsit and of the type-situation of which it is a function. Thinking, fantasy, and day-dreaming are forms of behavior, usage prevents us from calling them acts. George Herbert Mead referred to such behavior as gestures, the beginnings of acts, "truncated acts." Language, which makes such behavior possible, has provided a means of doing these acts of violence symbolically, thereby releasing the energy without destroying the human race. The symbolic process has saved mankind from other forms of behavior also.<sup>19</sup> Using atomic energy for constructive purposes is the problem of devising ways to release it slowly instead of explosively, this is likewise a fundamental problem in the release of energy as human behavior. When a court punishes a person for a criminal act it treats only a symptom of a tinsit, a practice long since frowned upon in medical science.

#### AN ACT IS A SPECIAL CASE OF TINSIT

Through classification, one habitual (conditioned) response will serve for a multitude of individual cases.<sup>20</sup> A tinsit is thus, in a sense, a category representing a class or type of acts. No two acts are absolutely identical, but they both may indicate the same tinsit and, as such, both involve the history of the personality, for tinsits emerge in an integration. Tinsits differ considerably in specificity; some may be highly specific to one situation, while others are aroused by many situations which have something in common, enabling us to categorize or type them. Many acts of an individual may, to the crude precision instruments of the courts, look like stealing, but more precise techniques, considering the history of the act, may indicate that the act represents some other tinsit. That such history may not be admitted as evidence does not add to the prestige of the court.

An act is a segment of a continuity of action just as a mile is a segment of a continuity of matter. An act is a segment of a process

<sup>19</sup> See Matthew 5:28.

<sup>20</sup> Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 340.



and is in some degree related to all other segments (acts) of the process. This relationship constitutes its history.

### HISTORICITY AND UNIQUENESS

Another implication of the historicity of the act is that it points to the act as a functional unit of some degree of stability, not a mere isolated, arbitrary, fortuitous, capricious phenomenon due to some momentary whim. The "unique" act has a history, in this case we conceive it to be lawful or conceptually intelligible. The effect of the concept is to gather together the apparently loose ends (acts) of the personality and enable us to see all acts as part of a relatively integrated whole. This apparently innocent little statement of emergence, "every act has a history," is fundamental to the whole theory presented in this book, and in many ways is the most important fact in the study and treatment of human behavior, and is fundamental to an understanding of such diverse phenomena as poverty, murder, divorce, poll taxes, economic monopolies, war, race riots, hoboism, grief, joy, insanity, and revolution. Isolated acts do not occur; every act indicates a tinsit and has a history.

This definitely does not mean that the history of every act goes back to infancy or childhood, tinsits may be assumed to differ in the length of their history. Nor does it mean that all behavior is habit, habit is but one form of tinsit. Every act is an emergent and if a given tinsit has a long history, the particular constellation called the present act may not be identical with, or may not, except to experts, even resemble the early acts which are its progenitors. Hence an act frequently gives the impression of being so different that it is called "unique."

Every act involves a reorganization of the whole system to some degree; so we can expect that the early special cases of a tinsit will not be identical with the later special cases of the same tinsit. This does not cancel its history. No act could possibly be completely new. In daily life people behave as if they believe this principle. They often generalize—frequently with great accuracy—on the basis of one act. They informally assume an average (a statistical operation) and say: "If John did so and so, he has probably done it before and will probably do it again under similar circumstances." We suggest that social psychology repeat the process formally.

Treating the individual statistically is doing formally what everyone daily does informally.

Human life is probably the most complicated process in the universe. Unless one is able to analyse some of its multifarious phenomena and to find recurring patterns to explain some of them, one can make no sense whatever of it.<sup>21</sup>

### THE LOGICAL BASIS OF THE HISTORICITY OF THE ACT

Within the present conceptual formulation this principle follows logically from the concepts *transit*, *emergence*, *system*, and *process*. The historicity of the act is a logical correlate of the repudiation of the unique act, and is supported, at least by implication, by principles of Freudian, *Gestalt*, and other psychologies. It will gain even greater support from the concept of selector-systems presented in the next chapter. Finally, it is supported by the theory of imitation.

#### *The Theory of Imitation.*

People once said that one learns by imitation; but we now see that one learns by *trying* to imitate. That is, one cannot imitate an act if one does not know how to imitate it, or we should not need athletic coaches and teachers. You cannot do what you do not know how to do, so if you do something, you must know how to do it; and if you know how to do it you must have done it before to some degree, either explicitly or implicitly; therefore you must have had, in some degree, a *transit* to do it. Implicit-explicit are, of course, phases of a continuous variable.

### 4. Can Personic Systems Be Classified?

Since our analysis and the acts of everyone in his daily social adjustments compel us to think of personalities in terms of similarities and differences as distributed on a continuum or scale, it seems conceptually necessary to provide formally for arranging personalities in categories so that we can isolate them, place them in order, and act toward them intelligently. We must seek to find some basis for classifying personalities into types but with a full understanding of what we are doing.

Such a classification cannot be undertaken in this book, but it

<sup>21</sup> Ernest E. Hadley: "Unrecognized Antagonisms Complicating Business Enterprise." *Psychiatry* (1938), Vol. I, pp. 13-31.

is desirable now to express a point of view on typology in its relation to the differentiation of personic systems. Thus, of course, would not be possible if each personic system were defined either as unique = 0 or as uniform = 100 on a scale of similarity. Under such conditions one person could not be compared with another in any respect and therefore none could be known.

In our daily living together everyone is placed into at least one type, and most people are placed in several types in different situations. Everyone knows about "the typical boy" or "the typical girl", a man may, in different situations, be referred to as a typical male, a typical Rotarian, a typical "yes-man", a woman may be a typical spinster, clubwoman, wife. Often we omit the word "typical" and say a person is a "glad-hander" or a "do-gooder." Or we may put type at the end of the statement—she is a motherly type, or a clinging vine type or athletic type, he is a "he-man" type, fatherly type, and so on. These are what we called stereotypes in Chapter II. All of these and hundreds more are general categories into which we place people in order to describe and interpret them, to praise or blame them. The stereotype may be complimentary or derogatory, just or unjust, but it always serves as a device of economy, a device to help describe and place people socially. What the stereotype gains in economy, however, it loses in accuracy, and accuracy in judging human behavior is often closely related to social justice and other ethical and even political considerations.

These popular stereotypes are used here merely to indicate that people do type each other. Those who devote their lives to the accurate study of any type of phenomena in the universe also find that data cannot be handled without resorting to categories and classifications, and we shall see that sometimes even careful students become so familiar with the categories they use that they forget that a category is a convenient mental construct and not part of one's data. Categories are not given in nature; they are man created labels or pigeon holes for bunching similarities and differences. Categories represent ways of acting toward things. Classification is one of the principal devices of all sciences; in fact, it is itself a science called taxonomy.

Students of human behavior also find it necessary to classify their data. The greater the accuracy one seeks, the more must one reduce the size and increase the number of the categories used, that is, we may approach unique = 0, but if we go too far the result is

as bad as if we had no categories at all. A reasonable balance must be struck between a small number of too large categories and a great many too small categories. For example, the term "man" is a category locating the human being in the biological order of things. But for studying man such a term is far too large a category, since it includes the whole scope of study. Man is a thousand things, not one. We may, for example, use color categories—white, black, brown, red, yellow. These categories are useful for certain purposes of anthropology and human ecology, but they are too few and too large for personality study. "Rich man, poor man, beggar man, thief"—these familiar categories are not useful for personality study because of too much overlapping, ideally, categories should be mutually exclusive. In the above jungle all may be thieves, all but the second may be rich, the last three may be poor, and all may be beggars.

But a science of human behavior must be able to postulate some kinds of types as norms from which deviations can be measured. If personality is a system, we find it reasonable and helpful to ask what kinds of systems there are. In Chapter VI we shall suggest that personality may be thought of as an energy system. Many men have studied personality as a type of energy system; for example, Jung with his "life force", Freud with his "libido", Bergson with his "élan vital", Nietzsche with his "will to power", all of these are interpretations in terms of an energy system; and there are others.

The break-down or classification probably most familiar to everyone is the *dichotomy*, or dual classification of opposites. We have already pointed out some of the evils of this type of classification. The dichotomy is probably the most widely used categorization in the study of personality "traits," some examples being extrovert-introvert, ascendant-submissive, intellectual-emotional, leader-not leader and adjusted-unadjusted.

Professor Kimball Young has given a review of various typologies, presenting many theories of personality and the types they propose, under three heads: 1. psychological types; 2. morphological types, and 3. sociological types. Under these three categories he discusses most of the important type concepts that have been used in personality study.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Young, *Personality*, Chapter XIII. This reference gives a well-rounded discussion of the limitations of typology. LaPiere and Farnsworth: *Social Psychology* give an enlightening discussion of the subject in their Chapter XI. They claim that personality typing is hardly more than stereotyping.

Data which exhibit marked similarities and differences cannot be studied accurately without some kind of classification, but we should understand that regardless of what is being studied, types always represent abstracted aspects of ways of acting toward data, types themselves are not given in the data. Hence a type never represents the whole thing studied, *types are invented to avoid referring to the whole thing*. One does not completely describe a personic system by the term extrovert, but that term does describe certain important aspects of *some*, not all, of the tinsits of a given personic system. If we speak of a ten-foot table that description is useful for a purpose but does not fully describe the table.

Some students of personality seem to object to the practice of categorizing people into types because types never represent the whole person. But the more aspects one puts into a given category or type the less precise will the description be, just as when one uses "man" or "woman." Although useful for some purposes, neither one of them tells us very much about personality. To represent the whole person requires a concept as broad as "personic system." If we are going to study many such systems we must break them down into smaller categories like tinsits and constellations of tinsits, and since no two personalities are completely similar, nor completely different, we must compare them on the basis of some acceptable range of similarities and differences which we can discover. Otherwise they cannot be compared at all.

"Type" is unsatisfactory at best even if properly used. To type one's enemies or inferiors or the objects of one's envy is relatively easy, accuracy is not an ideal in such procedures. "Nigger," "Hun," "Dago," "Sharecropper," "The Four Hundred," are based on certain aspects which the user dislikes or admires; the high degree of generality and inaccuracy permit emotional expansion and a feeling of superiority. Such terms are not to be dignified by the concept *type*, they are but stereotypes.

Personality typing has met with little success for two primary reasons: first, types have been postulated largely as discrete rather than continuous variables; and second, the typologists have been trying to type something that does not exist in looking for the personality as something *in the person* instead of seeing it as the person-in-situation. A person is referred to as an extrovert (a noun) as if the person behaved extrovertively in all situations. This is, of course, vague and illogical. Every normal person acts extrovertively

in some situations and introvertively in others; but for some persons one type of behavior is more probable in a larger variety of situations. Mere number of situations, however, is not the only consideration; types of situation must be considered and studied. We believe the use of nouns instead of verbs contributes to this abuse of the concept "type."<sup>23</sup>

If personalities were classified on the basis of their observed dominant traits in type-situations, probably no one would retain the present objection to the concept "type." We shall classify personalities in accordance with this practice. A dominant trait is a person's more probable or most probable tendency in a given type-situation. Type is, perhaps, an unfortunate word in view of our linguistic traditions, for it has a static connotation, and one thinks of it as representing a discrete entity, which in turn leads to dichotomous thinking. This leads to using type as the cause of behavior, and then each writer brings in his particularism: one is sure that the behavior is caused by morphological factors, another by psychological factors, another sociological factors, and divided we stand. Treating personality types as discrete entities instead of as continuous variables related to type-situations results in little or no thought being given to the classification of situations, or to their correlation with types of behavior.

We may summarize our conclusions regarding the use of the concept "type," and the concept "trait" also, as it will be treated later.

1. Types and traits are not discrete, concrete entities, but continuous variables in relation to people and dynamic when pertaining to a person's system. "Aggressive," "timid," "honest," or "introvert" are words describing highly probable or stable tendencies of persons in type-situations of greater or lesser variety, or degrees of generalization, both trait and type are dominant tendencies or constellations of tendencies of greater or lesser generalization in relation to such situations.

<sup>23</sup> G. W. Allport: *Personality*, p. 295, says: "A man may be said to have a trait, but he cannot be said to have a type. Rather he fits a type. This bit of usage betrays the important fact that types exist not in people or in nature, but rather in the eye of the observer." This statement overlooks the important fact that "trait" is a word describing certain ways of behaving and that "type" is likewise a word describing certain ways of behaving. A person is no more deluded when he sees a type than when he sees a trait; both are conceptual categories.

2. Thinking of a person as a type with the static, discrete connotation inherent in the word "type" tends to inhibit analysis of behavior; like the stereotype it describes only part of a person's system for a specific purpose and tends to close the mind to the rest of the person's system. (If a man commits one crime he is typed as a criminal, and so far as the public is concerned, when he is released from custody, he is an "ex-convict" and must assume the hazard of unemployment for life.)

We must orient our thought-ways to the idea that all people are more or less alike; types and traits may hide more than they reveal. But we shall probably have to do more typing rather than less. We must look for types of people-acting-in-situations.

## Chapter IV

### THE SYSTEM OPERATES SELECTIVELY

- 1 *The Selective Nature of All Natural Phenomena*
- 2 *The Nature of Selective Response*
  - A *Plasticity vs Selectivity*
- 3 *A Theory of Selectors*
  - A *The Doctrine of the Little Men*
  - B *The Selective Function of the Tinst*
  - C *The Mechanisms of Selective Response*
  - D *Needs as Selector-Systems*
4. *A Tentative Classification of Selectors*
  - A. *Somatic Selector-Systems*
  - B *Personic Selector-Systems*
  - C *Residual Selector-Systems*
5. *The Genesis of Selectors*

One of the interesting biases in man's thought processes is his belief that man alone, of all the phenomena in the universe, is able to make choices. This bias probably stems from the fact that, so far as we know, man is the only aspect of the universe that is conscious of making choices, or, as we say, of responding selectively to his environment. Yet a moment's reflection will convince anyone who is not afraid of such conviction that selective response is a property of everything in the universe, animate and inanimate alike

#### 1. The Selective Nature of All Natural Phenomena

Anyone who has raised a puppy or a kitten or any other pet learns very quickly that animals can be selective and fastidious about their foods, about what they will drink, about what they will play with, about where and when they will exercise their eliminative functions, and about the choice of a mate. They will like or dislike, fear or trust some things and some people more than others. Likewise he learns that a dog's stomach is somewhat selective, that it will reject some foods and articles and accept others; and he



learns, further, that if the dog gets a sliver in his paw the organism will be mobilized either to eject or to neutralize it, the white corpuscles of the blood will attack it and there will be pus. This means that the dog, his organs, and his tissues all function selectively, they select certain types of stimuli to which they will respond in certain ways. A car owner learns that his motor will run better on certain types of gasoline and oil than on others, that it responds selectively to fuels, refusing to go at all if fed kerosene, alcohol, water, or maple syrup. A billiard ball will respond to a cue, but not to a cue word, to sound waves but not to light waves. Iron filings will move in relation to a magnet but not to a twenty dollar bill or a pretty girl. An electron will respond to some phenomena, not all, under some conditions, not all. Water is highly selective about where it will run.

But man has never thought of all these "natural" things as being "free" or endowed with "free will" as he believes that he himself is. Perhaps the reader may say: "Oh, rubbish, these analogies are farfetched, an automobile *can't* run on maple syrup." But neither can a man run on food if his stomach chooses not to keep it down, or if his digestive and other functions are not able to handle it, a condition that occurs frequently in organisms in which perisodic systems emerge.

## 2. The Nature of Selective Response

Most people are accustomed to interpreting the term "selective response" as meaning the ability to select between a variety of things. This is, of course, partially correct, but—and this fundamental "but" is frequently overlooked—selecting between a variety of things does not mean selecting anything at all, that is, it does not mean selecting "freely." Selectivity actually implies a limitation, otherwise prediction would not be possible. Inanimate phenomena are generally *more* selective than living organisms. When we say that a motor cannot run on maple syrup, we are saying that it responds negatively to maple syrup as a fuel; to gasoline, however, it responds positively. But gasoline is the *only* fuel it will run on, the automobile motor is highly selective, very limited in what it *can* run on.

This kind of selection is true of all natural phenomena, and

man is as much a configuration of natural phenomena as is anything else in the universe. But man consists of living phenomena, and when we examine selective response in living organisms the concept is far more subtle and complicated. Man is so different from other natural phenomena, even from other living phenomena, that it does at first appear that in him selective response means the opposite of limitation and compulsion, it does appear that in man selective response, unlike behavior indicated by  $S \leftrightarrow R$ , means freedom of choice, and this does appear to mean that a person is free to respond or not to respond to the stimulus and free to respond to the "S" without compulsion from any source.

The superficial aspect contains, of course, an element of truth, but only an element, and not "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Selective response has a far more subtle meaning. Consider a puppy, for example. He is playing in a living room strewn with toys and objects. Suddenly he pounces on a rubber ball which excites him by bouncing away, and he dashes madly after it. But on his way he passes a small colored object, stops, gives it a few bites and is off again, only to be interrupted by another toy, and then another, and another, and another. As he passes a chair, a stool, a bookcase, an end table, a light cord, an open door, he takes a quick swipe at each one, to be momentarily stopped by the striking of a clock. Off he goes again, endlessly pulled this way and that by almost everything within sight, hearing, or reach, until he falls over exhausted and goes to sleep.

Now every intervening object "seems" to act as a stimulus to the puppy, he "seems" unable to select the things he will take a swipe at; everything seems to be a stimulus to his behavior. The word "seems" here is quite gratuitous, for he is indeed literally at the mercy of these things; he must respond to (take a swipe at) all of these intervening objects; he does not yet have any mechanism by which he can resist any of these objects, he cannot select among them. He has no choice. So we say he is "completely" plastic. "Completely" is an elaboration of the truth, for the nature of his organism makes for some selectivity.

The infant or baby responds similarly, except for its lesser mobility. Puppies and babies are quickly exhausted and both will fall asleep from utter exhaustion, frequently with a toy in hand (paw) or mouth. Everything within sight, hearing, or touch, has a valence of some magnitude for the young animal of both species

and the animal is literally pushed around (or pulled around) until exhausted. As these little animals grow up, however, many objects one after another begin to lose their valence and cease to have the compulsive power of stimuli, the little animal becomes more and more *selective*, *he is in thrall to fewer and fewer objects under different conditions*. He has built up some resistances, but he still acts compulsively toward *some* things, even if the number, kind, and degree are fewer and more differentiated. But when any object is a stimulus, choice is of the nature of strength of valence, and response to the *dominant stimulus*, by definition, allows of no choice at all.

Thus *selectivity* takes on the meaning of *limitation*, as the animal matures he is compulsively subject to fewer kinds of stimuli and subject to them in more varied degrees of compulsiveness. Thinking of this from the point of view of the object as stimulus instead of from the point of view of the respondent, we say 1) fewer objects have a valence for him, and 2) the valences of all objects become scalar, become continuous variables and are no longer absolutes. We can say this in several ways. the animal responds to fewer objects; there are fewer objects to which he *must* respond, there are fewer objects to which he *can* respond, in any given situation.

Thus we discover that although the popular idea of selectivity connotes freedom, what it actually represents is limitation or restriction; the animal is now *free* from the necessity of responding to everything within sight, hearing, or reach; he is free from the condition in which everything within sight, hearing, or reach has a strong enough valence to make him respond, which means that he can no longer respond to everything within sight, hearing, or reach under any and all conditions. The *freedom* people talk about in this matter is thus freedom from indiscriminate compulsion, *freedom* to be in thrall to fewer stimuli. It *does not* mean freedom "to do anything at all." It means restriction of the number and kind of stimuli, restriction in the strength of a stimulus depending on the conditions, *depending on the situation*. Behavior has become a function of the situation which now enables and compels the animal to select from among the many things that had been pulling and pushing him. But he is still in thrall to what he is sensitive to—to what he selects as stimuli.

Selective response gives one the freedom of a loose strait

jacket; there are no longer so many things one *must do*, nor are there so many things one *can do* regardless of conditions. A person with an abnormal compulsion is in this respect zero degrees plastic, 100 degrees selective. This meaning is contained in the popular expression "he is snooty, he is very choosy about his friends."

### PLASTICITY VS. SELECTIVITY

What emerges from the above discussion is the remarkable nature of all living organisms, a nature well-nigh incredible in the human organism. We see from the previous discussion that plasticity and selectivity are not two different kinds of processes but the same phenomenon measured by the opposite ends or areas of a scale. An adult organism is more rather than less selective, and a young organism is more rather than less plastic, we have a continuous variable on a scale of dynamics or "educability."

The puppy and the infant have a remarkable plasticity; and are highly, but not completely, unspecialized or unselective in their behavior. The neonate can be canalized and conditioned to any culture whatsoever, to any of the thousands of languages, dialects, and vocabularies on earth, to any of the infinite permutations of group-identifications and patterns of polarized common traits—*under certain conditions*. One of the conditions is the quality or condition of its nervous system, particularly the central nervous system, the most potent and crucial of all somatic selector-systems.

Plasticity, like randomness, is inversely related to selectivity. Selective response is at the other end of the scale from random response. The more stimuli one is *receptive* to, the less one is *selective*. Plasticity looks like "freedom," but is thralldom to uncontrolled diversity, it is chaos. Selectivity is restriction, and therefore freedom—freedom from thralldom to excessive diversity, but not freedom within the specialized selective pattern; selectivity is freedom from non-pattern. Without the selective function of probable ("established") behaviors, that is, selectors, one would be, not completely, but largely, at the mercy of his surroundings affecting him as stimuli. Selectivity is a function of *specialization*, and this means restriction, narrowing the range of thralldom represented by high plasticity. To specialize is to become selective in terms of the specialty, shutting off other possibilities (necessities).

Such is selective response as we see it. Our contention in this

and the following chapters is that man's selectivity is such that he, like the motor, cannot respond to that which he is not sensitive to, that he cannot avoid responding to his dominant stimulus in a given situation, that he cannot freely choose what his dominant stimulus will be in any situation. This ability to respond to a limited variety of stimuli in a limited variety of ways is a protective restriction preventing him from being compelled, like the puppy, to respond in every kind of way to every kind of object as stimulus.

The selectivity of man's behavior differs from the selectivity of the behavior of other natural phenomena, including, possibly, other living things, in at least two respects: in the extent of his selectivity, and in the extent to which he is aware of the process. Not always conscious of his choices, man is seldom, if ever, conscious of ("knows") how or why he makes any choice. His selectors usually elude him. But what are "selectors"? What are the mechanisms by which man selects? What is it that does the active selecting? How do men choose?

### 3. A Theory of Selectors

#### THE DOCTRINE OF THE LITTLE MEN

Traditionally, in our culture, almost everyone is taught that the actual selecting is done by a group of autonomous mechanisms or devices, this idea we may describe under the general heading of the "Doctrine of the Little Men." The West retains a well recognized popular prejudice against attempting to use the methodologies of the more exact sciences in the study of human behavior. For some people such technics tend to degrade the human soul and put it on a level with sticks and stones. Why these people believe that the men who use scientific technics and concepts think less of themselves than other men think of themselves is not clear, but many believe that such attempts at accuracy reduce the person to the status of a machine. Paradoxically it is the popular conceptual system of the man-in-the-street itself which treats the human being as a machine.<sup>1</sup> A machine must have attendants, and

<sup>1</sup> If the reader is surprised at the suggestion that the "man-in-the-street" has a conceptual system or theory, he may be assured that nothing approaching what we call knowledge (symbolized experience) would be possible, nothing could be known, without some sort of theory. A theory is a frame of reference to which one refers every sensation for interpretation.

the theory of the man-in-the-street provides them in abundance. According to this popular theory the soul is the chief engineer; his assistant is a husky stoker called emotion who tends the fires, and, when bored, builds up a head of steam on his own initiative; we also find an aggressive stationary engineer called will who has a mind of his own, to the great annoyance and suffering of another chap called conscience, whose assistants are censors, superegos, and ids. All of these gremlins are under the general supervision of a consulting architect called reason, whose executive officer is an ego, and who is usually somewhere else when wanted. These gremlins are prolific and have large families of self-willed urges, drives, élans, entelechies, dynamisms, and autonomous motives, who are rugged individualists and self-made men. The whole tribe operates in a system of social anarchy with a legal structure of *laissez-faire* and local autonomy under the slogan "free will for the gremlins." These little men are constantly getting in the way of research and socially visible (objective) thinking, and their endless quarrels and conflicts make human behavior an unpredictable enigma. The little men are fighters, constantly at war with each other, constantly blaming each other for throwing monkey wrenches into the machinery. To cover up their own delinquencies they send the machine off on endless witch-hunting expeditions and searches for scapegoats.

These little fellows have been doing the selecting in our culture, and if a student of behavior challenges their credentials, they grow violent and call the investigator "communist," "radical," "crackpot" or some equally denigrating epithet. To challenge the vested interests seems impertinent, and in this instance even dangerous; for these little men have, and are, vested interests; and they do not hesitate to cow a person with the boast that they have filled our prisons with hundreds of thousands of decaying men, have populated our mental hospitals with hundreds of thousands more, and have driven thousands from the security of their jobs or to suicide. These chaps are not sissies.

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(M.). Every normal person has some sort of philosophy of life, a set of attitudes, by which he interprets and evaluates what registers on his personality, and by which he transforms these events into "experience." To say that a man has no theory, no philosophy of life, is to say that he does not have a recognized way of looking at things and therefore can know nothing. For a good explanation of this see Arnold M. Rose: "Popular Logic: A Methodological Suggestion," *American Sociological Review* (Oct. 1946), Vol. 11, pp. 590-2.

Nevertheless, dangerous as it may be, the attempt must be made to discover a more adequate system of mechanisms for selective response, devices by which man is enabled and compelled to make certain choices. Let us begin with the postulates that no phenomenon in the universe is a stimulus unless it is responded to,<sup>2</sup> that phenomena to which the somatic structure is not sensitive in a given situation are not part of its environment in that situation, that likewise, phenomena to which the *personic* structure is not sensitive in a given situation are not at the moment available to it as stimuli and are therefore not part of the person's environment in that situation. Our position is that responses to such stimuli, that is, *all* behaviors, are tendency in some degree, under stated conditions. The title of Chapter I is therefore "Behavior is Tendency," and the generic unit is given as the *tinsit*. The *tinsit* possesses five properties, but it also has some functions, one of which is *selectivity*. This chapter is concerned solely with selectivity.

### THE SELECTIVE FUNCTION OF THE TINSIT

The author has learned, with gratitude and profit, from Professors Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Theodore M. Newcomb, and Stuart Chapin, that the concept here presented can be subtle, not to say foggy. With the help of their kindly criticisms, but without in any sense implicating them, I shall attempt to present my concept of "selectors."

In Chapter I tendency-in-situation was shortened to the form "*tinsit*," for convenience; but when we say "*tinsit*," we are still talking about "tendency" even though in a restricted form. Tendency, and therefore *tinsit*, was said to represent such phenomena as dispositions, predispositions, bents, inclinations, prepotent responses, determining-tendencies, "preferential responses" (Bartlett), mental or neurological sets, or any form of readiness. It seems almost tautological to say that all these forms of readiness perform a *selective* function, but that is the gist of the matter.

One of the five properties of the *tinsit* is *stability*, a continuous variable. When we apply the concept of stability to that form of continuity called matter or stuff, we refer to its capacity to be dependable or static; but when the concept is applied to that other form of continuity called process, the connotation is of something

<sup>2</sup> It is assumed, of course, that no behavior is possible without a stimulus.

dynamic, but also dependable, or *probable* Tinsit was therefore defined as "a probable behavior under stated conditions," or "a probable behavior in a given situation."

Now, if an action, a behavior, a tinsit, is highly stable or highly probable under certain conditions, the force of logic compels us to suspect that some other behavior is highly improbable under these conditions. This is the negative aspect of the selective function of the tinsit, which is thus necessarily a *determining* function in proportion to its probability. But we are here more concerned with its positive aspect why does a person select one response rather than another? We must emphasize that we are talking about a *function* of a tinsit, one function among others, the selective function, to which we might refer as the "SF." Vast precedent for denoting a mechanism or a function by its initials occurs in all the sciences, especially in psychology.<sup>3</sup>

A question of taste, however, determines whether we call this function the SF or something else; as we suggested in the first chapter, all units and their symbols are arbitrary and depend for their adequacy upon the extent to which they become standardized usages. While "SF" would be quite acceptable to professional students of behavior, other people might consider the symbol stiff and strange. Most people prefer a word for such purposes. For this reason we shall use a single noun instead of the initials "SF" to denote this selective function of tinsits, the noun is "selector" or "selector-system." To those who believe that nouns like this lend themselves to reification, we may reply that "the SF" or "an SF" is subject to the same disadvantage. This idea of selectors is not new or radical; only the term is new. Perhaps the greatest advantage of the term is that it immediately connects the function with the well-worn concept "selective response," thus bringing together under one specific term a large group of behavior phenomena and associating them with the concept of selective response.

### THE MECHANISMS OF SELECTIVE RESPONSE

Tinsits are of many kinds, and our contention is that all tinsits have a selective function to some degree depending on the situa-

<sup>3</sup> For example, JND (just notable difference), PGR (psychogalvanic reflex), PSE (point of subjective equality), LPD (least perceptible difference), PS (point of symmetry), and CR (conditioned response).



tion. Hence we may say that many kinds of selectors or selector-systems occur in different situations and that selectors are always selectors-in-situation. They do not exist, they occur, under certain conditions. These selectors will be called the mechanisms of selective response. Selectors, then, are choice-making devices or mechanisms or functions. Part of our theory is that in a broad sense choices are made by past experience, that what a person feels about what he is perceiving, remembering, forgetting, thinking, or imagining determines (other elements of the field-structure permitting) what it is that he perceives, remembers, forgets, thinks, or imagines.

Any hope, fear, bias, prejudice, interest, habit, philosophy of life, or set of values—in short, *any need*—any tinsit or constellation of tinsits that makes one positively or negatively sensitive to any aspect of a situation will be called a selector or selector-system. If a person has a strong anti-Semitic prejudice or bias, this bias will tend to select or determine his responses in any discussion or situation in which Jews are implicated. If he hears of a person whom he does not know, and hears that the person is a Jew, his anti-Semitic bias will determine (select) his attitudes, evaluations, and judgments about that person, usually without his realizing it. He has a need to hate Jews. If a man has a strong religious bias against eating meat on Friday, this bias will tend to select favorable responses toward fish or other meat substitutes in eating-situations on Fridays. If a man is a staunch Republican he will carry with him a complex configuration of ready judgments on all sorts of political and economic situations which will tend to select his political and economic behavior.

This selective function of prejudices, predilections, biases, fears, hopes, interests, or of any other tinsit, somatic or personic, is what we mean by selector or selector-system. Selectors are the mechanisms which determine how, and towards what, the somatic and personic processes are directed in a given situation. Selectors are thus limiting, sensitizing and anaesthetizing devices which screen situational influences. They serve as screening devices for the central member of  $S \leftrightarrow_r M_n \leftrightarrow R$ . Also as tendencies-in-situation, playing a selective role, they alert the person to certain components of the situation which implicate his personality structure. They are like photoelectric cells, "electric eyes," which open the circuits of the personality to certain stimuli appropriate to, or consistent with, the personality structure. Functioning as personic eyes and

ears they select visual and auditory perceptions, and both enable and induce a person to "see" a situation in a certain limited and biased way as a particular contextual configuration.

Selectors determine what components of a social situation can register on the personality, whether on the upper or lower ranges of the conscious-unconscious continuum. In terms of photography we might say that the situation focuses the camera and trips the shutter, but what appears on the picture depends upon the selective properties of the lens-in-situation. Selectors operate to channelize experience and awareness, but they also channelize un verbalized or unconscious behavior. Functioning both positively and negatively, they sensitize the person, open him up, to some stimuli; blind him, close him up, to other stimuli. Much, if not most, selection, both positive and negative, is more or less inaccessible to awareness under normal conditions. Selectors are the mechanisms of repression and of lesser degrees of inhibition. Selectors may be thought of as the colored spectacles through which man views his world, and which therefore in large measure determine what a man's world is. They select and thereby create a person's environment. They select the stimuli which induce the emergence of the tint appropriate to the situation as they induce the individual to see the situation. A person "sees" what he needs to see; he neglects what he needs to neglect.

### NEEDS AS SELECTOR-SYSTEMS

The development of our presentation does not permit giving our theory of needs until we reach Chapter VII. For present purposes, however, this theory of needs may be rather inadequately described by the statement that in any situation a person needs what he thinks he needs, and the extent or measure of his needs is what he thinks it is. The theory is based on the fact that men behave as if this were true. In other words, need is operationally defined and measured by the behaviors directed toward satisfying it; "need is what the response measures." This concept of need requires rigorous application to situations of which the need is a function.

Needs determine how the incoming energies are to be put into structural form. Perception, then, is not something that is first registered objectively, then "distorted." Rather, as the need pattern shifts, the stage is set, minute by minute [situationally], for quasi-automatic

structure-giving tendencies [selectors] that make the percept suit the need. The need pattern predisposes to one rather than another manner of anchoring the percept around one's needs *Needs keep ahead of percepts* . . . although perception does in a sense convey reality, nevertheless what will appear in the *next* instant in perception derives in part from *present* needs. The needs are always controlling, perception, instead of being the law-giver, takes orders from the need . . . it is the need pattern that plays the chief role in determining *where we shall look*, to what outer stimuli we shall attend, what other factors shall be allowed to enter the control box [selector-system].<sup>4</sup>

I have taken the liberty of inserting "selectors" after the words "structure-giving tendencies" and after "control box," because these ideas express what I wish to convey by the concept "selector" or "selector-system." And I have inserted "situationally" after "minute by minute" to call attention to the previous statement that needs, like all *insights*, are functions of situations.

Needs as selectors are not confined to the biological processes, though biological needs are important. If a person is a male, his social needs far exceed what is referred to as sexual, he needs to be a "man," often a "gentleman", he needs a man's status, a man's security. He may also have Republican or Socialist needs, Christian needs, upper class needs, health needs, occupational needs, educational needs, capitalist needs, parental needs, sibling needs, and many others. In fact, he needs, and will behave in the direction of satisfying, whatever he thinks he needs. And this behavior includes his perceptions, which in turn guide and direct his other behaviors.

It has long been recognized that man's perceptions are highly selective, and as Murphy suggests in the preceding quotation, the selection is performed largely by different types of felt needs. Both the selection and the needs are highly unconscious or autistic. Murphy defines autism as "the movement of the cognitive processes in the direction of need satisfaction."<sup>5</sup> Perhaps the most familiar autisms are man's every day attitudes toward various phases of his social involvements. Attitudes are among his most potent selectors, without his realizing it. A person's attitudes

<sup>4</sup> Gardner Murphy, *Personality, A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947, pp. 377-8. (Italics in the original.) This quotation is from Murphy's Chapter 15, on "Autism." This and his Chapter 14, "The Perceiver," offer abundant support, well documented, for the point of view of our present chapter.

<sup>5</sup> Murphy: *Personality*, p. 365.

toward a given event, person, scene, taste, sound, or anything else are potent field conditions determining his perceptions in relation to them, and will tend to control the power of these things to condition his behavior in relation to them. Attitudes are selectors, that is, are dispositions or tinsits which have a significant selective function in most situations in which they are relevant.

Attitudes are among those components of the psychological makeup of the individual which determine that he shall react, not in a passive or neutral way, but in a selective and characteristic way, especially in relation to certain specific stimulus situations. Attitudes are not, of course, the only psychological components or states that determine that the individual will react to the environment in a selective or characteristic way. When the individual is hungry, thirsty, or sexually aroused, or in some other emotional state, or has been recently stimulated by a functional change in the receptor organ or in the organism at large, he reacts in selective or characteristic ways to the environment. Attitudes, then, are *among* the various psychological factors which determine the individual's selective reaction to his environment.<sup>6</sup>

In the spirit of this quotation we contend that all tinsits, on every level of the somatic and personic, tend, in some degree, to operate as selectors, that any act will to some degree predispose a person's behavior in similar situations, and will to that extent operate as a selector. A man is not free to behave, he is not capable of behaving, in disregard of his past experience, in disregard of his biases, prejudices, hopes, fears, and predilections. Indeed, he is usually not aware that these factors are influencing his perception—what he “sees” in the most ordinary life situations. The limiting aspect of selectivity is well illustrated by the statement:

To be human is not to be diffusely stimulable in all directions, it is to be selective, to be oriented toward particular classes and modes of stimulation.<sup>7</sup>

A man with a violent prejudice against Negroes may not realize that he needs to see Negroes as inferior, that he “cannot bring himself to believe” that Negroes are potentially in every respect the equal of white men. A man with a strongly capitalist bias, set

<sup>6</sup> Reprinted by permission from M. Sherif and H. Cantril. *The Psychology of Ego Involvements*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; 1947, p. 17.

<sup>7</sup> Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb: *Experimental Social Psychology*, p. 97.

of beliefs, or common tinsits, does not usually recognize that these beliefs are part of his fundamental needs and that they will practically compel him, autistically, to fear and be suspicious of communism, that his beliefs will thus select his typical behaviors toward anyone or anything labeled "communistic" or "capitalistic." But all of a man's beliefs, in every area of life, perform a selective function of this sort in his daily life situations. Such beliefs are selector-systems. A person sees in any situation what he thinks he ought to see, what he expects to see, what he has to see, in accordance with his apperceptive frame of reference which is his total selector-system.

In every laboratory investigation, as has often been pointed out, the subject is confronted by a more or less definite task [a selector-system]. His problem is set in general terms by the instructions which he receives and by his attitude toward the experimenter. In the majority of cases it is yet further and more narrowly defined [selected] *by his own native or acquired temperament, bias, and interests* . . . For what is presented at once stirs up in the subject some *preformed bias, interest, or some persistent temperamental factors*, [predispositions, selectors] and he at once adopts toward the situation some fairly specific attitude.<sup>8</sup>

These are selectors—these biases, interests, attitudes, temperamental tinsits, and many phases of the strictly physiological and somatic aspects of the organism to be considered presently. Bartlett continues his comments quoted above with the following:

This is why in all perceptual reactions . . . certain special features of [an] object always stand out as, psychologically, the most important parts of the whole presented. Because this task factor is always present, it is fitting to speak of every human cognitive reaction — perceiving, imaging, remembering, thinking and reasoning — as an *effort after meaning*. Certain of the tendencies [tinsits] which the subject brings with him into the situation . . . are utilized so as to make his reaction the "easiest," or least disagreeable, or the quickest and least obstructed that is at the time possible. When we try to discover how this is done we find that always it is an effort to connect what is given with something else. Thus the immediately present "stands for" something not immediately present [selectors], and "meaning," in the psychological sense, has its origin.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Bartlett. *Remembering*, pp. 43-4. (Italics mine).

<sup>9</sup> Bartlett. *Remembering*, p. 44. (Italics in the original).

All selection is covert and for the most part highly autistic. Selection is thus a private aspect of every act or tinsit, more or less. Later we shall relate this to George Herbert Mead's concept of the "truncated act," for, as Mead holds, a covert aspect exists in every personic tinsit, and this must be inferred from the consummatory acts in situational context.

Attitudes are inferred from the reactions (verbal or nonverbal) of man. When an individual reacts *repeatedly* in a characteristic way (positive or negative) in relation to a certain stimulus object, we infer that he has an established attitude [tinsit] toward that stimulus. When a group of individuals react *repeatedly* in a characteristic way to a stimulus situation, we infer that the members of the group have an established social attitude [polarized common tinsit] to it. This characteristic reaction of groups of people is sometimes called "conforming behavior." *These conformities are discriminatory or selective, as all attitudes [tinsits] are*<sup>10</sup>

We may now proceed to a tentative working classification of selectors, after which we shall present a series of specific examples of different types of selectors. But before giving this tentative classification, a word of caution is in order. After what has been said about the little men, we hope that the reader will not get the impression that selectors are here given the role of the little men. Language and its vocabularies are powerful selectors, and the word "selector," like the word "tinsit," is a noun, a form of speech that easily lends its self to reification.

In Western languages things are symbolized by nouns, so that when a person uses a noun he often assumes that he is referring to an object like table, chair, dog, or apple. Since nouns are habitually thought of as representing concrete things, despite the abstract nouns in our language, many people are unwittingly led into error when they have to use a noun to refer to an abstraction like a *concept* instead of to a *thing*. When nouns like "tinsit" or "selector" are used to represent a concept or mental construct, people tend to

<sup>10</sup> Sherif and Cantril. *The Psychology of Ego Involvements*, p. 29 (last italics added.) Chapters III and IV of Sherif and Cantril's book offer well documented support for our theory of selectors. As explained in our Chapter I, attitudes are one class of tinsits, but we claim for *all* tinsits the selective function here attributed to attitudes, always, of course, as a matter of degree. Group attitudes, or what I have called in brackets "polarized common tinsits" is what Bartlett (*Remembering*, p. 257) refers to as "preferred persistent tendencies" of a group.

reify the concept, that is, they tend to think of the concept, too, as a thing because it is known by a noun. For this reason we have cautioned the reader that "tinsits" and "selectors" are not things. "Selector" is a term which refers to a selective *function* of a human disposition or tendency under certain conditions. A function must be symbolized (referred to) by a noun if a person wants to speak about that function.

But tinsits, whether performing a selective function or any other function, never do anything "themselves." It is always the person who behaves, the person tends-in-situation to select the  $\cdot M_s$  in  $S \leftrightarrow \cdot M_s \leftrightarrow R$ . To indicate how he does this, we invent mental constructs and abstractions which are symbolized by nouns. But these nouns are merely convenient devices for noting the fact that, and for locating the means by which, a person performs a function called selecting or choosing. "Selector" refers to a function of all highly probable forms-of-readiness: the function of coloring, determining, selecting our behavior, our perceptions, our judgments, our thinking, our remembering, and our forgetting.

#### 4. A Tentative Classification of Selectors

##### I. Somatic Selector-Systems

1. The Organism
2. Physiological State
3. Temperament

##### II. Personie Selector-Systems

1. Identification with Groups, Objects, and Qualitative Tinsits
2. Statuses, Roles, Attitudes, and Habits
3. Languages and Special Vocabularies
4. Traditions, Customs, and Institutions
5. Conceptual Systems and other Inventions

##### III. Residual Selector-Systems

1. The Adjustment Task
2. Precision Instruments

This working classification is in no sense a definitive formulation. It is not a good classification according to taxonomic principles, for the categories are not mutually exclusive. We present it merely as a utility device to aid us in the job of presenting the ideas

which it represents and roughly orders. Let us now examine these selectors in some detail.

### SOMATIC SELECTOR-SYSTEMS

The human soma, or body, is subject to two forms of selectivity: as a system its parts are limited in the ways in which they can operate, although they enjoy some variety in this respect, they also select the kind of stimuli to which they will or can respond, that is, they are limited, although they enjoy some variety here also.

1. Everything in the universe tends to specialize in its own most probable capacities. The *human organism* is no exception. It can neither fly, nor swim, nor run as well as most quadrupeds, other animals its size are stronger, it cannot fight well, indeed it is utterly helpless before a shark or a tiger. Natural selection dictates that the survival of this organism is contingent upon its developing, and *specializing in*, its own most probable capacities. In doing this its behavior becomes selective in terms of these specializations.

The most probable capacity of man lies in his central nervous system with its mysterious and almost unfathomable cerebral cortex. The thing has "brains." By specializing in the use of this probable capacity the human organism can compensate for its undeveloped capacity to fly, swim, run, climb, bite, and fight. To survive, it does not have to develop these latter functions to the point of specializing in them, for by specializing in its own natural functions it can more or less outstrip all competitors. *This very process of specialization converts a function into a selector*, this is the true nature of disposition on every level of behavior. At birth most of the functions of the human organism are rather highly unspecialized, plastic, teachable, or unselective. This is particularly true of its central nervous system, in which this organism will very soon begin to specialize, lose plasticity, and gain selectivity.

Perhaps of second importance in the human organism's most probable capacities is its remarkably unspecialized vocal organs. This constellation of function is originally so plastic that it can normally learn to speak any of the thousands of languages and dialects and accents of the world. The neonate has to be born somewhere, and it begins almost at once to specialize in the kinds of sounds which bring the best results, the language and speech of its own



groups. As it learns, its plasticity, its ability to learn and speak other languages and dialects grows less and less. Specialization again converts a function into a selector, a selector so powerful that when the person hears people speak some other language he will probably consider them inferior to him.

Possibly of third importance in the organism's most probable capacities is that complex of probable behaviors which emerges by virtue of his extraordinary hand. Although highly unspecialized at birth, it is equipped with a thumb that is opposable to the palm and fingers, thus enabling him to grasp both large and small objects, to manipulate all sorts of delicate devices, to write languages, and even to make signs for use as a language. But here again, if the person is going to get the best results from this instrument, he must specialize in some of its abilities. If he specializes in writing, or in watchmaking, or in surgery, or in music, his hand will not be worth much for building boilers, laying bricks, driving a truck, or doing other heavy jobs that demand a strong, hard hand. His specialization makes his hand selective in what it can do. A boilermaker would have difficulty picking up the main spring of a woman's watch.

Everything about the organism learns to specialize and become selective in terms of these specializations: its sensory equipment for receiving sound, light, tactile, and thermal stimuli, its binocular vision, its skeletal and muscular systems, its adaptive and sustaining systems (respiration, circulation and digestion)—all these, and many more, increasingly lose their plasticity after birth, tend increasingly to specialize in some kinds of activity rather than others, and thus become selective. The organism becomes a system of somatic selectors.

If, for example, the stomach specializes in certain kinds of food (becomes accustomed to them) and its owner goes to some "strange" land where his host provides his guest with his finest delicacies such as grasshoppers, ants, rattlesnakes, and other choice bits, the stomach is likely to behave selectively toward them, or, as we say, it may turn itself inside out. An ear belonging to a man working in a boiler factory is not troubled by the noise, but it may not hear the violins at the concert. If the lungs specialize in air at sea level, they will show some selective consternation in the mountain air.

Despite the human organism's extensive specializations, it is

still one of the most educable (plastic) of all living organisms. It can in many ways make remarkable changes in its specializations, that is, become selective in new directions. Consider the ant, someone has said that this insect has not learned a thing in the 100,000 years of its existence. It behaves entirely by instinct, is zero degrees plastic, 100 degrees selective, meaning that it must select only those behaviors which are native to it.

In addition to those specializations of the human organism that we have mentioned, other specializations and selectors determine its behaviors, such as sex, size, age, physique, and specialized immunities from, and susceptibilities to, disease. These, too, are somatic selectors which determine much of the organism's behavior. Cancer, for example, is a highly specialized form of somatic behavior.

All of these somatic specializations have, or are, selective functions, they operate as selectors to select behaviors and their stimuli throughout the dynamic course of the organism's life. There are wave lengths of sound and light, and many other phenomena to which the human organism is not sensitive and which therefore are not part of man's environment. Organisms with low general learning ability have very different specializations, and therefore sensitivities and needs, from those of higher learning capacity. The somatic aspects of one's attention span is an important selector of what one finds in a book. A little imagination will indicate that there are literally hundreds of more or less specialized functions in the organisms, everyone selects its own responses and thereby influences the selectivity of others in terms of these specializations, and every one of them adjusts its selective operations in accordance with the situation.

2. The second category of somatic functions or conditions which operate selectively, is the organism's *physiological state*: its general health, coordination, efficiency and degree of smooth operation. The behavior of the organism, and therefore the behavior of the person, in any situation is vitally affected by the physiological state at the time, for the condition of various body functions tends to select the kind of responses it can make. Whether a person is taking an intelligence test, courting a sweetheart, planning a meal, making a speech, painting a house, or doing anything else, the manner and efficiency of the behavior, and often the behavior itself, is selected by the physiological state of the organism at the moment.

The businessman with peptic ulcers will ruin a sale, offend customers, bungle his advertising, and upset his subordinates. Many a sour lecture comes from a sour stomach. A man does not flit about with a light and jaunty air when he has jaundice. But Pippa is eupeptic—"God's in his heaven, all's right with the world." How many noble deeds and broken heads might be traced to the selective capacity of a physiological state that sensitizes or anaesthetizes the person to pleasant or unpleasant stimuli!

3 Our third category of somatic selectors, *temperament*, being a more general constellation of somatic tints than the momentary physiological state, tends to help determine or select the more *long-range* and general attitudes, viewpoints, biases, and sensitivities of a person in many types of situations. Temperament is thus a ubiquitous selector of stimuli ( $rM_s$ ) and therefore behavior ("R"). Myerson gives an interesting description of "the selective nature of mood" in a psychotic personality, which is only an extreme form of the normal.

In manic-depressive psychosis, a general law of mood becomes revealed in sharp relief. The depressed man has his attention sharpened for the tragic and melancholic side of life. If he reads the newspapers, all that catches his eye are the murders, and especially the suicides, so that as he reads the world becomes redolent of tragic futility. If he walks along the street, all he notices are the sad faces. As he contemplates life and its possibilities, he sees only death and disaster of one type or another, the future has no potentialities of success and happiness. Around the corner is, not prosperity, but the sheriff, the poorhouse, old age, and death. When the same individual becomes manic—that is, exultant, happy, and overactive—by some chemistry of which we know nothing at the present time he sees only good in life. Everybody is smiling. Whatever great purpose he has is sure to be fulfilled. There are wedding bells everywhere. People smile as he comes near them. The world is gay and all its events are prophetic of joy and achievement.<sup>11</sup>

This kind of selectivity is, of course, not limited to psychotics. To a lesser degree it is quite normal for all people, particularly those with certain types of temperamental tints. We shall not attempt to define the dubious term "temperament." But we may use another example of affective behavior, the nervous, sensitive

<sup>11</sup> Reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., from A. Myerson, *Social Psychology*, pp. 196-7. Copyright 1934 by Prentice-Hall, Inc.

pattern so highly characteristic of some people in many situations. This configuration of highly affective tinsits selects for response many stimuli which persons specializing in more quiet, easy-going states would not usually notice. A squeaking chair, a dripping faucet, or another's fingers tapping on the table will at times drive some people frantic. This means to us that the tinsit to specialize in these moods *sensitizes* such people to "small" annoyances as stimuli, it is therefore a selector or selector-system

Personality is first of all a drive system, of which mood is a prominent aspect. The drive system determines a person's way of thinking and behaving. Dominated by these need patterns and beliefs, he perceives, so far as the objective stimulus structure permits, in such a way as to round out and implement the belief.<sup>12</sup>

### PERSONIC SELECTOR-SYSTEMS

One often reads that what are called acquired social behaviors are but a *modification* of original organic tendencies or motives. Although a large element of truth is contained in the statement, the word "modification" is far too general a term to indicate adequately the well-nigh incredible process that has occurred. The emergence of the personic in the human organism is perhaps the most important and astounding process that occurs in man's small corner of the universe. The emergence of the personic is not merely a "modification" of what was part of the organism before the event. It is that and also an expansion or extension of the organism to a new level, a new plane, of behavior. This book cannot be considered only a modification of some original organic tinsits. Writing a book does, of course, represent a modification or change in original tinsits, but a change so great that it represents a different *kind* of behavior. The emergence of the personic does not entail the addition of any new organs or structures to the original organism; the same processes mediate this as well as all other behavior of the organism, but personic behavior does represent a highly novel form of activity of those original somatic systems. Indeed, nothing in the universe can compare with it. The personic represents a highly novel level of reality. When we put all of the behaviors of the organism on our scale of similarity, the personic represents the ulti-

<sup>12</sup> Murphy. *Personality*, p. 402.

mate in the direction of unique  $= 0$ . But we cannot afford to fall off the scale

### 1. *Identifications with Groups, Objects, and Qualitative Tinsits*

We find that in the personic, as well as the somatic, specialization is also the keynote. Man specializes on all levels of behavior, and in the realm of the personic, specialization takes many forms. For survival, both on the somatic and personic levels, man must specialize in an immensely complicated system of social integrations. One of man's most highly probable behaviors is the tinsit to identify himself with a large number of social groups. Since group-membership is one of his most potent and significant forms of specialization, this becomes one of his most potent and significant categories of selector-systems.

The very nature of the social process on the personic level compels man to identify himself with cultures, nations, races, regions, urban and rural domiciles, social classes, sex groups, occupational groups, neighborhoods, families, churches, political parties, ideologies (in economics, politics, aesthetics, religion, and philosophy), congeniality groups, and with many combinations of polarized common tinsits associated with sports, clubs, education, and many other kinds of specialized activities. Everyone of these groups represents patterns of polarized common tinsits visible in the form of biases, interests, ways of looking at things, preferences, prejudices, attitudes—selector-systems—which in greater or lesser degree determine or select behaviors in given situations.

Social groups inculcate in their members their own specializations, and these appear in the members as complicated integrations operating as most probable behaviors in every situation in which the groups are implicated. For example, in a discussion of divorce, Protestants and Catholics will come *prepared in advance* for the positions in which they specialize and which they will take on the subject, and situation permitting, they will express themselves vigorously, defending these "responses-in-advance" (selectors) with conviction. And both Protestants and Catholics will do this quite apart from any premeditated plan. For the most part, both will fail to "hear" or "listen to" the arguments of the other, and neither may be aware of doing so, although each may accuse the other of doing so.

In any realistic sense these specialized probable behaviors are

needs of the person, just as food and drink are needs of the body. Our contention is that this kind of need is, under normal or usual conditions, the most important kind of need in the determination or selection of man's perceptions and all other cognitive processes. These become the person's anchors, the points of reference from which, and in terms of which, he views his world.

Much of the process of individual perception depends on the force of *past wants*, the person's needs to disentangle and restructure in terms of the situations with which he has had to cope. The fact remains, however, that we have *learned* to perceive as we do, and that needs play just as important a role in guiding the formation of our perceptual structure as in guiding the structure of our motor habits.<sup>13</sup>

These personic needs choose our dominant stimuli, "the ones that represent the prevailing anchorage."<sup>14</sup> As Professor Woodworth says "the individual is not an unbiased registering instrument."<sup>15</sup> Social groups arise because under differing conditions, dozens, hundreds, thousands, even millions of people specialize in the same types of personic behavior, which means "have the same perceptions" in certain situations; and people act in accordance with what they perceive. They cannot do otherwise. Eyes see, and ears hear, but personic selectors can and do determine *whether* they see and hear, and *what* they see and hear. Murphy, again, states the point well.

... we do not really see with our eyes or hear with our ears. If we all saw with our eyes, we should see pretty much alike, we should differ only so far as retinal structure, eyeball structure, etc., differ. *We differ much more widely than this* because we see not only with our eyes but with our midbrain, [emotionally] our visual and associational centers, [past experience] and with our *systems of incipient behavior* [tinsits] to which almost all visual perceiving directly leads.<sup>16</sup>

Professor Murphy would no doubt be the first to acknowledge that these "systems of incipient behavior" include one's professional biases, interests, and needs. He would also agree (see page 338 of *Personality*) that a writer with a professional bias somewhat different from his would say not only that "we differ" for the above reasons, but that we also resemble one another for the same reasons.

<sup>13</sup> Murphy: *Personality*, p. 339.

<sup>14</sup> Murphy. *Personality*, p. 347.

<sup>15</sup> Cited in Sherif and Cantril: *Psychology of Ego Involvements*, p. 31.

<sup>16</sup> Murphy. *Personality*, p. 333. (*Italics mine*).

If we see differently when our needs are different, the implication is that when our needs are alike we see alike. Group members do have similar needs, and they see alike in matters pertaining to the group. The personic system is as demanding as the somatic system, the personic has its needs just as the somatic does, and personic needs are just as inexorable as are the somatic needs. Social groups represent common personic needs.

Suppose, for example, the issue of tax-supported school buses arises in a community. All the specialized stocks of ideas that go with various group-identifications will quickly emerge, making the issue mean something different for Catholics, Protestants, Negroes, parents, children, men, women, police, physicians, garage mechanics, filling station and other property owners, and many other people with other group-identifications. These identifications are highly probable behaviors performing the function of selecting the meaning of this issue for the people involved.

A person's identification with a group "provides him with a role-position from which to perceive and interpret events and actions in this particular field."<sup>17</sup> "A person's behavior is most determined by the groups with which he is most intimately identified."<sup>18</sup> From this point of view a very large number of personic needs is determined by one's group identifications. Food, for example, represents very different stimuli for a millionaire at a night club, a child at a party, a native in his home in Calcutta, a southern sharecropper, and a resident of an urban slum. Food considered merely as an *organic* need makes little sense in such a comparison.

Eras or time-groups are other configurations which provide their quota of selectors in one's total selector-system. Whitehead has pointed out, as have many others, that in each era in history a person's behavior, including his thinking, is in large measure determined or selected by the "stock of ideas" then prevailing. This applies to philosophers as well as to the man-in-the-street. (See the quotation from Dewey, Chapter V, p. 153).<sup>19</sup> These "stocks of ideas" are the ways of thinking in which the people of the time learn to

<sup>17</sup>L. S. Cottrell, Jr. "The Analysis of Situational Fields in Social Psychology." *American Sociological Review* (June 1942), Vol. 7, p. 379.

<sup>18</sup>W. Coutin "The Criminal Personality" *Federal Probation* (Oct.-Dec. 1942), Vol. 6, pp. 25-30.

<sup>19</sup>See also Gustav Ichheiser "Why Psychologists Tend to Overlook Certain 'Obvious Facts.'" *Philosophy of Science* (July 1943), Vols. 9-10, pp. 204-8.

specialize. We therefore refer to such "stocks of ideas" as selector-systems, they are among the mechanisms which determine man's choices of one kind or another. They are the ground or background against which, and in terms of which, we see and perceive one configuration of meanings rather than another. Each generation of children develops patterns of ideas common and intelligible only to their peer groups, inducing parents of every age (even in Biblical times) to "see" their children as "going to the dogs." Yet these same parents, specializing in still other selectors of the period, are staunch devotees of the idea of "progress." The margins of our groups are the boundaries of our lives.<sup>20</sup>

On the basis of the preceding discussion we offer the following hypotheses: 1) that the influence of a group on a given personality is a measure of the degree of his identification with that group, 2) that a person's behavior is most determined by his most intimate identifications, 3) that the degree of identification tends to vary inversely with the size and complexity of the group, 4) that therefore the influence of a group on the individual tends to vary inversely with the size and complexity of the group, or with its ordinal structure.<sup>21</sup>

*Object-identifications* form another large configuration of human specializations having a selective function. Just as people identify themselves with groups, so they identify themselves with a vast array of objects, places, social causes, social problems, heroes, villains, models of many descriptions, sounds, tastes, colors, recreations, and hobbies. When a person faces a situation involving any one of these types of phenomena with which he is identified, he himself becomes involved, for better or worse, and these identifications operate to select his reactions. They are ego-involvements which operate as selectors.

We also have "*qualitative-identifications*," derived from the Latin *qualis*, "of what sort." While the other two types of identifications determine *what* one does in a general way, the present category is concerned with identifications which determine *how* one does it. These human specializations are traditionally called traits, and represent traits measured on such continua as introver-

<sup>20</sup> See Sherif and Cantril: *The Psychology of Ego Involvements*, Chapters 10 and 11 for an enlightening discussion of these subjects, with elaborate reference to supporting research.

<sup>21</sup> Ordinal structure refers to primary, secondary groups, etc., in a sociological sense.



sion-extroversion, ascendance-submission, honesty-cowardice, etc. These tinsits or constellations of tinsits perform the function of selecting how a person is going to do what he does, whether courageously, honestly, intelligently, or extrovertly, depending on the situation. They are qualitative selectors.

## 2. *Statuses, Roles, Attitudes, and Habits*

These are all *forms of behavior* and overlap those of the previous category. Status is defined as a person's position on his group's prestige scales. But this position is not written down or recorded anywhere, except in some relatively small class structures which maintain a social register. Status is known by certain specialized behaviors of self and others toward self, behaviors which emerge in various situations and define a person's position in terms of the social expectancies of self and others. These specialized behaviors which establish one's social position are selectors, they serve as biases inducing the person to select his significant meanings in the way of manners, duties, privileges, and social esteem. They place him in the social scale, give significance to his behavior in terms of his position on that scale. To him the meaning of his own status consists of his responses to that assigned position. Status selects more responses than people realize.

Sentiments, such as awe, love, admiration, envy, distrust or hate simplify and distort judgment. A certain tone of voice or accent, a colored skin, manners which we consider uncouth or affected, a style of clothing, or a smiling face frequently arouse an affective bias that becomes a focus for our judgments.<sup>22</sup>

But, as Professor Murphy suggests in an earlier quotation, these not only distort judgments, they create them.

Social or situational roles are another form of personic selector. For example, every person plays such roles as those of parent, businessman, churchman, lady, gentleman, brother, or sister. Each person plays assigned roles in the wide configurations of situations which constitute his society. These roles are highly probable behaviors, specializations, and as forms of readiness and dispositions, they select the responses appropriate to his role in given situations. Attitudes and habits are the operational symbols of social roles, constellations which perform selective functions cutting across many types of situations. What a person does overtly and covertly

<sup>22</sup> G. W. Allport. *Personality*, p. 520.

in any adjustment situation will be influenced by these constellations, usually without his being aware of their selective power

Our social roles must necessarily bias our judgments, select our needs, sensitize us to some stimuli, and anaesthetize us to other stimuli in our social fields. For example, the judge, the jury, the lawyer, the police, the probation officer, and the criminal—each plays a different role and each sees a criminal act in a different light. Each sees the act in the light of his roles and status, for roles are affected by status. The criminal commits a crime impelled by stimuli to which he is sensitive in the fields in which he operates, but he is tried on the basis of a different series of stimuli, those to which judges and juries are sensitive. His criminal behavior is a resultant of his needs in that situation, but those needs are not admissible as evidence. He is tried by the needs of the court. Needs determine (select) perceptions, and perceptions direct actions.

The preacher, the teacher, the advertising man, the "leader" are all trying to determine, modify, mold, change, strengthen, or weaken our selector-systems for their own purposes, trying to make us think and act as they think we should, in accordance with their own selectors.<sup>23</sup> Expressed colloquially, "What you see depends on where you sit." The function of science, as of all ideologies, and social groups is to enable everyone to see the same things in the same situation, regardless of where one sits—often to *make* one see, but at least to *let* one see, if the context of the situation permits.

These specialized behaviors and predispositions, operating as selectors, actually can control the extent to which various events condition a person's behavior. This is verified by Razran's experiments:

After experiments with 37 adult humans over a period of two years and using an array of different conditioning and conditioned stimuli, the writer was forced to conclude that, unlike conditioning in animals, *the regularity and efficiency of adult human conditioning is primarily determined by the general attitudes of the subjects stimulated rather than by the particular properties of the stimuli combined.*<sup>24</sup>

With reference to the phrase "particular properties" in the preced-

<sup>23</sup> The word "leader" is put in quotation marks to indicate doubt. In this book we speak of leadership as a function, not of leaders as kinds of people.

<sup>24</sup> G. H. S. Razran. "Attitudinal Control of Human Conditioning." *Journal of Psychology* (1936), Vol. 2, pp. 327-37. Citation from p. 328. (Itakes mine).

ing quotation, we shall later develop the point that "stimuli" have no properties other than those provided by the person's perceptions.<sup>25</sup> The idea that something "external" called "stimuli" exist which have properties of their own regardless of the primary responses made to them is very common in the literature of social psychology

Bartlett was presumably attacking this idea when he wrote the following about "listening":

. . . under no circumstances whatever does hearing without listening provide a sufficient basis for recognition. Listening, like hearing, is selective, but here the *characteristics of the stimulus* play a secondary part. Selective listening is determined mainly by the qualitative differences of stimuli in relation to predispositions [selectors] — cognitive, affective, and motor — of the listener. This type of selectivity, based directly upon qualitative factors, is dominant over any other type in all the higher mental processes. . . It appears that hearing, though necessary for recognition, by itself gave no sufficient basis for recognition, and that recognition became possible when the hearing reactions were supplemented by an attitude, or orientation, preferential response on the boy's part towards certain specific auditory situations.<sup>26</sup>

Roles and status factors can perform selective functions only as part of a person's perceptions, conscious or unconscious

It is generally recognized among social psychologists that the position occupied by an individual in the social hierarchy is one of the most important variables determining his behavior. Thus, attitudes towards political and economic change, and towards government relations have been shown to be closely related to class identification. Child-rearing practices seem to follow class lines more closely than color lines, and the language development of children reveals a marked relationship to socio-economic status. School achievement correlates positively with socio-economic status.<sup>27</sup>

Sherif and Cantril present a similar analysis and conclude:

. . . the attitudes most important in daily life are social attitudes — attitudes formed in relation to other individuals, groups, institutions,

<sup>25</sup> See Chapters VII and VIII, especially the first section of the latter.

<sup>26</sup> Bartlett *Remembering*, pp. 190-1. (Italics mine.) See our concept of "Listening is Behavior," Chapter I, sec. 5.

<sup>27</sup> Harrison G. Gough, "A New Dimension of Status: I Development of a Personality Scale," *American Sociological Review* (Aug. 1948), Vol. 13, pp. 401-9. This interesting paper cites a host of well-known studies to support these statements.

tools and technology, standardized values or norms. These are the attitudes that really determine an individual's reaction to other people, other groups, and map out for him the main boundaries of his experience and taste.<sup>28</sup>

Every personality is an immensely complex permutation of integrated, polarized common tinsits, identifications, and social specializations. And all of a person's groups involve some concept of status to which his behaviors must adjust. In Western cultures role and status often determine the basis of the individual's personal security. He must select in terms of these or perish.

### 3. *Languages and Specialized Vocabularies as Selector-Systems*

"The Greeks had a word for it," and so does everyone else, for a person can do very little of significance unless he has a word for it. Languages serve both to differentiate and to unify. They are immensely important selector-systems both in the creation and maintenance of differences between cultures as well as subcultural groups. As specializations within groups they are strategic symbols and media of unification. Within a linguistic area the specialized vocabularies of a language create and maintain intergroup differentiation and ingroup identification. Since most people have little occasion to interact in more than one linguistic area, their lives are concerned with the many vocabularies within their language. East side, west side, Park Avenue, the Southern Appalachian hills, the cotton belt, the factory, the unions, professions, sex groups, age groups—each has its own special vocabularies, the unerring shibboleths determining who belongs and who intrudes.

Vocabularies are important not only because they are ethnocentric vehicles of communication; not only because they set people apart, admitting some and expelling others, but also because they constitute the fundamental motives of personic behavior. Vocabularies select not only people, for example, friends or minorities; they also select behaviors. They not only influence others, but they have

<sup>28</sup> Reprinted by permission from Sherif and Cantril. *The Psychology of Ego Involvements*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; 1947, p. 25. As distinguished from these authors we find it uncongenial to use the dichotomy personal-social attitudes. We see *all* attitudes, and all other behavior, as scalar, as more or less social. In view of the nature of the symbolic process (Chapter VIII) we do not believe that any human behavior could be measured by the quantity zero on this scale.

the same influence on the person who uses them that they have on the persons addressed.

There is . . . a great range in our use of language, but whatever phase of this range is used is a part of a social process, and it is always that part by means of which we affect ourselves as we affect others and mediate the social situation through this understanding of what we are saying. That is fundamental for any language, if it is going to be language one has to understand what he is saying, has to affect himself as he affects others.<sup>29</sup>

So powerful and unfailing a selector-system is language and its specialized vocabularies, that it determines the very symbolic world one lives in, the world of meaning. Men could live in a world without vocabularies as the other animals do, but once a person has attained a vocabulary, the kind of world he can know thereafter is created and delimited until he learns other vocabularies. One cannot have any conception of a world except that which his vocabularies provide:

The language structure of a people limits and determines their notion of the structure of their world, because that language constitutes their responses to that world.<sup>30</sup>

This is true for the lawyer, the physician, and the scientist, as well as for the newsboy, the fish peddler, and the head hunter.

In acquiring a technical vocabulary with its terms and classifications, the thinker is acquiring, as it were, a set of colored spectacles. He sees a world of objects that are technically tinted and patternized. A specialized language constitutes a veritable *a priori* form of perception and cognition.<sup>31</sup>

Peoples in various regions of a country specialize in certain vocabularies of the national language. In the United States we see this in all of our geographical regions. In our Southeast, for example, when a Southerner sees a man of dark skin, he is not likely to see a "man"; he sees a "boy," or a Negro, or a "nigger." Now, these words are not merely words, but uncontrolled catalysts or cues to stimulate the emergence in the cognitive processes of a vast and complex configuration of values, biases, fears, unconscious guilt feelings,

<sup>29</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, p. 75.

<sup>30</sup> Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 270. Copyright 1939 by the Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

<sup>31</sup> C. Wright Mills, "Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge," *American Journal of Sociology* (Nov. 1940), Vol. 46, p. 322.

superiority feelings, thoughts of discrimination, place, status, and political ideas; all of these, at times, emerge with high emotional toning. "Nigger" is a philosophy of life, a way of looking at countless components of a culture, it is itself an elaborate selector-system that determines what a person "sees" and feels when he uses the word.

In other parts of the United States such words as "Jew," "Catholic," "Mexican," "Polack," "Swede," and many others also function as catalysts. A highly specialized vocabulary directing and motivating behavior is that of the thief, which "laymen" can scarcely understand.<sup>32</sup>

Because the underworld is an exclusive [specialized] society, it is necessary that the stranger be identified before he is admitted. The language [vocabulary] of the underworld is both an evidence of this isolation of the underworld and also a means of identification. Criminal slang of three hundred years ago is still being used today by criminals, though much of it is completely unknown to the general public.<sup>33</sup>

Even the meticulous research investigator does not escape this phenomenon. Indeed, the more meticulous he is in following scientific methodology, the more its vocabularies select his operations, his findings, his conclusions.

. . . in research, as in less disciplined activities, our conceptual language tends to fix our perceptions and, derivatively, our thought and behavior. The concept defines the situation, and the research worker responds accordingly. Explicit conceptual analysis aids him to recognize to what he is responding and which (possibly significant) elements he is ignoring. The findings of Wharf on this matter are, with appropriate modifications, applicable to empirical research. He found that behavior was oriented toward linguistic or conceptual meanings connoted by the terms applied to a given situation. . . . Response is not to the physical but to the conceptualized situation.<sup>34</sup>

The nature of vocabularies gives us an insight into the importance of situational context. Men give meanings ( $M_s$ ) to words in

<sup>32</sup> See E. H. Sutherland *The Professional Thief* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937, especially the Glossary, pp. 235-42.

<sup>33</sup> Sutherland: *The Professional Thief*, p. 17.

<sup>34</sup> R. K. Merton "Sociological Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* (May 1945), Vol. 50, p. 466. The reference to B. L. Wharf is to his "Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language," in L. Spier, A. I. Halowell, and S. S. Newman (eds.): *Language, Culture and Personality*. Menasha: Sapir Memorial Fund Publication, 1941, pp. 75-93.

terms of the context in which the words are used. But words are themselves *behaviors*, and all behaviors are in thalldom to contextual situations for their meaning. Words are ways of seeing, hearing, speaking, fearing, hoping—and they color, direct, and select the behaviors which they mediate. We shall develop this point later in some detail.

#### 4 *Traditions, Customs, and Institutions as Selector-Systems.*

Such specialized behaviors as traditions, customs, and institutions are the guarantors of order, continuity, and stability of all societies (and of all personalities), they are likewise stumbling blocks, sources of conflict, and symbols of decay and stagnation. Stagnation is socially-defined excess of stability. Traditions, customs, institutions, folkways, and mores do not reside in books, laws, or pictures, but are behaviors, common behaviors, common tinsits, of high probability in given situations. They operate in selecting an enormous area of every man's behavior, just as they constitute enormous areas of his behavior.

No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a definite set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking. Even in his philosophical probings he cannot go behind these stereotypes, his very concepts of the true and the false will still have reference to the structure of his particular traditional customs. We do not see the lens through which we look. No people have truly empirical ethics, they uphold what they find themselves practicing.<sup>35</sup>

We in the United States, for example, are in bondage to the tradition of freedom, and to all the customs which implement this tradition, as well as to all those customs which deny it. We are free to choose our jobs, our places of residence, our type of home, what we shall read, and whom we shall marry. When we say that we are "free" to do these things, we mean that we *must* do them, for they are social expectancies having the sanction of polarized common tinsits. Speaking of the institution of marriage, Margaret Mead says:

Young people in the U. S. . . . are brought up to *expect* to choose their own mates from within a very wide range of eligibility. They are cautioned against certain types of cross-religious marriages, and *they are armored, without their knowledge, with a large number of delicate*

<sup>35</sup> Ruth Benedict. "The Science of Custom." *The Century Magazine* (Apr. 1929), reprinted in *The Making of Man, An Outline of Anthropology* V. F. Calverton (ed.). New York: Modern Library, Random House, Inc., 1931, pp. 806-15.

*choice-making devices—sensitivity to clothing, to manners, to posture, to style of fun-making, and dating—which permit them . . . to make a workable choice*<sup>36</sup>

But freedom is only one of our hundreds of traditions, marriage only one of our hundreds of institutions, and we have thousands of customs, from men lifting their hats to women or rising when they approach, to passing traffic on the left or standing for the national anthem. All of these are highly probable behaviors for practically everyone in our culture. As specialized behaviors they operate to select vast numbers of related acts in appropriate situations. They set the stage, and are frames of reference in terms of which we all interpret our relationships with others. They are selector-systems.

In sociological vocabularies, the *person* is an institutionalized individual. Seldom is a person aware of even a fraction of the extent to which the traditions and customs of his society, inculcated in him "without his knowledge," select the meanings which are his choices and the stimuli to the predictable behaviors of himself and his fellows.

#### 5. *Conceptual Systems and Other Social Inventions as Selector-Systems*

Mention of but a few of the phenomena in this category gives us an idea of the enormous area of behavior it selects. We may include all conceptual systems, theories, and methodologies—scientific, political, religious, sociological, and psychological, all philosophies, systems of logic, and mathematics; ideologies of all descriptions, political and economic, all religions, cults, and ethico-moral systems, all value structures, socially provided means and ends, systems of education, and legal structures, all perceptual *schema* and every type of universe-of-discourse—in short, all the guiding systems of thinking by which men live. We are here thinking of all of these as forms of specialized expected behaviors.

Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear, by my ear, of your reason, by my reason, of your resentment, by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have nor can have, any other way of judging about them.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Margaret Moad: "What's the Matter with the Family?" *Harpers*, (Apr 1945), pp 393-9 (*Italics mine*).

<sup>37</sup> Adam Smith *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1817, p. 16



We may continue in the same vein—I judge your theory by my theory, your religion by mine, your politics by mine, your values by my values—in every area of life. How else could a man judge any fact or any statement about phenomena empirically verifiable *in terms of some conceptual system*? Every “way of thinking,” every conceptual system, creates and validates its own truths. Truths are always relative to the system which creates them. Science is such a system, as are theologies, philosophies, ideologies, and systems of aesthetics and of law. Each selects its own truths or facts for its devotees. Some implications of this phenomenon are in the “stock of ideas” of our own time. For example.

In recent years the nature of sociology as a science and its research procedure have been critically appraised from two widely different methodological standpoints—those of operational sociology and of the sociology of knowledge.

Operational sociology takes as its springboard the thesis that sociology, to be scientific, should pattern itself upon the physical and biological sciences. It places its emphasis upon making explicit, exact, and repeatable the operations involved in research procedure. It tends to discount the role of concepts and would reduce them to operational definitions . . . and to symbolic expression in quantitative symbols . . . The sociology of knowledge rests upon an assumption directly opposite to that of operational sociology. The former questions the validity of all knowledge and especially knowledge in the social sciences, because of its origins and cultural conditioning and the social equation of the investigator.

The sociology of knowledge, as it is being developed in this country . . . subjects the point of view, concepts, research methods and interpretations of research workers to critical examination according to the following considerations:

1. the existing social order tends to select problems for research and to predetermine the concepts, hypotheses, and interpretations of findings,
2. the scholar has a “mental set” [selector-system] i.e., a collection of assumptions and biases which he more or less unconsciously holds as a result of his cultural milieu, personal experiences, class origin, group identification, and educational training;
3. the methods currently regarded as appropriate for research upon any problem need to be seen as the accumulated result of the existing state of knowledge rather than as the most effective techniques for present and future study;

- 4 a given society tends to reward the social scientists [who have] the "correct" solutions and penalize those with the "wrong" answers<sup>38</sup>

One could scarcely find a piece of writing that is a more remarkable statement and example of the kind of selectors we are talking about in this section. The author of the present book considers himself a devotee of both of these schools of thought, he is an operationalist by virtue of his adherence to the concepts of the sociology of knowledge. Each justifies the other; the sociology of knowledge raises the very problems with which the present chapter is concerned, and the operationalist attempts to tell us how to correct and make allowances for them.

All knowledge is bias, all methodology is bias, bias is the purpose and the nature of both. Both knowledge and method select additional knowledge, every system creates its own truths, its own facts. Every fact, every truth, is a product of the concepts and methodology which "revealed," that is, created, it. As for the first of the four points in the quotation, consider the nature of wartime physics and chemistry! As for the second point, are not the physicist's methods and concepts a "mental set, a collection of assumptions and biases" and with the same kind of origin, with the exception of "class"? As for point three, Galileo found the Aristotelians in the same predicament, Newton, his predecessors, and Einstein, his. Point four applies to everyone.

If we are to maintain sanity, we can neither condemn biases (selectors), nor avoid them, for this is impossible; the task is to discover them and measure them and then make allowances for them as part of our methodology.<sup>39</sup> To discover them is the purpose

<sup>38</sup> E. W. Burgess, "Sociological Research Methods," *American Journal of Sociology* (May 1945), Vol. 50, pp. 474-82. Citation from p. 481. (Italics mine).

<sup>39</sup> This point of view about the nature and function of bias is not new and is held by an increasing number of writers. See, for example, L. S. Cottrell, Jr., and Ruth Gallagher, *Developments in Social Psychology, 1930-1940* Sociometry Monograph No. I (New York: Beacon House; 1941, page 44, where they say, "Bias is inevitable and, what is more, if we use it explicitly and invite many biases to a problem, it may become one of the most valuable tools in our entire kit." See also the forthright discussion of John Dollard's struggle with his own bias as it affected his research in *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, New Haven: Yale University Press; 1937, Chapter III, "Bias." Arnold M. Rose in his recent paper, "The Selection of Problems for Research," *American Journal of Sociology* (Nov. 1948), Vol. 54, p. 226, attributes our point of view to himself, Myrdal and Talcott Parsons.

of the present chapter. If we would know the nature of any truth, we must know the nature of the biases which selected it. The alternative is absolute truths, and the most absolute are those of the man who has the most bayonets. This, too, is a way of thinking, a theory and methodology, in itself a selector-system.

Most people are ethnocentric and egocentric to a high degree, and these specialized emotional attachments are selectors of "absolute" truths. The scientist is usually convinced that his type of truth is the only respectable type, the religious man is sure of his, and within the various religions, each is sure that the followers of other religions are "pagans" or "gentiles" or "heretics" or "infidels."

Almost all adult misunderstandings, arguments, and recriminations are colored heavily by egocentrism, by the assumption that the other fellow must see it as we do and is just perverse in not acknowledging it.<sup>40</sup>

One's selector-system as a whole—one's personality—selects one's truths as it selects all of one's other behaviors. A man's faiths or predilections, religious, political, economic, and scientific, are the operations of his selector-system. There is no correlation between "brains" and faiths, for all men, the bright as well as the dull, live by faiths of all kinds. The bright and the dull are members of the same groups, follow the same political, economic, and religious rituals, wear the same clothes, and eat the same foods. Not only the innate potentiality measured by an I. Q., but one's entire configuration of selector-systems sensitizes one to those elements of a situation which induce one's behavior.

One's personic selectors include the whole apperceptive frame of reference, the total integration of all the frames of reference in terms of which each personic response is interpreted and validated for action. What constitutes "understanding" is the finding (emergence) of a tinsit of satisfactory (tension resolving) fit in some frame of reference within the total integration occurring in the momentary situation. All training and experience is perceptual training at whatever point on the awareness continuum.

Any *Weltanschauung*, however derived, by engendering intelligibility upon the diversity of experience, serves as an important unifying experience [and device].<sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Murphy. *Personality*, p. 341.

<sup>41</sup> G. W. Allport. *Personality*, p. 346

A person's total system of definitions, his integrated configuration of meanings, constitutes his world, and no other world exists for him unless, and until, other selectors emerge. As we shall see (Chapter X, section 7), one of the primary functions of sociological groups is that of unifying for its members these definitions-of-the-situation, these structurings, these meanings, in order to standardize our responses to a degree which will enable us to adjust to one another with reasonable (socially defined) success.<sup>42</sup>

What is the meaning of a wedding or a funeral, how is it defined, what am I expected to do and feel in such situations? One of the functions of the members of a sociological group is to tell, instruct, train, and influence new and old members so that they all define such situations in much the same way and thus behave in the same specialized, approved manner. Knowing "how to act" is fundamental for status and security and one's sense of belonging. If individual differences were as pronounced as some writers suggest, no human society would be possible. Every conceptual system and every frame of reference is a guide, but it is also more or less a strait jacket. It is always a matter of *more or less*. For this reason this book, which is a conceptual system of a sort, holds to the hypothesis that *every human act is in some degree a deviation from (or an approximation to) a social norm*; that every act is relative to some social norm or norms. Nevertheless, it is also true that

Because beliefs and social practice thus come to us from without, it does not follow that we receive them passively or without modification. In reflecting on collective institutions and assimilating them for ourselves, we individualize them and impart to them more or less personal characteristics. Similarly, in reflecting on the physical world, each of us colors it after his own fashion, and different individuals adapt themselves differently to the same physical environment. It is for this reason that each one of us creates, in a measure, his own morality, religion and mode of life.<sup>43</sup>

The logic of any frame of reference commits one to its implications and its traditional findings and usages. Any frame of reference (a statistical method, a theology, a system of laws, or the mores) is more or less a kind of dictatorship, and he who steps over the boundaries of its permissible behaviors must expect to

<sup>42</sup> This idea is elaborated in Chapter VI.

<sup>43</sup> E. Durkheim: *The Rules of Sociological Method* (G. E. G. Catlin, ed.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2nd edition, 1938, p. lvii.

find himself at the mercy of its vigilantes. Vigilantes are those people whose selector-systems in certain situations are of great magnitude emotionally and do not deviate significantly from the social norm in direction, or whose deviations are perhaps "to the right" of the norm of conformity.

The personality or the total integration of probable behaviors, as a life-process in a sequence of constantly recurring situations, functions in the form of a total frame of reference for understanding, interpreting, selecting, and creating one's world. Fear shadows him whose world deviates too greatly from the consensual world which is the social norm of expected behaviors.

But these selector-systems are not little men, nor are they autonomous mechanisms operating on their own initiative. They are highly stable tinsits to look for friendly, agreeable, consistent, congenial types of social contexts in which one can safely behave—highly probable symbolic frames of reference or backgrounds to which a person must anchor himself as positions from which, and in terms of which, he can gain perspective for his meaningful behaviors. "Seeing is (depends on) believing." Every act must necessarily have a history.

## RESIDUAL SELECTOR-SYSTEMS

### 1. *The Task as a Selector-System.*

An individual's personic selectors decide what the nature of a task is, so we can say with Lundberg.

... the focus of our attention is determined by the adjustment which the situation requires ... The nature of the adjustment problem which confronts us determines our definition of the situation.<sup>44</sup>

But the task, regardless of how it is judged, is itself a selector-system because any task can be performed in only a limited number of ways. These limiting factors help select the responses which define the needs of the situation. For example, if one's car is out of order and is taken to a garage, the mechanic's personic selectors determine what the problem is, but the problem selects the ways in which the correction can be achieved. A disordered personality presents a similar instance. The psychiatrist's selectors diagnose what the patient's problem is, but this problem, too, sets its own

<sup>44</sup> Lundberg: *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 89 and 217. Copyright 1939 by the Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

limits for correction, even though the limits may be broader and less visible than the mechanic's problem. However, one can imagine no personality problem for which the entire personality with all its insits in all types of situations need be studied.

If we had to characterize each individual personality trait for each individual, our task would be a hopeless one. In practice the structure of the individual must be given *only with regard to those differentials which are important for any specific problem.*<sup>45</sup>

All behavior is adjustment, and all tasks of whatever description are adjustment problems; the needs of the adjustment problem are the needs of the personality in that situation.

## 2 Precision Instruments as Selector-Systems.

Precision instruments operate as extensions of somatic selectors. Microscopes, telescopes, loudspeakers, radar, interview schedules, personality tests, and tools of all sorts help to select responses that could not otherwise be made. Microscopes and telescopes, for example, enable one to see (select) what one could not see otherwise, and one cannot respond perceptively to what one cannot "see." In a recent letter in which a mother described her son's experience with his new glasses, she said: "He wore them to school today and he was amazed at what he saw." He was now able to make responses (see things) he could not make before. An interview schedule will enable an investigator to perceive what he could perceive in no other way, and aids in selecting the kind of data the investigator can secure with it and gain from it. What one "sees" by the use of precision instruments will of course depend upon one's personal selectors; when one is learning to use a microscope one sees many things that are not there.

These ten categories of selectors symbolize specialized tendencies-to-act-in-certain-ways-in-certain-situations. They select the primary as well as the secondary stimuli, the implicit as well as the explicit responses. These form the relatively plastic cast of selective responses within which the behaviors of every man are bound. The miracle is the incredible number of choices which they permit for every person. Fundamentally these are the mechanisms of selective response, and are the immediate determinants of behavior. This statement raises a question, for we said earlier that the situa-

<sup>45</sup> J. F. Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order*, p. 280. (Italics mine). Courtesy of McGraw-Hill Book Company.

tion is the immediate determinant of every human act. Is this a contradiction?

We have here an important lesson in the nature and function of logic as a selector-system. An algebraic formula is a system of logic, and if one follows the steps one by one, a result will occur which could not occur or be known otherwise. Logic is like that, if one follows wherever it leads. Since "selectors" is a name given to certain functions of *tinsits*, the statements that the selectors *and* the situation are the immediate determinants of behavior means that logic compels us to see something of the nature of human situations, namely, that selector-systems are important components of situations, that selectors are always selectors-in-situation.

### 5. The Genesis of Selectors

If the logic of selectors is sound, then one of the most important problems of social psychology (and of the sociology of knowledge) is the understanding of the genesis of these selectors. Since the subject is so large, and since it is not immediately pertinent to the framework of the logic of symbolic interaction, the main discussion of the genetic development of selectors is reserved for a later work. Enough may be said here, however, to indicate the importance of the genesis of selectors in our general schema. The implanting and incorporation of selector-systems is called the process of socialization. Formal education is the incorporation of a wider variety of the more accurate and discriminating of personic selector-systems. Formal education is designed to free the personality from the necessity of responding to a chaos of confused and conflicting stimuli ( $rM_s$ ) to which the less educated are presumed to be subject. "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free"—free from having your behavior determined by an unselected conglomeration of unrelated, disjointed, inaccurate, and conflicting stimuli such as rumors, prejudices, propaganda, race hatreds, avarice, and every evil thing.

But where do we get our selectors? The reader's answers to a few simple questions will quickly indicate adequate replies to the question. Where does one get one's body, one's physiological state, one's temperament? Obviously the answers require a knowledge of biology and physiology, and every high school graduate knows enough about these things to indicate the overall answer.

Where do we get the personic selectors? A glance at the five categories of our crude classification indicates that they are learned—that they are inculcated with such subtlety that we are gradually armored, as Margaret Mead says, with a large number of choice-making devices without our being aware of what is being done to us. An infant has as much choice concerning what his selectors are going to be as he had in the selection of his parents. The study of the growth and development of personality is the study of the processes by which the early personic selectors are implanted by social conditioning and canalization, and how these in turn, with the emerging somatic selectors, operate to select all subsequent selectors as Razran's quotation suggested earlier. Selectors are emergents, and as the twig is bent . . .

From the point of view of personal responsibility the child has nothing to say about the inculcation of these determinants of his behavior. He is born into the social process as a going somatic concern, and he is compelled to incorporate the social process as his own action process. We were all probably adults before we discovered it, perhaps most people never discover it. Willard Waller gives us an insight into this process:

One part of our culture . . . the control culture, is of special importance for family life. The control culture is the whole structure of customs, institutions, beliefs, shibboleths, folkways, mores, and other devices which serve to regulate society . . . it is very much an understatement to say that it has been transmitted or passed on to us. It was imposed upon us by force and fraud, and by persons who were once so victimized themselves, it goes back endlessly, tame humans taming the wild ones forever.<sup>40</sup>

A person is well advanced toward the status of adulthood before those selectors emerge which make him sensitive to, and therefore enable him to "see," what Waller here means by "fraud."

<sup>40</sup> Willard Waller, *The Family, A Dynamic Interpretation*. New York: The Gordon Co., 1938, p. 18.



## Chapter V

### SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY OF SELECTORS

- 1 *Selectors are neither Absolute nor Autonomous*
- 2 *Selectors-Systems are Dynamic*
- 3 *Selectors Limit and Facilitate Learning*
- 4 *Selectors are Substitutes for Free Will*
- 5 *Selectors Confirm the Historicity of the Act*
- 6 *Selectors Obviate Conative Concepts*
- 7 *Selectors Offer a Basis for Prediction*
- 8 *Selectors in Private Dialectic Constitute Thinking*
  - A *Thinking is Behavior*
  - B *Definition of Thinking*
  - C *Creativeness as Degree of Novelty*
  - D *Thinking as an Efficiency Device*
  - E *Thinking and Intelligence*
  - F *Thinking and Reason*
  - G *Thinking and Personal Responsibility*
  - H *Thinking Inhibits Overt Action*
  - I *Curiosity and Anxiety*
  - J *Remembering and Forgetting*
  - K *Common Properties of the Cognitive Processes*
  - L *What is Intuition?*
  - M *Is Thinking Painful?*
  - N *Thinking as Process*

Anyone who has been intimately associated with American colleges must be acquainted with the great reverence for what are called "facts." The assumption is that if one accumulates and assimilates enough facts, one will soon find one's self educated. However, the point of view seems to be gaining ground that the importance of facts lies not in their statements, but in their implications. Facts themselves are seldom enlightening, and they may be useless or even dangerous if the person using them does not know their more important implications. The implications of facts are the empirically verifiable relationships between them.

The general statements about selectors in Chapter IV are here assumed to be facts as "facts" were defined earlier in this work.

The present chapter is an attempt to state some of the more important implications of these facts. As more conceptual tools are formulated in the chapters which follow, more implications will come to light

### 1. Selectors are neither Absolute nor Autonomous

Selector-systems do not operate as absolutes. They are not static constants independent of the behaviors which constitute them, but are definitely contingent upon the conditions under which they occur. What stimuli ( $rM_s$ ) they select in human behavior in a given situation are normal for that personality in that situation. In another situation other conditions may activate other selectors. This does not mean that selector-systems lack stability; what it does mean is that social situations in a given culture, group, or community are relatively stable, otherwise the personality could not be stable

When one is skating, the idea of swimming may be suggested by some event, but the symbol "swim" is not selected as an activator of behavior, for swimming is not an appropriate behavior for a skating situation. This is self-evident common sense when put into popular speech: men do not usually smoke pipes at banquets or in church; girls do not wear bathing suits to school, one does not go fishing in the bathtub. Nevertheless men do go to banquets; they do smoke pipes, girls do go to class . . . A stimulus that passes the selector screen in one situation may not in another; the needs of one adjustment situation may not be those of another. The situation determines which of its components are available as selectors of appropriate behavior. The probability of a given selector is a function of the probability of a situation or type of situation in which that selector is implicated. Selectors are not autonomous little men.

### 2. Selector-Systems are Dynamic

In much current literature on human behavior the word "dynamic" has the connotation of "self-propulsion" or "inner spontaneity." But dynamic in the present work means only "changing"

as against more static connotations. Selector-systems undergo more or less constant change in the directions of both growth and atrophy, and at differential rates, as is true of all other functions of the organism. The organism and all its functions are in some degree changed by their own behavior. Selector-systems are functions of dispositions or tinsits, and they are modified in accordance with recognized principles of learning and development. Selector-systems are emergent and they are constantly modified in greater or lesser degree by the process of emergence. No person is ever *exactly* the same after any act, even though we must recognize the principle that a "difference that makes no difference is no difference." The personality is a dynamic, changing, moving, and emerging phenomenon, not a static thing.

### 3. Selectors Limit and Facilitate Learning

One of the many forms of dynamics is "learning." Learning is behavior, and learning is as much a function of the situation as any other behavior. This is one of the most important implications of the theory of selectors, for the theory implies that regardless of any somatic selector or any innate potentiality for learning, a person can learn only what his personic selectors will permit in a given situation. Regardless of the quality of that somatic selector which the psychologist measures in terms of I.Q., a person can see, hear, smell, taste, believe, learn, and know only what his personic selector-systems permit.

Regardless of how "bright" a KuKluxer is, he cannot "see," or believe in, the potential equality of Negroes and whites, his personic selectors will not permit him to "know" such things. A person who believes in free will cannot believe, regardless of his I.Q., that a criminal could not do otherwise than behave criminally in a particular situation. The young man who for months gave his sweetheart lilies of the valley "because they smell so sweet" *could* not, after he was jilted, smell the beauty of these flowers. People who see ghosts and witches, whether in 1700 or 1949, could not and cannot avoid seeing them, no matter what the level of their potential learning capacity on the somatic, or native, level. A student facing a difficult examination, who usually suffers nausea in such situations, frequently *cannot* hear the bell calling him to class.

A person with a violent hatred of communism, capitalism, or of anything else, simply cannot see any good in them, no matter how "bright" he is. These are examples of inhibitions and repressions; but selectors work in an opposite way too, when selectors "won't let" a man see one thing, they facilitate his seeing something else; indeed they often make him see something else.

A person's apperceptive frame of reference envelops him in a coat of mail, operating as a system of selectors it "screens in" what is congenial and "screens out" what is not congenial in every situation in which the person behaves, regardless of the quality of his somatic endowments. Learning is the emergence of relatively new selectors, and no new selector can emerge unless it represents to an acceptable degree a fit in some system of the total integration.<sup>1</sup> But the emergence of new selectors is not dependent upon a perfect fit, nor is it dependent upon a "good" fit in the total integration. A selector may emerge as part of a constellation of tinsits which is in conflict, more or less, with some other constellation. A new selector may emerge with a workable fit in a religious constellation and may at the same time be in conflict with another, say scientific, constellation. It is difficult to see how a person's behavior could in all situations appear "logical" under such conditions.

"Intelligence," that is, intelligent behavior, may be operationally defined as the effectiveness of one's selector-system in given situations. Psychologists have long tried to explain the innate limiting factor in learning, usually referred to as native capacity or native intelligence. The assumption has been that this native endowment is a constant and that it can be fairly reliably measured by contemporary intelligence tests. Even the experts in such matters, however, are not completely satisfied with their tests, and some doubt occurs about whether intelligence is a biological constant under all conditions. The new Stanford revision claims validity only for American whites.

Psychometrists have insisted that this native endowment merely sets the limits of learning ability; that even if a person has great native learning potential, this does not guarantee that the person will be "intelligent" under all conditions. Despite this insistence the idea is widespread among the general populace and among many psychology majors in our colleges that if a person has

<sup>1</sup> "Acceptable" here does not necessarily mean conscious acceptance.

a high native endowment he can learn well regardless of what are here called his personic selectors.

This native endowment is one of the somatic selectors; *but no category of selector-systems at any level can operate independent of the other categories.* All professors, and most parents, are aware that frequently a very "bright" student will be unable to learn a foreign language, or mathematics, or some other subject. Recently a parent was heard to yell at a ten year old son: "Why can't you get this through your thick head?" "Thickness," of course, refers to the nature of the mesh of the boy's selector screen in that situation. This "mesh" is made up of personic as well as somatic (I Q.) selectors, and we suspect that this parent had something to do with the boy's selectors, both somatic and personic. This child is beginning to learn, what every child must learn, that his society has ready-made names for all the selectors he is compelled to incorporate—desires, prejudices, biases, whims, will, and will power. And he will learn to his sorrow, guilt, or resentment that society holds him responsible for the selectors which emerge in his behavior and will yell at him: "Why can't you get this through your thick head?" He will soon "catch on" and will say the same thing to some other child.

#### 4. Selectors are Substitutes for Free Will

It is not our purpose here to engage in an argument about "free will" or "free choice." That is for philosophers and theologians. The term "will" is not used in the present work, except for exhibition purposes. "Will" is a little man who survived the death of his parent, the old faculty psychology. What is popularly known as "will" is in the present work interpreted as the dominant stimulus or tinsit, and "will power" as the magnitude of the dominant stimulus or tinsit in a given situation.

Since there is no faculty of will there is nothing to be free in the sense of free will. Selectors are the mechanisms of choice, but it is difficult to see in what sense they could be free. A bias against foreigners will not make a person free to love foreigners. Every tinsit as an emergent is a resultant of the interacting components in the contextual configuration called the situation, and resultants are not "free." If one is sensitive to a given influence in a given situation to a degree which makes the influence a dominant stimulus,

then he has no mechanism or device by which he can disregard this dominant stimulus. One cannot act in disregard of one's selectors, but those who hold a person responsible for his selectors imply that he *can* act outside his selectors.

Since the churches, families, social agencies, and men of "good will" generally, give their time and substance to train the child in "the way he should go," they are, in so doing, and as determined by their own selectors, stimulated to inculcate in the child what are to themselves good selectors. Their eternal hope is that if they succeed with the child, he will never be free from those selectors. What else could be the purpose of Sunday Schools and other character-framing institutions? The telltale clue to our problem is this: if these good people *succeed*, they cannot then help feeling *proud* of their work ("they did it"), but if they *fail* (that is, if the child fails), they are sorry, but they do not necessarily feel guilt, because they impute the failure to the child's free will, to a bad biological inheritance or to a bad environment, and the child will learn to justify his behavior in vocabularies consistent with such terms.

From our point of view the personality as an emerging integration does indeed control its own growth in the complex configuration of situations which constitutes its society. To speak figuratively "no new selectors are admitted into the personality without the approval of the charter members and those subsequently selected, but a member, after being admitted, can in no sense 'do as he pleases'." Each selector is bound by its own nature and by the system or sub-system that screened it in. This, by implication, is what gives early childhood training its great significance, and every child-training agency in every society (in its own vocabularies) recognizes this principle.

### 5. Selectors Confirm the Historicity of the Act

A fifth implication of the theory of selectors is that it logically repudiates the concept of the "isolated" or "unique" act and the partial definition of personality. The situational components, of whose interaction the act is a resultant, provide the stimuli which slip through the elaborate screen of selector-systems; the screen is sensitive to such conditions. The act, then, is congenial to, and is an emergent in, some system in the personality, and therein lies its

history. The recent development of projective methods like the Rorschach ink blot and the Harvard Thematic Apperception tests indicate the occurrence (presence) and nature of these selectors <sup>2</sup>

## 6. Selectors Obviate Conative Concepts

Conative behavior is a major field of long standing in traditional psychology, it is concerned with phenomena designated by such words as striving, trying, attempting, endeavoring, wanting, desiring, seeking, wishing, longing—"as the hart desireth the water brooks so longeth my soul after thee"—(it is very old), and involves such nouns as motives, desires, wishes, wants, drives, yens, urges, impulsions, compulsions, and the whole vast hierarchy of inner pulls and pushes which people have been taught to feel. Conative concepts, being organocentric rather than field-centric, are not congenial to the view and method presented in the present work. Like other organocentric concepts, conative concepts tend to direct one's thinking toward behavior as independent of the situation in which it occurs. A typical conative statement, for example, is expressed in the words "... striving-from-within is a far more essential characteristic of motive than stimulation-from-without" <sup>3</sup> This statement more or less represents the position of those who adhere to concepts like Allport's functional autonomy of motives, and is implied generally in what is called conation, or conative behavior. Those who adhere to conation usually interpret the word "dynamic" to mean internal spontaneity, not merely change. The point of view is conducive to concepts like "local determination." We avoid this kind of thinking not because it is "wrong," but because the point of view of the present work is field-centric rather than organocentric.

In the first place conative types of thinking are closely related to concepts of causation which many social scientists consider to be a disease that has long plagued their disciplines. Nearly forty years ago a sociologist wrote a paper entitled "The Social Forces Error," in which he pointed to the inadequacies of seeking the

<sup>2</sup> See B. Klopfer and D. M. Kelly *The Rorschach Technique* (Yonkers, N. Y.: World Book Co., 1942); H. A. Murray (*et al.*) *Explorations in Personality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938). For a rapid survey see Murphy *Personality*, Chapter 28.

<sup>3</sup> G. W. Allport *Personality*, p. 204.

"causes" of social behavior in the conative phenomena often referred to as "social forces."<sup>4</sup> The point he developed is that these phenomena, far from serving as explanations of behavior, must themselves be explained. Motives, desires, urges, and striving-from-within are themselves behavior. They are resultants like any other behavior. To use them as "causes" or explanations of behavior is to explain a given behavior by itself, which is like saying that a person is sorrowful because he is full of sorrow. If, for example, a boy runs away from home and after a few days is caught in another city, he is asked why he ran away. Very likely he hasn't the remotest idea why, but knowing what he is expected to say, he claims he had an intense desire to see the other city. This is then assumed to be the cause of his running away. But this really tells us nothing about why he ran away. What we must know are the conditions under which such desires arise, for the desire to run and the running are both functions of the situation or field conditions. "Desire" in this instance is merely another word for a stimulus which is unknown, but so powerful are the vocabularies as selectors that some people actually believe they have achieved an explanation of something if the word "desire" is substituted for the word "stimulus" when the stimulus is unknown. This is particularly important in all disciplinary situations.

In the second place, desires, strivings, and other conative feelings are, in some areas of social science, still assumed to be functionally autonomous, operating on their own initiative. Coming and going of their own free will, they often "get a strangle hold" on a person and make him do things. They represent *local determination* in an extreme form, and separate the personality from any vestige of control by the situation. They lead to arguments about the relative importance of "striving-from-within" as against "stimulation-from-without." Here are good examples of the doctrine of the little men. To use the example of the runaway boy, in conative thinking the desire to run away is often accepted as an example of the autonomous motive "desire-for-new-experience" which all people are presumed to have. But what the social psychologist wants to know is what are the conditions under which such desires arise. Why did the boy have the desire this week and not last week? To say that he did have the desire last week, but that the desire was stronger or

<sup>4</sup> E. C. Hayes. "The Social Forces Error" *American Journal of Sociology* (Mar 1911), Vol. 16, pp. 613-25.



dominant this week, tells us nothing. We must know the conditions under which it was dominant this week.

A third objection to conative concepts is that they so frequently have led to the construction of all sorts of lists of "motives" (such as the desire for new experience), which are often spoken of as the causes of behavior. These so-called motives or needs are not only taken as explanations of behavior, they are often assumed to be common-human biological and physiological constants or "dependable motives."<sup>5</sup>

Our objection to the use of conative concepts is not based on an inability to feel such inner strivings, desires, longings, and urges, nor is it here denied that they seem to have driving power of their own. But we believe that such feeling-experiences are conceptually-conditioned responses, that is, are selected by concepts which one has learned. Careful observation indicates that such inner strivings are activated by situational conditions which the conceptual system of this book enables us to detect and describe without great difficulty in most instances. Those who are not habitually stimulated to look for the field conditions correlated with conative behavior are prevented from doing so by the very selective devices we are discussing, especially the conceptual formulations which will not let them "see" such situational conditions.

Possibly such conative concepts as *feelings* would be useful if taken as clues for the investigation of the relevant field conditions under which the feelings occur. Frequently a clean break with a traditional system is more useful than an attempt to reinterpret it. The explanation of this fact is that the term "inner-striving" operates as a selector-system resolving our curiosity and thus preventing the search for the significant situational changes involved in the occurrence of the inner striving.

Experience with students has taught us that once a person has become accustomed to "seeing things" in accordance with our viewpoint, he begins to pay attention to those situational changes which direct his behavior; he receives stimuli to seek them out and frequently discovers them. One sees, not what one "wants" to see, but what one *has* to see, according to the selective properties of one's apperceptive frame of reference. The question is which is the more

<sup>5</sup> See Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1940, Part II, Chapters IV, V, and VI for one of the best analyses of this point of view.

adequate for social psychology and the more amenable to the methodologies of the more successful sciences.

## 7. Selectors Offer a Basis for Prediction

When one first contemplates the selectivity of human behavior one is appalled by the thought that this very variety-producing selectivity itself prevents the prediction of human behavior. But we have now reached the point where we can see that it is precisely this selectivity that makes prediction possible. The reason is that selectivity is a limiting and ordering process, that selector-systems are highly stable under appropriate conditions, and are dependable under these conditions in terms of probability. The *concept* of selectors itself becomes a selector-system enabling us to see selectors as a relatively stable basis for prediction of behavior in terms of probability under stated conditions, thus delivering us from the chaotic uncertainty of capricious "free" choice in the person or group under observation. The traditional approach is to find such a stable base in the organism; the field or situational approach finds the stable base in the field, which includes the organism. The field approach holds that no organism exists apart from some field.

A concept of control must be part of every system of prediction. The strict organocentric view interprets the cause of behavior as residing within the person or elsewhere in the organism, frequently "regardless" of the structural properties of the situational field. With this sort of control, it is difficult to see how we can avoid making allowances for capricious, spontaneous, and unpredictable action. But if our concepts lead us to see action as a selective function of selectors-in-situation or of the situation-as-a-whole, then the person as a selector-system operates under the control of observable conditions, or under conditions we hope can be made observable and measurable. As Cottrell says:

It is through a knowledge of how the person consciously and unconsciously perceives (structures or defines) the major types of situations in his life activity that we gain a maximum of predictive power. This knowledge is gained through an intensive analysis of the person's important incorporated self-other patterns [selectors], their genesis and intrapersonal organization . . . If we can determine [discover] the self-other or response-expectation pattern of a person, we know how

he will tend to perceive, or structure, or define a situation involving others in different areas of activity. We are then in a position to be precise and specific in prediction about what he will tend to see and the position he will tend to occupy in the situation as he perceives it.<sup>6</sup>

### 8. Selectors in Private Dialectic Constitute Thinking

Our final implication of the theory of selectors concerns the relationship between selectors and the process of thinking. In the daily round of one's duties as a professor, one is constantly involved in the discussion of the ideas presented in this book. In such situations a person's selectors will sensitize him in such a way that he will take notice of the similarities and differences in the reactions of many sorts of people to these ideas. Perhaps the most pronounced uniformity in this regard is the very common tinsit to resist a deterministic view of human behavior. Once it is recognized, however, that this point of view may be thought of as relative, specifically, to a scientific conceptual system, and does not necessarily commit ethical-moral conceptual systems, little or no difficulty is encountered.

At least little difficulty is encountered in so far as the discussion pertains to what people generally call "behavior" or "conduct." But a subsequent reaction occurs with extraordinary uniformity: the idea that "thinking" somehow escapes the principles of interactional determinism. People who have come to accept, often with enthusiasm, the idea that "behavior" is interactionally determined are still sensitized by traditional conative concepts to "feel" that thinking is, must be, or ought to be, free from the principles of determinism.

They generally grant that thinking is an activity of some sort, but of a very mysterious and unusual sort, and that it is an activity which is "creative" in a sense not true of something called behavior. "Thinking" presumably is to them an instance where the individual is master of the situation, where he does not need the interpretation of an expert—for anyone can "feel" what is going on, and one "just knows" that one makes up one's own mind and is free to make one's own decisions. The idea is common that "thinking," whatever it is, is spontaneous, self-initiating, uncaused, and undetermined.

<sup>6</sup> L. S. Cottrell, Jr. "The Case Study Method in Prediction," pp. 363-5.

"Thinking" seems to be the one ineffable way in which the individual escapes what is often called the "disillusioning" implications of a deterministic point of view. Presumably, then, "thinking" is an activity by virtue of which one retains one's illusions!

The ideas just described are a convincing demonstration of the great stability of those genetically developed selectors which the individual in our society incorporates in the form of conative concepts. It is likewise a demonstration of the great distance between the type of thinking current in the general population and that current among practically all professional students of behavior.

### THINKING IS BEHAVIOR

Our position holds that thinking is, in the most realistic and literal sense, behavior, and therefore subject to the same principles which apply to any other behavior. Field conditions to which one's selector-systems are functional operate to direct one's thinking in the same manner in which they direct other behavior. One does not, and cannot, step out of the social process temporarily while doing some thinking and then step back into the process to use the results of that thinking.

Once a person has incorporated and integrated the symbolic process, he does not, under normal conditions, break free from this process for a fraction of a second during his entire lifetime. He goes endlessly from situation to situation, field to field; his behavior merely changes direction. This thought disturbs many people, even though they admit that they do not "freely choose" to be disturbed. A few years ago President Roosevelt was violently accused of trying to "pack" the Supreme Court, and during the controversy the statement was made that the Court's decisions were often determined by the "personal predilections" of the Justices. Such a thought was monstrous and shocking to many people who nevertheless promptly and bitterly fought to prevent the appointment of "liberal minded" Justices, or, as the President said, to prevent his "unpacking" the Court.

Some people believe that thinking is an activity separate from and superior to the personality and the social process. They grant, of course, that it is *the person* who does the thinking, but the activity is somehow assumed to be independent of the person. They admit that something from the "outside" *may or may not* influence this

activity, just as some writers have assumed that a personality trait is a special kind of something which exists separate from behavior, and which may or may not influence behavior.

Justices, in their *ex cathedra* function, are thus assumed to be outside and above the stream of life. Thinking is looked upon as a disembodied spiritual activity which the high nobility of the Justices will not permit to be sullied by mundane reference. Thinking, according to this view, is a spiritual activity beyond the reach of the principles which determine human behavior. We feel that this view is in error.

### DEFINITION OF THINKING

The title of section 8 is our definition of thinking. Our position is that thinking is itself behavior, covert symbolic behavior, that one's cognitive predilections *are* one's thinkers, and that thinking is the actual process of selectors in the act of trial-and-error selecting in a kind of private dialectic up and down the continuum of consciousness. Thinking is traditionally referred to as reflective behavior, but it might well be called a private showing of selectors at work on a problem, that is, of the person watching himself behave selectively to various implications of a problem, taking his own role. All behavior is more or less selective, and the selective aspects of all behavior are private, when we are aware of the process, that is, when we are paying attention to it, we call it thinking.<sup>†</sup>

When one is quietly thinking about some proposition an endless stream of ideas (the private aspects of selectors) passes in review, and one is aware that some of the attitudes or thoughts recur more frequently and seem to dominate the others. Gradually or suddenly one is aware of an attitude or "prejudice" emerging and dominating the situation, but what had been going on before this prejudice emerged was of exactly the same nature as this prejudice which one has "felt" come in and make the decision or become the decision. This selective process is continuous and never stops, it merely changes direction with changes in the situation. Tensions are resolved with every decision, but the process goes on and is involved with some other phase of the proposition being reflected upon.

<sup>†</sup> LaPiere and Farnsworth define thinking as "covert symbolic trial and error," *Social Psychology*, p. 131.

Such changes in direction may "feel" like free choice, if this is what one has been taught to feel under such conditions. All of these ideas "passing in review" are George H. Mead's "truncated acts," the beginnings of acts which are interrupted before they can become overt acts, they are the covert aspects of tinsits. The "stream of consciousness" is a process of symbolic trial-and-error; and the tinsit which proceeds to an overt act, or to covert decision, is that tinsit which, among one's selectors, best fits the situation as the person sees it.

### CREATIVENESS AS DEGREE OF NOVELTY

All behavior is emergent, and all emergents are creative in the sense that they represent change, or the "new," in some degree. Every act is a "decision", every act is a resultant, and all resultants are emergents in the selective process and are creative in the sense that they are in some degree new. Traditionally, the word "creative" is applied only to those emergents which are *unusually* new, that is, unusually different from other acts of self or others. Creative-noncreative is for us not a dichotomy but the extremes of a continuous variable, *every act is more or less creative*, even though we reserve the word "creative" for those acts characterized by a high degree of novelty.

The essence of Reason in its lowest forms is its judgments upon flashes of novelty . . . Reason is the organ of emphasis on novelty . . . Mere repetition is the baffling of opportunity . . . The inertia weighing upon Reason is generation of a mere recurrent round of change, unrelieved by novelty.<sup>8</sup>

Reflective (conscious selective) behavior differs from other selective behavior in that it represents tinsits in the form of vocal gestures which are not necessarily immediately instrumental to the more public or visible forms of behavior in the form of consummatory acts. The nature and the degree of novelty emerging in this process depend on many factors: on the kind and the amount of the person's symbolized experience; on the margin-of-error in rule-taking, especially when the "other" appears not in person but in the form of a book or a formula or a conceptual system; on differential experience, which means differential selectors; on the

<sup>8</sup> A. N. Whitehead. *The Function of Reason*. Princeton, N. J. The Princeton University Press, 1929, pp. 15, 18

nature and variety of the groups and objects and qualitative tinsits one is identified with, etc. In specific interactions seldom, if ever, do we find two persons with identical permutations of such identifications.

In practically all adjustment problems Negroes and whites think differently, the upper classes think differently from the lower, the young from the old, men from women, and Americans from Japanese. Presumably, then, the groups we are identified with have something to do with how we think about various matters. All one's attitudes are to some degree group attitudes even if we have to use zero. One's identifications are the ground against which, and in terms of which, the dialectical processes emerge on the screen of awareness. *Thinking is the more or less conscious activating of these attitudes and other tinsits on the covert symbolic level*, for the most part in verbalized form, but not exclusively. People think the way their groups think—more or less, this is what makes a sociological group. We have an expression in our culture which reveals this very plainly, the expression is "right thinking." "Right thinking" people are *my* people. Right thinking is group thinking—but of *my* groups. It is ingroup thinking; wrong thinking is outgroup thinking, or greatly deviating ingroup thinking. The naive assurance with which members of the dominant classes assume that their opinions are those of "all right thinking people" is delightful. All groups feel this way; only the dominant groups can afford the luxury of openly admitting it.

The following quotation, taken from a brilliant essay by John Dewey, gives much the same point of view as presented in the preceding paragraph.

There is no thinking which does not present itself on a background of tradition, and the tradition has an intellectual quality that differentiates it from blind custom. Traditions are ways of interpretation and of observation, of valuation, of everything explicitly thought of. They are the circumambient atmosphere which thought must breathe; no one ever had an idea except as he inhaled some of the atmosphere. Aristotelian physics and Ptolemaic astronomy were for centuries the taken-for-granted background of all special inquiries in those fields. Then came the Newtonian background, for two centuries more imperious than any Tsar. So the fixity of species was the background of biological sciences until the time of Darwinism came, it then reigned so completely . . . that Mendel's work did not even cause a ripple.

Myerson has remarked that we can explain why medieval thinkers thought as they did and behaved as they did, because we are outside their age. We cannot explain why we believe the things which we most firmly hold to because those things are a part of ourselves. We can no more completely escape them when we try to examine into them than we can get outside our physical skins so as to view them from without. *Call these regulative traditions apperceptive organs or mental habits or whatever you will, there is no thinking without them.* I do not mean that a philosopher can take account of this context in the sense of making it a complete object of reflection. But he might realize the existence of such a context, and in doing so he would learn humility and would be debarred from a too unlimited and dogmatic universalization of his conclusions. He would not freeze the quotidian truths relevant to the problems that emerge in his own background of culture into eternal truths inherent in the very nature of things . . .

Another aspect of context is what I have called "selective interest." *Every particular case of thinking is what it is because of some attitude, some bias, if you will, and no general theory can be formed which is not based upon what happens in particular cases.* This attitude is no immediate part of what is consciously reflected upon, *but it determines the selection of this, rather than that, subject matter . . .* There is selectivity (and rejection) found in every operation of thought. There is care, concern, implicated in every act of thought. *There is someone who has affection for some things over others, when he becomes a thinker he does not leave his characteristic affection behind.* As a thinker, he is still differentially sensitive to some qualities, problems, themes. He may at times turn upon himself and inquire into and attempt to discount his individual attitudes. This operation will render some element in his attitude an object of thought. But it cannot eliminate all elements of selective concern; some deeper-lying ones will still operate.<sup>9</sup>

### THINKING AS AN EFFICIENCY DEVICE

What a person is able to learn apparently depends on the nature of all of his selectors, not merely upon a somatic selector such as the native endowment measured by "I.Q." When a person's selector-system or systems have attained a high degree of stability and magnitude (they are functions of tinsits) it is difficult for them to change; they have lost many of their dynamic properties. Under

<sup>9</sup> John Dewey "Context of Thought." *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. 12, no. 3. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1931, pp 214-16 (Italics mine).



such conditions it is difficult, if not impossible, for a person to learn anything that differs significantly from those selectors, it is difficult for anything very new to emerge. This explains one difficulty many people encounter in understanding that thinking is behavior determined in the same manner as all other behavior. Nevertheless, thinking is an efficiency device. It enables a person to undertake a great deal of trial-and-error behavior very quickly without acting out, completing, every tinsit by the cumbersome movements and mistakes of overt behavior.

But *what one can do* by thinking-behavior is strictly delimited (determined) by the nature of the task and of the other categories of selectors as components of the situation. Thinking is not a form of magic, and if one is not equipped with the appropriate selectors, one may think about a problem until doomsday and never approach a solution. One's possible behavior, whether thinking or any other, is always limited by the range of one's selector-systems in that particular situation. Hence the efficiency of one's private dialectic depends upon the extent of one's symbolized experience, which is knowledge.

Thinking is thus the process of selection itself, selectors in the act of selecting, unencumbered by overt follow-through. To speak figuratively, "thinking means that various selective factors are screening in all sorts of stimuli on some subject and tossing them about, so to speak, among themselves within the family and not for public consumption at the moment, in a kind of private meeting of all of one's biases, interests, predilections, and other tinsits implicated in a certain adjustment problem", thinking is an internal interaction which is traditionally called subjective. Thinking is the interaction of certain elements of the personality involved in a given situation, a series of rapid responses to a dominant tinsit or constellation of tinsits in some context of situation. Tinsits which are to some degree relevant to, or implicated in, the situation are activated in rapid succession, but most of them are interrupted and quickly inhibited or forgotten because of their poor fit or degree of irrelevancy. This symbolic interaction amounts to a reorganization of the situational field in which the personality is at the moment involved; it is a kind of reshuffling of meanings, and in this process relatively new relationships between these meanings emerge in many different kinds of combinations.

Dynamically the act of insight consists in a *reorganization of the field* . . . in the fields of both perception and of thought there is a shift in the totality of internal relations <sup>10</sup>

### THINKING AND INTELLIGENCE

We have pointed out that intelligence is not a function of one type of selector only, a somatic potentiality, but of all of one's relevant selector-systems operating as an integration. Intelligence is a word derived from the Latin words *inter* (between) and *legere* (to choose). It means ability to choose between, to select, to discriminate.

But which discrimination one makes (whether it be in the realm of good-bad, big-little, beautiful-ugly, or any other serial relationship) must necessarily be contingent upon what particular frames of reference the person has incorporated, we find these among his personic selectors. For this reason it is difficult to isolate and measure the particular somatic selector which is usually thought of as intelligence. What is usually called intelligence, and what is presumably measured by the I.Q., might be referred to as the biologically determined capacity to incorporate and integrate certain types of personic selectors. But a high capacity of this type will not insure such incorporation and integration. The development of this capacity is contingent upon the types of interaction one gets into, especially in the formative early years of life.

While some very general norms of ability have been established for infants and very young children, the most precise tests are applicable only after a relatively elaborate system of personic selectors has emerged. Intelligence is thus seen to be a social-interactional phenomenon with its limits set, for specific situations, by all relevant selectors, not merely by the innate somatic potentialities. An "uneducated" person may behave far more intelligently than an "educated" person in some situations. We are certain that the unlettered newsboy, the trash collector, the garage mechanic, and the hobo have in many situations behaved more *effectively* than has the professor.

Thus, while reflective selection is potentially an efficiency device, it does not necessarily result in efficient behavior. Even if, by reflection, one arrives at a judgment representing an accurate

<sup>10</sup> Lewin *Personality*, pp. 195-6.

view of the relationships in a situation, one's selectors may not permit one to act on this judgment; the theoretically efficient thing to do may not in actuality be possible, for it may not be "expedient" in one's judgment, one may be biased by virtue of other dominant tinsits. All knowledge is bias. One may see what ought to be done and yet not be able to do it (actually this means that one sees what one would probably do if the situation were different).

We have two kinds of limitation here a person may not be equipped to improve a situation by thinking, and secondly he may be so equipped but unable to act overtly on the reflective choices made. A choice, like any other response, is a resultant of all the relevant factors in the situation. Thinking is not necessarily an assurance of "know how"; and "know how" is not necessarily an assurance of "can do" or even of "want to." In purely intellectual behavior such as mathematical problems, "reason" may be king, with a king's limitations, but reason is compromise in situations where other tinsits have an interest, and highly stable tinsits operating as selectors are vested interests. What one can think about, as well as what one can think about what one thinks about, is determined by the nature of the particular configuration of selectors activated in that situation. Generally speaking, the more emotional one's behavior, the less efficient is the selective process.

Thinking involves responding to one's own tinsits, taking one's own role, and we know no reason to believe that these responses are not selectively determined in the same manner as all other responses. The more intense moments of thinking might be likened to a brain storm, or a battle of tinsits. Every writer knows that ideas often come from one-knows-not-where, and that such ideas, if wanted, must never be allowed to escape; there and then we must throw them to the wolves and make them fight for survival in the dialectical battle of tinsits. If these fleeting, transient ideas are to be exploited for all they are worth, they must be responded to, thought about, directed into interaction, subjected to criticism, and made to fight for survival before they are forgotten and lost, perhaps forever; a particular permutation of selectors may never occur again.

The history of inventions and systems of thought are replete with stories of incredible moments when elaborate systems of meaning suddenly came so quickly into view that they could scarcely be put down on paper, they came so fast. Difficult prob-

lems are frequently solved in dreams. The day before these words were written, the first of the month, brought along with the telephone bill a little folder announcing "Telephone scientist's dream is nightmare to Axis bombers." A few words of the story illustrate several points:

An electrical gun pointer that is expected to better the record of its predecessor which, in one action in the South Pacific, helped a battery shoot down 12 out of 16 Jap bombers with only 88 shells, was shown to the public at Murray Hill, New Jersey, on the grounds of the Bell Telephone Laboratories. Among the witnesses at the demonstration were many of the 400 engineers, scientists and technicians of the laboratories who had taken part in the development of the device.

A military secret during almost a year of fighting, the gun pointer measures how high and how fast an enemy plane is flying, makes allowance for drift, muzzle velocity, gravitational pull, air density, and wind, and then points the gun and sets the shell fuses so that bursts will occur within lethal distance of the target. It does all this, as one news writer has stated, quicker than you can say 'By Golly!' The electrical gun pointer was conceived—in a dream, no less—by Dr. David S. Parkinson.

This story—and history presents many of them—puts a considerable strain on the idea that thinking is free from the principles of determinism. Those insights of the inventor which were relevant to the dominant situation, or the problem, "on his mind" were in full-fledged interaction even while he was sleeping. Thinking is not a form of magic; one cannot accomplish by thinking what one's selectors are not equipped to accomplish. The story indicates that every act has a history, that novelty is emergent, and that the new is a matter of degree. All of the principles involved in this invention were probably known (that is, not new) to many scientists and technicians, but this particular permutation or combination was highly novel or "creative." It represented a "reorganization of the field" as Lewin and Mead would say.

Thinking involves carrying on a conversation with one's self or with some aspect of the "generalized other" and the nature and quality of the thinking depends upon what one is able to talk about. For example, if a person "has" a conceptual system, that is, if he has specialized in mathematics, philosophy, theology, or science, then he tends to think in those systems, and the systems control, determine, and select his thinking on all matters where

these systems are implicated. He tends to think in these terms, he has such tendencies or tinsits which play a selective role as his thinkers. He can have conversations in these systems all by himself. Some of these conversations are highly stimulating and often highly creative when the symbolized experience (selectors) of the person makes this kind of conversation possible. The efficiency of the process is bounded and determined by one's knowledge. As Mead says, "Our thinking . . . is a play of symbols"<sup>11</sup> Symbols are acts, acts are tinsits, and selectors are functions of tinsits.

### THINKING AND REASON

Popularly speaking, "reason" is one of the little men. In the present setting reasoning is not a type of activity different from thinking, it is merely more restricted by some logic or conceptual system and therefore more controlled by the structure of that system and therefore more accurate. Reasoning is more highly disciplined, trained, or educated selecting. All people reason, some do it well in some situations, others in other situations; some usually do it well, others badly. The quality depends upon many factors, —experience, training, knowledge, the apperceptive frame of reference, or the system of logic used. Reasoning is selecting accurately as constrained (guided) by some conceptual system.

Reasoning is the perceiving or conceiving or recognizing of relationships between elements in a situation in accordance with the way in which one has defined or structured it. All people reason to some degree, but only the technically trained person of wide experience can perceive many of the relationships and consider all of the significant elements in a given situation. Selectors determine perceptions and judgments. All reason is relative to some conceptual system in terms of which its validity is determined. One can reason in philosophy, theology, art, science, magic, or any other system; reason involves awareness of the boundaries of one's system of logic or methodology. Any search for truth is a fitting of experience within such a frame of reference, and is thereby selectively determined. One's *possible* behavior is limited to the possible activity of one's range of selectors in a given situation.

In virtue of the internalization or importation of the social process of communication, the individual gains the mechanism of reflective

<sup>11</sup> G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 181.

thought (the ability to direct his action in terms of the foreseen consequences of alternative course of action).<sup>12</sup>

But the "foreseen consequences" are what the individual is able to foresee. Education, experience, and knowledge are so important because the more one has of these, the more will the activity of the tinsits so inculcated and colored operate in the behavior called thinking to sensitize the individual to more tried and reliable and adequate alternatives and "consequences"

One of the hopes of social psychology and of education is to discover and disseminate increasingly more adequate stimuli to increasingly more adequately sensitized people, so that then they may increasingly use them as increasingly more effective selectors in our rapidly changing worlds. Different kinds of thinking, "logical," deristic, fantastic, and imaginative represent different kinds of tinsits operating privately at different levels of reality and at different levels of consciousness.

#### THINKING AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

"Children" under eighteen years of age, other animals, and the mentally ill or otherwise inadequate are not held responsible for their behavior in our society, speaking in very general terms. But nature has not arranged her processes of maturation to conform to our folkways. Hence it is difficult to know how to distinguish between a child and an adult. For voting purposes, one becomes an adult in most states at the age of twenty-one, in Georgia at the age of eighteen. For purposes of juvenile courts most states feel that the magical number is eighteen, though California puts it at twenty-one. For purposes of working—release from the obligation of attending school—twelve states put the age at sixteen years, four at fifteen years, thirty-one and the District of Columbia at fourteen years, and one, Wyoming, is content to wait and see, for the law is silent on the subject. Some states base the matter not on age but on color.

In terms of the codified law, these legal ages of consent for various purposes must be assumed to be group expressions of attitudes toward maturity and responsibility for one's own behavior. But even in states where the juvenile age ends at eighteen for court purposes, the law is still unable to go all the way, for

<sup>12</sup> G. H. Mead *Mind, Self and Society*, p. xxvi.

capital offences are handled by the criminal courts, regardless of the age of the offender.

Why is it that juveniles, animals, and the mentally incompetent are not held responsible for their behavior? The reason appears to be that these subjects are not able to think properly, are unable, as Mead says, to "see" the same consequences of their acts which the dominant strata of society "see." They do not see the "right" things, they do not engage in "right thinking." The deviations in age-of-competence in the law arise from many factors, but primarily from the need to state a marginal age. The law, being practical, cannot abide indecision, so the age at which one is properly able to think out the consequences of one's acts depends upon what political-geographical area one lives in. In some states Negroes are held responsible at a very tender age. This may indicate that those states consider Negroes brighter than whites.

As criteria of responsibility, geography and color are not entirely satisfactory for socio-psychological purposes. It is as though the various groups knew that thinking is the activity of one's selectors but persisted in the feeling that an individual *should have* the "right" selectors developed by the age of fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, eighteen, or twenty-one. Then, the assumption goes, by thinking, *one can get outside the determining atmosphere, as Dewey says, and be free and responsible.* Society is in a difficult position in this matter, and the variety of laws indicates that the dominant groups which sponsor and enforce the laws do perhaps harbor an uncomfortable conative feeling that the groups themselves, "society," play a not too heroic role in the incompetence of these juvenile subjects. They *ought* to have the *right* selectors by the legal age. Why don't they? Well, members of "society" have to sleep nights; surely it isn't their fault. It's due to "free will," and free will develops at the age of fourteen, or at least fifteen, or surely sixteen; well, it *ought* to develop by the age of eighteen anyway, certainly by the age of twenty-one!

All behavior is selective; when we are conscious of, or verbalizing the process, it is generally called thinking. But selection goes on at all levels or ranges of the conscious continuum. The vast majority of selection occurs in the lower ranges of the continuum, that is, unconsciously, but it is still selection, and what behavior and consequences are selected always depend on the selective

mechanisms available. One can neither think nor behave in any way outside the channels of one's selectors.

One's selectors enable one to see  
 One's selectors enable one to hear.  
 One's selectors enable one to smell.  
 One's selectors enable one to taste  
 One's selectors enable one to perceive and judge.  
 One's selectors enable one to think.

For example, a highly emotionally-toned bias, prejudice, fear, or hope may modify, distort, enhance, block, or even destroy any of these abilities. The bias, then, would be performing a selective function and therefore be called a selector in this situation.

*The selectors are functions of the behaviors at different levels which constitute these acts. Thinking, and all other behavior, is the interaction of situationally-implicated personic selectors. Thinking is the sequential emergence of situationally-implicated selector-systems on the covert symbolic level.* Learning is the degree of novelty in this process, the modification and extension of these mechanisms.

### THINKING INHIBITS OVERT ACTION

Overt action toward the problem at hand must be inhibited or blocked during such private activity, continued covert trial and error is contingent upon such blockage. Like white corpuscles attacking a foreign body piercing the skin, the selectors rush in, as it were, to overcome such blockages. Thinking occurs in a dilemma, when the situation has developed to a point where it is no longer clearly defined or structured. "One of the first reactions of the individual to blockage is fulfillment of the act on a plane of lesser reality."<sup>12a</sup> The common expression "watch what you're doing," "use your head," and "stop and think" illustrate the point. "Stop and think" means stopping one's overt action and using the more economical process of covert trial and error; one's selectors play

<sup>12a</sup> J. F. Brown: *Psychology and the Social Order*, p. 290. See his section on "The Reality Dimension," pp. 284 ff. Caution is needed in interpreting this concept of reality. If the kind of thinking we have been discussing does not resolve the tension arising from the blockage, the reflective processes may be directed toward fantasy or the person may actually fall asleep or begin fighting.



on the problem until the tinsit-of-best-fit is aroused. If the best fitting tinsit doesn't fit well enough, and if the tension is not resolved one does not normally withdraw into fantasy, one looks for someone who has a tinsit of better fit: "Two heads are better than one."

Thinking is a form of measuring which refers a sensation to one's selector-system, just as we refer an object to a yardstick for measuring or defining, the resulting "measure" is called a perception. This reference is the object's meaning in that situation. In competitive activities such as sports, in boxing for instance, we commonly say "each stood for a moment looking the other over, taking his measure." Thinking cannot free one from the determining components of a situation, but it can extend a wider range of one's selectors than is involved in immediate overt trial response. Reflection is *mediate*, as distinguished from immediate behavior.

In the type of temporary inhibition of action which signifies thinking . . . we have presented in the experience of the individual, tentatively and in advance for his selection among them, the different possibilities or alternatives of future action open to *him* within the given social situation—the different or alternative ways of completing the given social act wherein he is implicated, or which he has already initiated.<sup>13</sup>

This statement by Mead can be misinterpreted. True, this is "his" selection, but in a stricter sense the situation itself guides the selection by arousing whatever tinsits it does arouse. What tinsits the situation can arouse depend on the nature of the situation of which the person's selectors are an integral part. These cannot be separated—they are all part of the situation. Selectors are selectors-in-situation. Selectors do not exist: they occur in situations. Selectors are tinsits performing a selective function. The alternative open to one person may not be the same as that open to another, and this selective function in large measure provides the illusion of free will. This quotation from Mead, however, points to the *determining properties of the situation*, for "the different possibilities or alternatives of future action open to *him* within the social situation" means literally that. It depends upon what the situation means to him as his selectors let him see it. At another time the same person might "see" several other alternatives, several others might emerge.

<sup>13</sup> G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. 90-1. (Italics mine).

Now, the intelligence of the detective over against the intelligence of the bloodhound lies in his capacity to indicate to himself what the particular characters [meanings] are which call out his response of taking the man. Such would be a behaviorist's account of what is involved in reason. *When you are reasoning you are indicating to yourself the characters [meanings] that call out certain responses and that is all you are doing given certain characters, certain responses are indicated*<sup>14</sup>

Or, as C. Wright Mills states:

Thinking follows the pattern of conversation. It is give and take. It is an interplay of meanings. . . . The meanings of words are formed and sustained by the interaction of human collectivities, and thought is the manifestation of such meanings. . . . The generalized other is the internalized audience with which the thinker converses, a focalized and abstracted organization of attitudes of those implicated in the social field of behavior and experience.<sup>15</sup>

A person cannot do what he cannot do whether the doing be overt or covert. Substituting symbols for overt acts gives one an economical advantage by permitting a more efficient use of the resources of the personality at a given moment, but it does not give one free choice. In non-technical language people frequently say: "He saw the consequences of his contemplated act, and he used this insight to control his behavior"; what actually occurs is that the situation calls out a symbolic response which we call an idea, the idea then stimulates other selectors, and this interaction continues, governed by the adjustment problem or situation, until some response becomes dominant. This dominant response is the resultant and it proceeds to overt action. "Seeing the consequences" means being aware of the relationships in this sequence of interaction. A person has no mechanism by which he can freely and arbitrarily control and decide which tint is to become dominant. That is determined by the structure of the total situation of which he, as a selector-system, is an integral part.

Common experience demonstrates this. What student, after an examination, has not said, "I know that point—why didn't I say that?" Why didn't he? Because he did not think of it at the moment—in that situation. The situation did not arouse that tint

<sup>14</sup> G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 93. (Italics mine).

<sup>15</sup> C. Wright Mills: "Language, Logic, and Culture," *American Sociological Review* (Oct. 1939), pp. 673, 677, and 672.

in him, and there was nothing he could do about it or he would have done so. If ideas do not emerge, that is, if the situation does not arouse them, one cannot free-will them to come, even when the ideas are potential responses for some other situation.

Frequently students can do better on a test if they allow their selectors more time for a question—if they think about it longer—or if they leave it and “try” again later, which means facing another relatively fresh situation. They thus give a situation or several situations more opportunities to call out the tinsit of best fit, the most relevant response in their repertory, to the problem at hand. We can never be certain that a given situation will arouse the most scientifically efficient and relevant response among a person’s potential responses—which means that one does not always do one’s best. The situation is the immediate determinant of all behavior. Thinking is trying it symbolically before trying it in overt action, and naturally, something is learned thereby, for all learning is action, covert or overt.


### CURIOSITY AND ANXIETY

These two words symbolize certain confused, rapid, incomplete, and ineffective forms of selectivity, only some minor phases of which are on a conscious level, that is, represent thinking. The reader may find it strange that these two types of behavior, curiosity and anxiety, are discussed together. But this is done as a result of the logic of the system of thought here presented. Many writers assume that curiosity is an instinct, but this seems to me no more necessary than to assume that many other forms of behavior, such as gregariousness, acquisitiveness, etc., are instincts. Curiosity consists of the partial stimulation of several tinsits, none of which adequately fits the situation.<sup>10</sup> These tinsits are stimulated and are

<sup>10</sup> The intention of the present work is not to describe the physiological correlates of the various mechanisms presented in this conceptual formulation. This would require too much space and would represent too great digressions from the theoretical formulation with which the book is concerned. Students, however, seem to be intrigued with the nature of “partial stimulation.” If the reader’s curiosity in this matter annoys him, he may consult standard works on the subject, or look at J. G. Miller *Unconsciousness*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1942, pp. 138-41. Repeated subliminal or sub-threshold stimuli may have a cumulative effect. This “suggests that repetition of stimuli which appear too weak to elicit a response and are unable to give rise to subjective report may still affect the person’s behavior” (p. 138). See the description of Erlanger and Gasser’s three types of nerve fibers.

then quickly inhibited by their irrelevance, and the cumulative frustration of this process builds up as a "tension" which the situation directs toward resolution (In conative terms, the tension drives toward discharge.) The tension is resolved when the process of trial-and-error-selection results in the arousal of a *tinsit* which best or adequately fits the situation. Such a *tinsit* is a modification of some other *tinsit* or *tinsits*, it is an emergent. This process is the so-called drive of the uncompleted task. Curiosity frequently leads to very intensive (concentrated) thinking, the delay in overt action permitting a full play of selectors on the problem. Full play means that overt action is inhibited while the situation arouses as many different *tinsits* as it is able to, or to put it another way, while one responds to the situation in as many ways as one knows how. The solution is a resultant of these varied trial-and-error responses, and represents role-taking in some form.

Figure IV.  
Curiosity and Anxiety as Partial Stimulation



Activity which precedes the emergence of the dominant selector or solution is of the order of curiosity, that is, it is the same kind of activity. Frequently curiosity is of long duration with many temporary decisions interrupting the activity until the situation recurs in which the curiosity is resumed. When the *tinsit* of satisfactory fit emerges—when the problem is solved—the tension is resolved and curiosity no longer occurs.

Our hypothesis is that anxiety is of the same nature as curiosity, but with a different feeling tone. When the process is more or less pleasant we call it curiosity; when more or less unpleasant we call the process anxiety. These processes may be illustrated by the analogy of the diagram, Figure IV.

As the aim "D" moves rapidly to the right touching each contact "C" for a fraction of a second, each of the five small dials "d" is partially stimulated, moves fractionally and falls back to zero. By analogy we may think of the small dials "d" as tinsits. Each one was stimulated partially but not significantly, no one tinsit was stimulated sufficiently to activate it fully, but just enough to indicate the nature of the tinsit. Its failure to persist indicates that it does not represent a good fit for this situation. We mean that no one of the partially stimulated tinsits is adequate to give the person a satisfactory (tension resolving) understanding of the situation, enough security, or insight to permit satisfactory role-taking.

Each partially stimulated tinsit is therefore quickly inhibited and subject to immediate amnesia. A number of partially or weakly stimulated tinsits thus inhibited in quick succession results in a cumulative frustration which is felt as a tension. If the person interprets this tension as pleasant, the adient process is pleasant, if he interprets the tension as unpleasant, the adient process is called "worry." The former is curiosity; the latter anxiety. We believe that this is an adequate operational specification of these phenomena.

Curiosity and anxiety are, then, forms of frustrated selection; curiosity being rather high on the conscious continuum, anxiety on a lower range. In neither is the person aware of what in the situation "eggs him on." He knows enough, however, to realize that it is probably pleasant or unpleasant, and can be measured near one or the other end of the pleasant-unpleasant continuum. Or we may say that in each instance enough stimulation is given to indicate to the person that whatever it is that "bothers" him, its *general* nature is probably in harmony with the self (curiosity), or not generally in harmony with the self (anxiety).<sup>17</sup>

## REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING

In these processes we have two highly selective and "creative" forms of behavior. Both experimental studies and introspective

<sup>17</sup> This last paragraph seems to me to conform in large degree to Harry Stack Sullivan's concept of anxiety as a protector of the self. See *Psychiatry*, (1940), Vol. 3, pp. 9-10. Sullivan says, "Not only does anxiety function to discipline attention, but it gradually restricts personal awareness." In our terminology this amounts to saying that "anxiety" is a term referring to the operation of a selector-system of a certain type under certain conditions.

reports indicate that remembering is creative in the sense that it "constructs" rather than reproduces, it is a construction by selectors-in-situation. Memory is a highly selected and selective distortion of a past situation made to conform to the person's needs in the present situation. How a person feels about what he is remembering is the key to what he remembers. Remembering is in this sense not different from perceiving.

The first notion to get rid of is that memory is primarily or literally reduplicative or reproductive. In a world of constantly changing environment, literal recall is extraordinarily unimportant . . .

Suppose an individual to be confronted by a complex situation. This is the case with which I began the whole series of experiments, the case in which an observer is perceiving, and is saying immediately what it is that he has perceived. We saw that in this case an individual does not normally take such a situation detail by detail and meticulously build up the whole. In all ordinary instances he has an overmastering tendency [tinsit] simply to get a general impression of the whole, and, on the basis of this, *he constructs the probable detail*. Very little of his construction is literally observed and often, as was easily demonstrated experimentally, a lot of it is distorted or wrong so far as the actual facts are concerned. But it is the sort of construction which serves to justify his general impression. Ask the observer to characterize this general impression psychologically and the word that is always cropping up is "attitude." I have shown how this "attitude" factor came into every series of experiments that was carried out. *The construction that is effected is the sort of construction that would justify the observer's "attitude"*

From the outside, all this may look like the continual re-excitement of well-established traces, *but it is not*.<sup>18</sup>

Bartlett's work is an experimental verification of the theory of selectors presented in this chapter. We have repeatedly emphasized the selective power of attitudes, but attitudes are only one form of disposition or tinsit. These are forms of need; later we shall present a theory of needs which will interpret all dispositions as needs, regardless of level of activity. Furthermore, our position throughout has been that needs select all cognitive processes and all other behavior. Needs are selectors. Thus memory and forgetting are forms of thinking, the private interaction of the selective aspects of tinsits. Thinking, memory, perception, and all cognitive

<sup>18</sup> Bartlett: *Remembering*, pp. 204, 206, 205. (Italics mine).

processes are built on the spot to conform to the situation as a person's selector-systems allow, or make, him see the situation.

Forgetting is a reminder that one can construct by a process of elimination. People are surprised to hear "forgetting" spoken of as behavior. Rather frequently we hear such statements as. "Well, I thought forgetting was failure to think of something," the implication being that forgetting is not behavior, but a lack of it. This apparent contradiction is but the negative aspect of selectivity; if something is selected, something else must be rejected, and forgetting is here interpreted as rejection. Forgetting is positive, a form of active inhibition with amnesia of impression so immediate that the process appears negative, that is, as a lack of action. In forgetting, as in remembering, and perceiving, what a person feels about what he is forgetting, determines what he forgets. In the reconstruction which we call remembering, forgetting is the autistic elimination of materials which would prevent a reconstruction in harmony with the present situation as the person sees it. As the Freudians say: we forget what we want to forget, we say. we forget what we have to forget, what we need, under present conditions, to forget. Forgetting, then, is an active phase of the private dialectic of selectors, it represents the inhibition, with immediate amnesia, of some tnsits or constellation of tnsits which have been partially stimulated but which represent a poor fit for the self in that situation. The many selective factors involved in forgetting have been empirically verified, and offer excellent corroboration of the operation of selector-systems.<sup>10</sup>

### COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE COGNITIVE PROCESSES

What is the difference between imagining, curiosity, anxiety, thinking, reasoning, remembering, and forgetting? Our position is that they are all in general the same kind of activity but that they differ in degree in two respects: in the amount or degree of control, and in the degree of selectivity or variety of tnsits involved. The control is exerted by the situation as a whole, more specifically by what we may call the "tightness" of the relationships of the tnsits involved, as in the elements of the logic or conceptual system in terms of which selectivity occurs. If a person knows only Euclidian

<sup>10</sup> See J. G. Miller. *Unconsciousness* New York John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1942, Chapter IX

geometry, then no amount of reasoning will permit him to see that parallel lines can meet. Or, to put it positively, Euclidian logic will compel him to see that parallel lines cannot meet. Other geometries will make him see otherwise. From this point of view reason is most controlled or disciplined, fantasy least.

The second criterion of difference is variety of "materials" involved. Fantasy is probably characterized by least selectivity in this respect, and forgetting by the most selectivity. However, these are merely guesses, for research has failed to establish a graded hierarchy for these processes in these respects. However, to the extent that Bartlett's researches bear on the matter, his own conclusion is as follows:

I suggest that the chief differentiating marks between constructive recall, constructive imagination and constructive thinking are to be found in the range of material over which they move and the precise manner of their control. Constructive thinking demands the bringing together of realms of interest which ordinarily, so far, have not been connected. It must submit to whatever kind of control the nature of the topic [situation] demands.<sup>20</sup>

### WHAT IS INTUITION?

We don't know, but we have an intuitive "hunch" that intuition is super-high-speed perception, so fast that, as in curiosity, the cues or hints are not clearly enough recognized to be isolated and "nailed down." This is one phase or form of what we earlier called "unconscious thinking." We might state as an hypothesis that such impulses never reach the cerebral cortex, never get beyond the thalamus. We might even call it thalamic thinking. If the selector-systems derived from a man's world persist in saying that intuition is what women use for brains, then at least women are faster thinkers than men. And we have not observed that they are less accurate when their training equals that of men.<sup>21</sup>

### IS THINKING PAINFUL?

It is commonly said that thinking is painful. Such a generalization is a bit too facile. To most people in some situations any work

<sup>20</sup> Bartlett: *Remembering*, pp. 312-13.

<sup>21</sup> At least one writer will go along with most of this section. See Murphy. *Personality*, pp. 356-8.



is painful. But we have not observed that the people who devote their energies to the intellectual life are "wracked with pain." Their life span is longer than the average for the population, and they are, on the whole, a rather agreeable lot. However, Clarence Day is not being wholly facetious when he says, "But deep thinking is painful. It means that people must channel the spreading rivers of their attention."<sup>22</sup> It involves a form of restraint imposed by the situation.

Reflective behavior involves the inhibition and frustration of overt action, and all restriction runs counter to the romantic-individualistic complex in our ethos, but this is not usually painful in those situations in which the selective dialectic gives promise of an advantage. Most situations for most people are so well defined or structured by their groups that extended reflective behavior is not necessary for adequate adjustment, the unobstructed flow of overt common tinsits is usually immediately adequate. Hence the average person gets relatively little practice and training in the more disciplined reflective activities, and it is seldom pleasurable to do what one does not do particularly well, as the average person realizes when he comes to make out his income tax return.

Those whose lives involve "considerable" reflective behavior, frequently find overt action rather unstimulating, which is to say, a bore. Both the ivory tower and the football field have their place, the difference is not so much one of kind as of degree. The idea that "thinkers" indulge in thinking inordinately outside the field of their particular specialty is a fraud selected by the bias of social status. "Thinkers," like the masses of people, frequently vote against their own best interests, relying upon the situational definitions of their more common groups for the meanings which direct the course of their daily round of living.

### THINKING AS PROCESS

In the formulation of a conceptual framework diagrammatic aids are frequently profitable. There seems to be introspective evidence, if not experimental evidence, that the "stream of consciousness" may, as a useful hypothesis, be conceptualized as similar to the radio impulse or wave. We may call "stream of

<sup>22</sup> Clarence Day: *This Simian World*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1920, p. 48.

consciousness" a series of "ratioimpulses" (from ratiocination and impulse) This concept of thinking or attention can be formulated as a continuous series of such impulses which we may represent by a series of dashes — — — — —. Let us assume for purposes of discussion that these occur normally at fifteen per second

In what is generally referred to as automatic behavior, that is, behavior that is so habitual (so probable) that it does not require attention, we may avoid the idea of automatism by suggesting that possibly this type of behavior requires a degree of guidance represented by only a flash of attention, say every tenth or fifteenth or thirtieth or sixtieth ratioimpulse. If this were true, then the more stable the tint the fewer would be the ratioimpulses required for the guidance of the behavior. These ratioimpulses would be of such short duration, or so weak in intensity, that a person would not be aware of them or they would be immediately subject to amnesia of impression. In a highly "autonomous" concatenation attention might be reduced to every hundredth ratioimpulse.

Thus "shifting of attention" can be described by saying that one or more of these ratioimpulses is attracted to some object or event other than that toward which the main stream of ratioimpulses is directed. "Duration" of thought or memory would then be described as continuous direction of those impulses, extreme "concentration" by every impulse being directed toward the object or event in question. Hypnosis would be an extreme case.

To anyone interested in unconsciousness (unattended), two major facts are of outstanding importance beyond all others that are known: (a) attention may be directed toward more than one thing, but its range is limited, and (b) attention shifts.<sup>23</sup>

Ratioimpulses may be intermittently directed at more than one thing, but the number of such things is small. Certain well-practiced behavior may permit many such shifts, while other behaviors require practically all of the impulses to be directed upon the goal.

. . . in every day life, perception is, by and large, a series of quick looks, glances, inattentive listenings, furtive touches.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> J. C. Miller: *Unconsciousness*, p. 164.

<sup>24</sup> J. S. Brunner and Cecil G. Goodman: "Value and Need as Organizing Factors [selectors] in Perception," Theo. M. Newcomb and Eugene L. Hartley, (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology*, Henry Holt and Company, 1947, p. 104.

The greater the magnitude of the tinsit, regardless of its stability, the greater the number or proportion of ratioimpulses it commands Lewin would, no doubt, order this to the strength of the object's "valence." The "endurance" of attention would, then, appear as "recurrence" and would fit our conception of behavior patterns as occurring rather than existing.

This general hypothesis suggests that when a person sees something and makes a verbal report of it, he has transformed light waves into ratioimpulses and these into sound waves. Even the movie projector transforms light waves into sound waves. If a person sees something and does not make a verbal report (sound waves) he has nevertheless transformed light waves into ratio-waves, or "thoughts," which is to say, *meanings*. Similarly the person can so transform sound waves and others, like pressures and odors. All of these, in turn, become part of the total selector-system called John Doe.

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It is hoped that this and the previous chapter have presented a rough idea of the selective processes in human behavior as we see it. Selectors are not little men; they are tendencies-in-situation, probable behaviors under certain conditions. They do not operate in a vacuum. It now devolves upon us to elaborate the nature of the human situation and the nature of causation insofar as it relates to such configurations.

## Chapter VI

### THE SYSTEM OPERATES IN SYMBOLIC FIELDS

- 1 *The Problem of Causation*
  - A "Causation An Episode in the History of Thought"
  - B *The Concept of Forces*
- 2 *Personality as an Energy System Operating in Dynamic Fields of Interaction*
  - A *Some Properties of Personality as an Energy System*
  - B *The Dynamic Field of Symbolic Interaction*
  - C *The Field Basis of Explanation*
  - D *Field is a Concept*
  - E *The Football Field*
  - F *There is "No Local Determination" in the Field*
3. *Historicity and the Field Approach*
  - A *The Field is a Segment of the Social Process*
- 4 *The Consensual Field*
  - A *Consensual and Personal Fields*
- 5 *The Stuff that Social Fields are Made of*
  - Table 2 *Some Components of Social Fields*

#### 1. The Problem of Causation

Among the universals in human society are the vocabularies of causation. Everything that happens must have a cause, things don't just happen, they are caused to happen. The present chapter is an attempt to describe how people have thought about causation, and to indicate some of the changes that are now taking place in Western thinking about causation.

#### "CAUSATION: AN EPISODE IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT"<sup>1</sup>

Few people realize the extraordinary changes that have been occurring in our world during this twentieth century, particularly during its last three decades—not only the two great wars of our

<sup>1</sup> This section heading is enclosed in quotation marks as a tribute to Lawrence K. Frank whose brilliant article by this title is the source of much of what appears in this section. The article appears in the *Journal of Philosophy* (Aug. 1934), Vol. 31, pp. 421-8.

generation, but also the extraordinary changes in the forms and concepts of political and economic systems, in the forms and concepts in literature, architecture, engineering, painting, sculpture, music, recreation, medicine, and even in community and family life. And the changes have been, and are continuing to be, no less marked in the philosophies and the sciences. These latter changes are so startling that when they are eventually described formally in history books they will far overshadow in importance the political ideologies whose violent eruptions are for the present so spectacular. Possibly never before in all human history has a man's world undergone such widespread and significant changes in practically every field of human activity.

To begin to trace these changes, let alone the attempt to find their "causes," leaves one giddily floundering in futility. For a generation to successfully adjust to the politico-economic changes alone, would be more than enough, but these are only part of what the generation soon to enter college will have to face as problems of adjustment. Fifty years from now—perhaps twenty-five—scholars may wish to go to the history books and find out for themselves "what caused" the tremendous upheavals in the twentieth century Western World, possibly but fifty years from now technically trained people may not have in their vocabulary a phrase such as "what caused that?" In fact, some writers do not use the phrase now, even though they find it difficult to express themselves in any other way. "Cause-and-effect" has been the great watchword of the sciences during the lifetime of all persons now living, but "cause-and-effect" thinking has accomplished so much for the more exact sciences that its achievements have projected these sciences to a level where "cause-and-effect" is no longer adequate as a conceptual tool.

Man has probably always been interested in causation, and perhaps he always will be. Anthropologists have indicated that primitive peoples, no less than "civilized" peoples, have always felt it necessary to ask and to answer the question "what caused that?" Whenever great events have occurred—storms, earthquakes, death—the problem of survival as well as curiosity has sent the masses to their wise men for explanation, hope, and security. In every culture prophets, shamen, magicians, wisemen, not only asked but answered such questions. And the questions and answers were always framed in terms of a cause or causes. Early man

generally believed that such events were caused by spirits of the departed or by a hierarchy of spirits and gods who had to be placated and appeased for the welfare of the group. This mode of thinking is usually called "animism."

During the last three centuries the rapidly developing sciences have given the *coup de grâce* to this animistic system of ideas, and the key scientific concept in this accomplishment has been cause-and-effect supplemented by the concept of impersonal force. No doubt the early scientific use of the concept was crude, and the frightened religious and ethical leaders interpreted the usage in equally crude, mechanistic, even fatalistic, terms. Long and bitter controversies developed which were known as conflicts between religion and science. Indeed, so crudely "mechanistic" was early science in the use of this cause-and-effect concept that the Church was compelled to protect itself with the old doctrine of free will.

The social sciences were rather late in abandoning their animistic outlook—some critics say it has not yet been abandoned. But the rapid development of the science of statistics infused new life into the social sciences, and they set out with vigor and determination in the pursuit of cause-and-effect. Since the more exact sciences had used a concept of force to which they had habitually imputed causal properties, so now the social sciences developed their concept of force or forces and these were called "social forces," as described in Chapter IV.<sup>2</sup> These forces were conceived as common human tendencies (not instincts) called desires, wishes, motives, wants, and needs and they were assumed to be the "causes" of human behavior.<sup>3</sup>

The changes that have been and are now taking place are extraordinarily exciting in that although the masses of people have not yet abandoned animism for cause-and-effect, the advanced

<sup>2</sup> See the paper referred to in our Chapter IV, E. C. Hayes: "The Social Forces Error," *American Journal of Sociology* (Mar. 1911), Vol. 16, pp. 613-25, and the comments by other sociologists, pp. 636-41, and the reply of Hayes, pp. 642-4. See also S. Hect: "The Uncertainty Principle in Human Behavior," *Harper's* (Jan. 1935), Vol. CLXX, pp. 237-49, Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 58 and 83, and G. C. Homans and C. P. Curtis, Jr., *An Introduction to Pareto* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1934, Chapter II).

<sup>3</sup> In addition to the references in the previous note, this subject is treated by Read Bain in Chapter II of *Trends in American Sociology* (G. A. Lundberg, R. Bain, and N. Anderson, eds.), New York: Harper & Brothers; 1929. One of the chief burdens of Lundberg's *Foundations* is the repudiation of this complex of ideas.

legions of theoretical physics, biology, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and political science are beginning to abandon cause and effect and the forces to which causal properties have been imputed. The new position, which will be described in sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, is in general agreement with the point of view of the present volume, and is called by various names and combinations of names, such as operationism,<sup>4</sup> configurationism, the situational approach, and field theory.

Stated briefly the new point of view holds that science does not seek a specific cause for a specific event, that while things do not just happen and therefore must be caused, yet we do not think in terms of, nor seek to find, specific, unitary causes, nor specific, unitary forces endowed with causal properties. Rather, we think of all events as occurring within a configuration of interacting phenomena. From this point of view one does not impute causal potency to any object, nor to any point or position at any particular moment in the configuration or field of relationships. One now speaks of processes, relative uniformities, correlations, concomitant variations and sequences in terms of the transformation of energy, whether we are studying people or electrons. If one wishes to explain some phenomenon, one does not point to a "cause", one points, if one must point, to a correlation coefficient, or to an emergent in a configuration of events.

. . . the clue to the understanding of events is to be sought in the organization or configuration of space-time which by reason of that structure or spacial arrangement gives rise to events as energy transformations.<sup>4</sup>

Cause-and-effect in the sense of specific causes for specific events has not been abandoned because it is "wrong." The new way of thinking does not use the terms "right" and "wrong" in this way. Truth is no longer described in terms of "right" and "wrong," except in terms of the conceptual system which creates it.<sup>5</sup> As

<sup>4</sup> Frank "Causation," p. 423.

<sup>5</sup> See the definition of "fact" given earlier—A fact is a statement about phenomena empirically verifiable in terms of, in accordance with, some conceptual formulation, scheme or system. The words "fact" and "truth," as here used, are interchangeable. Facts or truths are always relative to the systems of thought which validate or create them. For example, according to the conceptual system called Euclidean geometry, parallel lines never meet, but according to some modern geometries, such lines do meet. These are not "contradictions," as that term is generally used. Each is a fact or truth in terms of the system from which it emerged.

between ways or systems of thinking we now speak of fact or truth as representing that which is more adequate or less adequate for a purpose, truth is thus a measure of adequacy for a purpose.

An example of the inadequacy of the method of seeking specific, unitary causes for statistical or configurational phenomena is the study of juvenile delinquency and the efforts to correct it. At various times and places people have been certain that this social phenomenon was caused by "the broken home," but studies of broken homes indicated that the majority of children from such homes were not delinquent. Or else "poverty" was the cause. But studies of the poor showed a minority of delinquents, while studies of delinquents revealed many victims who were not poor. And so it went, one social condition after another was singly blamed as the cause of delinquency—broken homes, poverty, lack of home ownership, hard times, good times, divorce, parents, and the schools. Such social phenomena are not caused by any one of these "forces" but by certain types of combinations of all of them. Hence it is now said that delinquency is likely to occur (probability) under such and such conditions, it is a resultant of a configuration of many interrelated conditions. No specific, unitary cause exists or occurs.

### THE CONCEPT OF FORCES

The crux of our problem is the concept of force to which men have traditionally imputed causal properties. The simplicity of the idea of forces causing things has always been attractive: forces cause things to happen; find the force and one solves the problem. Certain forces cause men to behave in certain ways: find the forces and one knows why men do what they do, control the forces and one can make men do what one thinks they ought to do, and prevent their doing what one thinks they ought not to do. Obviously anyone who attempts to upset this neat way of thinking is going to meet strong opposition from many sources. Nevertheless, certain thinkers are out to destroy this concept. They are not numerous, but they are very vocal and very determined.

However, Professor George Lundberg, who belongs to this group, and to whose work I am greatly indebted, makes a statement concerning the concept force which is probably not wholly justified.



*Energy*, then, is not an entity, or an attribute of substances, but a name for *amounts of changes in relationships*. *Force* is the rate of such changes in time. In the social sciences (and even in physics) these terms have been widely misused as the *cause* of the observed behavior. From this insidious linguistic fallacy of imputing a *causal* property to words which merely indicate a *relationship* of societal significance vast confusion has arisen in the social sciences especially. As a result a large part of the literature of sociology has been given over to the elaboration of long lists of "interests," "desires," "wishes," "satisfactions," "drives," and "instincts" as *causes* of observed behavior.<sup>6</sup>

With the spirit of this statement we agree, but the statement should be tempered in two respects: 1) the imputation of causal properties to force is not a linguistic fallacy, and 2) those who impute such properties to force have been primarily physicists and biologists and later the psychologists and sociologists, in addition to practically everyone else.

This criticism is put into the body of the text rather than in the appendix because its importance merits it. Let us take the first point. On page 59 Lundberg justifiably attacks certain writers for confusing words with what they stand for, when they assume that there is one "correct" and "true" meaning of a word. But this is exactly what Lundberg himself does in this instance. "Force is the rate of . . . changes in time," he says, and presumably any other definition is not "correct" but a linguistic fallacy. But note the following definition from a standard text in physics:

*Conception and definition of force.* From infancy our experiences have taught us that muscular effort is required to move matter at rest or to stop matter already in motion. Whenever we see matter in motion stop, or matter at rest move, we attribute to it some cause equivalent to muscular effort and we give this the name of force. Our idea of force, therefore, originates in our muscular effort, and consequently we may define force as *that which changes or tends to change the state of rest or motion of a body*.<sup>7</sup>

In this same quotation the units of force are listed as pounds and grams with an absolute unit "called the *dyne*." Later appear "Meth-

<sup>6</sup> Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 205. Copyright 1939 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

<sup>7</sup> Robert A. Millikan, Henry G. Gale, and C. W. Edwards. *A First Course in Physics for Colleges*. Ginn and Co., 1928. Examination of later texts by other authors reveals little or no difference in definition. An old text is cited to indicate that this way of thinking has been widespread for a long time.

ods of measuring force," "The moment of force," "The law of parallel forces," "Couples," "Vectors," and "Resultants."

Since force is so defined in a standard text in physics, Lundberg's definition is not the only accepted definition, and the imputation of causal properties to force cannot be considered a linguistic fallacy. Words derive their meanings from common usage, and imputing causal properties to force was and is the common practice in all the sciences, even if not at all levels of science. We should be very much astonished if there is anyone who has had a first course in physics who has not learned to think of force as causal. That is what the present writer learned in college, and physics was then considered a highly respectable science by those who respected science. On page 60 Lundberg says "force *is* that which makes pointers move across dials," which certainly sounds causal.

In the second place we wish to bring out here that people were taught, and accepted the idea, that forces were causes, and most people still believe so regardless of their field of activity. *To miss this is to miss the drama of the great changes now taking place as significant socio-psychological phenomena.* Educated people must face in the near future the problem of sloughing off what they learned in the best schools and colleges and what their children are learning today in those schools, that is, their "causal" selectors. Before theoretical physics reaches and changes undergraduate courses in physics, we may witness the anomalous situation of the social sciences being in one respect more advanced than physics!

But we are in a period of transition and if we expect to communicate with our generation we shall have to compromise when writing books on concepts which are in the process of change. This is one reason for compromise; another is that in the new way of thinking one deals with large numbers of variables among which one looks for relative uniformities and correlations, and only mathematics can now handle events involving many variables. But the sciences which are concerned with human behavior have not yet developed to the point where they are able in all instances to measure behavior with sufficient accuracy to justify mathematical treatment.

The compromise made in the present work is to abandon the use of the term "force" generally, but where it is used, to define it as "rate of change." We can, also, more and more use mathematical concepts even when we do not have mathematical data. We can

speak of dependent and independent variables, of interaction and interdependence of phenomena in a configuration of phenomena

By way of transition one of our most useful concepts will be selective response and the concept of selectors. Indeed, one of the ideas which has contributed much to the abandonment of cause-and-effect thinking in favor of something more adequate, was the "discovery" that biological organisms and other phenomena respond selectively to their environments. Neither the human organism nor the personality is the passive victim of all changes in any situation, they are not sensitive to all influences in a given situation. Even an automobile motor is sensitive only to gasoline as a fuel, it responds selectively to fuels. And it would be a metaphysician's holiday to argue whether the gas, the spark, the starter, or the driver "caused" the motor to run.

Out of a totality of events at any one place and time, only a few will operate upon a given organism. Each organism in a given situation will selectively react to the totality of events there present, plainly demonstrating that the so called causal agent is contingent upon the organism, its prior conditioning and present state.<sup>8</sup>

Students of human behavior have long recognized this, but common selectors in the form of traditional cause-and-effect thought-ways have sensitized them to ideas of "causal factors" or of "multiple causes." This was to be expected so long as we were in bondage to causal concepts.

If we were not so devoted to the causal principle we would be more ready to entertain a less artificial and clumsy theory of human behavior and our thinking would be so much advanced. Perhaps we would be more aware of the role of prior experience in patterning behavior so that under the impact of a situation-stimulus the organism behaves as it has learned to respond. This view would not be inconsistent with the growing belief among physicists that what has happened to an atom or electron or any energy complex in the past is the major clue to its present behavior.<sup>9</sup>

Few thinkers would deny that the psychoanalysts have made a genuine contribution in this respect, for the old idea of cause-and-effect assumed that in human behavior either an external or an innate factor was the exclusive agent in causation, and the previous

<sup>8</sup> Frank, "Causation," p. 425.

<sup>9</sup> Frank, "Causation," p. 427.

conditioning of the person was largely ignored. The configuration of social and community conditions as well as the previous conditioning of the person is still largely ignored in our criminal courts and will probably continue to be ignored so long as the criminal law, like the canon law, is guided by unitary causal concepts along with the concept of free will.

No one knows how long it will be before the sciences in the colleges abandon their causal orientation, but possibly the social sciences may not in this instance lag so far behind the more exact sciences, the former have never had their concepts so well formulated as have the latter, and a change should not be so difficult. L. K. Frank, however, is not so optimistic:

Just as the physicist is seeking to understand the individual space-time configurations which give rise to events in place of the older statistical search for determining causes, so the social scientists of the future will study the organic configuration, man, and how his behavior, patterned by his experiences, gives rise to the various aspects of social life we call economic, political, social. But this shift in social science is not to be expected in the immediate future because social scientists are so engrossed with the cause and effect formula.<sup>10</sup>

## **2. Personality as an Energy System Operating in Dynamic Fields of Interaction<sup>11</sup>**

One of the concepts of this volume is symbolic interaction. The first five chapters indicated the kind of interaction referred to, and explained that such interaction always occurs in context, that is, in a configuration of occurrences called "the situation." All situations are more or less dynamic (changing) in the relationships of their components. The changing of such relationships represents the transformation of energy in one form or another.

### **SOME PROPERTIES OF PERSONALITY AS AN ENERGY SYSTEM**

One of the important properties of all energy systems is

<sup>10</sup> Frank: "Causation," p. 427.

<sup>11</sup> Had it not been for the compromise stated in the previous section this section title would have read "Personality as an Energy System Operating in a Field of Force." The term "field-of-force" will be used occasionally in what follows, and when so used it will mean a configuration of occurrences or changes of various degrees at different rates.

change.<sup>12</sup> Change is a continuous variable, always occurring in greater or lesser degree and at greater or lesser rates. Since a person can never separate himself from a situation at any moment of his life, he is himself such a changing component, or system of components, even though in some instances neither the amount nor the rate of change is either perceptible or significant. The personality as a system of units must be regarded as constantly undergoing change from birth to death, sometimes changing much, sometimes imperceptibly, sometimes rapidly, sometimes slowly, in widely differing amounts and rates.

A second property of personality as an energy system is that its dynamics are relative to, or functional to, the dynamics of the field in which it is operating, and of which it is itself a function. The important implication here, and one too often overlooked by critics of field thinking, is that *the personality is part of the field*, not something separate from the field. It is not something which is influenced by the field and in turn influences the field. Once the human organism has integrated the symbolic process, and has achieved personified behavior, the person cannot behave except in a social field, whether he is alone or not. To hypothesize the nature of his behavior outside a social field is meaningless, since such behavior could not be the behavior of a person.

In summary, personality is here viewed as a relatively organized system of energy constantly undergoing transformation at different rates as it operates in, and as a part of, dynamic fields of social interaction.

### THE DYNAMIC FIELD OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTION<sup>13</sup>

The concept of field is but an elaboration of the concept situation. The two terms are frequently used interchangeably by many writers, but the term field is coming to be more acceptable because

<sup>12</sup> J. F. Brown *Psychology and the Social Order*, p. 477, says "dynamics is the science of systems undergoing change."

<sup>13</sup> No attempt is here made to give an exhaustive account of field theory. To do so would require so much space and give so much weight to one phase of our discussion as to destroy the thread of the theory presented in this book. We wish to give only enough of any conceptual or methodological formulation to indicate its implications for the general conceptual formulation which this book represents. Readers who wish to know more about the rapidly developing system of thinking called "field theory" are referred to Lewin's *Dynamic Theory of Personality*; J. F. Brown *Psychology and the Social Order*, Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*.

of its use in the physical sciences. Social scientists are reluctant to give up the term situation for at least two reasons. It has a long history and is well established even in popular vocabularies, and the term also has a "use-meaning" which many writers believe relieves them of careful, rigorous definition. In fact the situational or field approach in social psychology is in its infancy, and these terms and the concept which they symbolize lack a clear-cut, vigorous specification. This is currently the most important and most difficult job facing social psychologists.

We may think of a *social field* as any configuration or set of relationships which forms the context in which any person's behavior occurs. We may think of a social field as a pattern of relationships which obtains at any given time and place where one or more persons are communicating to self and/or others by the use of symbols. Symbolic or social fields will be more rigorously delimited after we have discussed the symbolic process in Chapter VIII, but the fundamental ideas must be presented here.

A social field can be as large or as small as is necessary to comprise all the influences affecting a sample of behavior under observation. For example, we speak of "the international situation," "the business situation," or "the housing situation." Mrs. Smith's tea party is a situation or a series of them, when one meets an importunate creditor on the street, that is an "embarrassing situation." The term field can be substituted for situation in each of these instances.

A social field, whatever its boundaries or size, is always a segment of the social process and therefore a segment of all the other processes diagrammed in Chapter I. "It is the knife with which we cut social process into manipulable sections."<sup>14</sup> Whatever goes on in the field is behavior of some kind, of things and people, and all behavior is change of some sort. All changes in the field are functions of the relationship between the various components of the field. But neither the formal investigator nor the normal everyday participant in a social field is ever interested in all the changes in a field; he is interested in, and by, only those changes which he believes implicate him in some respect.

When one is concerned with a fairly complicated field of social

<sup>14</sup> L. S. Cottrell, Jr., and Ruth Gallagher: *Developments in Social Psychology, 1930-40*. Sociometry Monograph No. 1. New York: Beacon House, 1941, p. 556.

interaction we find it useless to impute causal properties to any behavior or position in the field, that is, to any object or person. The field is dynamic and everything in it is more or less changing, which means that the relationships are changing. The question is never whether or not change is occurring, it is always a question of how much and in what direction and at what rate. Since man has always sought the cause of things our vocabularies are saturated with words of causal implication, and one is tempted at every moment in observing behavior to ask why this or that relationship is changing, why someone does so and so, and what the causes are. This age-old tinsit must be resisted by concentrating on the behavior observed. Causal concepts are not adequate for manipulating the symbols which communicate meanings in a configurational setup like a field, nor in a complex linear setup like the continuous process of *which a given field is a historical segment*.

We may think of the field we are observing as a circus which we have entered late when everything was already "in full swing." We do not know how it began, we were not there. So it is with the observation of social interaction—it began with the beginning of time and it has been going ever since, never stopping for a second. If the reader will think of himself for a moment he will see that this describes every moment of his everyday life. He leaves one field only to enter another, the process never stops. Even in his sleep he is active to some degree and during waking hours even if he is sitting "still" his thoughts never stop, they move incessantly until he dies. Someone has said that nothing is permanent but change.

Society or the social process has neither beginning nor end—for scientific purposes—just an incessant process, a continuous, endless sequence of fields. We are born into this process and gradually we find ourselves in "the swing of it"—like coming into the ongoing circus; we die and leave the ongoing process—like leaving the circus before it is over.

Theoretically, everything that changes, and everything does, may affect everything else, this is the significance of interaction in a field. Without beginning or end, no one knows what causes what, specifically in a one to one relationship. So instead of speaking of causes, which would send us back to the beginning of time, we speak of, and look for, concomitant variations or changes which occur in sequence, and we look for relative uniformities in such related changes. When we see that certain behavior or changes in

relationships frequently occur together or in sequence, we try to observe all the relevant *conditons under which* such behavior occurs. Then we predict behavior in terms of the probability of its happening again in a similar situation or in a field of similar structure.

A person, for example, is dynamic, changing all the time, more or less, in the course of a day—moving about, changing position in relation to other people, changing moods, changing tasks, changing clothes, and status. Now let us take a slow motion picture of this constantly changing stream of activity. We may see that at one moment or in a sequence of moments one undergoes a change which we have learned to call anger, and we may then notice that this change is followed in sequence by changes in others with whom one interacts. We examine the field conditions under which such behavior takes place, and if we see this sort of change between people occurring with a degree of similarity which approaches uniformity, we predict the probability of such changes in the future under similar conditions.

In this minor incident nothing was said about “cause,” but a policeman might find it necessary to use the term. Even careful students of field theory, like J. F. Brown and K. Lewin use the term “The force which is causing the behavior is to be ordered to a vector within the psychological field, as is its present position.”<sup>15</sup> Only a pedant would object to imputing causal properties to the police force. “Cause” is a concept and will not bite anyone. It is merely inadequate for describing complex fields of interaction. We shall later use vectors to indicate the magnitude and direction of changes taking place, and in simple situations we may use causal terminology. However, when we come to a complex field the whole causal ideology is quite inadequate.

### THE FIELD BASIS OF EXPLANATION

People are generally uneasy in the presence of events which they do not understand. Call it fear or anxiety or whatnot, people want things “explained” so that they can act safely in relation to them. In view of the common tinsits in our culture, the only satisfying explanation for anything has been to get an answer, direct and unequivocal, to the simple question: “What caused that?” or

<sup>15</sup> J. F. Brown *Psychology and the Social Order*, p. 46.



"Why do people do such things?" But if two or more phenomena occur together frequently, and if these are very familiar to a person, he is usually quite content merely with knowing of the high correlation between the two phenomena

If, for example, a person has heard at various times a strange buzz on his radio and has usually found that at these times a light bulb was burning out somewhere in the house, then he merely looks for such a bulb whenever the buzz occurs. He may actually say "a bulb burning out is causing a buzz." Yet he knows nothing about causation in this instance, he is quite satisfied with knowledge of a high positive correlation between "buzz" and "bulb-burning-out." A little training will transfer satisfaction with this type of explanation in more complex problems.

I believe that examination will show that the essence of an explanation consists in reducing a situation to elements with which we are so familiar that we accept them as a matter of course so that our curiosity rests. Reducing a situation to elements means, from the operational point of view, discovering familiar correlations between them.<sup>16</sup>

And when the relative importance of the variables becomes that familiar, there can be no harm in speaking of cause, but under such conditions, as the preceding quotation suggests, there is no need to speak of cause.

Operationally speaking, cause is imputed to the independent variable or combination of variables when it shows a high probability-expectation in its concomitant variations with other factors or combination of factors, still other relevant conditions held constant.<sup>17</sup>

### FIELD IS A CONCEPT

If one meets a stranger on a train, and the stranger states that he is a salesman, one will very probably reply "Well, that's interesting, what is your field?" And just as naturally the salesman will probably reply "shoes," or "textiles," or some other industrial field. What or where is the "shoe industry"? There are factories where shoes are made, and one can see and touch them. But what is the "industry"? "Shoe industry" is a mental construct, an abstraction,

<sup>16</sup> P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics*, p. 37. Copyright 1927 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

<sup>17</sup> Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 83. Copyright 1939 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

*a concept which comprises and unifies our responses toward all activities, collectively, associated with the making of shoes.* "Field" is also such a concept. Every professor has his recognized field of study. General Eisenhower was in charge of the European field of operations in World War II. We speak of the field of battle, which may be a city street or the air above it. The visual area of a microscope or telescope lens is called the field; and we speak of the field of vision. There are gravitational fields, magnetic fields, light fields, sound fields, various psychological fields, various sociological fields, *and as many other fields as one needs to subsume and describe any kind of activity.* A field "is that aspect or segment of the universe to which we respond as a whole"<sup>18</sup> at a given time and place.

In any field which one may be studying one is concerned with only those components which are relevant and effective in that situation. The limitations of one's sensory equipment as well as the limitations of language and one's other selectors make it necessary for one to pay attention to only those components of a field to which one is sensitized in relation to what one is investigating, or otherwise behaving. If one is studying light, one disregards those components of the field which concern only sound. If one is studying the motion of a billiard ball, one disregards components of the field which pertain to light because they are not relevant. So in social fields, one pays attention only to those components which are relevant to particular behaviors of particular people. One cannot respond to the whole universe at once, so we have to break down our total fields of study into smaller fields, and for any research project or for any moment of living, the size of the field is just large enough to include the specific behaviors in which we are implicated. We are compelled by the nature of our limitations to react selectively to the universe and to shut out consideration of any field components not directly relevant. The field is thus referred to as a closed system. This directs the investigator's or the participant's attention and makes him see whatever he sees and makes judgments about. In study and research we do this as method; but we do exactly the same thing in the countless situations in our daily living. This is one of the many instances in which the scientist does deliberately as method what everyone does daily unwittingly as normal behavior.

<sup>18</sup> Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 217.

All human behavior is a social, not an individual, phenomenon. If we say that magnetic force influences certain metals in certain ways under certain conditions, and that social stimuli influence certain people in certain ways under certain conditions, we are not speaking figuratively in the second case. One statement is as verifiable as the other, and both are, as we previously defined the term "fact," literal "statements about phenomena empirically verifiable in terms of some conceptual scheme." We do not maintain that the forms of energy are the same in both cases. In both cases, however, the influences are fairly well understood. "Social behavior may be regarded as the resultant of all relevant factors in a field of force."<sup>10</sup> Let us illustrate this.

### THE FOOTBALL FIELD

Most readers of this book are familiar with the game football. One customarily thinks, however, of the football field as a marked off, flat piece of ground on which the two teams play. The game, however, is a much larger concept, for the entire audience participates, and we can hear the game miles away from the actual scene. We should like to extend the field in this instance to include the entire game, using the stadium as the boundaries of the closed system and including everything in the stadium relevant to the game—audience, officials, players, guards, cheer leaders, soft drink and peanut vendors, bands, loudspeakers, balloons, flags, colors, noises, smells, and symbols of every description. This is the field.

Continuing our analogy between "the resultant of all relevant factors in a field of force" and the football game, we can see that just before the game begins the general atmosphere is relaxed, dispersed, diverse, and informal—we aimlessly take our seats, the teams "warm up"; the officials, band, cheer leaders, and field employees are making preparations preliminary to the game. Many people pass before us, but their movements lack order and direction. Even as the teams run out on the field before the kickoff the same general lack of order and attention prevails. Suddenly, the world explodes as the teams rush to their places and deploy for the kickoff. Everyone is on his feet, yelling, clapping, and cheering. *Then, without any command, 50,000 people sit down.*

The whistle blows and everyone jumps to his feet to see the

<sup>10</sup> Lundberg: *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 469-70

kickoff and then they sit down again. It is as if someone had tripped a huge switch and charged the whole field with electric current. The chaos of movement and sound is now gone and fifty thousand noses snap in unison toward the grid like the points of little dials in an electrical field. One feels the magnetism—the social tension. *The field is established*: traditions, rules, regulations, taboos, imperatives, restrictions, predictions, expectancies, honor, etiquette, convention, and custom—all come into play with overwhelming expectancy and take over complete control of the behavior of all the thousands in the *field*.

The field of operation is now a powerful, dynamic framework of controlled imperatives with the sanction of law. If a rule is broken, penalties immediately take effect, no apologies, no regrets, rule, law, custom, and tradition hold sway. Resentments, resistances, and conflicting attitudes appear; cheers, jeers, threats, fears, and hopes—social influences, social stimuli, vectors in a social field of force. Certain things we dare not do, certain things we must do; everything is determined by the field structure, social influences, meanings, the stimuli in the whole field of operations.

The rest of the universe is shut out, the energy of the thousands is hemmed in and concentrated in a closed system, one segment or aspect of the universe, a frame of reference where it is not true that “anything goes”, everything, all significant behavior, is determined by well-defined, stable, standardized rules and laws—common tinsits. The sanctions are honor, fair play, tradition, and pride—common tinsits of personalities, the behavior of self and of others, influences, social magnetism, social gravity, and social dynamics. People are “moved,” get excited (kinetic), some negatively (anger), some positively (joy), there are attractions, repulsions, and interaction—systems of energy operating in a field of interaction. We are governed by unwritten rules—meanings, social stimuli which determine behavior.

This description suggests the meaning of a field of interaction as a closed system with the many personalities involved operating as part of the field. The dichotomy “organism-environment” or “hereditary-environment” cannot handle such a situation, for the question is not merely of something “out there” working on a collection of organisms. Dynamic interactional concepts are required to do justice to such a social field. A social field is a tremendously complex whole or system of interacting parts, all of which are integral

parts of the field. From the merging of these parts in action there *e-merges* the incredibly complex phenomenon called "the game."<sup>20</sup> The football field is far more dramatic and of greater magnitude than most social fields, but our contention is that every human act occurs in a social field.

### THERE IS "NO LOCAL DETERMINATION" IN THE FIELD

The concepts of "no local determination" and "behavior is a resultant" are two of the most fundamental concepts of field theory and of the conceptual formulation in this book. We again call the reader's attention to the following facts, relating to these two central concepts. Chapter I stated that

To name a *transit* it is necessary to name the situation of which it is a function, we thus avoid the fallacy of conceptually separating the tendency from the situation in which it occurs, and of which it is a function. The significance of this will appear in almost every section of the book.

This idea emerged again in Chapter I in the section on "Prediction vs. Prophecy," as well as in Chapter III in the discussion of partial definitions of personality. In Chapter IV we discussed it in the section about selectors not being causes of behavior where the problem of control was raised. We shall now discuss the principle in still another connection.

The description of the football field enables one to see that no particular action of a person in that field is caused within the person in the sense of an internally-initiated spontaneous act, but rather that every act in this field is a resultant of all the relevant components operating in the field. The individual human organism is but one configuration of such components. The concept "no local determination in the field" cautions against

attributing causal efficacy to one element in a situation and ignoring the dynamic context in which the element is found.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> It is difficult to take seriously the alarmists who love to warn that sport in America is becoming decadent because it is a "spectator" phenomenon, as if people were calmly sitting there having things done for them. People go home from "seeing" a football game dishevelled and sweating, with sore muscles, riled emotions, and ruined finger nails—exhausted.

<sup>21</sup> Katz and Schanck. *Social Psychology*, p. 393.

As an indication of how subtle this concept is, and of how much it needs repetition, we now present a statement which occurs only twelve pages after the preceding quotation:

Many measures which pass as personality scales . . . show how a large number of people behave in one situation, *but they do not indicate whether the behavior is situationally or personally determined* <sup>22</sup>

Certainly, in the minds of these authors the second statement is not a violation of the principle in the first. But from the point of view of the present work the second statement is such a violation. Here we have an important difference between field theory and the traditional approach. A statement almost identical with the second quotation appears in another text in social psychology

. . . the "parts" of a given personality can be known only as they function in some sort of situation, e g., "honesty" appears only in circumstances in which it is possible to steal, cheat, tell lies, etc. This means that attributes of personality must be observed in operation—as one factor in an interaction. Since the interaction necessarily involves a number of variables, *it is difficult* to isolate the personality from the context in which it behaves. Thus we are never absolutely certain whether two people are behaving differently because of *the different factors in their personalities* or because of *different circumstances in the situation* in which they behave. Likewise, we are never completely certain whether changes in a given person's behavior are to be traced to variables *within his personality* or *within the situation* in which it operates.<sup>23</sup>

We wish to emphasize that these quotations are in no sense presented here as criticisms of the books in which they appear, nor of their authors, for the statements represent the traditional and majority point of view. The quotations are cited here to illustrate and clarify the point of view of field theory.

From the field point of view personality and situation cannot be separated because field theory as a system of thought cannot conceptualize any two such separate phenomena. In field thinking we can find no personality apart from situation. Person or personality is a process of the organism *under certain conditions*, not under all conditions, in certain situations, not in all situations. Again, this is why we had to use "tinsit" instead of tendency.

<sup>22</sup> Katz and Schanck: *Social Psychology*, p. 405. (Italics mine).

<sup>23</sup> LaPiere and Farnsworth. *Social Psychology*, pp. 174 and 253. Copyright 1942 Courtesy of McGraw-Hill Book Company. (Italics mine).

We have earlier referred to some differences between modern and Aristotelian concepts. Kurt Lewin and J. F. Brown, among others, deserve credit for calling attention to what field theory considers fallacies in popular reflective behavior. In relation to the topic "Teleology and Physical Vectors," Lewin says

. . . for Aristotelian concepts the *cause* of a physical event was very closely related to psychological "drives", the object strives toward a certain goal, so far as movement is concerned, it tends toward the place appropriate to its nature. Thus heavy objects strive downward, the heavier the more strongly, while light objects strive upward. *the kind and direction of the physical vectors in Aristotelian dynamics are completely determined in advance by the nature of the object concerned.* In modern physics, on the contrary, *the existence of a physical vector always depends upon the mutual relations of several physical facts*, especially upon the relation of the object to its environment.<sup>24</sup>

The whole structure of Western thinking is saturated with the organocentric thinking that Lewin criticizes here. The old instinct theory of human behavior is a good example, as is the Nazi German (and American) idea of race superiority, or, generally, the theory of social class superiority—the rich are such because they are ambitious or the poor are on relief because they are lazy. People do not realize that such terms as "ambitious" and "lazy" explain nothing. The real question for social psychology is "what are the significant conditions in a social field under which ambitious and lazy traits emerge?"

Brown says, in relation to the practice of conceptualizing the person as some entity apart from a field, that all such fallacious theories have

a common methodological weakness, namely, the desire to find certain human reaction tendencies which remain constant, independent of changes in field-structure. . . . In modern kinetics the movement is defined by a vector whose direction and magnitude at any place are both determined by field-structure. . . . The individual is in the field, a part of the field, and can never be considered as outside the field or as working on it from the outside.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Lewin: *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, pp. 27-8. Copyright 1935. Courtesy of McGraw-Hill Book Company. (Italics mine)

<sup>25</sup> J. F. Brown: *Psychology and the Social Order*, pp. 91, 37, 329. Copyright 1936. Courtesy of McGraw-Hill Book Company.

And Lewin says:

*only by the concrete whole which comprises the object and the situation are the vectors which determine the dynamics of the event defined*<sup>26</sup>

In the study of human behavior the dichotomous concepts of organism-environment are such old selectors that they have sensitized most people to seeing these as two discrete phenomena.

Only by analysis and selective abstraction can we differentiate the actual occurrence into two factors, one called organism and the other environment<sup>27</sup>

In other words, we do not have here two discrete phenomena; it is not that A influences B and B influences A, nor that "person" influences "situation" and situation influences person, *situation and person are phases of one whole*. A person is never at any moment in his whole life separate from a situation of some kind, he is as much a part of the social field as electricity is of an electrical field, and there is no social field except where he is. Human interaction is described in Chapter I as a fourfold process involving emergence, selective response, role-taking, and interpersonal integration. When these processes are occurring, they constitute a social or symbolic field. We may close the discussion by citing a highly significant statement from a work already mentioned several times.

Roughly stated, the field theory of personality regards the total environmental setting *as well as* the inner structure of the person as decisive in the shaping of conduct. There is surely no objection to a statement so broad as this. But in practice, the field theory inclines to put too great emphasis upon the momentary determination of conduct without giving due credit to the enduring systems of personality, *often quite unaffected by changes in the surrounding conditions* [These enduring systems] are the one and only guarantee of stability in personal conduct.<sup>28</sup>

Enough has already been said about the idea represented in the first sentence of this statement. The words "often quite unaffected by changes in the surrounding conditions" represent, I think, a misunderstanding of field thinking.

<sup>26</sup> Lewin: *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>27</sup> John Dewey: *Psychologies of 1930*, p. 411. Cited by Lundberg: *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 239.

<sup>28</sup> G. W. Allport: *Personality*, p. 304. (Italics mine).



In the summer we swim in the lake, in the winter we skate on it. "In ice" the lake has a structure which endures for months, and which is not perceptibly affected by changes in time of day, by changes in amount of light, by changes in the number of fish in the lake, by the distance of the lake from the railroad track, by the political party in power, by the amount of smoke in the air, by the price of shore lots—apparently "changes in surrounding conditions" do not affect it. But such conditions are not relevant to ice-ness, and will have no more effect on ice than will the tax rate. If, however, we discover a significant change in temperature or wind velocity, that is, in the *relevant* conditions, the ice-ness of the lake will be affected as an enduring system. Man, who always lives in situations, admittedly has enduring (recurring) action systems too, and no matter how many *irrelevant factors* in his fields change, these enduring systems will naturally be "quite unaffected." We urge that we study the *conditions under which* behavior occurs in order that the relevant changes may be isolated.

Because the personality is not perceptibly affected by changes in everything in the field does not indicate that the field is ever unimportant. Buildings, bridges, and paintings endure, too, much longer than the traits of a man, *but not if there are significant changes in those elements of the field which are relevant to their endurance*. If a person has a relatively enduring habit of stealing, thousands of changes in his life situations may not affect the habit at all; but just one significant change in one relevant factor, and the habit is affected (lack of opportunity to steal, achievement of security, new job opportunity, or whatever may be significant in the case).

Field theory holds that the field is a whole and that any change affects the whole, but the theory does not hold that every change in the field affects all positions in the field equally or even perceptibly. Lewin considers the personality a *Gestalt*, a "system whose parts are dynamically connected in such a way that a change of one part results in a change in all the parts."<sup>29</sup> Conceptually this is necessary, but it does not mean that all changes are equal and significant, or even perceptible with present instruments. How

<sup>29</sup> K. Lewin, *Principles of Topological Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936), p. 218. Lewin adds, "This unity may differ for different kinds of changes." See Henderson's very instructive "Diagram of Interaction" with his and Lundberg's comments in Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 218-19.

big is a change? Measurement is the only answer to such a question. But the significance of a change must be determined on other grounds, and then correlated with measurements.

### 3. Historicity and the Field Approach

One of the criticisms of the field approach to the study of human behavior is that field concepts are fundamentally *ahistorical*. It is said that field theory postulates behavior to be induced by a momentary field of force with little or no consideration given to the history of the personality. If this criticism can be justified, it is indeed a challenge to the present work which grants a central position not only to the field and the personality of which it is a part, but which goes even further and postulates the historicity of the act and of the field itself.

We may examine two instances of the criticism in question. The first is contained in the quotation from Professor Allport cited previously to the effect that

in practice the field theory inclines to put too great emphasis upon the momentary determination of conduct without giving due credit to the enduring systems of the personality . . .

A second instance of this criticism comes from Cottrell and Gallagher, who say.

. . . while we look with favor upon this field-ahistorical approach in social psychology which promises to get rid of the futile attribute-hunting, we cannot afford to be completely uncritical of the applicability of this mode of thought to the process social psychologists are describing. It is a peculiar property of human behavior that it is both integrative of present dynamic fields, and projective of past ones, and a philosophy of research which is so oriented to the temporal present that it is incapable of appreciating this fact will do little to enlarge our understanding of human experience, however intriguing the geometries it may produce<sup>30</sup>

We believe that this criticism arises from a misunderstanding of terms. To say that field concepts are ahistorical is not the same as saying that the behaviors so conceptualized are also ahistorical.

One may postulate the ahistoricity of the laws, principles, or

<sup>30</sup> Cottrell and Gallagher: *Developments in Social Psychology*, 1930-1940, p. 10.

genotypes of field theory without in any way implying the ahistoricity of the field components. A careful reading of a statement by a recognized student of field theory will throw some light on this problem. According to J. F. Brown

Aristotle as a physicist is concerned with empirical observations of his own time . . . Statements about falling bodies in modern kinetics are statements about *types* of events which hold throughout space and time . . . The relationship between time and space expressed in the law of falling bodies, although never agreeing precisely with actual data, presumably holds for all past and future historical times and for all positions in the cosmos. Explanation of an event consists in adequately describing the underlying genotype and in seeing if the phenotype (experience or data) may be precisely *ordered* to it. Laws are descriptions of genotypes. When the laws (genotypes, underlying dynamics) are well enough known to allow measurement, one can predict the future quite independently of the past. The psychologist always excuses his lack of precision by referring to the difficulties of a genetic nature which hamper him.

In the theory of the social field the attempt will be made at a strictly ahistorical science. In order to avoid misunderstanding it is necessary to emphasize that we do not deny the importance of history. The historically conditioned changes in economic systems, transportation, communication, social class structure, etc., *must all be taken into consideration in the genotypical field description*.<sup>81</sup>

This statement does not seem to contain a bias against consideration of the historical or genetic aspects either of the social field or of any of its components. What appears to be ahistorical is not the field, nor the persons, nor yet the behaviors or changes in the field. Ahistoricity here applies to the constructs, concepts, principles, laws, and genotypes. A statement of principle or law is presumed to hold true regardless of the history of the phenomena to which the law refers, for a law always includes a statement of the conditions under which the law holds. The fact that these conditions are genetically or historically implicated is not denied by this proposition.

For example, if we should state as an hypothesis "The ability to take the role of another varies inversely with social distance,"

<sup>81</sup> J. F. Brown: *Psychology and the Social Order*, pp. 38-9 (Italics mine)  
Courtesy McGraw-Hill Book Company

this is a description of a genotype—a general truth, which is in no way impaired by any historical conditions. If an investigator is studying a known tinsit, he can make predictions on the basis of the conditions under which that tinsit is known to emerge in some degree of probability. He does not need at that moment to know the history of the personality, but whoever formulated a description of the tinsit would have to know the history of the personality—or at least the history of the behavior and its conditions, which the stated tinsit describes, in order to specify the behavior as a specific tinsit.

If a given field activates a certain tinsit or constellation of tinsits, it does so at a certain moment and this is “momentary determination,” but it is a momentary determination of the activity of the very “enduring systems” which Professor Allport is championing. Allport himself states this very nicely (p. 312-13):

The basic principle of behavior is its continuous flow, each successive act representing the mobilization of all energy available at the moment.

The momentary field does not, in each instance, “create” the tinsit, it activates the tinsit, the behavior which is most probable in such a field. Whether Professor Brown would agree with this interpretation of “ahistoricity,” we do not know. In any case, this is the interpretation of ahistoricity in the present work.

Finally, if we were to accept the last sentence of Professor Allport’s statement, our problem would probably have no solution. The sentence states that the “enduring systems” of the personality “are the one and only guarantee of stability in personal conduct.” These “enduring systems” can be enduring or stable only because the fields of which they are functions are stable—only by virtue of their being functions of stable (recurring) fields. If Mr. Smith has a highly stable tinsit to be jolly at breakfast, this is possible because breakfast as a situation or field recurs daily or frequently. That is, breakfast, as an institution, is a highly stable or recurring field. We could not conceivably predict that Mr. Smith would be jolly at breakfast if there were no breakfasts. In any case, the tinsit “jolly-at-breakfast” is a specification of a certain behavior under stated conditions (ahistorically) whether or not these conditions ever occur again.

## THE FIELD IS A SEGMENT OF THE SOCIAL PROCESS

A situational field is here postulated as a segment of the social process, and therefore has a history. By the same reasoning which finds the history of an act in its character as an emergent in the individual life process, so the history of the situational field lies in its character as an emergent in the larger social process. The social process is an ongoing, continuous whole, and a field is but an arbitrarily devised ahistorical mental construct used as a partitioning unit of this process. Hence a "unique" situation field is for us as fallacious as a unique personality or unique act. A relatively stable society means that its fields frequently recur. If this were not so the concept of "precedent" in law and elsewhere would be meaningless. The continuity, stability, or endurance of the constellation of tinsits called a trait is for us strictly contingent upon the continuity, or recurrence of a field or type of field of which the trait is a function.

Every field has a history specified by the relationship of the field to the social process of which it is a segment. Such relationships are the very phenomena by which one measures the stability of a society. The high probability of the recurrence (or "endurance") of expected fields constitutes a stable society. And these must be related fields. *The highly probable recurring phenomenon called society is a sequential configuration of related fields*—this is the definition of the social process, and the meaning of traditions, customs, folkways, and other highly probable common tinsits.

This kind of thinking necessitated that the term "tendency" be replaced by a term like "tinsit." One of the great fallacies of the "futile attribute-hunting" which Cottrell and Gallagher deprecate is the failure to recognize that no behavior could recur ("endure") unless the conditions under which it occurs also recur. Social fields can thus be stable only because they are segments of the ongoing social process, and are thereby endowed with historicity. Social fields thus have a linear as well as a configurational dimension. The ahistoricity of the laws governing such fields refers to the proposition that these laws hold regardless of where or when the fields occur.

The reality which we know as society or social community is a description of, or a reference to, a sequence of interrelated situational fields. A "stable" society is such a stable sequence. If this

were not true, customs, traditions, institutions, manufacturing, advertising, investments, planning, or any social expectancy would be meaningless

As an illustration of what we may hope to accomplish by ahistorical manipulation of historical fields, we may cite a hopeful statement by Cottrell and Gallagher.

As social psychologists learn to emphasize the operations they perform in analyzing behavior, the concept of the situation will grow quite naturally in specific meaning and usefulness. For, after all, the term simply describes the unique grouping of operations performed in the act of understanding a particular role. Eventually it should be possible to use the concept as rigorously as this *Given an external situation consisting of the following role expectations . . . , and a subject equipped with the following role patterns . . . , we may predict that the role of the subject in this situation will be . . .* When we have attained this much precision in our situational analyses, it should not be long before we can generalize about types of situations which produced types of behavior, and this is what we are ultimately looking for.<sup>82</sup>

#### 4. The Consensual Field

To the people operating in a given social field, the field is what they think it is, for each person in a field, the field is what he thinks it is. Doubtlessly some students of human behavior exist who would disagree with the preceding statement. They assume that such statements are an admission that human behavior is an unpredictable enigma, a labyrinthian darkness from which the human mind cannot escape.

When we say: "For each person in a field the field is what he thinks it is," some readers will probably say: "One cannot define or describe a social field if every person in it sees it as something different." But these two statements are by no means the same. To say that a field is what a person thinks it is does not mean that every person in the field thinks of it differently; certainly not to a degree that makes a difference. In psychology and social psychology we recognize that one of the primary concerns of the adolescent is the

<sup>82</sup> Cottrell and Gallagher: *Developments in Social Psychology, 1930-1940*, pp. 55-6 (Italics mine) The italicized portion is an ahistorical principle.

fear that he might not see, feel, talk, think, look, and act like everybody else in his peer groups. And that fear seldom leaves him in any appreciable degree for the rest of his life.

### CONSENSUAL AND PERSONAL FIELDS

Every human act is in some degree an approximation to (or deviation from) a social norm. "In some degree" includes the lower as well as the upper ranges of the scale. Writers often distinguish between what they think of as the "objective" field and what the individual believes it is. For the former concept writers use such terms as actual, physical, external, or objective, the latter being the most popular. In addition, psychiatrists usually use the term "reality." In view of the nature of perception we consider these terms unsatisfactory, for the process of perception is the same for all people, though the determinants, biases, or selectors may be different. Regardless of how a person interprets or perceives a field, it is real or "objective" to him. "We accept as real the conditions which control our responses"<sup>33</sup> The fact that Jack interprets a field differently from Jill does not make his interpretation less objective nor hers more objective. In the absence of scientific measurements, what a given field "really is" beyond what a given person thinks it is, can be nothing more than a statistical average, a mean or a mode of the interpretations of all persons in the field or familiar with it. This kind of reality is highly standardized in every culture and in every social group. We shall later maintain that such standardized behavior constitutes the reality which we call a sociological group.

In the normal round of daily living we determine this reality by a consensus of the participants or of technical observers. For scientific investigators the nature of reality must be determined by a consensus of competent investigators. We shall call this average or modal interpretation the consensual interpretation or definition, and the field thus interpreted or defined will be called the *consensual field*. The field for any individual will be called the *personal field*, which will be thought of as a deviation from (or approximation to) the consensual field as a norm.

If, for example, a dozen people are enjoying a picnic on a

<sup>33</sup> Charles W. Morris, in his introduction to G. H. Mead's *The Philosophy of the Act*, p. xix

lake shore, and toward dusk a member of the party screams that she has just seen a ghost, the rest of the party will probably try to comfort her. Her field was highly personal. But if ten of the party should see a ghost, then that is the real, or consensual, field, and the two skeptics "had better mind their manners." For each of the ten the personal field deviated zero degrees from the consensual field, which was the operating norm for that field. The personal field of the two skeptics deviated from the consensual field to a degree approaching 100, and from the point of view of society at large the consensual field of the ten persons deviated from the social norm to a degree approaching 100. Consensual fields are frequently peopled by witches, ghosts, spies, and other projections of group hysteria and folkways. While this is being written the consensual American political field contains a nest of "Reds" under every government bureau. Citizens who cannot see these reds are presumably living in highly personal fields, and they learn to be inarticulate for fear of being suspect. They are abnormal.

The consensual field is a central tendency of personal fields, and every social group constitutes such a central tendency in some respect. The personal field of one person will tend to be more rather than less like that of other group members. Careful investigation will probably show that many of what superficially appear to be highly personal definitions of a situation are in fact the consensual definitions of some group or groups with which the person is identified. This is frequently overlooked for at least two reasons: 1) in normal daily interaction people do not announce themselves as being, or even think of themselves as being, the appointed representatives of their groups, for their representativeness consists of their polarized common tinsits, and 2) a person is seldom aware of the source of his definitions for even his more stable social situations. The source of the definition may be lost in the history of the act, but it will frequently be found to be an identification tinsit of which the person is not aware.

The personal definitions of normal people are not personal in the sense of being highly new or different from those of anyone else, instead they are in greater, rather than lesser, degree, approximations to some consensual definition. *A person can communicate with others only to the extent that his definitions approximate those of a consensually defined norm*, usually called the social norm. When a person's deviations are too great he is described as abnor-



mal. Books in the fields of sociology, anthropology, and social psychology sometimes confuse students because the authors unintentionally give the impression that social norms are precise enough to represent single points on a scale. But a social norm or definition almost always represents a range on a scale as a result of what we have called the margin-of-error-in-role-taking. When people speak to us about anything we repeat the words to ourselves, and this repetition may represent a great or small deviation (error) from the speaker's idea of what he said, or from the general consensus. We listen not only with our ears but with all our relevant, implicated, and "interested" selectors. In stable groups the deviations are usually small.

In the course of time a person has repeated to himself, and is therefore familiar with, numerous versions of a situation's given definition. The social or consensual definition is an average of a sort for everyone who uses that meaning as part of his behavior. Symbols are socially accepted averages. This drives the sciences more and more to the use of mathematical symbols in an effort to reduce the area of deviation, for when a hundred million people define "four" as "two plus two," these symbols are practically duplicates for the hundred million, the margin-of-error is too small for calculation and is of no significance whatever. So far as we know this is as near as man can approach a social definition which represents a point on a scale.

Human or symbolic fields are, for the present work, conceptualized fields. When a person's behavior tends to be more and more unrelated to the consensual fields of his groups, and tends to become fixated as such, and when there is for him only one general conceptualized field for all functions of life, such a person is referred to as a neurotic or psychotic, depending on the nature of the deviation. The measurement of this deviation then becomes the operational definition of abnormal behavior. For various purposes and for different types of analyses we may speak of normal fields, subdivided into many varieties of classifications, and abnormal fields such as parataxic, manic, schizophrenic, etc.

To return to the beginning of section 4, it should now be apparent that the statement "the-field-is-what-a-person-thinks-it-is" does not mean "every-person-sees-it-differently" to a degree that makes a difference. If the two statements had the same meaning, there could be no social groups.

The American ethos places great value on the idea of individuality and individualism, and the resulting selectors provide most Americans with an incapacity to notice what they might have to regard as "regimentation." This selective incapacity operates as a defense mechanism against a more or less unconscious realization that the behavior of all people in a stable society is necessarily highly uniformly routinized. Routinization consists of and assures the continuous recurrence of familiar situations, and uniformity converts the process into a social group. The continuous rhythmical recurrence of familiar consensual fields is what constitutes a stable society.

. . . our scientific statement correlates that which the individual himself experiences . . . with the experience which belongs to everyone. This is essential in order that we may interpret what is peculiar to the individual . . . [The scientist] wants to state the experience of an individual just as closely as he can in terms of the field which he can control, those conditions under which it appears.<sup>34</sup>

### 5. The Stuff that Social Fields are Made of

The author was once asked, "What kind of stuff are social fields made of besides land, air, and people?" The safest answer indicated was, "We don't know." Contemporary writers are unhappily aware that the "stuff" social fields are made of can at present be described only in very general and imprecise terms. Earlier we suggested that the term "situation" is synonymous with the words "the conditions under which." Since we have now equated "situation" and "field" presumably the synonym applies to "field" also. But this juggling does not solve our problem. If "field" means "conditions under which," what, specifically, is the nature of these conditions? What are the units of measure involved? What are the analytical mechanisms? Since social fields have at least two dimensions, linear (historical) and configurational (structural), what units are to be used for each?

The answer to such questions constitutes one of the most important current problems in social psychology. We are badly in need of help. The disciplines concerned with the study of human behavior have operated so long under the guidance of selectors

<sup>34</sup> G. H. Mead. *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. 33, 34-5.

which see the determinants of behavior as located primarily in the area bounded by the skin, that too little attention has been given to the classification and analysis either of "situations" or "fields"<sup>35</sup> With the discipline of social psychology in this condition the best we can hope to do is to indicate some suggestive terms of our own and of other writers These may serve as tentative hypothetical units and processes. Whatever units are ultimately adopted by the profession will emerge from hypotheses verified by research

We may begin our search with a simple exercise in logic The field conditions must consist of whatever influences human behavior *Whatever influences a given behavior constitutes the conditions under which it occurs* This is the clue to the investigation of the relative weights of organic and social conditions as field components. Also, we assume that nothing can influence human behavior unless in some degree it *registers* on the human organism as a selector-system.<sup>36</sup> The obvious question, then, is "what is it that influences personality by registering on it?" And the apparent answer to this question is "stimuli" In earlier chapters we stated that stimuli are of two general types represented by the formulations  $S \leftrightarrow R$  and  $S \leftrightarrow {}_rM_s \leftrightarrow R$ , the latter being the type relevant to human or personic behavior.

Chapter II stated that both the primary stimulus (S) and the secondary stimulus ( ${}_rM_s$ ) are determined by one's selector structure. The  ${}_rM_s$  symbolizes the primary response which in turn becomes the secondary stimulus This is a symbolic phenomenon, namely, a meaning. Social fields, then, are configurations of inter-

<sup>35</sup> Considerable interest has arisen in situational analysis during the last few years The works of Lewin, Brown, and Lundberg are useful in this direction. Most of the work has been done in the field of social psychology See L S Cottrell, Jr. "An Analysis of Situational Fields in Social Psychology" *American Sociological Review*, (1942), Vol 7, pp 370-87, A W Gien "The Social Situation and Personality Theory" *American Sociological Review*, pp. 388-93, J F Brown *Psychology and the Social Order*, pp 267-73, and his "Individual, Group, and Social Field" *American Journal of Sociology*, (1939), Vol. 44, pp 858-67, K Lewin "Field Theory and Experimentation in Social Psychology Concepts and Methods" *American Journal of Sociology* (1939), Vol 44, pp 868-98, A H Maslow "A Theory of Motivation" *Psychological Review*, (July 1943), Vol 50, pp 370-96 Lewin *A Dynamic Theory of Personality* is almost entirely situational analysis See also LaPiere and Farnsworth *Social Psychology*, Part V, and R T LaPiere *Collective Behavior* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938, especially Chapter III. These references will lead to many others

<sup>36</sup> The term "register" is used by Karen Horney to include influence whether conscious or unconscious.

related meanings. Since  $M_s$  symbolizes human responses, and since for us all responses are tinsits, social fields are therefore configurations of tinsits, whether the tinsits are measured in the covert or overt ranges of the visibility continuum.

Now, since all tinsits are functions of the commonality continuum, that is, since all tinsits are more or less common, we may say that social fields are configurations of common tinsits. The greater the degree of commonality of the tinsits operating in a field, the more does the field represent a type field. Type of field in turn represents, reinforces, and justifies high degrees of probability and social expectancy. *A social field is thus a segment of a continuous process in which common personc tinsits emerge in interaction.* As a corollary we may say that the social process is an historical sequence of configurationally related fields.

Every social field is structured or socially defined in some degree by the group or permutation of groups whose property it is, and the norm for every human act is the socially defined norm for that act in that field. On this basis we may say that every human act is a component of a field and is in some degree an approximation to (or deviation from) a social norm. Social norms may be thought of as common probable behaviors or common tinsits. In given fields they operate to select the socially expected response of self and others. In Chapter IV we stated that we think of norms as selectors. Social norms are always more or less related to specific fields. The terms "social role" and "social status" are far too general to be useful in field analysis, they must be reduced to "situational role" or "field role," and "situational status" or "field status."

In every field, for example, a person plays a more or less recognized, assigned role (wife, mother, son, leader, doctor, or parson) and each of one's roles in a given field symbolizes certain appropriate behaviors which people more or less expect. The behaviors for a given role in a given field will vary with the person's status in that field. Given field X, what is a son supposed (expected) to do? What is a leader expected to do under such and such conditions? What does one's group expect a mother to do in this situation? Whom does one expect to be present in a given field? Such questions indicate that fields are structured in terms of relatively specific behaviors for specific roles. Cottrell and Gallagher suggest as terms such field units as "self-other patterns" and "role-patterns of expectation and response."

. . . social situations are made up of the interplay between roles of expectation and roles of response . . . All of us act against an incorporated structure of expected acts from others in our environment <sup>37</sup>

If, then, we are looking for the stuff that social fields are made of, the conditions under which specific forms of behavior may be expected to occur with some degree of probability, we may begin by studying *that which* is symbolized by the many terms we have used in this discussion. These include social stimuli, common tinsits, primary and secondary symbols, selectors, common selectors, common selector-systems, self-other patterns, field roles, field statuses, role-patterns of expectation, role-patterns of response, social expectancies, field norms, and group norms. These are all probable behaviors under stated conditions, the stated conditions or the field are the immediate determinant of every human act.

Thus, by extension, we say that all of the following and many others are the stuff that social fields are made of, and all are common tinsits

TABLE 2. SOME OF THE COMPONENTS OF SOCIAL FIELDS

inhibitions	friendships	fears	laws
taboos	enmities	hopes	institutions
restrictions	obligations	humor	officials
customs	duties	sorrows	theologies
traditions	rights	grief	religions
rules	goals	nostalgias	styles
regulations	interests	values	fashions
folkways	ideals	attitudes	standards
mores	loves	habits	norms
ethics	hates	prejudices	size
connections	aversions	assumed roles	physique
memberships	statuses	imputed roles	age
gods	loyalties	traits	sex

The list is presented merely to indicate the kind of symbols which locate and specify the kinds of influence which operate in social interactional fields. This list of components overlaps considerably and could not be used for study in this chaotic state but

<sup>37</sup> Cottrell and Gallagher *Developments in Social Psychology, 1930-1940*, p. 34-5. In the article by Cottrell cited earlier, "The Analysis of Situational Fields in Social Psychology," he says. "By social situation is meant the system of self-other patterns comprising a given interact."

must be classified with many more, and related to type fields. Whether all of these components of the list will ever be found operating in any one field is a matter for investigation. Cursory inspection however, suggests that they all operate in the football field. In the years to come we believe every kind of influence which operates to determine human behavior will be tracked down and ordered to type fields. An important phase will be not merely these components of interaction, but the *relationships between them* in given fields. Behavior in a field is always a resultant, a geometric sum of the vectors.

The local structure of the field determines the behavior of a given individual at any definite time. The variations in distribution of boundaries and barriers, their permeability, and the fluidity of the social field all combine to make the situation which determines what an individual's locomotions will be.<sup>18</sup>

*The field is the immediate determinant of man's every act, regardless of how many acts he knows how to perform.*

In contrast to the doctrine of "the little men" in which the human being is conceived of as a machine, we believe, that the concept of the personality as an energy system operating in dynamic fields of interaction, represents a realm of law and order, a conceptual frame which invests personality with the dignity and reliability of nature, of which man is a part. It is impersonal and no respecter of persons, it grants no special privileges to any class of determinants or conditions, and it is related in integrity and

<sup>18</sup> J. F. Brown *Psychology and the Social Order*, p. 61. Courtesy McGraw-Hill Book Company. If some of the words here seem strange, contemplate popular usage: everyone speaks of *boundaries* of the Negro and Latin quarters, certain places are *out of bounds* for soldiers, lack of "family" or "social position" are frequently social *barriers* to clubs, fraternities, and dates; *permeability* is not so common but represents what a student called the "bustability" of social barriers; *fluidity* refers to the freedom of movement in a social field, for example, freedom to rise or fall in occupations and social classes, social mobility generally, *locomotions* refers to movements in social space, *social space* refers to the relationships between components of the social field in terms of *social distance* which in turn refers to such behavior or relationships as involved in "the old dowager was haughty, aloof, and *distant*" or "the difference between delinquent child and problem child varies directly as the social distance from the railroad tracks." Lewin defines a force in terms of three properties: direction, strength, and point of application treated as a vector quantity. Driving forces correspond to positive and negative valences; restraining forces correspond to barriers. (Lewin: p. 81.)

methodology to the more exact sciences. The little men are "out in the cold" Behavior is seen as the emergent resultant of social interaction in delimited fields, subject to principles treated as relative absolutes in terms of probability. A field is established wherever and whenever the fourfold pattern of human interaction occurs.

## Chapter VII

### THE SYSTEM IS ACTIVATED BY SITUATIONAL NEEDS

1. *The Nature of Stimuli*
  - A *Field Components as Stimuli*
  - B *Stimuli are Situational Needs*
2. *The Relationship Between Need and Necessity*
  - A *The Nature of Action Process*
    - Figure V *Action Process of an Inanimate Object*
    - Figure VI *Action Process of a Child*
  - B *"Situation" as Position in Social Fields*
    - Figure VII *Action Process of an Adult*
  - C *The Nature of Will, Choice, Decision, Intention, and Need*
  - D *An Operational Definition of Need*
  - E *Determinism and Ambition*
3. *The Relativity of Needs*
  - A. *A Classification of Human Needs*
  - B *Delinquency as a Felt Need*
  - C *Hunger as Personal and as Organic Need*
  - D *Norms and Patterns of Variation Among Needs*
  - E *The Basis of Uniformities*
  - F *The Concept of Needs as Emerging in Hierarchy*
- 4 *Personal Needs and the Group Ethos*
  - A *Social Service and the Middle Class Ethos*
5. *Needs are Stimuli, Stimuli are Meanings*

Because of our interpretation of causation in the previous chapter, it is now necessary to investigate the nature of human stimuli and human needs. A long tradition has led man to believe that most of his needs are given in nature. We should like to counteract this emphasis by establishing a point of view that might help bring man's thinking more in line with his daily practice of satisfying his needs.

#### 1. The Nature of Stimuli

Frequently a person will say "Now, why did I do that?" In some respects, that one does anything is remarkable. Human soci-



ety, indeed all of nature, is incredibly successful in inducing continuous and incessant action. This idea has intrigued many great minds, and many, even in our own day, are impelled to investigate the nature of life itself. So ubiquitous is action that operationally life may be defined as "goingness." What makes it go?

Something can be gained by attempting to answer this question. The human organism is an organization of protoplasm, and protoplasm can do nothing without a nudge of some sort. It is totally indifferent to anybody or anything that does not goad or irritate it in some way. Children seem to be aware of this, as their behavior at the zoo testifies. If they see an animal sleeping or just lying there passing the time of day, they goad it with a stick, or a peanut, or a shout, or a wave of the hand. A child cannot get much idea of what an animal is like unless it does something. To such simple minds an animal is what it does.

Animals are organizations of protoplasm, and protoplasm has certain properties. Three of these are worth examining. First, differential sensitivity to various kinds of influences, second, differential response or the capacity to respond in different ways to the different influences to which it is sensitive, and third, what we may call a dynamic tinsit to change or modify its organization in the process of adjusting and adapting to these influences. This third property is particularly important, for it is the basis of learning, indeed, it is learning.

Learning is change, every act represents an adjustment or change of greater or lesser degree. Such changes include modifications in attitudes, ideals, hopes, and fears—phenomena which we have called personic tinsits. Every act represents some change in the organism, and therefore a possible change in the personality, because it is logical that the organism is never quite the same after any act, for the act is now part of one's experience, and every subsequent act is performed with that act as part of the background or apperceptive frame of reference. We learn by doing, but a given act may not necessarily represent a significant change, that is, significant for the personality or for the organism.

The "influences" which activate these three properties of protoplasm are traditionally called stimuli. A stimulus is a goad, an exciter to action. Anything which will induce action is called a stimulus. Nature is successful in inducing incessant action because the universe is made up of billions of things which can become

"influences" and so operate as stimuli. And the universe includes human society which is also made up of billions of things which can operate as stimuli. For the neonate only events of the physical universe can operate as stimuli, but the neonate soon learns to be "irritated" by social events and symbolic events, stimuli of the order  $S \leftrightarrow {}_rM_s \leftrightarrow R$ . The social process is an endless stream of such phenomena, and these are the components of social fields.

### FIELD COMPONENTS AS STIMULI

In social fields man's selectivity is immensely important because the components of any social field represent many more stimuli than any one person can respond to, he must select or be overwhelmed. A person's behavior in any field is activated only by those stimuli to which he is sensitive. Theoretically a person learns to make his adjustment to other people in the field with the understanding that they may be sensitive to stimuli other than those to which he is sensitive. But people of the same culture, community, or group have so many tinsits in common, and their social expectancies are so stable, that most of the countless fields in the daily rounds of living do not produce conflict. Social fields are group phenomena; they involve common tinsits, common stimuli, and common understandings, more or less.

But common tinsits include what LaPiere and Farnsworth refer to as "divergent but interlocking patterns" and "parallel interlocking patterns."<sup>1</sup> These authors illustrate parallel patterns by the "uniform response of a company of soldiers to an officer's command", and of divergent patterns they say: "The value of divergent but interlocking modes of behavior may most clearly be seen in the artificial actions of people on the stage. The members of a cast do not behave alike, but each responds at a given cue in a way that facilitates the behavior of all the others and contributes to the organization of the whole situation."<sup>2</sup>

Differential sensitivity to stimuli means not only that a person is sensitive to different kinds of influences in a field, but also implies that all people are not sensitive to the same stimuli, it implies further that all people who are generally sensitive to the same

<sup>1</sup> LaPiere and Farnsworth. *Social Psychology*, p. 293-4

<sup>2</sup> LaPiere and Farnsworth. *Social Psychology*, p. 294. This is also a good example of interpersonal integration

stimuli are not always sensitive in the same degree nor even in the same fields. Stimuli do not always have the same direction or magnitude for all people in the field. For example, a Northerner may go South and be depressed by many sights, whereas comparable conditions in the North hardly impinge upon him, and if he should remain in the South for a few years he may drive through the countryside and never "see" the cabins and gullied fields. Writers frequently say that one sees what one wants to see, *it is probably more accurate to say that one sees what one has to see*, as determined by one's selector-systems. Quite likely Americans scattered about the world in the armed services have everywhere seen things that the natives did not notice—and the natives have probably seen things in the Americans that the Americans had not noticed.

This line of thought furnishes us with a very important generalization: *phenomena are not stimuli unless responded to*. Noises, smells, sights, and behavior of self and of others are not stimuli for a person just because they are in the social field. The selectivity of the personality in specific fields determines whether or not an event or object becomes a stimulus. Selective response puts order into the field, as it puts order into the universe. All behavior is the result of stimuli, all stimuli are field components, if one would understand the behavior of self and others one must investigate the stimuli, which is to say the structure of the field.

### STIMULI ARE SITUATIONAL NEEDS

Since no behavior can occur without a stimulus, stimuli are needs to action. A need is that which is necessary to complete or instigate an action, or to change a present condition in the direction of meeting some standard or norm. A need is thus a measure of a deficiency of some sort, a measure of the extent to which a given condition deviates from some standard. This discrepancy operates as a stimulus with a direction related to, or measured in terms of, that norm.

A need is thus something that is necessary to decrease or increase a discrepancy. When one is aware of or feels the discrepancy, such a need is also a response ( $rM_s$ ) and is necessary in that sense too. Like the behavior of everything else in the universe, human behavior does not just occur; it always occurs in response to some

need which is a function of the field structure. Since for human, that is, personic, behavior a stimulus is one phase of a tinsit ( $rM_s$ ), human stimuli have the properties of a tinsit, namely, magnitude, direction, stability, commonality, and form. Needs are here thought of as having these properties.

## 2. The Relationship Between Need and Necessity

If we are going to study personality as an energy system operating in symbolic fields, we must attempt to get a more intimate view of how stimuli work on and through the personality to incite and direct activity. Frequent reference has been made to process, and to an act as a segment of a process. Also it has been urged that since any act can be broken up into smaller segments, an act is itself a process.

### THE NATURE OF ACTION PROCESS

In order to illustrate what is involved in the idea of an act as a process, we shall use three diagrams, one illustrating the behavior of inanimate objects, a second illustrating the behavior of a child, and the third, that of an adult.




Figure V.

### Action Process of an Inanimate Object

Figure V illustrates the behavior of billiard balls under certain conditions. The problem is to have cue ball C strike ball A and

then ball B as one action process. Shall the player aim at A or B? He aims at neither, but at point X, and he cues the ball off center, putting a spin or "English" on it. This establishes vector  $V_1$  in direction of X and vector  $V_2$  in the direction of A. Cue ball C sets out in the direction of X but at point  $X_1$  something happens, the field changes, forces are redistributed, spin begins to occur. The direction which C takes after  $X_1$  will depend upon new relationships between all the components of force in the field. These relationships, in this instance, are such that C moves toward points between X and A through a series of new positions  $X_2, X_3, X_4$ , etc., in a constantly changing field. The action of C, then, represents a process, a sequence of related positions equivalent to the resultant R. It is as if at each new position in the process the ball were reasserting its destination A, and so on around the table until it strikes B.

A person seeing this "act" would refer to it merely in terms of R, but the "act" can be broken up into many segments or smaller acts occurring between the successive positions  $X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4$ , etc.




Figure VI Action Process of a Child

Actually there are millions of such positions and acts in this process, depending on how large or small a segment one wishes to examine as an act.

In Figure VI we have a similar setup involving personical behavior in a social field.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Lewin has a similar problem in his *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, pp 32-4.

Here we have a child, Ch, facing two desirable objects, T a toy and C, candy. Vectors  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  represent stimuli of equal magnitude but of opposing directions, each directing the activity of the child toward one of the objects. The problem is for the child to choose one of the objects. Assuming that the child does not undergo a change immediately upon the appearance of  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ , a choice here is impossible because  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  are equal and in different directions.

Of the many possible resultants in this situation we may indicate three. 1) the child may fall asleep (frustration and withdrawal); 2) the child may develop a mild neurosis (frustration and escape), 3) the child may attack (frustration and aggression). Accepting the last as the most probable we see the child set out toward X and continue in that direction until at  $X_1$  the stimuli  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  change in relative magnitude, which means that all components in the field are redistributed and we have a new situation. The direction of the child's movement must begin all over as the stronger of  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  "reasserts" itself. This stimulus to "succeed," must reappear and dominate each new situation in the field. So an action process is established and the child finally reaches T.

A person observing this act would assume stimulus  $S_2$  to be responsible since this is indicated by the resultant R which represents a "simple" choice, or decision, but actually involved here is an action process consisting of a series of related situations in a dynamic field. In each new situation,  $X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, \dots, X_N$ , all of the field components are redistributed, the resultant of which is equivalent to R, but anything might have happened in any of these new situations, depending on the field structure which includes the child as a selector-system.

#### **"SITUATION" AS POSITION IN SOCIAL FIELDS**

Attention is called to the fact that in a physical field as illustrated in Fig. V,  $X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots, X_N$  are called "positions," but these same symbols in Fig. VI are called "situations." Since it seemed comfortable to use "situation" for this purpose in a social field, and since long usage has made writers reluctant to abandon the term "situation" in favor of "field"—a reluctance evident in the present writer—it is here suggested that the term "situation" be used to represent a locus in a social field.

From this point on this usage will be adopted in this book. "Situation" will refer to some local configuration of relationships and activities within a given social field. The two concepts provide useful analytical tools, "situation" representing the immediate configuration which admits of analysis not only in terms of itself but in terms of some larger configuration called the "field," the latter being a smaller configuration than the social process. While gaining this advantage, we also avoid the experience of having to abandon a much used term, and, purely as a coincidence, of course, it enables us to retain the term "insit."

Let us now take a more complicated example on the level of adult behavior. Figure VII represents the stimuli directing a college senior to a two o'clock class on a spring afternoon. For example, we shall assume that a student named Betty Anne enters in her diary the simple statement "Went to my two o'clock class." What are the field implications of this simple statement? Let us further assume that the season is spring, and birds, bees, and flowers are exerting their usual influence. The social field is full of romantic and nostalgic stimuli designed by nature to mock the imperatives of civilization. But Betty Anne must go to class. She reluctantly leaves her dormitory and sets out in the general direction of her classroom. Secondary stimuli are bombarding her with ideas of other potential and more desirable situations, but for reasons which she may or may not know, she is fortified with a powerful dominant stimulus, and she keeps repeating to herself, like one whistling in the dark "I've got to go to class," "got to go to class." This is the stimulus that goads her on her way—"got to go to class," "got to go to class." GGC is a powerful stimulus today.<sup>4</sup>

As the diagram indicates, as soon as she gets out to the street her direction is turned by a puddle in the street. This puddle, which

<sup>4</sup> The reader should understand that the diagram (Figure VII) cannot possibly record every thought, feeling, fear, hope, or wish that might be operating to motivate a person, or that a person might experience, in such a field. We do not intend to suggest a simple S-R type of analysis, but to keep the already complicated diagram relatively simple it is assumed that the person whose behavior is being described had already come to the decision represented by the dominant stimulus GGC. The making of this decision, probably a tremendously complicated configuration of interacting stimuli, is not described here; and the diagram illustrates only something of what happened to that decision after the person began to act upon it in this particular momentary, but typical field. Any decision involves a more or less elaborate dialectic; the diagram illustrates the fact, but only some phases of the process.




Figure VII. Action Process of an Adult



we shall call  $CS_1$ , operates as intervening or "competing" stimulus number one.  $CS_1 =$  "puddle" at situation  $X_1$  directs a change in her course toward a well-known footpath. Upon reaching the path stimulus  $GGC$  reasserts itself (reappears in the field) in the form of  $GGC_1$  and easily overcomes  $CS_1 =$  "puddle." Since person's activity never ceases,  $GGC_1$  is reinforced by many other subsidiary stimuli such as "good old path," "path is dry," and "got fifteen minutes yet."

Betty Anne, in accordance with social expectancy for a person with the role of student-with-a-two-o'clock-class, is walking toward the classroom but  $GGC_1$  has hardly appeared when Betty Anne hears the loud noise of an automobile crash. Craning her neck and automatically moving to see more clearly,  $CS_2 =$  "Heavens! a crash!" appears in the field and changes her direction so drastically that conscience in the form of  $GGC_2$  appears. But situation  $X_2$  is exciting, and  $CS_2$  is so powerful that  $GGC_2$  is only a minor influence tending to return her to the original direction, when stimulus  $CS_2$  reappears in the field with great magnitude in the form of  $CS_{2a}$  plus many subsidiary stimuli not shown in the diagram—stimuli such as "I-hope-no-one-was-hurt" and "wonder-if-it's-anyone-I-know."

Betty Anne increases her pace and runs the last few steps to the edge of the crowd. Since the accident is not serious, she decides that situation  $X_1$  is not so interesting after all, and furthermore it's getting late, and  $GGC$ ! So  $GGC$  reappears in the field in the form of  $GGC_1$  and takes her as far as the library when she sees a few friends talking and an intervening stimulus  $CS_3$ , of small magnitude, appears and directs her toward this group. After a few pleasantries  $GGC$  relentlessly reappears in the form of  $GGC_4$  supported by many subsidiary stimuli not shown—"what-a-day-for-a-picnic," and "wonder-what-that-budding-shrub-is." The latter moved her slightly from her course, but  $GGC$  now comes to her rescue in the form of  $GGC_5$  as she follows another student path.

Her good intention is again checked when she hears the clanging and sirens of the fire company. This is a relatively strong stimulus  $CS_4$ . But situation  $X_5$  is naturally of short duration in this array of motors, and  $GGC$  again appears in the field in the form of  $GGC_6$ . This gets her as far as the main entrance to her class room building when she runs into a bad situation  $X_6$ , a dog fight. Here  $S_6$  appears, with less direction than emotional toning, but her

undirected flight is ordered by GGC which comes to the rescue in the form of GGC<sub>7</sub>, which carries her running into her classroom by a side entrance.

That evening Betty Anne records in her diary the relatively innocuous observation "Went to my two o'clock class" In other words, nine hours after she "went-to-class" this peripatetic excursion was remembered as the resultant R—an act.

This "act" of going to class illustrates a number of important facts about human behavior In the first place this "act" is really an action process just as truly as the processes illustrated in Figures V and VI. The field is dynamic, continuously changing, with many new situations arising to form the process. *In the second place, Betty Anne's going to class was not the immediate result of stimulus GGC which was present when she left the dormitory even though ex post facto it appears that R = GGC, as she wrote in her diary The stimulus GGC had to be "reasserted" (had to reappear) at least seven times or she would have missed her class. If any one of the CS = intervening stimuli had been strong enough to overcome any one of these numerous components of GGC, that stimulus, and not the component form of GGC would have prevailed and she could not have reached her class The original stimulus GGC was not strong enough. It had to reappear again and again in each new situation The fact that GGC is for her a recognized stimulus in each new situation does not mean that it is not a new stimulus, newly exerted, in each instance The structure of the field throughout the process is such that GGC is in each instance a stronger stimulus than any of the intervening stimuli. All the intervening stimuli could not overcome the GGC stimuli, but they certainly "tried," that is, they occurred in the observed magnitudes and opposing directions*

Notice the words "could not." All of these CS components could not overcome a recurring GGC component. What do we mean by "could not"? Although we say *this stimulus* could not overcome *that stimulus*, actually we are talking about Betty Anne, and the "could not" means that Betty Anne could not choose to be finally directed by the intervening stimuli rather than by the GGC stimuli in those situations, or in that field. If the intervening stimuli had been strong enough they would have prevailed over the GGC components; this means that if Betty Anne could have succumbed to the intervening stimuli she would have done so, but she could

not. Her dominant stimulus (resultant or choice) in each situation was the geometric sum of all the components operating in the field, many of which, of course, are not shown. The vector  $R$  is the total resultant (choice or decision) but there was a smaller resultant,  $r$ , in each of the situations, and  $R$  equals the sum of all the little  $r$ 's. Choice in this book is always such a resultant, determined by the configuration of stimuli in the field. Betty Anne did what she could, she did not do otherwise because *in that field* she could not.

Let us review our conclusions. When we say "the fact that Betty Anne is in the classroom proves that she could not do otherwise in that situation," or when we say "if Betty Anne could have done otherwise *in that field*, she would have done so," we mean that if, in that field, any of the intervening stimuli could have effectively overcome the GGC components, then Betty Anne could not have gone to class. Whatever stimuli in the field prevail are, by definition, the dominant stimuli for Betty Anne *in that field*. *This does not mean that Betty Anne could not cut her class under some other conditions*, as her record will probably indicate. And if she ever did "cut" class, she had to. One cannot logically say, "In situation K I did so and so, but I could have done something else." This, then, is the meaning of necessity, this is determinism. And this is what scientific theories call "choice" or "decision."

*In this particular case the logic of the situation interests us most.* The illustration indicates what a person usually means when in popular speech he asks "why" someone did something. The "why" means "why was GGC so strong for Betty Anne in that field?" This, of course, cannot be answered without some knowledge of Betty Anne's history—the history of that act or type of act in such fields. Perhaps the church on the corner furnished some of the uncharted stimuli, such as Betty Anne's concepts of duty, honor, personal integrity, fear, and ideals, perhaps she was going to take an exam; perhaps her quota of absences was "used up." Only investigation will uncover such "motives" operating in the field, but apparently Betty Anne's behavior can be described without knowledge of such "forces." Perhaps everyone at one time or another has intended to do something only to find that somehow he did not do it. Then later he may say "I fully intended to do it." What does "fully intended" mean? It means, in Figure VII the original GGC. "Fully intended" means "originally intended" before intervening stimuli interfered. Now we see how important it is to study, analyze,

type, and classify personalities-in-situations, in fields of interaction in which people live and move.

#### THE NATURE OF WILL, CHOICE, DECISION, INTENTION, AND NEED

For summary purposes we may bring all these terms together and define them, for our use, in terms of Figure VII. Will, drive, or motive is the dominant stimulus in any situation, will power refers to the magnitude of this dominant stimulus or tinsit, choice and decision are illustrated by the resultant, R, and the uncharted smaller r's, intention is the original stimulus, in this case GGC, need is any stimulus which is responded to. Even in this relatively simple field one cannot put one's finger on any specific "cause" of Betty Anne's going to class.

#### AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF NEED

For those whose selectors are hospitable to operational definitions it will probably be satisfactory to say that *need is what the response measures*.<sup>5</sup> All students of behavior would probably agree that all needs are stimuli. We also wish to suggest the corollary that all stimuli are needs. This seems to follow logically from the Betty Anne illustration. The idea has been stressed that nothing is a stimulus unless it is responded to, and that if it is responded to, it was necessary in that situation. What is necessary in a situation is a need in that situation. All responses are necessary, all responses are needs. Tinsits are needs in those fields in which they are activated.

We have choice here, but not free, undetermined choice; choice is orderly and predictable, not chaotic. The only needs are situational needs, and these are the necessary stimuli to human behavior. When a man says "I need a new car," that response, not the car, is his need. If he buys a car, then that response is his need in that situation. What the response indicates or measures is the need.  $rM_s$  is an expression of need.

Since every dominant stimulus is a resultant of many subsidiary, preliminary, and exploratory stimuli it follows that in any

<sup>5</sup> The term "measures" suggests the more accurate and precise phases of the function that is also described by the terms "indicate," "symbolize," "define," and "specify." All of these terms are otherwise synonymous.

social field there must be hundreds of potential stimuli. What, then, is our answer to the question. "What are the needs of the personality?" Apparently the answer is that the needs of the personality include everything in the universe that may become stimuli. *The only empirical test of the needfulness of any phenomenon for any personality in any situation is whether or not it gets responded to; for if it gets responded to it was necessary, and if it was necessary it was a need*

Hence, if we are going to examine the problem of classifying human or personie needs, we shall require something more than the usual list of organic needs common to so many contemporary texts. But classroom experience has established a need that must be expressed before going on to the above problem. This need is a response to the highly stable tinsits of students, who when confronted with a necessitarian manner of thinking, ask such questions as "If all behavior is determined, what is the use of trying to do anything? Why ideals, God, ethics? Why ambition at all?"<sup>6</sup>

### DETERMINISM AND AMBITION

When students first come in contact with a deterministic theory of behavior, some of them confuse it with fatalism, and they react with questions such as the previous ones. Although these may sound like questions they usually are not, they constitute a rebellion, a resistance to a new idea. Such questions are an indirect way of saying that without free choice there can be no ambition, that level of aspiration is a meaningless concept. But this is like saying that without free choice a person's behavior cannot be determined in conformity with the romantic individualistic complex of our

<sup>6</sup> Our society builds into its personalities such powerful selectors on this subject, both pro and con, that no discussion will satisfy all people. It is difficult for many people to look upon a point of view with the idea of merely understanding it, the feeling is that one must look upon any point of view with the idea of adopting or rejecting it. The objective is not an understanding, but a crusade. Some "hard boiled" professors would even resent the idea that such a subject as "Determinism and Ambition" should be discussed, they look upon such discussion as a condescension to small minds. But the fact is that a scientific point of view of human behavior is not the norm for our culture, and every generation of college students is a fresh batch of minds meeting this problem for the first time. To assume the haughty air that a scientific theory of human behavior must be taken for granted and not discussed, is to fail in our obligation as students of behavior.

ethos, of which the common tinsit toward personal initiative is a part.

If we were to treat the student's statement as an inquiry, and answer it with the statement "There is no use trying to do anything about it since there is no free choice," such a statement would have relatively little influence on his level of aspiration, for it would be but one of many facts and conditions under which he would thereafter behave. His behavior would continue to be determined by all of his social fields as usual regardless of how his "question" were answered. The highly probable result of an answer like the one above would be to resolve a momentary tension and bring his curiosity to rest. It would probably not affect his ambition significantly.

From the point of view of this book ambition is not contingent upon the idea of free choice. Free choice is merely one of the illusions men in our culture are taught to believe. We are taught to believe that a man strives to get ahead as a result of his belief in free choice. On the contrary the truth is the reverse of this, namely, that men think they are free largely because their culture induces them, among other things, to strive to get ahead, and to put great value on this striving (We have explained the meaning of the conative term "striving" in Chapter IV)

Considerable misunderstanding of the nature of ambition and individual initiative is general. Ambition and individual initiative are types of common tinsits in most classes and groups in our society, and they are inculcated in the same manner as all other culture traits. The concept "ambition" is purely relative to the value structure of certain groups. Everyone is ambitious; but that for which one is ambitious is a group-defined value and need. Jeeter Lester is ambitious to reach the point where he can devote the entire day to sleeping on his front porch; a little 'gator hunter of the Okefenokee swamp in South Georgia is ambitious only to hunt more and bigger 'gators.

In the popular expression "getting somewhere," the somewhere is a group-defined end. People do not "get ambition" as a concept; they get interested in or become identified with specific group-defined ends, and tinsits toward these ends are called "ambition." For any group a given behavior represents ambition only if the group defines it as such. Ambition is a continuous variable like any other tinsit. When one's tinsits toward group-defined and

group-approved ends are of a direction and of a magnitude meeting the group norm, one is said to be ambitious. Most people of our dominant groups would be either shocked or amused if they were told that Gyp-the-Blood was a very ambitious man—he wanted to be a “big-shot” gangster. This is a consuming ambition for thousands of American boys.

But, of course, behavior is not supposed, by our groups, to be ambition unless it meets with the approval of our groups. Striving to get ahead means that one's selectors are sensitive to that value as a norm of one's groups, that this group value is a strong stimulus to one's behavior in particular fields. Striving to get ahead in the dominant classes means sensitivity to strong stimuli in the form of certain social expectancies of those classes. Striving to get ahead in a criminal gang means sensitivity to what that gang defines as desirable behavior. People are ambitious when the field conditions are appropriate. One is directed toward a “high” level of aspiration only as high as defined by one's groups, since there is no absolute level. One seeks such a level not because of free choice but because one has been conditioned to care what one's others think about what one does, and because one's interests toward “ambitious” ends are built or canalized in one's behavior structure, one's selector-system. All behavior is ambitious in the sense that it is movement in some direction, whether or not it is called ambition depends solely upon what group is doing the calling. Any concept of personality needs that neglects one's group-identifications—and all other identifications—is hopelessly outmoded and inadequate.

### **3. The Relativity of Needs**

The idea of relativism in human behavior is often difficult to communicate since in our culture the basic or typical personality is compelled to incorporate powerful selectors which induce a person to look upon his group values as absolutes. Also a relativistic position can be demonstrated only by wide experience and considerable data. Finally, conventional psychology and much social psychology, even though they represent data and concepts heavily weighted by emphasis on individual difference, frequently postulate behavior norms as absolutes in the form of biological constants. These are frequently presented as lists of “organic needs” or “basic needs.” In presenting a different point of view, we are not

suggesting that these practices are "wrong" The position of the present work may be stated in the form of three general ideas 1) that all needs are relative, 2) that needs are frequently imputed or ascribed to persons who are not at the time aware of the needs, 3) that all felt needs are experienced as tensions, but the tension is not always identified

Let us begin with the first point, that all needs are relative. Relative to what? The only way anyone can define a need is in relation to some standard or norm of self or others But standards are themselves values relative to the groups which sponsor them. Standards for any mode of behavior differ between cultures and between the hundreds of group configurations within a culture, between groups of all sorts, and between individuals within these groups Thus all needs are measures of deviation from some standard of excellence or efficiency or desirability in health, morals, decency, level of living, well-being, etc *And all norms are social norms*, social definitions of some sort We hold that any norm for any individual, regardless of how he defines it, is in some degree an approximation to, or deviation from, a social norm of some sort

Whether or not a person needs something depends upon what it means to him or to someone who believes that it is his right to speak for him Meanings are responses or behavior Need could not be known unless someone made a response defining and indicating it *Needs are therefore personic phenomena*. If needs are going to be responded to satisfactorily, someone must know that which the need pertains to, regardless of whether it pertains to the personic or the somatic level That is, while all needs are personic phenomena, they may pertain to different levels of activity.

Norms, as generalized statements, are ascertained and inferred by observing the relative commonality of tinsits of a group or groups Such norms may be stated as laws, ordinances, acts of officials, specialists, and professional bodies, or as traditions, folkways, and mores of social class, sex, and age groups. For example, departments of welfare of the various states maintain official standards called the "needs test" on the basis of which "needy" persons are defined. These "tests" differ widely among the states and federal government. Then there are standards of health set up by medical associations, and finally social norms represented by the folkways of the particular group involved. *Human needs are not*



*given in nature*<sup>7</sup> We may recall from the first chapter that no units of any kind are found in nature. The needs of people, regardless of who they are, become some degree of what their groups specify them to be.

Our second idea is that people are often said to be in need of something even though the people involved either do not know it or have not communicated it. We have read in sociology texts that primitive peoples need our modern public health facilities. These people, however, do not know about this "need", it is the need of our society, not theirs. According to our operational definition of need as that which the response measures, the needs of a personality or group in a situation are the stimuli which that situation activates. Such needs are determined by the person's selector-system as it appears in any situation. Such needs we shall call "felt" needs. It is evident, from the public health illustration, however, that a person or group may have needs which their own selectors have not indicated. Such needs are the projected needs of others, and will here be called "imputed" needs.

The view that no needs are given in nature implies that all needs of the neonate are imputed needs. It has been said that physicians bury their mistakes, but this is true of all people when they fail in these imputations, that is, when they impute the wrong needs to the neonate. The needs of certain groups (the upper classes, for example) are often spoken of as if they were given in nature, and perhaps such attitudes represent significant field conditions determining the traditional academic approach to basic needs. The third idea is that felt needs are always experienced as tensions. But even so, frequently people cannot identify their tensions, that is, they do not know what "caused" them, nor how to interpret them.

In the discussion of these three general ideas we have used terms and concepts of various aspects of human needs—organic, personic, imputed, felt, identified, and unknown. In Table 3 we present a tentative working classification of needs which attempts to give order to these concepts, and to indicate the relationships between them.

No attempt is here made to construct a definitive formulation, this classification of needs could be much more elaborate. Our

<sup>7</sup> As stated earlier, we assume that the need for activity is given in the organism, but this is on the organic, not the human level.

view is that all needs are originally imputed, but that once they are recognized and adopted they become felt needs. Needs may be recognized by some persons and not by others, by some groups and not by others. They may be recognized and not adopted, or adopted and not recognized (unconscious needs). Needs may be imputed but not accepted, they may be imputed by some and disputed by others. There are all sorts of conditions of needs in social fields. An imputed need is always a felt need of the person or group imputing it to others, but it is not necessarily a felt need of those to whom it is imputed. A felt need is always experienced as tension of some degree, but all tensions may not be identified by self or others, or they may be identified by others and not by self, by self and not by others, by neither or both.

TABLE 3. A CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN NEEDS

I. *Imputed Needs*

1. Identified Needs.
  - a. Personic (Love, Status, Security)
  - b. Somatic (Medical and Welfare Specifications)
2. Unidentified Needs
  - a. Personic (personosomatic [psychosomatic] phenomena.)
  - b. Somatic (Vitamin deficiencies, etc.)

II. *Felt Needs.*

1. Identified Needs.
  - a. Personic (Same as above, but recognized and adopted as group norms.)
  - b. Somatic (Same as above but recognized and adopted as group norms.)
2. Unidentified Needs.
  - a. Personic (Where a functional neurosis is felt as tension, but its source unknown.)
  - b. Somatic (A neurosis with an organic basis, with organic basis unknown.)

In the preceding classification table the first major category, Imputed Needs, may be illustrated by what some constellations of the upper class feel the lower classes ought to have in terms of health services, working conditions, or housing. Until the lower classes accept and express these needs as behavior they remain for them only imputed, not felt, needs. Again, dominant persons or groups may impute certain needs to groups lower in the social

scale and then assume that these are the felt needs of those lower scale groups, the former may, and do, then hold the latter responsible for behaving according to such felt needs. For example, the dominant classes in a society frequently impute certain needs to minority groups and then blame these groups for not behaving as if these were really the felt needs of the minority groups—use of soap, patterns of speech, dress, or religion. This is probably an important factor in racial and class prejudices and conflict, and of attitudes toward minority groups generally.<sup>8</sup>

Parents hold children responsible for, and the courts hold all people responsible for (that is, expect them to have, and blame them for not having) the felt needs of the dominant groups. People are constantly blaming others for not having the “right” felt needs, or for not behaving as if they had such needs, and they point with pride to “right-thinking” people. Of course all people would have the “right” needs if they had the “right” selectors. These phenomena are important socio-psychological factors in social interaction, and they go far in accounting for many types of conflict and misunderstanding, normal and otherwise, in persons and groups. They are the basis, likewise, of many forms of cooperation and “ingroup” loyalties.

Failure to recognize the principle that human needs are neither absolute nor given in nature, and worse, the assumption that they are, is one of the chief sources of social injustices, social disorganization, race riots, minority group discrimination, group and personal neuroses, and many other forms of social failure. The most ubiquitous and devastating human cry all down the ages is and has been “they don’t understand us; they blame us for doing what we feel a need to do; and they blame us for not doing what we feel no need to do.” This is the cry of the persecuted, disadvantaged, and minority groups everywhere in this increasingly chaotic and lonely world. This is as true of nations as it is of smaller groups and individuals. We shall have to insist, and we hope to demonstrate, that human needs are, without exception, relative to group norms. But since we accept none but continuous variables, this principle must provide for scalar measurement, which always

<sup>8</sup> The reader will run into a good example of this in Interlude II, following this chapter, in Mr. Girdler’s reference to people who live in squalor despite the fact of “free water and cheap soap.” Our point is that the words “free” and “cheap” are totally irrelevant if the people have no felt need for such things.

includes zero. Highly personal or individuality needs are thus in some degree approximations to (or deviations from) such norms. The felt needs of a personality in a situation are represented by that which activates his tinsits; and the tinsits themselves are needs or they would not occur. The needs of a personality, then, include any and every "that which" that might activate his tinsits in any situation. This means that everything in the universe is theoretically a potential or possible human need ( $rM_s$ ), however improbable.

Man threads his way through this maze by the mechanisms of selective response. The needs of a person are what his selectors select in-situation, and the needs of a group are what the group's selectors select in relation to given situations. The needs of individuals differ, and those of groups differ. Common needs activate common tinsits. Needs are emergents in interaction in social fields, they are seldom biological or physiological constants. Biological and physiological needs must always be stated in relation to some desirable norm or standard, which is to say, some social definition or norm.

### DELINQUENCY AS A FELT NEED

Let us assume that a boy has a "delinquent" tinsit to steal in certain types of situations. A highly materialistic and competitive culture like ours presents countless opportunities (situations) for stealing. These situations are loaded with appropriate stimuli in the form of neighborhood vocabularies; "gadgets are good things, everybody wants them," "the big shots do it, and I'm going to be a big shot," "Dad makes business 'deals' so why shouldn't I?," "others get away with it."

These and hundreds of others are potent common tinsits in some areas of our culture. If a person has the appropriate selectors, he cannot prevent such ideas from coming into his head, for he has no control for such processes other than his established selectors. These ideas are therefore needs for him in certain situations. If a boy's society inculcates in his personality structure only positive or facilitating selectors and *fails to inculcate appropriate inhibiting selectors*, the child or youth is devoid of any mechanism by which he can overcome the positive selectors. In "delinquency areas" a boy's society inculcates "delinquent" selectors as judged

by the larger society; but neither the boy's society nor the larger society inculcates in him selectors which inhibit what the larger society calls delinquent tendencies *Prohibition without inhibition is like taxation without representation*, and in the American tradition this is a just basis of rebellion.

A person can have a felt need only for that to which his selectors, whether facilitating or inhibiting, make him sensitive. The test is not whether one is sensitive to delinquent ideas in any situation (presumably everyone is in some situation); the social test as it operates is whether one is sensitive to such ideas (has the need) in "too many" situations or in the "wrong kind" of situations, as defined by social norms. The habit of stealing could not possibly cause stealing, but it can sensitize a person to, make him susceptible to, ubiquitous delinquent stimuli in the social fields of our culture, and thereby give him the need to steal. "Attitudes sensitize the [person] to the stimuli which will set the response free."<sup>9</sup>

#### HUNGER AS PERSONIC AND AS ORGANIC NEED

Hunger is an interpretation, it is an  $rM_s$  in response to an S which is a physiological activity. "Hunger" is thus a socially conditioned personic response to an organic activity called stomach contractions under certain conditions, not always. If, according to our rule, an event is a stimulus or need only if it is responded to, then stomach contractions must be considered an organic need, for contracting is response to some sort of event or condition on the physiological level. If, when one feels this activity going on, one says "I am hungry," that is a personic response and must be accepted as a personic or human need, the former being an animal need. But even one who is not a physiologist knows a good deal about such things, and probably even a person with little or no schooling knows very well that people say "I am hungry" under widely differing circumstances.

One may approach the subject from two directions, from the reference of the actual stomach contractions (organic response) or from the reference of the symbol "hunger" (personic response). We shall begin with the first. Why do stomach contractions occur? Under certain conditions they will occur if we have a tissue need or chemical imbalance of the kind which food normally corrects.

<sup>9</sup> G. H. Mead *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 218

But under other conditions when one might logically suppose the need to be even greater, there may be no stomach contractions, as, for instance, in conditions of over-fatigue, violent anger, fear, or in other highly emotional states. Such contractions may not occur when one is actually starving, if we may trust the testimony of people who have undergone long fasts for religious or political purposes or of men who have been adrift on the sea for as long as eighty-five days (nearly three months) during the last war. On the other hand, stomach contractions can occur when one is well fed. This was demonstrated by an investigator who injected blood from a starving dog into the blood stream of another dog that had been recently fed, and the stomach of the latter began rhythmic contractions.

Now let us approach this from the point of view of the personic response. When or how does one get hungry? We begin by saying that under certain conditions one feels hungry when stomach contractions occur, but sometimes also when they are not occurring; and sometimes one is not hungry when they do occur. Hence, under certain conditions one may be hungry without relation to stomach contractions. You may have it in any combination depending on the situation, and that is why personic behavior is often difficult to study. One may get hungry at six o'clock even though no biophysical deficiency, or contraction, occurs if six o'clock is one's regular meal time. As mentioned previously, people who have taken long fasts say that they do not feel hunger after a few days even though they are starving.

People often confuse another phenomenon—appetite—with hunger, and one can get into complications over this too. Appetite has been defined as differential food preference, and it may be purely a personic response, that is, a matter of personality need, not an organic need; but it may also be a device (homeostasis) by which the organic maintains mineral and other balances. The evidence is not conclusive.<sup>10</sup>

The point of all this is that the action structure we call personality has been conditioned to all sorts of stimuli, and it has developed, through canalization, needs that may have no counterpart in the organic system. Consequently we may quite properly speak of personality needs or personic needs as distinguished from

<sup>10</sup> W. B. Cannon: *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*. New York: D. Appleton & Co.; 1929, Chapter XV. See also the interesting analysis in D. B. Klein: *General Psychology*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1936.

organic or somatic needs, and this is one of the most far reaching and significant facts in the whole field of human behavior. Personality needs may be conditioned to and canalized as almost any kind of phenomena—sights, smells, sounds, temperatures, colors, signs, social values, and standards of every description.<sup>11</sup> Possibly some members of the upper classes have never felt hunger, only appetite, and such people might find it difficult to understand others whose long periods of hunger have been conditioned not so much to food as to political ideas and revolution. Stomach contractions can mean political rather than nutritional needs.

The quality of daylight, the sound of a clock, the smell of foods, the idea of food—all of these and many others can make one hungry. Who has not gone to a movie after dinner and witnessed scenes of eating, drinking, smoking, and other behavior that made him feel he could hardly last out the picture? The “problem child” who dawdles with his food during meals may or may not feel hunger. Suppose he does feel hunger and goes to the table but refuses to eat while mother and the family offer threats, advice, moralizing lectures, rewards, and other forms of attention. Then hunger may become a device for controlling the attention of the family and may become unrelated to any physiological need for food. Not long ago the author visited a hospital where a little girl had been taken for forced feeding because she was starving. Her family is well to do, but her “hunger” had been conditioned to “control family,” and nature had no substitute to get her to eat. She was literally starving to death. There are millions of people of India who would (and do) starve rather than eat what we call “beef.” Cows roam at leisure among the starving with complete safety, for when these people see a cow the resulting *rM*<sub>s</sub> is a religious, not a food, symbol. What has been said about hunger may also be said in differing degrees about thirst, sex, rest, sleep, or any other physiological or organic need.<sup>12</sup>

Sexologists and animal psychologists have so colored the thinking of traditional psychology that sexual activity is frequently

<sup>11</sup> See Murphy: *Personality*, chapter on “Canalization.”

<sup>12</sup> Our discussion is in no sense an attempt to minimize the importance of the organism. It is a pity that such a caution should even have to be mentioned in a work like this, but so great has been the traditional emphasis on organic needs as absolutes operating in disregard of situational contexts that merely to challenge this tradition means to run the risk of being called an environmentalist. Such is the selective power of tradition as a frame of reference.

spoken of as if it were an absolute need regardless of social fields, despite the wide differences in cultures, groups, ideologies, religions, philosophies, ethical systems, and mores throughout the world. The traditional attitude ignores the fact that tens of thousands of priests of all religions, ascetics, holy men, fakirs, saints, and men and women in monasteries everywhere, manifest little or no sexual need. Even a speaking acquaintance with sociology and anthropology would convince one that sexual need is functional to (varies with) not only the preceding constellations of human patterns, but also, and significantly, social class identification and age groups.<sup>18</sup>

*Organic or somatic needs are never components of social fields, they can become such only by being transformed into personic needs.* For example, hunger is an interpretation, a meaning given to stomach contractions or to the time of day or to boredom or to many other conditions and conditionings. Hunger is thus a personic phenomenon, and social fields are here postulated as composed of personic phenomena exclusively. Despite the fact that millions of people the world over—including the United States—have never had “enough” to eat, it was not until after World War II that “enough” in scientific terms was applied on a large scale. A standard was then set up in terms of calories. “Enough” is now relative to that social norm or standard which states the needs as measured by some degree of efficiency, a degree somewhat above the survival level. The idea that man does not live by bread alone is very old, but presumably “color” is an important nutritional need also, as indicated by the following clipping from *Time*, January 7, 1946:

#### Monochrome Menus

Is Britain getting enough to eat? Yes—according to a scientific definition of “enough.” But the common man’s stomach rumbles a frequent dissent. The British diet may be adequate, but the drab, monotonous stuff that Britons have been eating for six years leaves half of them (according to a Gallup poll) feeling underfed.

<sup>18</sup> See Alfred C. Kinsey *et al.*, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1947). Kinsey finds a definite “class angle” to sexual needs. Such needs appear to vary with educational level and between the two sexes, and between people of different backgrounds generally. One reviewer (*Time*, Jan. 5, 1948, p. 66) quotes Kinsey as follows: “In no other field of science have scientists been satisfied to accept the biologic notions of ancient jurists and theologians, or the analyses made by the mystics of two or three thousand years ago.”



Said one British doctor, as reported in *The New Statesman and Nation* "I've had to stop putting American magazines in my waiting room. Their technicolor food advertisements upset my patients, whose food is so monochromatic."

### NORMS AND PATTERNS OF VARIATION AMONG NEEDS

Needs vary in a great many ways, and many kinds of needs are felt in various situations and among various peoples. A need is indicated or measured by a response or tinsit. In this book we speak of stimulus and need as synonymous, and we think of them as changes in the field which activate the tinsit-structure which we call personality. A suggested pattern of variation in needs is given in the following outline.

#### I. Needs of a Given Person in Different Situations.

1. Differences in direction
2. Differences in magnitude
3. Differences in stability
4. Differences in degree of commonality
5. Differences in form

#### II. Needs of Different Persons in a Given Situation.

1. Differences in direction
2. Differences in magnitude
3. Differences in stability
4. Differences in degree of commonality
5. Differences in form

While the various elements of this pattern will be involved in the following discussion, no attempt is made to follow the above pattern as an outline, for to do so would offer too many restrictions, and so systematic a treatment is not necessary at this point.

Selectors make it possible for one to respond to one segment of the universe at a time, to prevent one's being overwhelmed by the whole universe coming in on one all at once. This, then, should be a basis for studying similarity of needs among men. We may begin with one of the many lists of needs referred to earlier. In 1923 Professor Knight Dunlap published the following list of nine "desires."<sup>14</sup>

The first thing we notice about these conative phenomena is

<sup>14</sup> Knight Dunlap, "The Foundations of Social Psychology," *Psychological Review* (1923), Vol. 30, pp. 81-102. Cited in Young, *Personality*, p. 63.

that they are very broad categories of desire. A moment's reflection reveals that each involves many directions and magnitudes. For example, among the alimentary desires are hunger and thirst, and these vary in strength and direction in various situations. They also vary for different people and for different groups such as nations, economic classes, and religious sects. Each of the nine desires in this list may be broken down into several or many categories, and these smaller categories will vary in the ways indicated by our outline pattern of variation. Depending on the situation, any one of the nine may be so small in magnitude as to have no

TABLE 4 KNIGHT DUNLAP'S LIST OF DESIRES

1. Alimentary	4 Activity	7 Parental
2 Excretory	5 Shelter	8. Pre-eminence
3 Rest	6 Amatory	9. Conformity

significance for the personality, or may be of such magnitude as to put one in the hospital. Each of the nine may be so conditioned socially as to bear no relationship to its meaning in this list—as in the instance of the little girl whose alimentary desire called hunger was not for food but for getting attention and controlling her family.

Take number three, rest: what is rest? For the author rest means many things—frequently it means going out on a lake in a rowboat for from three to seven hours with rod and reel. At other times rest means reading a stimulating book, and sometimes, reluctantly, it means bed. Different people vary tremendously in the amount of sleep they need. Thomas Edison and Napoleon required only a few hours sleep out of the twenty-four. Is sleep a physiological need? If so, how much sleep? Or how much of anything in the list? Are we dealing with anything approaching a physiological constant here? How much is anyone of these an organic need and how much a personic need? A debutante may truthfully say that it is an absolute necessity for her to sleep until noon daily, while a worker's wife with ten children would be bored to tears if she had to sleep so much.

Let us grant that these are not constants based on some hypothetical "needs" of the organism. But surely everyone has these needs in some "reasonable" amount, that is, there must be some norm. What shall we use for a norm? We might try "efficiency." Very well, efficiency for what? The debutante needs much sleep

and a sparing diet for efficiency in her work. The mother of ten children needs little sleep and much food for efficiency in her work. How about "health" as a norm? But what is the basis for a standard of health? When the debutante ages a bit she may "have nothing the matter with her" but she may have three doctors, and the mother of ten may find even one doctor a luxury. The rich, the poor, the black, the white, the north, and the south all have different standards of health. Health is what one's groups say it is, that is, it is an imputed need operating as the norm of some group. For the members of such a group it is a felt need because of one's identification with the group. The following is a news story appearing in *The New York Times*, January 13, 1946, p. 8, (emphasis added).

#### INDIA'S HEALTH NEEDS SHOWN TO BE URGENT.

Awaited with much interest in connection with administrative reforms being undertaken in India is the report of the Health Survey and Development Committee, which . . . has been engaged upon its immense task since 1943. The survey will provide the most comprehensive review ever made of India's public health requirements. How very great these requirements are is shown by the fact that the mass of the country's 400,000,000 population is still dependent upon indigenous medical systems held to be woefully inadequate *judged by Western scientific standards*.

There is, as pointed out by *The London Times*, a recorded death rate of 22 per 1,000, an infantile mortality rate of 162 per 1,000 live births, an average annual mortality of 145,000 from cholera, 70,000 from smallpox, 31,000 from plague, 290,000 from dysentery, 500,000 from tuberculosis, 3,667,000 from "fevers." India has only 42,000 doctors—one to every 10,000 people—whereas 300,000 are needed, in place of the existing 7,000 nurses she needs at least 750,000, there are only 5,000 trained midwives, although 70,000 would be none too many.

The reporter speaks of "health requirements" but it soon dawned on him that "requirements" (needs) are always relative to some standard, so he says "as judged by Western scientific standards." "India has 42,000 doctors . . . whereas 300,000 are *needed*," and if the 5,000 midwives were increased to 70,000 that would not be "too many." The story realistically makes all this relative not to Western operating standards, but to Western scientific (ideal) standards. Science, like any other group, imputes needs in accordance with its norms. Health needs, like sexual

needs, vary greatly between the social classes, racial groups, age groups, sex groups, religious groups, and regions. In our own South, a sharecropper may be infested with hookworm and pellagra; but he is healthy if he can work. Among the upper classes, who accept as felt needs a need imputed by medical practitioners, health means not absence of disease, but "buoyant" health, which is something more.

The norms for shelter vary from shacks to mansions, and each is a need. What is the norm for amatory desire? What is the matter with people who have no parental desire? And so it goes. If such a list is supposed to represent some common human need it is at least misleading, if not false. These are needs only to the extent that they become stimuli to personic behavior, only to the extent that they arouse instincts toward change of conditions, and that, apparently, cannot be based on the organism. One cannot even state a minimum need except in terms of some norm like efficiency or health, and all the norms are group norms. We need what our groups expect us to need, or what some social functionaries—teachers, preachers, advertisers—convince us is socially desirable.

Could we, perhaps, find a list not based on the organism? W. I. Thomas published such a list also in 1923.<sup>15</sup> They are called the four wishes and include

- The wish for security
- The wish for response (affection)
- The wish for new experience
- The wish for recognition

But here we have the same difficulty. A given person varies greatly in these needs under different conditions, and people vary not only in the extent of the need, but in its direction and stability. What is security for one this year may not be a year hence. During the depression many wealthy men fell out of windows in the large cities; most of them "went broke," that is, had only a few million or a few hundreds of thousands left—but their insecurity was not imaginary. Need is what it does. Need is what the behavior measures. Any norms one can find for such needs are formed where all other norms are formed—in one's groups. One man is president of a bank and director of many corporations, but has an intense in-

<sup>15</sup> W. I. Thomas: *The Unadjusted Girl*. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1923, later given more elaborate conceptual treatment in *The Polish Peasant*, referred to earlier.

feigning to be proud because he does not receive "recognition", we compliment our maid on a fine dinner and she goes home singing, proud, and successful.

One needs what one has learned to need through social interaction. What one needs depends on personal and social meanings and these meanings do not exist as inherent values which may be described by a list of organic needs. The organism has no fixed needs, unless one describes them by such broad categories as "food," and even then this must be qualified by "to live" "To live" is by no means a need for all. Doubtlessly much money is spent for food, and much food is consumed, as status symbols. We learned much about food in World War II. We read that Japanese soldiers conquered the whole South Pacific with each soldier carrying a little bag of rice in his pocket. Former President Hoover says the British normally eat 940 pounds of food annually, while U. S. Americans eat 1400 pounds on the average.

But we cannot study man's behavior unless we can bring some order out of all this. Suppose we try again by making very careful delimitations. Suppose we say: "A man needs a certain amount of food, of the right kind, properly prepared, in proper amounts, with reasonable regularity, sufficient to maintain him at a decent level of living." No. That will not do. Even if we could agree on the amount, right kind, proper preparation and regularity, we could disagree on what is a decent level of living. This applies to all other needs, too. Perhaps the only area in which we even approach a scientific feeding is that for babies. But this applies only to upper class whites who can afford to pay the doctor bills, it is a social class norm.

### **THE BASIS OF UNIFORMITIES**

We hope that the reader has been aware that in our discussion of needs emphasis has so far been on differences, and criticism has been made of some methods of describing relative uniformities. This is just the opposite of the emphasis in our early chapters. Why? When we were discussing the scale of similarity in Chapter III we gave the definitions Unique = 0, Uniform = 100, and it was stated that one emphasizes different ranges of this scale for different purposes. The purpose in emphasizing the lower end of the scale in our discussion of needs has been to indicate the fallacy

of defining norms for human needs in terms of some physiological or biological norm of the organism

Social psychology must, of course, attempt to discover and measure on the upper end of the scale of similarity, must isolate relative uniformities in all the phenomena it deals with. But relative uniformities on the personic level cannot be determined merely by reference to biological norms, and even biological norms cannot be determined without relation to the field contexts in which they appear. One of the important conditions retarding the sciences of human behavior has been the long tradition of attempting to measure symbolic phenomena in terms of biological norms.

Everyone knows that we find high degrees of similarity among people concerning needs of all kinds. The problem now is to devise conceptual formulations in terms of which research can be directed toward the isolation of well-defined personality types. But these types must be conceptualized as personic tendency-systems functional to well-defined type fields of symbolic behavior. When this is done, need, *as that which gets responded to in given situations with given degrees of probability* will have great value for personality study. This will be done, but it will require a more careful analysis of selector-systems than we have given. It will also require more attention to social fields and less attention to conative feelings. What are the field conditions under which given types of human needs occur—that is, what must be systematically studied? It is doubtful whether the study of the lower animals or even the study of the human organism by itself will contribute much to an orderly analysis of normal (usual) personic behavior.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> An instance of the human organism properly studied in relation to human behavior is suggested in the communications of Reo F. Fortune *American Sociological Review* (Aug. 1941), Vol. 6, pp. 571-2 and the subsequent issue (Oct. 1941), pp. 725-6. Presumably Prof. J. K. Folsom wrote Fortune on this matter and in his *Family*, p. 80, Folsom gives the following quotation from Fortune, suggesting high positive correlations between social codes and physiological reflexes.

If these reflexes are in the lower vesical pathway, for example, the social codes which condition them have lower vesical pathway supports. If these reflexes are in the stomach and the gut the social codes which condition them have stomach and gut supports. In this sense we may say, for instance, that Arapesh warfare is pegged in brain and lower vesical pathway supports. It is fought over women, but not over food or land or material plunder. In the same sense, Central New Guinea warfare is pegged in brain and stomach and gut supports. It is fought over food, land and material plunder, but not over women.

It is as remarkable as it is unfortunate that this type of research has not more extensively captured the imagination of students of human behavior.

### THE CONCEPT OF NEEDS AS EMERGING IN A HIERARCHY

Professor A. H. Maslow has published a suggestion of considerable originality which has promise in several directions. Space does not permit us to consider more than the essentials, but the original paper is readily available.<sup>17</sup> Maslow's theory is that the needs of man form a hierarchy of prepotency or magnitudinal priority. He lists five basic needs arranged in a hierarchy from most to least basic, under stated conditions, and suggests that each emerges when the one beneath it is satisfied within approximation of some norm. The five basic sets of goals or needs are.

- 5 self actualization
4. esteem
- 3 love
2. safety
1. physiological

These are similar to Thomas' four wishes. While Maslow treats the whole subject from the point of view of conative behavior, his theory differs considerably from conventional views. He sees the most basic or physiological needs as indicated by appetite and controlled by the principle of homeostasis, the tendency of the body automatically to move toward the maintenance of a "normal" state of mineral and chemical balance, although all this does not apply to all the physiological needs. He says that such needs may serve as channels for all sorts of other needs, for example a person who is "hungry" may really be seeking comfort.

For Maslow human physiological processes thus involve something not characteristic of experimental rats. When the minimum (a continuous variable) of this most basic hierarchy is met, then the needs of the next order emerge—the needs for safety, representing "more social goals." These may now "serve as the almost exclusive organizers of behavior, recruiting all the capacities of the organism as a safety-seeking mechanism" (This could be interpreted as corresponding to the function of the selectors in our theory.) To a person in this condition, says Maslow, the outlook for the present and future is colored by this need—"Practically everything looks less important than safety."

Once this order of needs is satisfied to a requisite degree, the third order, love needs, emerges and proceeds to recruit the po-

<sup>17</sup> A. H. Maslow "A Theory of Human Motivation" *Psychological Review* (July 1943), Vol. 50, pp. 370-96

tentialities of the person for such purposes, love now becomes everything and colors all behavior. Love is broadly defined, "love and affection and belongingness." When these needs are met, the "esteem needs" emerge as behavior determinants. These are of two kinds. 1) desire for strength, achievement, adequacy, confidence, independence, and freedom, and 2) reputation, prestige, recognition, and attention. (To fit into our theory these would have to be related to specific fields of specific cultures.) When the person is satisfied that he enjoys the requisite amount of these, the least basic needs, those for self-actualization emerge as a new form of discontent, "unless the individual is doing what he is fitted for." (This would have to be related to adequate formulations of personality types.) The theory, like our own, is necessitarian. "What a man *can* be, he *must* be."

Maslow then gives a list of the "preconditions" for basic need satisfactions. Positions in the hierarchy are not fixed but may vary in a given person under different conditions and the order of needs in the hierarchy may vary between individuals. Deprivation may lead to a revaluation. "Thus a man who has given up his job rather than his self-respect, and who then starves for six months or so, may be willing to take his job back even at the price of losing his self-respect."

A weakness of the theory is the lack of an operational definition of "need," for his necessitarian position is contradicted by the statement "There is no necessary implication here that he will act upon his desires." What else could he act upon? Maslow recognizes determinants of behavior other than "needs and desires." People whose needs have been early and long satisfied are the "strong" personalities. Needs are most often unconscious, and most behavior is "multi-motivated." Since not all behavior is determined by basic needs, "field" determinants are recognized. Maslow's concept of field theory is very different from ours, for him "field" and "personality" are separate phenomena. He sees psychopathic behavior as due to the frustration of basic needs—"Who is to say that a lack of love is less important than a lack of vitamins?" A man with satisfied needs, he says, has no needs, "a man with needs is a sick man." This is a very different concept of need from that given in the present work, but the concept of needs emerging in a hierarchy is a realistic and promising concept.

While the general orientation of Maslow's study is conative it



is much less organocentric than most theories of motives. The general framework is amenable to field theory by the use of operational definitions. Important aspects of the theory for us are the relativity of needs and the emergence of needs in a hierarchy, each stage operating, in terms of our theory, as a system of dominant sensitizers or selectors rather than as direct causes of behavior. Such a hierarchy might well play an important role in a theory of social stratification. Probably many people in the lower economic classes seldom rise above the third order in the hierarchy. Finally, the theory of hierarchy offers a frame of relationships rather than physiological constants as a basis for determining needs. Whether or not this particular hierarchy will hold for all cultures is doubtful, but this is a matter for investigation.

#### 4. Personal Needs and the Group Ethos

Group ethos may be defined as the highly stable constellation of a group's most common traits, the most characteristic patterns of a group. The ethos is the culture core of norms from which personal needs are measured as deviations, including deviation 0 and possibly 100, and is thus the repository of needs which the group imputes to bona fide members, making such needs the felt needs of persons identified with the group.

In a dynamic society like ours the ethos is continually undergoing change in differing degrees at differing rates. Some of the modifications of the ethos of a group occur by imputation from other groups in the interactional process. In this process a given group ethos is affected by imputations from both above and below it in the class structure. The needs of a group are the expected behaviors of members of that group; but in a society as dynamic as ours some elements of the ethos are always marginal or doubtful even to members, and this is sometimes a source of personality maladjustment. But it may also be a source of "progress," that is, change in the direction of what the ethos is at the time defining as progress.

#### SOCIAL SERVICE AND THE MIDDLE-CLASS ETHOS

Even a casual survey of magazine articles, editorials, novels, radio programs, opinion polls, and community chest campaigns

indicates that one element of the U. S. American middle-class ethos defines the mature or "civilized" personality as involving the obligation of service to others in one form or another.

This common middle-class tinsit, which has not escaped the notice of cynical commentators, represents a powerful "felt identified need" of a large proportion of our population. Activities directed toward the betterment of living conditions among less fortunate groups play an important part in the work of all sorts of upper and middle-class groups: luncheon clubs, junior leagues, women's clubs, volunteer workers, social agencies, church guilds, societies, lodges, and government agencies. These activities not only support professional workers, they define the middle-class concept of important needs of the "civilized" person.

From the point of view of personic needs such activities are not merely concerned with salvaging the social waste of human resources in the community, such activities represent definite and powerful needs of those engaged in the work, they constitute the process by which socially defined personic felt needs of the upper classes are imputed to the lower prestige classes. These needs are imputed from above in the hope that they will be transformed into felt personic needs of the lower groups.

This process thus serves two purposes: it has a dynamic effect on the lower class ethos, and at the same time maintains and satisfies important needs of the upper classes. Once these needs are incorporated into the ethos of the lower groups, the continuous demand for their satisfaction becomes a perennial source of conflict between the classes. The conflict arises from the fact that not all members of the upper classes are interested in or engaged in the "imputation" activities, even though they may have enjoyed a certain kind of satisfaction in watching those activities.

But for the large number of persons who do participate, these activities serve as important personic needs. If a person needs to "relieve-the-distress-of-others," such needs represent tensions which can be resolved in no other way in the social fields of our culture. A society like ours must induce such tensions in the personality structures of a large proportion of the more fortunate classes, for progress, as defined in the middle-class ethos, is the progressive adoption by more and more people of scientifically and ethically imputed standards and the common personic needs determined thereby.

The social process which directs the activities of large numbers of people toward the transformation of imputed needs into felt needs for the less fortunate members of the community means a great deal more than the mere sentimentality indicated by such expressions as "helping the poor," "raising community standards," or "uplift." Such activities are a direct response to the demands of class ethos, and they furnish large numbers of highly competent people opportunities for significant social participation and self-realization. Democracies would do well to take note of this fact

Reference to people who engage in such activities by the derisive terms "up-lifter," "do-gooder," so popular in the Menckemian decade, have called attention to the smugness, naiveté, and uncton which sometimes color such activities, but if and when public agencies supersede and destroy the private agencies, large numbers of lay people will be denied access to participation in highly significant social fields. As suggested in the section on "Determinism and Ambition," such participation is one of the effective mechanisms by which the concept of ambition in the dominant classes is diffused throughout society. Revolution is another mechanism.

### 5. Needs are Stimuli; Stimuli are Meanings

Obviously when one is dealing with needs as relative phenomena, the probability of the changes in the field activating a person's tinsits depends upon what these changes mean to that person in that situation. But the question is not only of degree of probability; it is also a question of which constellation of tinsits is activated, and this depends upon the meaning or significance of a given change for a given person in a given situation. Organic needs do not become stimuli to personic behavior unless they are transformed into personic needs; organic needs are never forces in a social field of interaction. This is because changes in a symbolic interactional field cannot affect personic behavior until they are given meaning: the person then responds to the meaning ( $rM_s$ ) by which he interprets the event.

To phrase it a different way, our position has been that if a response occurs, it was necessary; it was therefore a need. The selectors determine the appropriate action process in each situa-

tion and the changes in the field activate that process. Changes are not stimuli unless responded to, so when something selects the appropriate stimulus this something thereby selects the appropriate response. But this something does not activate the process—it merely sets the stage—*it induces readiness*, in accordance with one's interpretation of the changes, the field as a whole does the activating. *The process of selection determines the meaning of the changes in the field*, and the response is made in accordance with that meaning. From that it follows logically that the stimuli to human behavior are meanings. It follows then that whether or not any phenomenon in the universe can become a stimulus or a need depends on what it means to the person in a given situation. Human stimuli are meanings-in-situation, and this is what constitutes human needs.

## INTERLUDE TWO

### *"Boot Strap" Thinking*

No theory of human behavior is of any importance in itself. A theory of behavior derives its significance from its implications for daily living, and these are revealed by applications to what goes on in people's lives everyday

Thousands of people believe that the average business man is corrupt, greedy, and selfish in a sense which is not true of everybody, even though these traits in business men as a whole have never been scientifically demonstrated. The theory presented so far in this book should lead one to re-examine such thoughts, for if they are true of the business man, then it cannot be because such men represent a special kind of man different from the rest of us; it must be related to the field structure—which includes our socio-economic system and the interaction relationships in business fields. If we wish to change all this we cannot do it by preaching to individuals, or by other forms of verbal magic. If our social system produces this kind of behavior in men engaged in certain types of activity, then only a change in the system will produce the kind of behavior we want.<sup>1</sup> Nothing will ever be gained by seeking to discover what kind of men these men "really are", we are interested in the field, the conditions under which they behave.

Thousands of people likewise believe that the behavior of our congressmen leaves something to be desired. But our analysis must suggest again that the trouble is not in the men. If what they do is determined by the field structure in which they operate, then only a change in this structure can change the behavior. One's attention should be directed to the fact that the same criticisms have been made of congressmen generation after generation.

It escapes our selectors that in so regarding Congress, we are undermining one of the most important of our free institutions. If it is true that no matter whom we elect to Congress he soon begins to act like a Congressman, then something must be in the function, rather than the man, which determines this behavior. The business-

<sup>1</sup> This point is well illustrated and analyzed in Lewin. *Resolving Social Conflicts*.

man and the Congressman—each plays a pattern of socially defined roles. Well established, expected behavior are assigned to these roles, and these expected behaviors become felt needs of these men in the situations in which their roles are implicated

A businessman incorporates selectors appropriate to business fields, the congressman incorporates selectors appropriate to political fields. They cannot do otherwise and continue in these functions. The assumption that a man can do anything that any and everybody wants him to do, regardless of the structure of the fields in which he operates, is an assumption that logically emerges from the concept of free choice

Some time ago *Life* magazine (September 13, 1943) carried an editorial by John K. Jessup. Mr. Jessup tells us that if we wish to iron out our economic difficulties we must believe "in the doctrine of free will which both Marx and Darwin undermined," and he urges that we must "tell the government to stop its aimless meddling." No doubt Mr. Jessup is a capable man with a good salary, no doubt he is a man of high purpose, and no doubt *Life* reaches millions of readers. I am convinced that Mr. Jessup in his high position represents the blind leading the blind, the apostle of futility.

We must "tell the government . . .", here is an example of resorting to the magic of words, it is assumed that men can behave in disregard of field conditions and that all one has to do is to "tell" them what to do and they will do what we want them to do, the structure of the field in which we all interact apparently has nothing to do with it. It is all a matter of free will, so Mr. Jessup wants us to have more belief in free will. He did not mention Freud who probably did more to undermine that doctrine than Marx and Darwin combined. But if we "have" free will, what has happened to it? How can anyone take it away from us? Is it merely a matter of belief or opinion? Apparently so, and Mr. Jessup and I are agreed on that.

Students of behavior try to describe what they observe, not what is the product of wishful thinking, but of course the latter operates as a selective factor. Mr. Jessup wants to go back to the good old days when men were ambitious because their free will made them so; he does not see that what one does is determined by the field structure—or as we might say, the system—in which we live. The only effect of Mr. Jessup's editorial is to increase the

frustration of the people, and add to their hatred of some kind of beings called bureaucrats, politicians, labor leaders, or selfish pressure groups.

In 1943 an interesting autobiography was published under the suggestive title *Boot Straps*. According to a reviewer of this book, its author says among other interesting things.

There is still squalor in America but it is my considered opinion that much of the squalor is made by those who live in it. With free water and cheap soap who, other than poorly trained children, really is obliged to live in filth?<sup>2</sup>

In comparison with this medieval point of view, how sparklingly fresh is George Mead's idea that "The only environment to which the organism can react is one that its sensitivity reveals." Mr. Girdler behaves in accordance with his selectors, since he cannot do otherwise, and he draws a brilliant stroke in his reference to the "poorly trained children." By "poorly trained" Mr. Girdler means the inculcation of selectors, and therefore needs, different from Mr. Girdler's. These "poorly trained" children probably have parents whose ideas of training children are determined by their selectors, inculcated when they, too, were "poorly trained" children.

Mr. Girdler presumably believes that these people can pull themselves up by their boot straps, as his incorporated selectors have led him to believe he has done. He has a "felt need" to get ahead, as his society defined ambition, and because of this and other selectors he believed he was endowed with free will. People who live in squalor apparently do not have such a "felt need," and therefore do not feel possessed of "boot strap will" in such matters. Why is it that people have to be "sold" on steel but not on soap and water?

The reviewer comments with detached sadness about an apparent lack of "felt needs" in Mr. Girdler's selector-system:

There is no sentence in his story which shows concern with problems of humanity as a whole, or interest in such humane values as philosophy or music.

According to the theory of needs presented in the previous chapter,

<sup>2</sup> *Boot Straps: The Autobiography of Tom Girdler*, written in collaboration with Boyden Sparks. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1943. Reviewed in *Social Forces* (Mar. 1944), Vol. 22, p. 352, by Erwin Hexner. (See our Chapter VII, p. 315.)

"free water and cheap soap" have absolutely nothing to do with one's need for soap and water. Mr Girdler imputes such needs to those who make the squalor they live in, and he then condemns them for not living by these imputed needs. But if soap and water are not felt needs of these people, then Mr Girdler's imputations will have to have some practical implementations.

Suppose this steel man (or the editor who lives by advertising) were to take the same attitude toward steel and what people "want" as building materials—that is, suppose they should take the same attitude toward their own products that they take toward soap and "ambition." Suppose the steel man's sales promotion manager should come to him and say: "Mr. Executive, people are in the habit of building with wood and stone and concrete, they do not want to build with steel"—or, "they do not want to advertise in *Life*."

Then the executive would say something like this: "Why, you idiot, why am I paying you \$50,000 a year? Of course they don't want to build with steel (or advertise) because they have never done so. How can they know about steel unless you tell them? (meaning "sell" them) It is your job (and the advertising man's) to make them want to build with steel, make them see its advantages, show them that steel is cheap, and that anybody can build with steel. Get going."

Wealthy advertisers, advertising firms, magazine editors, and the press generally, live by advertising, that is, by trying to make people need what they have not needed before, or to make them continue to need what they have needed before. Advertising and selling are two of the most powerful instruments in contemporary society for the imputation of needs. The industries based on these activities succeed only to the extent that these imputations become the felt needs of the masses of people.

Imagine the revolution if advertisers and sellers should adopt toward their own products and customers the same attitude they take toward people who do not care about, or do not have, soap, food, shelter, education, medical care, or ambition. The steel man and magazine man would be appalled at such attitudes if they were selling soap, food, shelter, education, medical care, and ambition. Every businessman knows that people do not at first want his products; they have to be sold, and all such businessmen grow rich "selling them on it."

As with all of us, selectors create blind spots as well as insights.



The "self-made man" that Mr. Jessup and Mr. Girdler yearn for belongs with the psychology of the man who lifted himself into his horse and buggy with his boot straps. Advertisers and steel men believe in free will until it comes to selling their own products and services. The churches (some of them) teach free will until it comes to selling people the church's kind of will. And all of these consider themselves logical and rational in their behavior.

All people behave in any situation in accordance with the way they see the situation. This way is usually the way their particular implicated groups see the situation, it is a function of their group ethos. Businessman, congressman, salesman, advertising man, government man, and squalor man each sees a situation in accordance with the traditional ethos of his own implicated groups, and each behaves accordingly. His own selectors make it impossible for him to do otherwise, what a man's selectors enable him to see constitutes reality for him.

Our difficulties arise from the extraordinary degree of specialization of occupation and interest necessitated by a highly technological society. Specialization of function is so great that an overall consensual situation is nearly impossible under present conditions. All of our problems are problems of social interaction—they are *behavior* problems. We pass them off in our ignorance and bias by saying they are racial, political, domestic, marital, economic, sexual, religious, and international, but these are merely categories in which some behavior problem falls.

But the only theory of behavior available to the people generally (and everybody has a theory to live by) provides no solution to our problems, and for a very good reason. The theory is such (Mr. Jessup's and Mr. Girdler's) that the only solution is the wholesale hunting for scapegoats at whom all can throw invectives, on the assumption that each person is free to do what everyone wants him to do regardless of the structure of his situation. The life philosophy of these two "successful men" requires and necessitates blaming individuals and groups; but so long as we do this we dissipate the time, energy, and means by which we could investigate the field conditions under which these problems occur.

A behavior problem means that people do not understand why men do what they do. And people do not understand this because their theory of free choice operates as a selector-system preventing them from trying to understand. It prevents this by 1)

directing their energies toward "scapegoating" and 2) preventing them from seeing that the important thing in behavior is the *conditions under which it occurs*

One of the most important of the implications and concepts of field thinking is that within the field everything that happens—all behavior—is assumed to be a resultant of the interaction of all relevant components operating in the field. Hence, we are compelled to abandon the Aristotelian idea that whatever happens to an object or whatever an object does is to be explained by the nature of the object, that whatever a person does is due solely to something called the "nature" of the person. But the person has no nature aside from the fields in which he operates.

Popular solutions to problems are hardly more than cynicism. "What I am selling is right, and what you are selling is wrong." The editor and the steel man are sure that the ideas the government is selling are wrong, and the government men return the compliment. Each side thinks it operates on the theory of free will which gives each a convenient supply of scapegoats: the editor and the steel man agitate themselves by shouting "New Dealers," "Reds," "bureaucrats," "crackpots," "tax eaters," and "labor lovers", and the "bureaucrats" shout back "monopolies," "business crooks," "unfair trade practices," "tax evaders," "pressure groups," "lobbyists," and "greedy capitalists." One's vocabulary is the medium by which one acts. Consider, in addition to the above epithets, such common terms as sharecropper, niggers, hunkies, polacks, kikes, white trash, okies, greasers, relievers, bums, economic royalists, greedy industrialists, exploiters, corrupt politicians, chiselers, racketeers, featherbedders. All these phrases are the stock in trade, the concepts, that decorate the house of free will—"everything is in the man."

One of the great books of our time is Lincoln Steffens' *Autobiography* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931). Steffens spent a lifetime pitting a brilliant mind and a great spirit against a system which had brought him up on a theory which needs the above epithets. But his book indicates that he learned differently before the system broke him:

I had come so definitely to the conclusion, that man's ideas were determined by the teachings of his childhood, by his business interests, by his environment, and not by logic, that muckracking looked useless.

Society moved like a glacier, slowly, if it progressed it grew like an oak tree—slowly.

All things and all men behave and change in accordance with the kind of stimuli they are able to receive, and the kind they are exposed to. Behavior is always a resultant of a configuration of stimuli. This is choice. Behavior, then, will depend upon two things 1) the kind of selectors which have been built into the person's action structure, which determines the kind of stimuli (incentives) he is sensitive to, and 2) the kind of interactional situations his life provides, which determines the kind of stimuli (incentives) he is exposed to. To disregard either of these conditions will make one a blind leader of the blind.

We cannot expect people to adopt as their felt needs those imputed needs which we think they ought to have unless they are able frequently to interact in situations which build into them the appropriate sensitizing tendencies and which expose them to the appropriate stimuli for arousing such tendencies. This is the empirically verifiable basis of observed behavior, everywhere and always. Every act has a history, and the acts which "sorry" people fail to perform are acts which have no history in the situations in which they live. People cannot do what they do not know how to do; they cannot transform imputed needs into felt needs unless they can come to live in the kind of situations in which such felt needs are appropriate.

People do what they have to do—they have to do what they do—under the conditions under which they do it. If we would have them do otherwise, we must change the conditions, if we would change the conditions, we must know what the conditions are, if we would know what the conditions are, we must have a theory of behavior which will direct men of affairs toward the encouragement and support of scientific research in the fields of human relations.

To go on as we are going can lead but to decay and ruin for individual and institution alike. Our vocabularies are increasingly poisoning millions with the corrosive chemistry of hate, and our impotent "scapegoating" serves only to bring us closer to the mental hospitals where all such primitive behavior must eventually lead when used as mechanisms of adjustment in a civilization like ours. All of these are indicators of fears, anxieties, frustrations, and

hatreds. One in nineteen of us now goes to a mental hospital at some time in life, one in ten would go if we had the hospitals. The idea that all this name calling and "scapegoating" is healthy because it represents a safety valve system for the release of tensions, is fallacious. Such a view fails to recognize that the theory which requires these safety valves is itself the source of the tensions.

## Chapter VIII

### HUMAN NEEDS ARE MEANINGS

1. *The Nature of Meaning*
  - A *Meaning as Response*
  - B *Meaning as Stimulus*
  - C *The Nature of the Behavior Called "Knowing"*
2. *The Symbolic Process*
  - A *The Nature of Gesture*

*Figure VIII Covert and Overt Phases of Behavior*
  - B *Anticipation*
  - C *The Nature of Symbols*
  - D *What Symbols Symbolize*
3. *The Significant Symbol*
4. *The Person and the Symbolic*
5. *The Emotions as Meanings*
  - A. *The Adaptive Systems*
    - 1) *The Nervous System*
  - B. *The Autonomic Nervous System and the Emotions*
    - 1) *The Two Autonomic Syndromes*
    - 2) *The Bear Came Over the Mountain*
    - 3) *Emotion vs The Emotions*
  - C. *Pain and Pleasure as Meanings*

#### 1. The Nature of Meaning

Meaning is not a mysterious something which inheres in objects. No object or act has meaning independent of the behavior directed toward it; the behavior directed toward it in a given situation is the meaning in that situation. Meaning is behavior and is a function of the situation. This is evident from the hackneyed expression "a reader gets out of a book what he puts into it" A reader sees in a book what he has to see in accordance with his selectors, and what he misses he misses on the same basis. What anyone gets out of a book is the selective responses which the book activates.

In terms of our formulation  $S \leftrightarrow {}_rM_s \leftrightarrow R$ , the physical phase is the primary stimulus  $S$ ; the primary response  ${}_rM$  to that  $S$ , is the meaning, which in turn becomes the secondary stimulus,  $M_s$ ,

to further action, R, overt or covert. A person's behavior toward (in relation to) an object is what defines the object for him. The formulation  $S \leftrightarrow \cdot M \cdot \leftrightarrow R$ , representing primary and secondary stimuli and responses, was presented in Chapter II, section 3, but since the present chapter is largely built around this concept, we shall review and elaborate the concept at this point. Since  $\cdot M \cdot$  operates both as response and as stimulus, we shall discuss it under these two heads

### MEANING AS RESPONSE ( $\cdot M \cdot$ )

One way to get at meaning as response is to state its function. Its function is that of placing objects and acts, of pointing to or at, of designating, or indicating, or defining, or specifying, or measuring. *The only thing that can perform such a function is a human response*. The yardstick does not measure an object, the person does. The measure of an object is a person's response in accordance with his perceived relationship between the object and the yardstick. This response of the person gives the object significance for the person's further behavior toward the object. The meaning of any future situation for a given person is what he thinks he will probably do in that situation, the meaning of any present situation for him is what he thinks he is doing in that situation. Nothing has meaning except as we behave toward it, our behavior gives it meaning, indeed, our behavior is its meaning. What possible meaning could the universe have for man apart from man's behavior toward it?

Some readers will say: "This sounds plausible, but it bothers me to say that one's response is an object's meaning, rather than that one's response gives an object its meaning." This is an instance of language getting in one's way; an example of reification. One does not "give" meaning in the same sense that one gives Christmas presents. An object does not reach out and take the meaning which you give it, your giving = your response = its meaning for you. Out of my window I see an object, I "give" it a symbol, "tree." This symbol, "tree," stands for the object, that is, for the response which the object is expected to elicit. Can we say, then, that this symbol is the object's meaning? Certainly. The object, as S, operates as a stimulus and calls out the meaning, but only responses or tinsits are "called out," so meaning must be a response. When I later

behave toward this response I am then responding to my own response as stimulus.

Suppose we resort to the concrete. Mead says

We must be constantly responding to the vocal gesture we make if we are to carry on successful social conversation *The meaning of what we are saying is the tendency to respond to it*<sup>1</sup>

This, in our terminology, is equivalent to saying that the direction of a tinsit is its meaning. Our response to an object is what defines the object for us. Mead uses the following illustration

You ask somebody to bring a visitor a chair. You arouse . . . in the other . . . the tendency to get the chair, but if he is slow to act, you get the chair yourself. The response to a vocal gesture is the doing of a certain thing, and you arouse that same tendency in yourself.

Mead liked chairs. Later (p. 279) he says.

. . . we are what we are in our relationships to other individuals through taking the attitude of the other individuals toward ourselves so that we may stimulate ourselves by our own gesture, just as a chair is what it is [means what it means] in terms of its invitation to sit down.

A chair is what it does (to us), that is, what it makes us do to ourselves. Now, obviously, the chair does not issue invitations, it does not say anything, we do. We assume the role, "attitude," of the chair and then respond to that. Our first response, "M" "assuming the role of the chair," is the response which is for us the meaning of the chair in that situation. This "assuming" was our gesture, and it stimulated us, M<sub>s</sub>, to sit down, if the conditions were appropriate. Others infer our meaning from what we do.<sup>2</sup>

### MEANING AS STIMULUS

Meaning, as stimulus, is that-toward-which people respond, or behave, in terms of an attraction-repulsion continuum, a positive-negative scale of more or less. A "thing" is that which arouses a tendency-to-act, and the thing is represented and "known" by that action, that is, that action itself becomes a symbol for the

<sup>1</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 67 (Italics mine)

<sup>2</sup> "Conversation is continuously going on, and what was response becomes in the field of gesture a stimulus, and the response to that is the meaning," G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 181

thing Some writers have led people to think of the object itself as the symbol, but in the present work symbols are acts operating as stimuli Meaning arises from the impact of a physical event (light or sound) upon one's selector-system, "when the selectors act," that is, when the person acts selectively, that action is meaning,  ${}_rM$ , and this act in turn becomes a stimulus,  $M_s$ , to further action,  $R$  The  $M_s$ , then, is that-to-which we respond ( $R$ ) as stimulus

The stimulus to act arises from the impact as a sensation ( $S$ ) on our selector system. When we respond ( ${}_rM$ ) to this ( $S$ ) as stimulus, the response  ${}_rM$  is "meaning", and when we respond ( $R$ ) to  ${}_rM$  as stimulus ( ${}_rM_s$ ), we are responding to meaning Since the personality is an integral part of the situation or field, we can say that "meaning" as stimulus ( ${}_rM_s$ ) is a function of the situation. A stimulus, then, is an act of our own which operates as an inducement, influence, or incentive to further action of some sort. "Meaning determines action"<sup>3</sup>

Every act has a history and represents a tendency of some degree of probability under stated conditions Every personic act has reference to some meaning, positive or negative, in some degree, and the behavior includes the meaning One does not just have an attitude, but an attitude toward something, and that "something" is part of the attitude (tinsit) Those who have difficulty seeing  $S \leftrightarrow R$  or attitude-value as two phases of the same event should now see the inadequacy of speaking of a human stimulus as external, something "out there."

Calling a stimulus "meaning" makes it easier for one to see it as an integral part of the tinsit, just as direction is "part" of an arrow One can now see that the stimulus or meaning is not an inherent part of an object, nor is it even "in" the personality;  ${}_rM_s$  *emerges in action as a relationship between the components of the situation*, it is a function of personality-in-situation.

As regards content, no action is referred either to the person on the one side or to the psychological environment on the other, or yet to a more or less combination of both factors. Rather each action is referred to a momentarily obtaining structure of such a person in such a psychological situation.<sup>4</sup>

If one likes to think of meaning as residing somewhere, "in" some-

<sup>3</sup> G. W. Allport *Personality*, p. 550

<sup>4</sup> Lewin: *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, p. 242. Courtesy of McGraw-Hill Book Company.



thing, let us say for the present that the meaning of an object lies in its symbol, and this symbol becomes the stimulus for our action. But a symbol is itself a response, an action, and it sounds strange to say that an action exists somewhere.

### THE NATURE OF THE BEHAVIOR CALLED "KNOWING"

What we learn from this discussion is a highly significant factor in human behavior. That type of behavior called "knowing" is always indirect, whether it be knowing "physical things" or "things" like fears and traditions. Nothing can be known directly, despite the fallacious common tinsit to believe that somehow the phenomena of one kind of science called "physical" are known directly, while the phenomena of another kind of science called "social" are known indirectly. Knowing is behaving, it is personic behavior, covert, overt, or both. As Lundberg says "The fundamental datum of all science is the human response"

All things are known to the human being in the same way. We know or experience always through the media of symbols or meanings, and these are human responses to that which calls out the response, whether the "that which" is what is symbolized by "horse," "man," "tradition," " $H_2O$ ," "quart-of-milk," or "love." Knowledge is symbolized experience. When we act toward anything or anybody we are acting in relation to, or responding to, our own interpretation ( $rM$ ) of their behavior, and our interpretation is obviously a response, an action. We respond to our own experiences as stimuli ( $rM_s$ ) and this continues minute by minute in a never-ending process until we die. Strictly speaking, when we behave in interaction with others we are in fact responding to our own behavior, and we hope they like it, if that is what they are expected to do at the moment.

Some time ago a friend received some objects made of wax in the form of apples, oranges, and bananas. One evening he passed the bowl of "fruit" to some friends, and one man took an "apple" and bit into it. Certainly he was not responding to what he bit into; he was responding to the symbol "apple." His response ( $rM$ ) to that which ( $S$ ) called it out gave the "that which" (wax object) its meaning ( $rM$ ) for him, and when this response ( $rM$ ) operated as a stimulus ( $rM_s$ ) for him, he bit. Those present could infer his meaning from his act, as can we here and now, but no one could

make such an inference if it were not for the amazing fact that man is able to "take the attitude of the other"

To speak of a human stimulus as "external" or "internal" is to misunderstand this aspect of human behavior, and also it is seldom enlightening to speak in terms of the "cause" of an act. Cause is seen to be a correlative function of the changes occurring in the configuration of relationships we call the situation or field of interaction. Where would one begin if one were setting out to find the "cause" of the man's biting into that which looked to him like that which we call "apple"?

This process of interaction in which a person behaves toward others and toward objects by actually using his own response as stimulus, is called the symbolic process. The symbols are those of his responses which become stimuli to his further behavior. For the individual person this process begins some considerable time after birth with the rise of the self, and ends with death. For society, the process began "in the beginning," and it will end, no doubt, "in the ending."

## 2. The Symbolic Process

We were directed to the discussion of meaning by the conclusion reached in the preceding chapter which was that a need is what the response measures, and that whether or not an event becomes a need depends upon the meaning it "has" for the person involved. As indicated above, such events or phenomena are symbols, and to say that a symbol "has" a meaning is to say that the symbol "has a tendency" to induce one to act in a given way under certain conditions. When a person's own response has meaning for him, it is a symbol which acts as a stimulus to his further behavior and may therefore be called a need. In accordance with the previously mentioned tradition in psychology of stressing individual differences, many writers tend to assert or imply that stimuli are intensely personal. So great is this emphasis that they come to see everyone as deviating greatly from the norm.

In this and the next chapter an attempt will be made to indicate that if human stimuli were as highly personal as some writers suggest by the constant use of the word "unique," social adjustment

would be impossible. This, we hope, will be made evident from a consideration of the nature of gesture.

### THE NATURE OF GESTURE

Among the genuinely satisfying conveniences of living in groups are those clever little tricks which one's society provides for sending messages to one's friends and enemies without going to the bother of writing letters or making speeches. If we are in an informal situation and someone asks us a question the answer to which we do not know, we merely shrug our shoulders and raise our faces a bit, if we are annoyed, we may frown, if troubled, we purse our lips and frown, if pleasantly shocked, we lift our faces, open our eyes widely and purse our lips, if angered, we scowl and lower the corners of our mouths. If we want something, we may alternately glance at it out of the corner of our eyes and then at the person who, we think, might get it for us.

While people do vary in the minute mannerisms with which they perform these gestures, the variations are remarkably insignificant for people of a given culture or other group. People are seldom if ever at a loss to interpret a gesture as a smile, a shrug, or a scowl, even though everyone makes them a little differently. This is a "difference that makes no difference." There are dozens of such gestures, probably hundreds of them, which use different parts of the body in different combinations in context-of-situation. They are devices for communicating meanings, and they make possible the conversation-of-gestures. Not only does every culture have its own set, that is a social norm, of such postural gestures, but groups within a culture have a few of their own. Even the animals have sets of them and use them all the time.

Mead calls these the beginnings of acts which have been interrupted and superseded by other acts before the act could be completed. They are thus "truncated" acts, in Mead's words. They indicate the on-coming act, but the consummatory act frequently fails to come off because the person addressed sees it coming, anticipates it, and responds to it before it is finished. Thus gestures have come to take on meaning in their own right, they are substitutes for complete acts, they are symbols. While they are exceedingly useful devices, they are not adequate in themselves for

communicating the more complicated meanings; and they are quite inadequate for communicating abstract ideas.

Modern life could not be carried on with such non-verbal language alone. We shall take the position of Mead that words also are gestures, vocal gestures, which are also the beginnings of social acts. In the first chapter we stated that acts are continuous variables as regards their overt and covert aspects. Just as postural gestures by interpretation have come to be acts in their own right, so the beginning of the vocal gesture, the covert phase, has taken on a function in its own right, a function called thinking. The context in which a word is used leads to relatively easy anticipation of what the next word is to be, so the speaker is often interrupted and the "next" word does not get spoken. It is truncated at the inception of the overt phase, and occurs only as a thought. This is Mead's theory of the origin of thinking.




Figure VIII. Covert and Overt Phases of Behavior

These acts may be illustrated by Figure VIII, which is intended to represent John Doe facing to the right. The meanings  $M_1$ ,  $M_2$ ,  $M_3$ , and  $M_4$ , represent the beginnings of acts, only one of which,  $M_4$ , proceeded to consummation in an overt act. Line A represents the periphery of the body, and the area between line A and line B represents the area of postural gesture. It is evident that  $M_2$  and  $M_3$  became overt to the extent of becoming visible postural gestures, but  $M_1$ , theoretically, had no accompanying overt expression and occurred only as a thought.

Mead does not use diagrams, but he would probably say with reference to Figure VIII, that any behavior that does not proceed beyond line B is a gesture, whether vocal or postural. Beginnings of acts truncated at line B are behaviors which are no longer

limited to accompanying overt acts like  $M_4$ , but can operate in their own right as postural gestures. Behaviors truncated at line A are beginnings also, which do not have to be accompanied by overt acts, and which occur in their own right as thoughts. One can think about another person without going over to see him. Behaviors truncated at line A amount to carrying on a conversation with oneself. All behaviors truncated at lines A or B Mead calls "attitudes," but in the present work they may be called other kinds of tinsits, also judgments, thoughts, fears, or hopes.

The vocal gesture has not put the postural gesture out of business, indeed, the latter is so important that speech by itself would be flat and uninteresting—even comical. Since light travels faster than sound we frequently learn the meaning of a person's speech before he is finished speaking, his postural gestures tell his story because the two types of gestures, with a third type—tonal gesture or inflection—are so thoroughly integrated in one's behavior. The next time the reader has guests and the conversation lags, he might ask his guests to play this game: try saying "yes" repeatedly and at the same time make the negative gesture with the head, then say "no" several times while nodding "yes." Even more effective is the use of vocal sounds, not words, for "yes," raising one's voice while nodding "no", and for "no" allowing the voice to fall while nodding "yes."

Verbal and postural gestures are highly integrated components of the same act. When a person is nodding "Yes" he is at the same time saying "Yes," even if only to himself. Both of these types of behavior are symbolic acts and are part of the symbolic process. In combination they enable us to communicate all the subtleties of true conversation. Whenever we refer to speech or vocal gesture we shall be referring to both in combination. All conversation is an integrated combination of gestures.

Everyone has his own way of making these gestures, and we can distinguish people from each other by these differences. They are, to be sure, personal, but they are not unique; *if they were, they would be useless for purposes of communication.* Jack and Jill, as we shall see in the next chapter, can understand each other precisely because their gestures, learned in the same groups, are so much alike that they are common tinsits. We can go downtown and meet a "complete" stranger and carry on a conversation with

him without "missing a trick." We can anticipate his responses to our vocal gestures because his responses to them are so much like ours

### ANTICIPATION<sup>5</sup>

When we anticipate another's response to our words in the speed of conversation, we perform one of the greatest achievements of man. How do we do this? Suppose we are talking to the stranger. We "size him up" quickly by using many devices we shall not discuss at this point. We make some rapid mental judgments, reservations, and assumptions—one of which is that he is one of our kind, at least to the extent of being able to "understand" us.

How do we anticipate his response to what we are saying? How do we know how he is going to interpret what we say? What we do, without realizing it, is to direct our on-coming words at ourselves, with lightning speed, while we are directing them at him. We respond, covertly, to our own words before he gets them, and this gives us the meaning of what we are saying to him. We assume that our words will affect him in the same way they have affected us, with some allowance for personal differences. But we would hardly have dared make this assumption if we were not reasonably sure that the two of us had a good many traits in common, enough so that he will take our words as we have taken them, that is, that he will quickly repeat them to himself covertly and then respond to them overtly in the same way we did in that flash.

We have run our own words through ourselves and we assume that what they did to us they will also do to him. This is what is meant by anticipating his response to our speech. We have another point, we have assumed that the stranger will interpret our words as we do. But how does he do this? He interprets as we do because he has done this before, he has many times previously responded to the symbols we used, and he therefore recognizes them and makes his own assumptions about us, namely, that we are using these symbols in the same way he has heard and used them before. He behaves as if he knows that "every act has a history." And as

<sup>5</sup> The reader will find the rest of this chapter easier reading if he will at this point return to Chapter I and reread section 5 on interaction, especially the short section on role-taking.

he talks back to us he goes through the same process through which we went.

A constant stream of interaction and adjustment is at play here just as between two boxers in a ring, except that the boxers do not use overt vocal gestures. While we are telling him, he is repeating our words to himself, so he receives everything twice, once from us and once from himself. While he is telling us, we are repeating his words to ourselves, so we receive everything twice, once from him and once from us.

This is how we acquire accents when we go to Boston, or to the South, or London, or other parts of the world, this is how we "pick up" colloquialisms, local color, slang, and language itself. We say words to ourselves while others are saying them to us, and soon we begin to say them out loud the way we heard them.

This behavior is not confined to verbal conversation. The reader will recall that in our description of the football field attention was called to the absurd idea that fifty thousand people were merely spectators. They go home sore of muscle because they have been doing to themselves what the players (and the crowd) have been doing to them. This is called "empathy." To know what another is saying or doing, we have to say what he is saying and do what he is doing, thereby we receive (give ourselves) the same meaning.

Now to return to the stranger when we respond to our own words as we expect the other person to respond to them, that is what Mead calls "taking-the-attitude-of-the-other" or "taking-the-role-of-the-other." When our own words stimulate us to respond in the same way as our listener, that is role-taking. When the words of the other person stimulates us to behave in the same way he does, that is role-taking. And it is all done by symbols. But just as the stranger was able to receive (give himself) our meaning because he had experienced it before with others like us, so when we respond to what we are saying in the manner in which we expect him to respond, we can do this only because we, too, have experienced it before—we had to learn what responses to expect of him under stated conditions. This is symbolic interaction of a high order, and is the most important mechanism by which we achieve interpersonal integration. This illustration has involved all four phases of interaction as presented in Chapter I, namely, emergence, selective response, role-taking, and interpersonal integration.

## THE NATURE OF SYMBOLS

According to one writer:

*A symbol is a stimulus—largely verbal, pictorial, or material—which stands in place of, or suggests, or represents, some object, situation, or relation, by reason of some association of the two in experience*  
 Symbols serve as handles, as convenient devices by which to take hold of, or to control, the world of situations around us . . . <sup>6</sup>

Gestures represent one form of such symbols, but among the most important forms of gestures are words which, we are told, are

more effective than other gestures because they more specifically locate objects and situations in time and space, and characterize and qualify them as to number, kind, and relationship . . . <sup>7</sup>

While words are the most effective symbols available to most people, the most effective symbols yet devised to perform the functions which Young describes are scientific symbols, mathematical symbols in particular. As devices for placing and characterizing relationships and for achieving accuracy and the widest possible agreement or standardization of response or meaning, they are without equal. This is why students of behavior are more and more seeking operational definitions for their concepts.

But for most people words—language—represent the great symbolic achievement of man. Words as symbols are nevertheless often a great hindrance to understanding the world we live in. In the first place, words as symbols retain their meaning (men continue to respond to them in the same way) long after that which they symbolized has changed.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, a word may be associated with very different phenomena in the experience of different people and may therefore come to symbolize different things to different people.

Man has for centuries made dictionaries in the attempt to standardize people's responses to thousands of words. Presumably if a "standard" dictionary states that a given word symbolizes a given response, we are to accept it as a fact, yet many "standard" dictionaries have been published, and at least one excuse for more

<sup>6</sup> Young *Personality*, p. 191. (Italics in the original)

<sup>7</sup> Young, *Personality*, p. 192. For "gestures" see pp. 140 ff.

<sup>8</sup> See E. D. Chapple and C. S. Coon *Principles of Anthropology* New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1942, Chapter 19.



than one such dictionary is that they differ in their definitions of many words. Each dictionary represents the experience of many people in different ages and in different parts of the world, and each attempts to standardize the responses of a very large group of people toward a given word. Probably the ideal definition is one like  $6 = 3 + 3$  (six is what three plus three measures), a definition with which everybody on earth who can understand it will agree. When we use words as symbols we must be content with much less precise meanings.

A person's world at any moment is for him only what his word-symbols indicate it to be, the meaning of his world consists of his responses to it. "A symbol is nothing but the stimulus whose response is given in advance."<sup>9</sup> We spend our lives learning these responses-in-advance, which become our selectors, and as many people learn the same advance response to a given stimulus, to that extent it is not "highly personal" or private. In our daily world we understand each other pretty well because the responses of most people of a given society or group toward what they see and hear fall pretty much in the same categories—and categories are symbols "... a category is a symbol releasing a habit mechanism."<sup>10</sup>

### WHAT SYMBOLS SYMBOLIZE

It is often difficult for people to gain an adequate understanding of the symbolic process largely because in popular usage symbols are thought of as referring primarily to *that which* is symbolized by such words as "object" or "thing." More careful analysis indicates that what symbols actually refer to is the person's behavior toward such objects. That is, symbols are not objects, but our behavior toward them. Earlier we quoted George Preston to the effect that behavior consists in doing something about something. We may say, too, that a symbol represents what people do about something in given situations, and what people do on such occasions is always an approximation to (deviation from) a group definition, an expectation, or norm. Symbols are always social definitions of what-to-do-about-something, and our behavior is always an approximation of this definition.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> G. H. Mead *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 181.

<sup>10</sup> Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 244.

<sup>11</sup> This fact is often lost in a heterogeneous society like ours, but it is evident in more homogeneous societies.

The symbolic process is an action process, and the referent of a symbol (that to which a symbol refers) is action and action-relationships, not static phenomena like that which the word "object" refers to or symbolizes. Objects and things are of course symbolized or they could not be known, but what we wish to emphasize is the desirability of thinking of symbols as forms of action. Chapple and Coon make this emphasis.

Thus a symbol may be anything—an object, a word, a place, a condition, a natural phenomenon like lightning or the sun, or a person—*which refers to the relation between persons and objects, or a combination of such relations* . . . in most cases symbols are directly associated with interaction in context of situation rather than with specific objects or persons . . . A symbol which refers to a loved one refers to the effect of the loved one on the person in question in interaction.<sup>12</sup>

Markey makes a similar statement. The name of a thing refers to its proper use.<sup>13</sup> The name of a thing tells us how to behave toward it, what meaning to give it. The name of a thing is a way of behaving in relation to it.

The word "relation" which always appears in discussions of symbols, refers to behavior-in-relation-to something. In the present volume the word "symbol" refers to patterns of interaction in a given context of situation, symbols have (are) meanings in terms of their connection with what people do. All social behavior, including all knowledge, is in terms of symbols. To a bank teller a five dollar bill is a thing to be filed in the compartment of a drawer and to be counted *in the context of situation* of his daily work; but in his non-occupational situations the significance of such a bill is the role it plays in human interaction. A five dollar bill is what it does, which means "what it induces people to do." "All words (stone as well as taboo) are symbolic designations of some behavior phenomenon to which we respond. It is our response which gives it meaning."<sup>14</sup> The only way symbols can be developed is by action; and they are in turn stimuli to action.

The symbol has a double validity, that is, for both the stimulus and the response. The object spoken of is a *behavior object*, one which has

<sup>12</sup> Chapple and Coon. *Principles of Anthropology*, p. 466 (Italics in the first quotation not in the original).

<sup>13</sup> Markey. *The Symbolic Process*, p. 56

<sup>14</sup> Lundberg. *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 23

received its character as an object due to behavior responses—this holds regarding all objects<sup>15</sup>

A symbol is a substitute for that which it symbolizes, and this is always a response of some sort to something. The symbol, then, functions in behavior in place of such acts “Thus a person can adjust to an absent situation by means of symbolic behavior”<sup>16</sup>

### 3. The Significant Symbol

It has always been very easy for man to think of himself as important in the scheme of things. This is probably because he is the only animal that can think so, because, so he thinks, he is the only animal that can think. A rattlesnake behaves as if the majesty of his self-assurance were the delight of the Lord, but he cannot tell or write about it. Snakes and other animals than man are believed by some to be able to respond to signs but not to symbols. When dinner is announced a man is usually very much pleased, but he could remain in his easy chair and enjoy “dinner,” and that is probably what he was doing when dinner was announced. His dog, however, wriggles and wags and runs in extrovertive glee to his appointed corner at “dinner-is-ready.” The dog cannot stay where he is and drool his gustatory ecstasy in the absence of dinner.

Men respond to both signs and symbols, animals, we are told, respond to signs but not to symbols. These qualifying clauses may appear to indicate that the author is skeptical about the latter, and that is correct—he is. However, like all else, this process is a matter of degree.

A sign symbolizes the presence of something, the symbol is a substitute for, even in the *absence* of, what it symbolizes.<sup>17</sup> The symbol is a function of reflective behavior (to a degree), the sign is not. When a man grows weary with the burdens and baubles of civilization and has an “inner striving” (symbolic stimulus) to escape, he may lean back in his chair, close his eyes, and within a few moments be standing in a rowboat reeling in and tugging with an enormous bass or “muskie” (a much bigger one than he

<sup>15</sup> Markey, *The Symbolic Process*, p. 28. (Italics mine).

<sup>16</sup> Markey: *The Symbolic Process*, p. 106.

<sup>17</sup> If this explanation is too simple to suit the reader he may consult Markey *The Symbolic Process*, pp. 115-6, or other references mentioned in the present chapter.

can catch in the water) His hands may actually be out in front of him vigorously going through the motions of reeling and tugging, while his dog stands by in amazement, the dog can get excited about the catch only when he is in the boat actually watching it. The dog cannot use words as significant symbols to stimulate himself. At least, we do not think so.

Mead contends that the vocal gesture is the only kind which calls out in one's self the same response it calls out in others

If we exclude the vocal gesture, it is only by the use of the mirror that one could reach the position where he responds to his own gestures as other people respond <sup>18</sup>

This is what Mead calls the *significant symbol*.

The vocal gesture becomes a significant symbol . . . when it has the same effect on the individual making it that it has on the individual to whom it is addressed <sup>19</sup>

*When two or more people interact in this way we have what is called language.* Once this process is established, that is, after one has developed a system of personic tinsits in sufficient degree to be called a personality, the person may be thought of as interacting even when he is alone This would be social, but not collective behavior

A dog cannot condition himself:

his reflexes can be conditioned by another but he cannot do it himself Now, it is characteristic of significant speech that just this process of self-conditioning is going on all the time <sup>20</sup>

For a person to understand what he himself is saying, his words must affect him in much the same way they affect his other listeners. As he hears what he himself says, he tends to respond as his other listeners do This sort of behavior is what constitutes the significant symbol, the primary mechanism of role-taking. When

<sup>18</sup> G. H. Mead. *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. 65-6 We accept this with reservation, for there is a kinaesthetic correlate for all gestures

<sup>19</sup> G. H. Mead. *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 46, also pp. 75, 108, and 268 Mead refers to significant as conscious. " . . . the conscious or significant conversation of gestures is a much more adequate and effective mechanism of mutual adjustment within the social act . . . than is the unconscious or non-significant conversation of gestures," p. 46 But we question whether the vocal gesture is the only one

<sup>20</sup> G. H. Mead. *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 108.

a person talks he is always sure of one listener, even when he is alone.

Up to this point the middle term of the formulation  $S \leftrightarrow \text{r}M_s \leftrightarrow R$  has not been given a name. Since this middle term and "significant symbol" seem to me to represent the same phenomenon, the symbol  $\text{r}M_s$  is hereby named the significant symbol. This differs some from Mead, for whom the significant symbol is always conscious. When, however, unconscious-conscious is treated as a continuum rather than as a dichotomy no difficulty arises in our usage.

#### 4. The Personicon and the Symbolic

Of the two terms personicon and symbolic, personicon is the larger term, all of man's symbolic behavior is personicon, but not all personicon is symbolic. All of the person's behavior is personicon. Response to meaning is a test of the personicon, but not necessarily a test of the symbolic. Both a youth and his heart might start jumping at an appropriate symbolic behavior of a maiden; but his heart might also start jumping in response to much more prosaic stimuli. In essence the symbolic is a substitute behavior. A symbol, as defined earlier, is something that stands for something else, and is substitutive in this sense. Symbolic behavior is frequently spoken of as antithetical to "actual" behavior, but the difference in this instance is overt vs. covert, for both are "actual." Hence "actual" is probably not a good antithetical term in relation to symbolic. Perhaps a better term is direct vs. symbolic.

For example, one might injure a person directly by maiming him, or symbolically by calling down a curse on him. Symbolic, or substitutive behavior, may be overt or covert. To write poetry to one's love is overt symbolic (substitute for directly making love), to recite the poetry to one's self is covert symbolic. Making love directly is not symbolic. All these types of behavior, however, are personicon. Any response to meaning is personicon. A foot race is direct personicon behavior, but not symbolic and not substitutive, normally. All personicon behavior involves the use of symbols, but if direct and not meant as a substitute, it is not symbolic. To the extent that animals other than man engage in symbolic behavior (substitutive), to that extent we cannot say that all symbolic behavior is personicon.

Generally speaking, however, we may say that all symbolic behavior is personic, but not all personic behavior is symbolic. The difference is that in symbolic behavior we are doing something indirectly rather than directly.

The significant symbol ( $rM_s$ ) is always symbolic; but the response to that may be either direct or substitutive. Abstract thinking as a covert response to the  $rM_s$  may not be symbolic, for it may be the only direct response possible, not a substitute for any other behavior. But thinking is an activity in its own right, an activity of the person, and therefore personic. Symbolizing is a function, and any act or thing may on occasion serve this function. Things and acts may have several functions, the function of symbolizing (acting as a symbol) is to act as representing something else. When an act, sound, or color is performing this function we call it a symbol. Probably no act has a symbolic function exclusively, and probably no act or object is incapable of having a symbolic function. A hatchet may have a chopping function; or it may have a symbolic function on February 22.

It is this substitutive character that distinguishes the symbolic. The symbolic process in human interaction is the process in which a person behaves toward another by using the other's responses as his own and responding to them as stimuli to his further behavior.

## 5. The Emotions as Meanings

In Chapter VII we made the following statement:

Organic or somatic needs are never components of social fields, they can become such only by being transformed into personic needs.

Both general types of systems, the somatic and the personic, have their own types of environments and their own configurations of fields. The integration of the organism is a formidable affair even before the emergence of the personic, and this integration, wonderful as it appears, is seldom so successful after the emergence of the personic.

## THE ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS

The systems of the body which play the most significant, or at least the most immediate, roles in the integration of the somatic

and the personic are two of the adaptive systems. The nervous system and the endocrine system operate to integrate and coordinate not only the somatic and the personic, but also the many subsidiary relationships of each, and they function to maintain these integrations as a constantly recurring, ongoing process.

### *The Nervous System*

Like Gaul, the nervous system is divided into three general parts. Anyone who ever helped in the kitchen in the preparation of foods—chicken, fish, rabbits, or pork tenderloin roasts—is aware that the backbone is a formidable affair. It is evident that the backbone is more than bone. The neat little rings that one finds in the salmon on the table indicate that the spine is hollow.

Through this hollow spine runs an insulated conduit whose upper terminus is a bulbous formation called the brain. The bony structure of the spine serves as a scaffolding by which the attached muscles keep the organic structure upright, and the stuff in the conduit mediates that which keeps the personic system more or less upright, that is, right-wise, which is to say, righteous, in accordance with one's group-identifications.<sup>21</sup>

That part of the nervous system within the spinal column and head is called the cerebro-spinal or *central nervous system*. Connected with this is an elaborate system of forty-three nerve trunks which go to all parts of the body, this system is called the *peripheral nervous system*. Just outside the spinal column, on the ventral or front side, running along the spine up to the back of the skull are two rows of connected nerve centers, like two strings of beads, this is called the *autonomic nervous system*. These three general systems integrate and coordinate all the functions of the organism in cooperation with the endocrine system of ductless glands, by electro-chemical processes.

Whatever the human being can learn to do is limited by the nature and efficiency of these systems. We should keep in mind (keep saying to ourselves), however, that the nervous system is a communicating system, a medium for conducting messages. It is selective in terms of its own nature, a somatic selector-system, but it is not a little man and has no "will" of its own. What it can do depends upon two sets of conditions: 1) a vague phenomenon

<sup>21</sup> Since the normal position of man is erect or upright, presumably he is most a man who stands most upright. The relationship of this property of the organism and the ethical vocabularies of the personic are probably not due to chance.

called quality, and 2) the kind of training and treatment to which it is subjected in the social process. What the nervous system can do and does do, then, depends upon its ability to carry messages, and upon the kind of messages it is called upon to carry

In general the central nervous system is *primarily* concerned with the kind of stimuli we have referred to as meanings, while the other two nervous systems are *primarily* concerned with stimuli in the form of physico-chemical events. The word *primarily* is emphasized both from the temporal point of view, temporal order of emergence, and from the point of view of its function.

Nothing in the organism operates independently, there are no rugged individualists here. This is a hint from nature that freedom without the bonds of organization or security simply does not occur; both are achieved through interdependent relationships. The autonomic system might appear, from its name, as if it were "a law unto itself," but it "plays ball," like all the other parts. The autonomic is *primarily* concerned with the sustaining systems, and was so named because people used to believe that it was not subject to "voluntary," that is, verbal control.

### THE AUTONOMIC NERVOUS SYSTEM AND THE EMOTIONS

Every system is a system of systems, and the autonomic conforms in this respect. The autonomic consists of a pair of twins who cooperate beautifully in a negative sort of way. There is a division of labor between them, and each does its job in relation to the other with incredible exactitude as a joint enterprise. The twins are called the *sympathetic* and the *parasympathetic* systems. Like many children, they are badly named. The sympathetic usually operates when a person is least sympathetic. "Para" is a Greek prefix meaning "along side of", but both teams go along on whatever enterprise the organism has at hand. These twins are not only fanatically devoted to each other; *they are fanatically devoted to the concept of situation as developed in this book.* Furthermore, both twins are subject to call twenty-four hours a day for some sixty-five years, on the average, and they do not dillydally. They are ready for business at a fraction of a second's notice.

#### *The Two Autonomic Syndromes*

Each of the two autonomic systems is itself a system. Each



operates as a pattern or syndrome. The two syndromes are described partially in Table 5.

TABLE 5 THE COMPLEMENTARY AUTONOMIC SYNDROMES

FUNCTION	SYNDROMES	
	PARASYMPATHETIC	SYMPATHETIC
Pulse	slow—regular	rapid
Blood Pressure	low	high
Respiration	slow	rapid
Digestion	active	inhibited
Salivation	active	inhibited
Iris	constricted	dilated
Sexuality	ready	inhibited
Facial Muscles	relaxed	tensed
Laughter	ready	inhibited
Musculature	low tonus	high tonus
Feeling Tone	pleasant	unpleasant

The parasympathetic is frequently called the appetitive system, while the sympathetic is frequently called the defensive or emergency pattern. Table 5 contains only some of the more important types of responses that make up these syndromes. These phenomena operate as a pattern, a configuration, a syndrome, or as a unit. All the elements listed, and more, come into play together. Generally accepted is the recent discovery that the violent emotions are all accompanied by the sympathetic syndrome. It apparently makes no difference what the violent emotion is—fear, anger, jealousy, thrill, disgust, hatred, romantic love, or any other, *this visceral response in the form of the sympathetic syndrome is the same*. What, then, differentiates one emotion from another? If the visceral syndrome is practically the same (see Appendix Two) in all violent emotions, how does a person know whether he is experiencing fear, hatred, anger, jealousy or romantic love? Let us take an example.

#### *The Bear Came Over the Mountain*

Let us suppose we are out trout fishing in the mountain streams. We are weighted down with heavy hip boots, fly rod, landing net, box of flies, pliers, nippers, fishing jacket, first aid kit, leaders, and all the other status symbols that are the socially accepted impedimenta of the fly fisherman. We have been wading up

and down stream all morning, climbing over rocks and through bushes, slipping and falling but enjoying it all. At noon we are weary and hungry, and can hardly walk another step. The situation as a whole nudges us suggesting that if we have to take another step, we will die on the spot. But remaining is impossible, so we stumbly drag ourselves up to the path on a narrow rocky ledge. Suddenly about fifty feet or so in front of us, we see a huge she-bear with a cub coming along on the same and only path.

Quicker than we can say "Heaven help me!" *sympathetic syndrome* takes over and we are a new man, our strength—for flight or fight—is as the strength of ten because our heart is pure adrenalin—almost. Our heart action and circulatory system are speeded up, blood vessels are constricted, the adrenal gland of the endocrine system spurts blood sugar into the racing blood stream, the digestive system and hunger are inhibited, the respiration system is speeded up; pulse and blood pressure are high, salivation is inhibited and our mouths are dry, the iris is dilated—we stare in "open-eyed terror", perspiration is at full flow, the muscular system is toned up and ready to go, facial muscles are tense, the sexual system is inhibited, and there is no humor in the universe—in retreat we are ready to outrun Diana, or to take on the dragon like Saint George, depending upon our personic selectors.

Let us assume for a moment that what we saw coming around the mountain was not a big she-bear with cub, but a beautiful princess. In this case the physiological pattern would be practically the same, possibly not quite so intense—although it could be. The viscera could not distinguish between a bear or a princess, nor whether we were experiencing fear or romantic love, in both instances the sympathetic syndrome would be in operation. But we would know whether it was fear or love. How would we know?

We would learn through the situation; what it means to us. Our society has given different names to this sympathetic syndrome, this defense, this emergency or thrill pattern of visceral responses, *depending on the meaning of the situation which arouses it*. The experience of the sympathetic syndrome may be called fear, love, anger, anxiety, jealousy, religious exaltation, or many other names depending upon the meaning of the situation which arouses the syndrome. The emotions, then, are responses to meanings, the emotions are names which our culture gives to certain types of situations which arouse the sympathetic syndrome. The

emotions are meanings. The emotions are *personic* not *somatic* phenomena

It is an interesting coincidence that no such long list of names exists for situations which arouse tender emotion, that is, for situations which arouse the parasympathetic syndrome. Perhaps this is because in "nature" this is the normal condition of the viscera. One would not last long if the sympathetic were in operation all the time—as contemporary mortality rates from heart disease and commitments to mental institutions indicate. The viscera are innervated by the parasympathetic nervous system when situations are not so spectacular. In those calm moments when one sits by a bubbling brook in the deep shade on a sunny day, when the blood flows lazily along and breathing is not noticed, and pupils are contracted and the world is dreamy, and food is good and girls are fun—this is the province of the parasympathetic. To those for whom nature is telic, perhaps this was the main idea, but the frustrations of secondary societies seem to be increasingly turning us the other way.

#### *Emotion vs. The Emotions*

We see that we can no longer speak of specific emotions like fear, love, courage, and sorrow as if each were a specific organic tendency. They are true organic tints, meaningless terms without consideration of the situations which arouse the visceral syndrome. The syndrome itself is emotion but not any specific emotion, the syndrome is stir and upset, but the situation determines what kind of stir; it tells what the stir is all about, whether it is fear stir, love stir, hate stir, courage stir, or sorrow stir.

In the hypothetical incident of the bear and the princess in the mountain only one visceral syndrome was involved, but the princess situation can be called love, while the bear situation can be called "fear" or "cowardice" or "shame" if one retreats, and "pugnacity" or "courage" if one fights. With reference to the traditional terminology of fear, love, hate, etc., Lund says:

Not only is it obsolescent, but it suffers from the additional weakness of being external in its reference, of being descriptive less of emotional states than of the situations giving rise to them. No close inspection of such terms as pity, sympathy, envy, jealousy is required to realize that their distinguishable features are to be found chiefly in the implied social relationships. The bodily responses are much less varied than the situations responsible for them. This being the case, a given emo-

tional response [visceral] might be identified equally well by any of several terms <sup>22</sup>

An autonomic syndrome is like a piano, always more or less the same instrument but many types of tunes can be played on it. Consequently "emotion" is the pattern of visceral response which occurs as a coloring in various combinations and degrees with all behavior, all tinsits. Emotion constitutes what we have called the magnitude, strength, or intensity of a tinsit in a given situation. Thus we distinguish between the singular and plural forms of the word "emotion." The singular form symbolizes the varied permutations of the autonomic syndromes, the plural form—which we abandon—refers to the meanings which give rise to the syndromes. In place of "the emotions" we shall speak of specific type-situations, for example, fear-situation or anger-situation and for collective purposes, emotional-situations.

Emotional-situations, like any other, are group properties and definitions. One's society, specifically one's group-identifications, determines what (when) we fear, love, or hate. The extent to which an individual differs from this is a measure of deviation from a group norm. Whether we feel fear, hate, revenge, or courage, depends upon what the situation means to us, and we learn these meanings in and from our groups. Emotion is thus a configuration of organic tinsits, while an emotional-situation is a configuration of personic tinsits. The latter arouses, and is colored by, the former. Love, hate, fear, and courage are vocabularies which explain and justify personic behavior in socially defined situations.

### PAIN AND PLEASURE AS MEANINGS

In harmony with the preceding interpretation we may say that feeling is a person's interpretation of the present field in terms of the socially defined pleasure-pain continuum of one's groups. Were it not for social conditioning, physical pain, such as the pain resulting from the cutting of living flesh, would universally be the normal biological response or experience. That is, in every culture,

<sup>22</sup> Frederick H. Lund. *Emotions, Their Psychological, Physiological and Educative Implications*. New York. The Ronald Press, 1939, p. 5. On p. 14 Lund defines emotion as "a strongly affective state involving diffuse somatic reactions, and rather widespread, *centrally aroused*, visceral changes" (*Italics mine*). In this survey of physiological researches on emotion Lund presents the data and findings which support our interpretation.

everyone in everyday life situations would say that sticking a pin in one's arm hurts. But it is truly remarkable what group-conditioning can do to such normal biologically adequate stimuli. A person's particular permutation of group-identifications and other selectors tell him in a wide variety of type-situations just what kind of emotional-situation (love, fear, etc.) he is integrated into at the moment, and they tell him likewise whether he is supposed to like the experience or dislike it, and how much.

But it is highly important to notice that it is not the organic syndrome *itself* which one is compelled to interpret on this normative scale, it is the syndrome-in-situation which one has to deal with. Either of the two syndromes may be defined as pleasant in some situations, unpleasant in others, despite the fact that in standard texts the sympathetic syndrome is said to be unpleasant, and the parasympathetic pleasant, apparently regardless of situation.

Running the risk of over-simplification, we can identify four processes in an experience: first, the response, *M*, the person's giving a meaning to the perceived socially defined situation as one of fear, disgust, sorrow, love, or anger; secondly, a similar perception of the situation's meaning on the socially defined pain-pleasure continuum; third, we have the response called the visceral syndrome, in the permutation appropriate to the first two perceptions. These three events occur with such great speed that for practical purposes they are almost simultaneous, even though with the ability of science to measure in millionths of a second, the three could now probably be isolated. The fourth event is the person's perception of the visceral syndrome itself. This perception is delayed due to the time necessary for the physico-chemical events to occur, primarily the effects of adrenalin. The latter seems to reinforce and extend the others in time, and to perform other functions.

These four events as a pattern may be conditioned to any situation or type-situation whatever, and are traditionally called 'an' emotion like fear or anger. What is generally called "feeling" (the second event above) is this pattern of events; and the total experience is said to feel pleasant or unpleasant in accordance with one's definition of the situation. Social adjustment is contingent upon a strong statistical central tendency (that is, agreement) in these definitions for a given society or smaller group. Since the

visceral syndrome is practically the same in fear-situations as in those of love, sorrow, anger, and hate, this means that the syndrome is pleasant under some personic conditions and unpleasant under other personic conditions, depending upon one's definition of the situation. Such experience is first conditioned to specific situations which leads, through generalizing, to type-situations.

The holy men of India, for example, who lie on nails and thorns, should convince the most skeptical that pleasure and pain even of the physical type can be group definitions, that they can be for the human being personic, not somatic, phenomena. In most groups in our culture and probably in all cultures, sitting on nails and lying on thorns is defined as painful and unpleasant in accordance with what we have called the biological norm, but the Sadhus apparently have other ideas. They mortify the flesh as a means of edifying the spirit. The total experience for them is a "pleasant" feeling of religious exaltation, innervated by the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system. As the nails penetrate the skin the meaning for them is not pain but piety. Observation indicates that for this sort of event the faithful on-lookers are participating in the holy act—by role-taking—and it is for them too a religious, not an unpleasant, experience. The faces of such people may look to us as if they were in pain—but look at the faces of a youth and a maiden staring at each other in the throes of romantic love, or at any person in solemn prayer. No humor appears there either, it looks painful.

In parts of our own culture we frequently see pictures of religious devotees with deadly rattlesnakes wrapped around their shoulders. The love of gods takes many forms, most of which are the thrill type, that is, behavior innervated by the sympathetic division. If romantic love in our culture is unpleasant, it is a nevertheless immensely popular form of suffering. The same is true for diving into the water from high places, shooting up and down roller coasters, standing on the edge of a high precipice, witnessing a movie or radio mystery, contemplating the rescue of one's beloved from the jaws of death "or worse," and many other types of safely dangerous activity. All of these behaviors arouse the same sympathetic syndromes as do situations of fear, hatred, and anger; yet they are not generally defined as unpleasant.

## Chapter IX

### SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SIGNIFICANT SYMBOL

- 1 *Some Forms of Symbolic Interaction*
  - A *Role-Taking The Celebrated Jack and Jill Enterprise*
  - B *The Structure of Meaning*
  - C *Communication*
  - D *Sympathy*
  - E *Identification and Ego-Involvement*
  - F *The Role of Witness*
- 2 *Some Social Implications of Role-Taking*
  - A *Advantages to the Person*
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- 3 *The Margin-of-Error-in-Role-Taking*
  - A *Some Sources of Error in Role-Taking*
  - B *How Big is Public Opinion?*
- 4 *The Nature and Genesis of Mind*
  - A *A Point of View*
  - B *The Nature and Genesis of Mind*

#### 1. Some Forms of Symbolic Interaction

##### ROLE-TAKING: THE CELEBRATED JACK AND JILL ENTERPRISE

In our early childhood we all learn of a disastrous miscarriage of effort which, so far as I know, has never been accounted for. We are informed that: "Jack and Jill went up a hill to fetch a pail of water, and that Jack fell down and broke his crown and Jill came tumbling after." One would think that such an extraordinary misfortune would have been investigated long ago. Since this book is concerned with a theory of human behavior, perhaps we should offer a theory to account for the miscarriage of this enterprise. Our theory is a bit complicated, but an incident which has been passed on generation after generation must have some complications.

Like all good theories this one involves assumptions. Since Jack and Jill went up the hill to get the water, it may be assumed

that they were moving toward a pump, and secondly, since girls in our culture are not supposed to be mechanically inclined, it may be assumed that Jill did not know much about pumps. Our final assumption is based on a kind of knowledge that is not usually dignified by the name of science, we refer to those common informal generalizations about the ways of a girl with a boy and *vice versa*, which lead us to assume that Jack rose to the full measure of his masculine importance and was explaining the situation to Jill who, in the socially established pattern for girls, was taking it in with appropriate astonishment and conspicuous admiration.

As Jack explains the mysteries of pumps to Jill, the lever principle, the functions of leather gaskets or washers, etc., he is engaged in a process which involves addressing himself at the same time, thereby calling out in himself the same responses he is calling out in Jill, and Jill, as she *listens*, is using the same word gestures and so calls out in herself the same responses which Jack is calling out in her. In the process of giving Jill all the minute directions about the pump, Jack is also giving himself those same directions. This is the only way he could know what he is saying to her. Jill is not simply a passive receiver but is rapidly repeating to herself what Jack is saying, and is therefore giving herself simultaneously the same directions that Jack is giving her. This is the kind of behavior called "consciousness", it is also role-taking. This is how a person knows the meaning of what is said to him, and the meaning of what he is saying to another. Jack gives himself the same stimuli he gives Jill, and Jill gives herself the same stimuli Jack is giving her.

If the individual does himself make use of something answering to the same gesture he observes, *saying it over again to himself, putting himself in the role of the person who is speaking to him*, then he has the meaning of what he hears, he has the idea: the meaning has become his <sup>1</sup>

This is the mechanism of communication, and of sharing, and of identification; and the basis of sympathy. To grasp meaning in this manner is to "understand", which means the resolution of one's tensions in that respect. Thus we share experience in the

<sup>1</sup> G. H. Mead *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 109. (Italics mine). We use the story of Jack and Jill to enable us to paraphrase Mead and avoid the confusion which arises from Mead's difficult use of pronouns.



process by which we induce in others our own experience. The process of communication on the symbolic level does not always run as smoothly as with Jack and Jill, smoothness is a continuous variable, a matter of more or less, depending on many factors. No doubt when Jack first told Jill the function of the leather gasket in the pump, she knitted her brow (the socially defined symbol of doubt or confusion) and he, anticipating her confusion, taking her role, proceeded to re-explain without being asked verbally to do so.

What do we mean that Jill did not "understand" this point about the leather gasket? We mean that Jill did not have in her system of selectors a tinsit that fit that situation, she could not follow him (take his role) because she had no available response to correspond with his, and she was instantaneously aware that if under such conditions, she went on repeating his words to herself, she would be dealing with signs, not symbols, and would not be getting (giving) his meaning. She had no appropriate selector for that particular response of Jack's, so it went by her, and she revealed her confusion by a gesture, a frown.

One has to have something to communicate before communicating. One may seemingly have the symbol of another language, but if he has not any common ideas with those who speak the language, he cannot communicate with them <sup>2</sup>

Without common tinsits no communication or interaction as we understand them would be possible. "Know-how" means "available response or tinsit," that is, knowledge, which is symbolized experience.

What Jack and Jill have done here may seem relatively simple because we can all do it, but to describe adequately the complicated process would require a diagram so complicated that the reader would be confused. We shall try another method. We may recall that to perceive meaning a person must make a response which can serve as a stimulus to his own further action, and this stimulus must serve as a substitute for the act or object whose meaning he is seeking. We may call this self-stimulation, since this is what occurs (when one is stimulated to do it) in the symbolic process.

<sup>2</sup> G. H. Mead *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 259

## THE STRUCTURE OF MEANING

In the situation in which knowing Jack and mechanically untutored Jill find themselves at the pump, we must assume that she interrupted Jack several times when she perceived the oncoming of signs instead of symbols, that is, when she could not follow him because she had no tinsits to match his, that is, to fit the situation. At such moments she had to stop Jack (as students do in class) while she "searched" her system of selectors for some responses approximating those she was repeating to herself from Jack, that is, she had to stop and think, the cue for which may have been a knitted brow or a verbal request to have Jack repeat the point

As she searched her system of selectors, she reflected on one after another, rejecting some thoughts as obviously not what Jack meant. If Jack could not help Jill to find in herself some response or selector approximating his meaning, by analogy or otherwise, Jill could not possibly learn very much about a leather gasket. All her own rejected responses as well as the accepted ones—the entire complex of positive and negative responses including Jack's—constitute the structure of the meaning of the pump for Jill, and for Jack, too, insofar as he has responded to Jill's negative responses. *The structure of meaning is the configuration of responses that leads to that meaning as a resultant response.* Meaning is structured by the entire dialectic process.

Perhaps the following dialect went on as Jill's reflective behavior.

- $rM_s$  1. "The gasket is made of leather so it will be waterproof."
- $rM_s$  2. "No, that's not it."
- $rM_s$  3. "The gasket prevents sand from coming up."
- $rM_s$  4. "No, that's not it."
- $rM_s$  5. "The gasket insures a relative vacuum."
- $rM_s$  6. "Yes, that's probably it."

Response  $rM_s$  2 is a response to  $rM_s$  1;  $rM_s$  4 is a response to  $rM_s$  3;  $rM_s$  6 is a response to  $rM_s$  5. Responses 2, 4, and 6 are made to her own responses as stimuli, 2 and 4 are negative, rejecting 1 and 3, while 6 is positive, accepting 5 which is the resultant and is accepted as the meaning; but it is such only because of its relationships to the other responses. The structure of the meaning involves the entire complex, for the negative and rejected responses and

their referents helped define "gasket" for her in that situation. The resultant response is accepted as the meaning, but it is an emergent, emerging out of what went before; and while it is new (creative) it is not wholly so, for its parts are known, the emergent is not totally new, and is predictable in terms of probability. If it were a totally new response, she could not have made it, she had to know the word "vacuum" to say what she did, to receive (give) the meaning.

Now let us interpolate these materials into a statement by Markey as an illustration (to facilitate legibility M is used without the subscripts):

We do not know objects directly, but only indirectly through substituting some act representative of them [M 1, 3, and 5] and thus stimulating ourselves to respond [M 2, 4, and 6] to the substitutions as we would to the objects [gaskets] themselves. This involves a mechanism of interchangeable stimuli through which persons may take the role of the act or object. This means that knowledge as such rests upon a sufficiently consistent use of these stimuli by both parties [Jack's and Jill's responses to each other]. Too great an inconsistency [among the tinsits of Jack and Jill] robs them of their adequacy as substitute stimuli, and confusion, not knowledge, is the result. Due to similarities between individuals [common tinsits] they have been able to develop a large body of consistently interchangeable stimuli.<sup>3</sup>

Thus the symbolic process involves taking the role or attitude or tinsit of the other, and the "other" is often the "self", so a person responds to himself as object.

This has been a picture of Jill's part in the interaction, but Jack was performing some highly complex behavior himself. While Jack was 1) telling Jill, he was 2) telling himself and 3) taking the role of Jill, anticipating her responses, and 4) responding to his assumed role of Jill, all in a flash, as it were. To be a good speaker one must be a good listener, and both are exceedingly complex processes.

(As an act of good faith we must not go on without dismissing Jack and Jill, and giving the promised theory which accounts for their misfortune. They were so absorbed in this intricate process

<sup>3</sup> Markey, *The Symbolic Process*, p. 139. If we may refer to our remarks on conative behavior we may say that the experience of "inner striving" is a tension correlated with an imbalance between conditions which are 1) inadequately or negatively stimulating, and 2) a complex of symbolic responses operating as positive stimuli.

of role-taking that as Jack stepped back to make a gesture, he slipped and rolled down hill, and Jill, continuing to take his role, empathically, went tumbling after.)

### COMMUNICATION

Communication, then, involves a community of meaning, common meanings or *tinsits*, common selectors in the form of significant symbols, and to make this latter explicit, we shall quote once more, this time from Morris' introduction to Mead's work (p xxi).

Behavioristically the individual must be able to call out in himself the response which his gesture calls out in the other, and then utilize this response of the other for the control of his own further conduct. *Such gestures are significant symbols.* Through their use the individual is "taking the role of the other" in the regulation of his own conduct. Man is essentially a role-taking animal. The calling out of the same response in both self and the other gives the common context necessary for community of meaning.<sup>4</sup>

Obviously, then, if all personalities were "unique," if stimuli were highly personal, individual phenomena, then role-taking, common meaning, communication, sympathy, and empathy would all be impossible.

If behavior indicates what a person knows, it is communication.<sup>5</sup>

The following is a fine example of the subtlety and brilliance of Mead's insight:

We say the animal does not think . . . he does not put himself in the place of the other . . . and say, in effect, 'He will act in such a way and I will act in this way.' If the individual can act in this way, and the act which he calls out in himself can become a stimulus to him for another act, we have meaningful conduct. Where the response of the other person [B] is called out [in A] and becomes a stimulus to control [A's] action, then [A] has the meaning of [B's] act in his own [A's] experience. That is the general mechanism of what we term "thought," for in order that thought may exist there must be symbols, vocal gestures, generally, which arouse in the individual himself the responses he is calling out in the other, and such that from the point of

<sup>4</sup> *Italics mine*

<sup>5</sup> J. G. Miller *Unconsciousness*, p. 267

view of that response he is able to direct his later conduct. It involves not only communication in the sense in which birds and animals communicate with each other, but also an arousal in the individual himself of the response which he is calling out in the other individual, a taking of the role of the other, a tendency to act as the other person acts. One participates in the same process as the other person is carrying out and controls his action with reference to that participation. It is that which constitutes the meaning of an object, namely, the common response in one's self as well as in the other person, which becomes, in turn, a stimulus to one's self.<sup>6</sup>

### SYMPATHY

*Sympathy* is a form of behavior dependent upon this symbolic process. Since we think of interaction as a matter of more or less, measured on a scale, sympathy represents interaction measured on the upper region of the scale. It is interaction involving a high degree of interpersonal integration. Aside from interaction through scientific symbols the most efficient interaction is that involved in those complex forms of behavior subsumed under the generic term "love."<sup>7</sup> Sympathy involves reaching common ground, putting one's self in the other person's place, assuming his tinsits and thereby sharing his experience and his definition of the situation. Only by making the same or similar responses which the other makes toward a given situation can one achieve the same or similar meaning. To the extent that one can do this one can identify one's self with the other, *for one can "understand" the behavior of others only to the extent that one can respond to the other's tinsits in one's self.*

It is not sentimental to say that in this process we do actually become parts of one another in interpersonal integration. After a "good" visit with another person one feels that one knows that person pretty well.

Whenever two people are collaborating towards the achievement of a common goal, they and their interpersonal relations make up, compose, and are integrated into a *personal situation*. Factors in this two group which improve the collaboration, which increase the probability of achieving the goal, are constructive; factors which hinder the col-

<sup>6</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. 73-4.

<sup>7</sup> See the analysis of love in J. K. Folsom, *The Family and Democratic Society*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1943, Chapter XI.

laboration, diminish the probability, are destructive—with reference to the personal situation<sup>8</sup>

Thus we find constructive factors which facilitate interpersonal integration through role-taking, and destructive factors which inhibit the process. Among the former are the tender emotional situations and a high degree of commonality of selectors, among the inhibiting conditions are violent emotional situations such as those of hatred, anger, and jealousy, as well as social distance and prejudice. We state as a hypothesis that role-taking ability varies inversely with social distance.

Possibly personic typology might be constructed on the basis of role-taking ability in various types of situations. Occupational selection is somewhat related to role-taking ability, members of the professions, for example, representing good role-takers, industrial executives being poor role-takers, at least in relation to their subordinates. The two types, phases of a continuous variable, would correlate highly with James' *tough* and *tender* minds.

#### IDENTIFICATION AND EGO-INVOLVEMENT

The process of identification may be defined as a transit to act in the name of an incorporated constellation of symbols referring to persons, places, objects, and beliefs. Presumably the conditions under which identification occurs are similar to those facilitating role-taking. Identification, we believe, is achieved by means of the significant symbol.

The degree of emotionality in identification is a continuous variable, but generally it will be measured rather high on the continuum. Identification is either the same as what is generally called "ego-involvement," or very closely related to it. When a person becomes identified with a set of symbols—group, ideology, values, or persons—and acts in its name, whatever happens to the set of symbols happens also to him, for it is a significant part of his personality structure. The "individual" is often largely a hypothetical phenomenon. Men are not only products of each other, but are often in a very significant sense parts of each other. When our country wins a battle we behave as if we are the winner; when our union wins an argument, we win it; when our family or social class, our school, church, club, or race is honored, we feel hon-

<sup>8</sup> H. S. Sullivan *Psychiatry*, (1938), vol. 1, p. 25.

ored; when our team wins, we celebrate. Likewise when our groups lose, we lose, and we may become intensely depressed.

This is identification and is accomplished by assuming the tinsit of the other—the others of “our” groups. When others respond to the same stimuli to which we customarily respond, and in about the same way in which we respond, we are likely to approve of such persons. This is true whether the action is positive or negative, we approve of those who take the same actions as we do, whether to hate what we hate or to admire what we admire.

Social fields like the football field require established social controls toward which all, on both sides, respond in a similar manner to preserve order in the midst of violence. If a member of the opposing team were injured, it would be to our advantage theoretically, but we respond to the incident on the basis of a social norm as a principle to which both sides are expected to act alike—“sportsmanship.” We are to this extent identified with our opponents. Formerly this principle was adhered to even in war, but the new barbarism has changed that. Total war is a maximization of the outgroup principle, and represents a denial of identification with opponent in every respect.<sup>9</sup>

Once we have identified ourselves with others, we have acknowledged the role of others in the selection or determination of our own behavior. One of the most significant problems in contemporary western societies is the increasing difficulty of great numbers of people to discover anything with which they can successfully and satisfyingly identify themselves. With the pronounced impersonality of urban societies, and the apparent decay of primary institutions which goes with such conditions, the masses of people seem to be finding it increasingly difficult to find meaning in life. Loneliness, insecurities, and fears lead to the acceptance of almost any ideology as an anchor for identification, for the individual can find his own significance only by identification with some constellation of symbols which he and his people can hold significant.

For security, happiness, and peace of mind every person needs emotional identification with some configuration which his affections can encompass and which can become a part of him. How

<sup>9</sup> LaPiere and Fransworth *Social Psychology*, pp. 151-2, 418, use the concept of “negative identification” to describe hatred and outgroup attitudes. They make an interesting application of both positive and negative identification to the drama and to humor.

else can anyone achieve significance and stability of personality? Integration with others is the fundamental principle of the structure of the personality

### THE ROLE OF WITNESS<sup>10</sup>

That element of the American ethos which goes by the name of individualism or rugged individualism does not harmonize with the last sentence of the previous section. But role-taking as the central mechanism of human behavior has probably given everyone the experience of the role of witness. Due to the nature of language and the symbolic process, human beings witness their own behavior. A person does not make choices, he mediates them. He is a focal point at which the dynamics of the field are resolved into a resultant. The person is there in the role of participant observer and conatively he feels that "he did it." Since he can't escape role-taking in his perceptions, he becomes a party to any act he perceives and (in our culture) imputes personal responsibility to this relationship.

We see this sort of thing occur frequently when we witness the behavior of others, or even some desirable object. When a person is compelled to witness a crime, but has no other part in it, he may nevertheless feel guilt—just witnessing (role-taking) has made him a party to the act, and he may not be able to resolve his tensions until he tells someone else what he has told himself: "I just have to tell somebody." A similar situation involves "bearing witness to the Lord" at the camp meeting, except that here it may not be a guilt feeling, but a feeling that "I must stand up for my Lord", the person is in a sense responsible for "his" Lord. When a person has a particularly happy experience, as in seeing something of unusual grandeur—like the Grand Canyon of Colorado—he will probably exclaim "Oh, if mother were only here—I do wish she could see this."

Being a witness gives one a sense of responsibility for what is witnessed, either in the form of blame (guilt) or pride (credit).

<sup>10</sup> One of the best definitions I have seen for the term "role" is given by Professor L. S. Cottrell, Jr.: "An internally consistent series of conditioned responses by one member of a social situation which represents the stimulus-pattern for the similarly consistent series of conditioned responses of the other(s) in that situation is called a role." "The Analysis of Situational Fields" *American Sociological Review* (June 1942), Vol. 7, p. 374.



So it is that we blame ourselves for our socially disapproved (and therefore self-disapproved) acts, and praise ourselves—take credit for or pride in—our socially approved acts. This is the mechanism which releases “secrets.” Some people “just can’t keep secrets”, if it is wicked, it is too bad to keep, if it is good, it is too good to keep. “Gossip” is a functional necessity in interpersonal integration. So is confession, auricular or informal.

If a person perceives a criminal act he can perceive it only by doing it symbolically himself, through role-taking, verbally or empathically, or both. He could not otherwise give himself the meaning of what has occurred. He has therefore done it himself, and the only way he can free himself from the accompanying guilt feeling is to share his knowledge with someone. If the act witnessed is desirable and approved, the same process operates, but the conation is one of pride rather than guilt. It too must be shared. Human beings probably eventually share every significant experience, or pay the penalty in personal suffering.

## **2. Some Social Implications of Role-Taking**

We feel that the mechanism called the significant symbol—the mechanism by which one assumes the tinsit of, and identifies one’s self with, another—is so important that we are under restraint for fear that too much might be claimed for it. The following analysis is an initial and tentative presentation of some of the practical workaday aspects of this extraordinary phenomenon. The personal and social potentialities of the significant symbol may be thought of in terms of its advantages 1) to the person, and 2) to society.

### **ADVANTAGES TO THE PERSON:**

1. Enables one to anticipate the probable behavior of another, thus forming a primary mechanism of social adjustment
2. Provides one with a reference for an accurate concept of one’s self. Anticipating the response of another to one’s own act means that one is responding to one’s own act, thereby interpreting, giving meaning to, one’s concept of one’s self. By this process a person defines his own social situations.

- 3 Furnishes the basis for confidence in one's self.
4. Gives others confidence in a person, for it is empirical evidence of his consideration for them, which in practically all groups is defined as good manners, and generally arouses immediate social approval and cooperation. Our traditions which encourage parents and others to treat children as playthings prevents our treating them as people and putting ourselves in their place. Those who work with "problem children" are constantly frustrated by the difficulty of making parents and other adults see children as people. Children do not appear to them as "others", they are just youngsters.
- 5 Widens one's own experience thus broadening and enriching the personality and providing increased opportunities for self actualization.
- 6 Stimulates others to show affection for you
- 7 By it one gains knowledge of the rights of others and it therefore places one in a position to see and measure components in the field to which one would not otherwise be sensitive
- 8 Places one in a position of leadership in many situations with all that this involves as a function in human relationships.
9. Contributes to one's ability to understand the workings of one's world and cuts down the toxic flow of adrenalin

#### **ADVANTAGES TO SOCIETY:**

1. Taking the role of the other is a means by which others gain confidence in themselves and this makes for better social adjustment.
2. The recognition of the rights of others reduces conflict and increases cooperation
3. Encourages others to assume social responsibilities.

In short, the mechanism of the significant symbol demonstrates that whatever we do to others we do to ourselves at the same time, and this explains the destructive power of hate and arrogance, and the constructive power of consideration for others in human adjustment. The destructive horror of war, and of group conflict generally is not measured alone in the loss of blood and treasure; its abiding evil is that it fills the world with consuming hatred for generations to come, a passion that spreads into all areas of life, embittering and disorganizing personalities. That the effects of the significant symbol show a high positive correlation with the principles of ethics does not reduce the mechanism to an unscien-

tific adjunct of sentimentality, rather it offers empirical validation of ethics in human behavior.<sup>11</sup>

In every social situation a person behaves in accordance with his concept of his role, and his role in a given situation is what others lead him to believe his role is. But this in turn depends upon how he behaves toward others—the extent to which he gives them (and therefore himself) the advantages of the significant symbol. For a long and important period of life the child is what his family leads him to believe he is. He plays a pattern of imputed roles, many of which become established selectors in his personality structure. Others associate him with these roles which are thus reinforced by social expectancy. A person has one personality but many roles, but these roles are not invented by the person himself. The child who is continuously compared with others to his disadvantage must be expected soon to take this sort of role and respond to himself negatively as others do. This is also true of a child who is frequently compared with others to his too great advantage. Sympathy is not essential for communication, but it makes a great difference in the effect of what is communicated and the accuracy of the communication process.

### 3. The Margin-of-Error-in-Role-Taking

Although George H. Mead's concept of role-taking is admirable, the concept as he uses it is in need of modification. Much of Mead's work is difficult reading, but one can be reasonably sure of the way in which he uses the concept of taking-the-role-of-the-other. His usage requires modification in three ways. He gives the impression that when one takes the role of the other, one takes it over 1) exactly, 2) "for keeps," and 3) in his concept of taking the role of the "generalized other," his implication is that one takes over the attitude of the whole community or the attitude of everyone.

<sup>11</sup> Undoubtedly we have a good deal of overlapping in this analysis, but this sort of analysis deserves more attention by students of personality. It is surprising that it has not been given greater consideration. We suspect that this neglect is related to the prevalent phobia of being thought unscientific if one's writing and research is not conceived in terms of the lower regions of the thermometer. In view of what the Nazis have been "offering" the world it might be well for scientific writers to take stock of their own common tinsits lest the gangsters run off with the audience.

If these extremes were taken literally, they would destroy the usefulness of the concept of role-taking. Mead himself had some difficulty in these matters, for his conceptual formulation of the "I" as against the "me" appears to be a device to counteract these defects. As suggested in Chapter I, "one of the chief sources of error in learning is that one hears or sees a message but says it over to one's self differently." One does not always take the role of another exactly. In the second place, when one takes the role of another, it is taken as a necessary means to understanding, but not necessarily with the idea of keeping or adopting it permanently as one's own. In the third place, when one takes the attitude of the group or community or the "generalized other," one is not taking the attitude of everyone in the community. This would be possible only in a group of perfect homogeneity. It would not be possible even in non-literate groups and simple cultures.<sup>12</sup> No rule, value, norm, or thought-way in a community is adhered to in the same degree by all members of the different groups in the community. We hope to demonstrate in more detail in a forthcoming book that these modifications of Mead are of considerable significance for the analysis of the development of individuality, deviant personalities, personal and social conflict and social change, as well as for thinking of self in terms of "I" and "me."

The grade which a student receives on an examination is a measure of his margin-of-error in taking-the-role-of-the-other, not just that of his professor, but of all the symbolized experience involved in a course. So it is in daily living; one seldom assumes the traits of the other or of the generalized other exactly as given, and this margin-of-error plays an important part in the development of one's individuality which represents deviation of some degree from some group norm, somewhere in the range from zero to 100. There appear to be several potential sources of error in the concept of role-taking in Mead's approach.

### Some Sources of Error in Role-Taking

1) In attempting to take the role of the other, one may not perceive accurately, as judged by one's peers or by a consensus of

<sup>12</sup> C. Wright Mills in his article "Language, Logic and Culture" makes the same criticism of Mead's concept of the "Generalized Other." *American Sociological Review* (Oct. 1939), Vol. 4, p. 672

competent observers. One takes what apparently is the other's attitude, but a formal examination, or a cross-examination in court, may indicate that one's perception was inadequate. Such error could and does occur under many conditions. one's present physiological state, one's health, fatigue, the amount and kind of distraction present such as noise, heat, cold, and emotion, and many personal selectors such as biases, prejudices, and interests

2) Again, one is not always properly equipped to take the attitude of the other accurately, one's system of tinsits may not include tinsits which closely approximate those of the other whose role one is attempting to take. One cannot do what one does not know how to do, and frequently one is confronted with tinsits of others which one is not equipped to take and respond to as one's own. A period of symbolic trial and error may be required

These two propositions are apparently closely related to what was said earlier about imitation and intelligence. But taking the attitude of the other is not imitation, although if one's response were the same as the other, that would be imitation, and under certain conditions role-taking may involve imitation. Role-taking involves assuming the gestural aspects of the other's response, the beginning of the act (attitude), but not necessarily the consummatory or overt aspects. Mead was aware of this:

. . . of course if it were true that when a person shakes his fist in your face you just imitate him, you would be doing what he is doing and have the same idea as he has. There are, in fact, certain cases when the responses are like the stimuli in the social act, but as a rule they are different . . . The clenched fist in so far as it calls out that idea may be said to mean danger . . . If there is to be communication as such the symbol has to mean the same thing to all individuals involved.<sup>13</sup>

Role-taking is gesture-taking, and does not necessarily involve repeating the final act,—role-taking is chiefly on the covert symbolic level. Speech, however, is all on the symbolic level and must, to give meaning, be repeated by the observer, but not necessarily out loud

Other types of gesture are significant and effective for the other by virtue of their socially designated meanings learned in past experience. If we see a child playing across the street and the child suddenly turns and runs away, we do not run away in

<sup>13</sup> G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. 51, 54.

order to make his act meaningful to us; we look about and see a puppy running toward him and we respond to "puppy" symbolically as he did and thereby get his meaning (fear).

3) A third source of error in role-taking is that the attitude which we are presumed to be taking over as our own may not be reported to us accurately. Anyone who engages in public speaking soon learns that no matter how sincere the representatives of the press may be, they frequently misrepresent the attitude of the speaker, and when the reporter responds in writing to this "attitude-of-the-speaker," the response is often quite remarkable. It will not be accurately reported to the public, and therefore the public will not be able accurately to take the role of the speaker. These deviations or errors frequently grow in geometric or even greater ratio, and the cumulative effect contributes considerably to differential behavior (individuality) even in a close knit group like a family. Socially, its effect is often seen in conflict, social change, and all sorts of deviant attitudes and personalities. In many ways the similarities in human behavior are more remarkable than the differences.<sup>14</sup>

4) Finally, Mead probably did not mean to suggest that when one takes the attitude of the other, one takes it "for keeps," that is, to adopt it as his own, although Mead often gives this impression. If this were true, however, then indeed everybody would think alike. One takes the attitude of the other not with the idea of keeping it unmodified, but with the idea of "looking" at it and of trying to respond in the same way in order to understand (give) its meaning as the other person meant it. If one wants to know some new gadget, one examines it, "gets the feel of it," presses, scrapes, and rubs it—approaches it from every angle. But this does not mean that one necessarily buys it. In this sense we take the

<sup>14</sup> This whole train of thought about the margin-of-error-in-role-taking is insufficiently illuminated by Harry Stack Sullivan's attempted exposition of parataxia in interpersonal relations. His concepts are evidently related to Jack and Jill's tumbling for each other, although I have no great confidence that I can be included in Dr. Sullivan's 24 people capable of a "really understanding concomitance of reverie processes" with him. But I can probably take his role accurately enough in this instance to see a relationship between sympathetic at-one-ment and parataxia in role-taking, and their relation to transference in the interview. In the upper reaches this is smoky territory. It seems to me that in this article Dr. Sullivan puts psychiatry bodily into the social sciences. See Harry Stack Sullivan, "A Note on the Implications of Psychiatry, the Study of Interpersonal Relations, for Investigations in the Social Sciences," *American Journal of Sociology*, (May 1937), Vol. 42, pp. 848-61.

attitude of the other, re-enact it, rehearse it, try it out in our mind so we receive its meaning as our own, give our own meaning to it. We can't know anything except by making responses toward it, this is what constitutes "knowing."

We take each other's attitude as it is and we work on it, our final response to it may be the same or it may be quite different. The important thing is that we take it as given and make it our own as something to work on, but we may not adopt the same meaning. We take it over into ourselves by verbalizing it, saying it over to ourselves, then we know what it is, for we have "done" it. This gives us the other's meaning, but when we act on it in our own right, that act is our meaning of it. "It is a matter of taking the attitude of the others and adjusting one's self or fighting it out"<sup>15</sup> But one first has to respond as the other does in order to know whether or not to accept or fight it out.

One attains self-consciousness only as he takes, or finds himself stimulated to take, the attitude of the other. Then he is in a position of reacting in himself to that attitude of the other.<sup>16</sup>

Then he is in a position to behave toward himself as others behave toward him.

Mead was not wholly satisfied with the expression as it is worded.<sup>17</sup> Perhaps we should say that when one assumes a tnsit of the other for adjustment purposes one assumes what one believes to be the other's tnsit. We adjust to others by assuming that our interpretation of the other's gesture is correct. Usually it is, but we often make errors in anticipating what the other's attitude is; frequently we anticipate on the basis of what we think it ought to be, under the conditions. A person comes walking toward us on the sidewalk, we "take-the-attitude-of-the-other" which we assume to be that he will pass us on our left. Our response to this is to pass him on his left (in the U. S.). If we anticipate incorrectly, we collide. What we usually do is take the attitude of the generalized others, we assume the socially defined and approved (common) tendency in that situation. We usually behave toward expectancies which are common meanings, common tnsits, but sometimes we fail. Behavior must be measured in terms of probability.

<sup>15</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 193

<sup>16</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 194

<sup>17</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 161

## HOW BIG IS PUBLIC OPINION?

As an illustration of the immense significance of this general line of thought we take an incident from the workaday world. In the fall of 1943 we found a genuine threat to our security on the home front. The country was ablaze with invective directed toward the striking coal miners. People wondered why public opinion did not operate to send the miners back to work. Something called "public opinion" is supposed to do such things. In the midst of this there appeared a note in one of the national magazines.

In the midst of the recurrent coal crisis one fact sticks out for anybody who has ever covered a coal strike or visited an isolated mining town. The miners don't trust the newspapers. That is one of the major difficulties in the present emergency. The latest dispute, in one sense, boils down to rival interpretations of a mathematical formula by President Roosevelt and John L. Lewis over the WLB's compromise wage proposal. It is a field in which newspaper interpretation should be immensely valuable. But the miners just don't trust the newspapers. And though perhaps it is irrelevant, one can't help a certain sympathy. Wasn't it just the other day that the Associated Press garbled the account of the anti-trust verdict that went against it, and isn't it right now that most of the editorial pages which formerly thundered against the Justice Department attacks on "freedom of the press" are remaining mysteriously silent? Only a minor point, but it illustrates *why ignorant and suspicious miners in isolated towns find it so hard to tell which part of public opinion is genuine and which is phony*<sup>18</sup>

This illustrates that stimuli are meanings, and also the relationship between opinion (attitudes) and role-taking. Public opinion is a powerful influence in social fields, but it is not magic. If the miners do not get in touch with public opinion—take-the-role-of-the-generalized-other—how can they know what the public opinion is, and how can it influence them? The public was condemning the miners as selfish, unpatriotic, and other unprintable things; the public was responding to the meanings it received (gave) in this situation, but so were the miners responding to the meanings they received (gave) in this situation.

"The "public," whose selectors the miners ruled out, received its meanings from the press and from the larger group generally; and the miners, whose selectors ruled out the general press, found

<sup>18</sup> The *New Republic*, Nov. 8, 1943, p. 652 (Italics mine).



then meanings in their own group and its traditions.<sup>10</sup> Both groups were sincere, but neither could investigate the *conditions under which* its own members, or those of the other, acted, the social distance between them rapidly increased, and neither was able to take the role of the other. The resultant was conflict.

The significant *conditions under which* this complex behavior occurred were the meanings in response to which each side acted as it did. Objects and acts are what our behavior indicates them to be. Neither public opinion nor any other influence will ever affect anyone who does not take this opinion as his own and respond to it in one way or another. The miners took the public opinion of a half million miners as expressed in their own press, handbills, and traditions, as determined by their own selectors, other citizens, usually referred to as the "general public" found their meaning in the same way the miners received theirs, from their own press, group ideologies, and prejudices, as determined by their own selectors. Every act on both sides had a history. The behavior on both sides (really many sides) represented needs in that situation. Public opinion, or any other opinion, about anything, is to any man what his selectors say it is.

Now, if we were to use popular concepts we should say that neither side was responding to the "real" situation, that both sides were deluded and did not realize what the situation "really" was. From our point of view nothing could be more fallacious. Such talk assumes that there existed somewhere another situation, an overall consensual situation, which neither side perceived, that both sides were wrong because they did not see the situation as it "really" was, as if there could possibly be a situation apart from the behavior of those involved in it, when that includes everybody. Any other "real" situation is a purely imaginary phenomenon which, if it existed, must have existed in "the mind of God." The members of each side (or of every side) behaved toward their own complex of meanings; each had a consensual situation, and that is all that was available to them to respond to at the time, in that social field. People respond to what they have to respond to in a given field. What they have to respond to is what their selectors give them to respond to.

For analytical purposes one might say that we have two situations here; but more accurately we have one field made up of an elaborate configuration of conflicting situations and common mean-

<sup>10</sup> See the title of Chapter X.

ings for which no preponderant proportion of people had standardized responses. We found standardized responses, but they fell roughly into two general categories—those for and those against the mimers. In these roughly consensual but conflicting situations, we have one of the most appropriate conditions for warfare. The only relevant field for each was the complex configuration of meanings in relation to which the observed behavior was directed. Thus, at any given moment the only human environment that is operationally tenable is the configuration of meanings which motivates one's behavior, human environment is a structure of meanings, a meaning structure. Operationally, this is what both determines and constitutes human needs.

#### **4. The Nature and Genesis of Mind**

##### **A POINT OF VIEW**

For many years we have pondered the problem of how to organize the story told in this book, for a story like this has no "correct" beginning and ending. If human interaction had a beginning, no one knows when it was or what it was like, and the end is equally clear. If we go back, by reduction, from the living human organism step by step until we reach that conceptual area which we call the structure of the atom—and beyond—all we find is motion, interaction, change, and energy. A helpful attitude to take in approaching the study of human behavior is to think of one's self as entering a circus which is already in progress. Such an outlook is inevitable when one contemplates life in terms of energy; its capture, storage, and release is an ongoing affair, a continuous performance, with people coming and going all the time.

The hypothetical boundaries represented by the words "beginning" and "end" are in no way helpful for a scientific understanding of the social process. Where does one begin if one wishes to trace a circle or a sphere which is billions of intersecting circles? Where one begins is purely a matter of convenience. We have long been persuaded that a helpful point at which to begin the study of personality would be human society, from which one could work back and discover the individual, and one could keep on going right back to the structure of the atom. We find an appallingly beautiful unity in the structure of the universe as defined by the

sciences. One might begin the story of human behavior with society (one extreme of the process) as the periphery of the sphere; or one might begin with the individual person, a kind of halfway point on the way back to the center of things in the nuclear structure of the atom and pure motion, which is the other extreme. From this view personality looks like motion which has become conscious of itself.<sup>20</sup>

In the present volume, however, the author's selectors led him to go back a little beyond the individual, so our story began with action, and it seemed that we discovered the person in Chapter III. But that was a mirage born of analytical convenience, we are only now about to discover the person, for the person is an aspect of society, which is his mother and his medium. Using process as a frame of reference, we may claim temporal priority for the group as distinguished from the person, for this is what we actually see in human life. When the infant is presented to the world, it comes in, as it were, long after the circus has begun, and it soon learns to incorporate and participate in "the swing of things." When the infant arrives, mind is already here and in operation. The infant does not "have a mind," nor will it ever "have one", for mind, despite a language usage to which we feel compelled to conform is not the kind of phenomenon that can be "had." The infant is born into mind and gradually learns to participate in it.

Some years ago scholars debated over the question of whether such a phenomenon as a "group-mind" exists, and the participants on both sides were exceedingly troubled and unnerved because the antagonists pointed out that they could find no place where such a mind could exist, and the protagonists admitted this, and thought they had lost their group-mind. After all, "things" have a local habitation and a name, and the assumption was that "mind" must have this too. The difficulty with both protagonists and antagonists in this not-so-dead controversy<sup>21</sup> was that they were reasoning from analogy, the analogy of the "individual mind," which is often spoken of as if it were something that "exists" somewhere in the human body, probably in the head. The point of view was that the individual is a discrete bundle of stuff which has a place to keep a mind whether it "has" "one" or not.

<sup>20</sup> This is not given as a definition of personality, that was given earlier. The above sentence is but a descriptive phrase giving an insight into what was earlier defined as personality.

<sup>21</sup> See the remarks about it in Lewin *Resolving Social Conflicts*.

How could a group have a mind? Where would it reside? The group is made up of numbers of individuals, and a group-mind would fall through the interstices between them. It would get trampled under foot. But when the antagonists contemplated the individual they found no such problem, because the individual is not a plural number. But, the protagonists of group-mind pointed out, the individual is plural when he is looked at with certain conceptual tools such as *insights*.<sup>22</sup> Mind is emergent behavior, it is a social phenomenon. When a man goes to a hospital because he has "lost his mind," he has not lost his brain, nor has he, as a rule, completely abandoned reflective behavior or thinking. On the contrary, he has often increased it, indeed he is often sent to the hospital precisely because people have noticed his "queer" (uncommon) tendency to behave reflectively, almost exclusively, in almost all situations.

When a person lives exclusively, or nearly so, in reflective behavior, he will die if he is not cared for by others. Only in a figurative sense has he "lost" something, he has withdrawn in large measure from participation in mind in its larger aspects. When people speak of a person's having "lost" his mind, or when they say a baby does not have one, they are thinking of mind as an instrument by which reflective behavior is carried on. But in contemporary social psychology mind is not an instrument in this sense, mind is not an organ, like the brain. The infant does not behave reflectively because it has no personic tendencies in the form of situationally functional interaction patterns which operate as selectors, and whose operation we call reflection when we are aware that they are guiding and steering our behavior. He is not yet participating in the symbolic process. The mental patient, however, participates to a degree in the symbolic process, but largely as a private affair, not with others as reciprocal participants. Whereas the infant has not yet participated in mind, the mentally ill have withdrawn from social participation in mind to a degree defined as beyond the group norm.

If the author were asked why he did not begin his book with an analysis of society, he would have to say that so far as he can see the choice-making device or selector in this matter was the fear that if he had begun with what he has just written, many a

<sup>22</sup> We who came upon the scene later are guided and warned by the signs posted around the pitfalls, signs and warnings which a great many other men helped to erect for the benefit of those who follow.

person would have put the book down with a shrug—"pooh, mysticism." It is to be hoped that the preceding chapters are adequate to allay any suspicion that this book is a study in mysticism.

### THE NATURE AND GENESIS OF MIND

One cannot understand "group" or "individual" or "person" until one understands mind, for all four are but different aspects of the same phenomena. Personality is an emergent in interaction, group is likewise an emergent in interaction, and so is mind. Mind occurs rather than exists. Mind is what goes on between persons when they interact. Group is an aspect of mind, and so is person. Group is a way of behaving in context of situation, so is personality, so is mind. All of these words symbolize different aspects of the same phenomena. Mind is a property of selectors in action.

During the course of a day every person makes such common statements as "To my mind that appears reasonable," "I just can't make up my mind," "You can't tell that person a thing—his mind was made up before we got down to discussing the proposition." Such uses of the word mind are as familiar as the weather, and since most of one's friends talk like this at times, we must infer that the word provides (has) meaning for them, and that this usage or use-meaning is similarly vague for all. Apparently this usage represents a group definition, although an untrained person may not be able to point out just what group is responsible for the definition, and although a person using the word may not be able to give an accurate statement of its meaning. Without special training few people are able to give an accurate statement of the meaning of any of the words they use, because we all learn words not from dictionaries but from using them in interactional context with other people.

You can always detect a foreigner who has learned the language in school, who has learned it largely from the dictionary, rather than from using it in daily conversation. For example we have the story of the visiting professor from Germany who had learned that Americans frequently say to those whom they like "You're a peach." After an excellent dinner the professor wished to compliment his American hostess and gravely said "Madame, this was an excellent dinner, you are a prune." Nothing in a fruit will tell anyone anything about another person; but there is every-

thing in standardized responses, standard usage, and accepted use-meanings of words

We see how thoroughly a person incorporates use-meanings by daily role-taking in his groups when we attempt to change these group "definitions" or usages, or even when one attempts to define instead of use them, the former being a more abstract operation.<sup>23</sup> This is the problem which confronts us. Probably not one person in a thousand could, on demand, give a satisfactory definition of the word "mind." Furthermore, almost any verbal definition a person might hear would sound and feel stiff and very unlike his use-meaning, and he and his hearer would almost certainly tend to resist it.

An interesting example of this occurred when the attempt was made to explain to a class of some fifty students the relative precision of mathematical symbols as against verbal symbols. There was complete agreement on the operational definition "four is what two plus two equals." But when the students were asked for a written definition of the word "mind," the replies were confusing. Tabulation of the definitions indicated that fifteen students considered mind a thing, eleven considered it a place, twenty defined it as a function; nine described it by using a noun and a verb, four defined it as both place and thing, two as both place and function, five as both process and thing, five called it a concept, one an opinion and one an ability. For these students thing and place usually meant a part of, or place in, the brain; place was thought of as a "storage" place. One student said that only "civilized" man "has it", one said that "mind is a part of the brain that does not exist, another said, "It is a selection apparatus, human or otherwise." The "prize" definition was "Mind is what everybody should do to his own business." This clever statement recognizes that mind is a function, a doing something.

Despite these differences, every student in the class could use the word "mind" in a sentence without any danger of misunderstanding, all had the same "use-meanings." Group definitions are primarily use-definitions, and they lack the accuracy of dictionary,

<sup>23</sup> Since we intend to make further use of this concept "use-meaning" it should be pointed out that we do not mean by this term what is generally meant by "operational definition," which is a highly sophisticated and technical form of behavioristic definition. Use-meaning refers to usage of "the people" as distinguished from esoteric use by the remote denizens of the scientific world. It also refers to the manner of *using* words as distinguished from *defining* them.

scientific, or operational definitions. This contributes immensely to the margin-of-error-in-role-taking. Words get their meanings from social behavior, this is true of all symbols. Things are what people do in relation to them. Even the laws are defined by what the courts do, not by the legislative body which issues the statutes. The meaning of a law is the probable behavior of the courts in relation to it.<sup>24</sup> The meaning of language and of all other gestures and symbols is the common tinsit. It is what people of given groups will do under given conditions within a range of probability. The stability of a group's meanings is the degree of resistance to change, the resistance involved in the rejections or negative aspects of selectors-in-operation.

The significant point is that one cannot learn the use-meaning of language without at the same time, in the same process, becoming conditioned accordingly in one's social behavior, for language mediates other behavior. One cannot learn the use-meanings of language except by prolonged participation in interaction among the users, and a person cannot participate in this social process without having built into him, as tinsits, the imperatives, positive and negative, of the group-ways. The behavior norms of the group reside (occur) in the use-meanings of its language, and one imports, incorporates, and integrates them along with the language. This is the fundamental mechanism of social control, the mechanism by which the group determines one's behavior.

*The secret police of the group, along with its duties, slip surreptitiously into the personality as stowaways in the vehicle of language*

Once you have the use-meanings of the group's vocabularies, the group has you, and you will never escape completely, no matter where you go nor for how long. This is thralldom, but it is also a promise of security and the strength of nostalgias, longings for an absent part of ourself. To belong to a group is to pay a price in freedom, but in return we receive the security of a promise that will be kept.

When a word comes to be thoroughly imbedded in one's usage, that is, in one's behavior, it is evidence that one has incorporated, imported, introjected, introjected, internalized, or

<sup>24</sup> "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, cited in Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 200. See the statement by Cardozo in the same book.

interiorized a component or segment of the social process. These words refer to the mechanism by which a person takes into, and makes a part of himself, some part of the group—the mechanism by which a group part becomes part of the person's system of traits. Once this group-part has become a person-part the group is to this extent part of the person, and the person is to this extent part of the group. This is the kind of stuff a social group is made of.

Once this has occurred, the imported part becomes a full-fledged member of the person's system of selectors, and it will thus play its role in determining the person's perception of his environmental fields, which is to say his behavior. This imported part will help to select only those stimuli which are consistent with it. This is the positive aspect, but there is a corollary or negative function, too; for selection implies rejection of something else. This latter function appears in behavior as "resistance", so we say people tend to "resist" new ideas, new meanings, and new definitions-of-the-situation.

We have now described mind. But we are not yet through. For generations we in our culture have been using "mind" as if it were an instrument by means of which one thinks, our literature is saturated with this idea, it is part of our common speech-behavior. Hence, to modify one's concept of mind is a difficult task, and one must approach it from different directions.

Let us consider the term "social process." According to a standard work in sociology "*process* is the name for the interaction of elements whereby structures emerge or change."<sup>25</sup> What are elements? "For sociology in general, attitudes are the elements because they are the simplest communicable units of social behavior." And what are structures? Dawson and Gettys tell us this, too.

*Mechanism* is a well-established pattern of behavior for individuals or groups. Examples of mechanism are reflexes of the individual, the social attitudes of the person, and the folkways, rituals, myths and institutions of the group. All these are mechanisms or structures by which the behaving unit is prepared for immediate action. *Process* is the name for the interaction of elements whereby structures emerge or change.

Structures, then, are emergents in the process of interaction; they

<sup>25</sup> Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, *An Introduction to Sociology*. New York: The Ronald Press Co., revised edition, 1935, p. 252.



are configurations of tnsits of various kinds, some are private or personal, like reflexes, some are personic, like attitudes, some are groupal, like folkways and rituals and other common tnsits. We are primarily interested in the last two categories of tnsits. We note that Dawson and Gettys refer to attitudes as social attitudes, so the personic and group tnsits are very much alike, a matter, perhaps, of the degree to which these structures are imported into the tnsit-systems of group members. They differ in the degree to which they are common tnsits.

These structures are taken over by the person and made part of himself by the technique of role-taking. What we witness here is literally the importation of the social process into the person by means of interaction. When these tnsits are incorporated into the persons in the group, each person can (and must) assume the tnsit of the others, have the same or similar meanings, communicate, identify the others with self, identify self with the others, and belong to and participate in social living, which is mind. Self, society, group, mind, and personality—all emerge in the same process of interaction. We do not need to postulate a "gregarious instinct", we are dependent upon others because we are so full of them.

Mind is the presence in behavior of significant symbols. It is the internalization within the individual of the social process of communication in which meaning emerges. It is the ability to indicate [or the act of indicating] to one's self the response (and implicated objects) that one's gesture indicates to others, and to control the response itself in these terms. The significant gesture, itself a part of the social process, internalizes and makes available to the component biologic individuals the meanings which themselves have emerged in the earlier, non-significant stages of gestural communication. Instead of beginning with individual minds and working out to society, Mead starts with an objective social process and works inward through the importation of the social process of communication into the individual by the medium of the vocal gesture. The individual has taken the social act into himself. Mind remains social, even in the inner forum so developed thought goes on by one's assuming the roles of others and controlling one's behavior in terms of such role-taking—even the scientist's reflection about physical nature is a social process.<sup>26</sup>

Even one's own private and personal meanings are thus prod-

<sup>26</sup> E. W. Morris in his introduction to G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. xxi-xxii.

ucts of the social process of interaction in one's groups, they are therefore not something "unique," but are deviations of some degree from the norms of one's groups. Meanings come from one's groups, and one's system of "operative meanings," or selectors, is mind.<sup>27</sup> Mind is meaning-structure-in-action, that phase of the personality which operates in and as the symbolic process. Mind is the symbolic personic, it does not exist, it occurs, under certain conditions.

A person does not "have" a mind because mind is not the kind of phenomenon that can be "had," but as popular usage states it we may say that a person "has" a mind if he "has" a way of behaving—on the symbolic level. One can quite properly speak of the "Nazi mind," the "German mind," and the "French mind," and by analogy, the person's mind. Its locus, however, is between people, it is interactional, not spatial. Read Bain formulates it thus:

Both societies and persons are aspects of human interaction. It is . . . fruitless to ask whether the human mind is "in" the brain, or the ten billion cells of the cortex, or the organism-as-a-whole, or the "soul." It is "in" none of these, it is not located anywhere, it is not an independent entity. It is a name for the behavior of organisms that respond to themselves as objects at the same time they respond to others as objects, and to abstracted or "generalized" others, whether they be persons or inanimate or animate objects. Minded response to the latter two classes of objects implies response to and from other persons. "Mind" is not inside our head or skins, it is involved in all the social interactions of which we are capable. It is as much in the "other" as in us, as much in the objects—the mountain, the molecule—for which we have significant symbols as in our own subjective responses.<sup>28</sup>

Assuming that we have disposed of the idea that mind has a local habitation or seat of residence, another thought about mind is worthy of consideration. Language is man's great miracle, the social invention which enables him to do and perceive all the wonderful things we have been discussing. But what one can do, see, hear, admire, and understand—the world one knows—depends in large measure upon what language one is born into. Professor Ellsworth Faris releases one of his tensions in the following manner:

The dreary list of sentiments, feelings, and emotions in some books is

<sup>27</sup> See John Dewey *Experience and Nature*, pp. 303-8.

<sup>28</sup> Read Bain: *Marriage and the Family*, (edited by R. Hill and H. Becker). Boston. D. C. Heath & Co., 1942, Chapter VII, pp. 134-5.

written as if all the words in the world were English words. We make sharp distinctions between fear, terror, and awe and, forgetting that these are limited to our vocabulary, expect to find the fundamental traits of human nature described thereby. If we read German we may become interested in the distinction between *Mut* and *Tapperkeit*. Not knowing Japanese, we lose the precious insight which their idioms would give us in the inability of their language to make a neuter noun the subject of a transitive verb. A yet unpublished statement by a most eminent psychologist . . . is concerned with a discussion of "what emotions do" and "what intelligence does" in the behavior of human beings. No Japanese would [could] make such an egregious blunder because his mother-tongue is incapable of such erroneous metaphysical reification.<sup>29</sup>

Language may prevent knowledge as well as error, many groups who are held to be "inferior" are partially handicapped by their language, which is not a product of free will. The title of this volume is dependent upon Latin and Greek, and most of the sciences have had to go to these languages for their symbols. The fact that "mind" is a noun is a handicap, for it makes us think of "it" as an entity, even if "it" has no residence. Suppose mind were a participle instead of a noun, as in "I was just minding my own business", then we could see mind as behavior. Minding is behaving.

As it is now we are almost compelled to think of mind as something that uses symbols, takes them and compares them to each other, rejecting some, accepting others. The comparing and rejecting is mind(ing). Now we can see that when we are aware that our selectors are selecting, this activity constitutes thinking. Reflective behavior is selective behavior, the interaction of symbols, and all symbols are in some degree socially defined. To the extent that any thinking or any communication can take place at all, it necessarily takes place in terms of socially defined symbols or meanings.

When a person can indicate to himself and to others those elements in the consensual fields which answer to his system of interests, such elements are available to him as stimuli. His system of selectors makes this his environment, and this activity is mind(ing). Since the selectors represent an incorporation or internalization of the social process, mind is a social process, an

<sup>29</sup> E. W. Burgess (ed.) *The Urban Community*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1926, pp. 29-30.

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interplay of meanings which come more or less from one's group. We know of no other source from which meanings could come. That meanings vary in the degree of their commonality in no way invalidates this conclusion.

This chapter on the social implications of the significance symbol might fittingly close with a word from Mead:

I want to be sure that we see that the content put into the mind is a development and product of social interaction. It is a development which is of enormous importance, and which leads to complex and complications of society which go almost beyond our power to trace, but originally it is nothing but the taking over of the attitude of the other. To the extent that the animal can take the attitude of the other and utilize that attitude for the control of his own conduct we have what is termed mind, and that is the only apparatus involved in the appearance of mind. I know of no way in which intelligent mind could arise other than through the internalization by the individual of social processes of experience and behavior, that is, through the internalization of the conversation of significant gestures as made possible by the individual's taking the attitudes of the other individuals toward himself and toward what is being thought about. And if mind or thought has arisen in this way, then there neither could be or could have been any mind or thought without language, that is, the early stages of the development of language must have preceded prior to the development of mind or thought.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>30</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 191.

## INTERLUDE THREE

### *Some Thoughts on Seeing Things*

In this pause between acts we should like to have a very realistic and convincing illustration of the significant role-taking and how this process is limited by social distance. Secondly, we should like to use the same story to illustrate the importance of selectors in determining meaning.

*Life* magazine for January 10, 1944, carried a story (p. 4) by an unnamed army chaplain which attempts to explain some general and specific attitudes of some German prisoners of war somewhere in the United States. The chaplain says

There are two main difficulties in dealing with the presentment of the prisoners. One is that they think anything they may read in such magazines as the *Reader's Digest* and *Life* is Government sponsored and represents Government policy. They cannot understand how American men and women may write what they feel and think. All explanations as to the freedom of the press here in America are lost on them.

The second difficulty is that they seem unable to put themselves in the place of others. They lack moral imagination. Hence, they write things without reference to any thought of how it will sound to another person. *Their* ideas, *their* needs, *their* plans, *their* way of doing things seem to them so much superior to ours that they cannot understand how anyone could think otherwise.<sup>31</sup>

Let us consider the second point first. The expression "put yourself in the other's place" is, as we have seen, taking the place of the other. Following Mead we referred to this as the significant symbol, which is the mechanism by which we communicate meaning and discover the meanings of others. The German attitude seemed not only rude to the chaplain, it also seemed incomprehensible that civilized men could behave in that way, for Germans will "say things" but instead of taking the American attitude toward what they say and then responding to that as Americans do (thereby checking their arrogance) they ignore

<sup>31</sup> "PW's," by a U. S. Army Chaplain, from *Life*, January 10, 1944. Copyright Time Inc.

response of the Americans and take the attitude of their own German friends and respond to that as their own in the way their friends do. The chaplain, having been socialized in a different pattern, interprets this behavior as being rude and arrogant, and so would any gentleman according to our norm. But, just as the Germans cannot understand the American point of view because the social distance represented by "enemy" prevents their taking the role of Americans, so shall we be unable to understand the Nazi mind if we cannot take their attitudes and respond to them as they do.

This does not mean that we must take their attitudes and keep them, it means that we have to take them and respond to them as Nazis do until we get the Nazi's meanings—then we can adopt them or condemn them (the meanings, not the Nazis). We can do this to the extent of our role-taking ability in such situations, painful as it might be, and we can thereby understand the Nazis. We can understand them no other way.<sup>32</sup> It is not a question of the Germans not being able to use the significant symbol—but rather that they take the role of their Nazi comrades and superiors.

Anything that makes for social distance will inhibit and block this process. The tinsits of millions of Americans are so group-bound that they cannot use the role-taking process as a means of understanding certain other groups—white-Negro, labor-capital, Protestant-Catholic, or reactionary-radical.

Let us examine the chaplain's statement "They lack moral imagination." Notice that one has a common tinsit (and this is true of all people, more or less) to interpret as "moral" only that which conforms to the norms of one's own groups. The Germans do not think they lack moral imagination, they define their behavior in terms of their own group norms. The chaplain is a Christian and a teacher of Christian virtues of which sympathy and consideration for others are very important items. But the chaplain himself tells us what the norm for the German is:

We have seen in these young Germans the imprint of that monstrous hero described by Nietzsche. "The man who has won his freedom . . .

<sup>32</sup> From an idealistic, as distinguished from a strictly pragmatic point of view in the present instance, an inability of Americans or anyone else to take a role which they consider brutish is in itself a virtue. Inability to be brutish even symbolically can be defended as a universal good. From the point of view of our first section in Chapter VIII on "Knowing," the world can well dispense with the ability to "understand" brutality.

tramples ruthlessly upon that contemptible kind of comfort which tea grocers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and other democrats worship in their dreams. The free man is a warrior . . . ”

To us this detestable spawn of Nietzsche's inferiority tinsits is immoral but is the essence of morality to these young Nazis. If we are surprised at their behavior then we fail to take the role of the other. These Nazis do not feel "cruel and brutish", they know only that they are being good Nazis. They respond to that which has meaning for them in accordance with their common tinsits. One problem of the United Nations will be arranging conditions so that these young men will have built into them a more universal system of tinsits so that the rest of the world can live with them. Is anyone so naive as to believe that these young men can freely choose to be different without the necessary stimuli to do so? It will take some extraordinarily balanced and socialized people to do this job, it cannot be done by those who have learned to hate people instead of what people do.

Now let us look at the chaplain's first point. The German prisoners cannot grasp the reality of a free press. This illustrates that one's choices are not free, that our choices are determined by the selectors which are built into us by our daily interaction in our groups. In view of the training Americans have received, it is improbable that American prisoners of war in Germany could believe the Germans if the Germans said their press was free. Unless there is some unusual influence in another direction, all of us normally believe, see, and feel what we have been taught to believe, see, and feel. Our systems of selectors are built up in this way. The German prisoners have carried their environment with them, so have the American prisoners of war in Germany and elsewhere; so does everybody.

An enlightening example of the chaplain's selectors at work, as well as those of the Germans, is revealed later in the chaplain's story:

In conversation with a German-ordained Protestant pastor, it was revealed that: "There are German, American, English and other national versions of Christianity. Hence my comrades would not be interested to hear the American version." To the assertion that Christianity . . . was essentially a religion of world brotherhood, he answered "We do not stress that." To a like-minded non-commissioned officer I quoted the passage, "God . . . hath made of one blood all the nations

of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth . " He answered, "But we do not believe that "

If such statements surprise the chaplain, then his selectors have blinded him to what many people in the United States see daily. I do not know to what denomination the chaplain belongs, but I suspect a person informed in such matters could find some significant differences among the hundreds of Christian denominations in this country I suspect also that the American Marines who "visited" Haiti some years ago were Christians, which must have surprised the Haitians.

Finally the chaplain, of whom I heartily approve, quotes a German prisoner as saying

This year will see the end of the war in Russia When the Luftwaffe returns from the Eastern front, England will last just eight days I expect to be home in Germany next Easter.

Commenting on this the chaplain says "This man had access to the true facts of the military situation through our free press " But, did he? Things are not stimuli just because they are "lying around." If he does not respond to them as we do, they do not have the same meaning for him.

To have access to the facts given by our free press, this man's selectors would have to be rebuilt either by training or by the violent shock of a full perception of his country's defeat, the conditions under which he reads would have to be quite different. *A man has access only to what his selectors give him access* This German had no more access to our facts than the ignorant, poverty stricken people among us have access to soap and libraries and "ambition" Neither the United States Constitution, nor its Congress, nor all the laws of the states can give a man this freedom, for this freedom is a function of one's personality in the varied fields in which it operates. The laws can but guarantee this freedom to those capable of enjoying it Freedom means one thing to Americans, another to the Germans, meanings come from our groups.



## Chapter X

### MEANINGS COME FROM OUR GROUPS

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#### 1. Human Environments are Meaning-Structures

The title of this section is one of the few instances in which the word "environment" has appeared in this book. This is not an oversight; nor does it indicate a bias against the word. We have not used it often before because this is the logical place to define it and use it.

## A DEFINITION OF ENVIRONMENT

Environment refers to the total configuration of social fields which constitute a person's life milieu or a group's life milieu. Since analysis seldom requires the use of so large a term, we do not find much use for it in the present work. We have consistently attempted to pull down every behavior to its situation, with as high a degree of specificity as our conceptual tools and talents would permit.

Common meanings are the stuff of which social fields are made, logically then this is what social environments are made of too "Common," is a continuous variable, a quantitative concept measured on a scale. Every scale includes a zero quantity, but zero is a quantity. It is doubtful, however, if any human behavior could be measured by that quantity. No act is measured by unique = 0 on a scale of commonality or similarity. Since meanings never occur as isolated phenomena but as functions of personality integrations in social fields, they occur in configurations or structures, they are organized. Each meaning is itself a structure and is part of a hierarchy of larger structures. The structure of a given meaning is not merely the final response to an object or act, although this is an index, the structure of a given meaning as an emergent is the integration of all of one's responses to that object or act, the failures as well as the successes.

## THE LOGIC OF PERSONICS

A person does not (cannot) act in relation to that to which he is not sensitive. That to which a person is not sensitive in a situation is that which has no meaning for him in that situation, and that which has no meaning for him in that situation is not a need for him in that situation. Only the meaningful can be a stimulus to personic behavior.

We do not mean by this that all behavior is "rational" in the sense that it is intelligible in terms of some formal system of logic. *The meanings which a person gives and perceives in a situation constitute the logic of his behavior in that situation.* No behavior could possibly be illogical in itself, but only in relation to some established critical standards of some "generalized other." When people say that a given act is illogical what they usually mean is

that the act does not conform to their logic or to some other set of meaningful relationships. "Illogical" usually means "that-isn't-the-way-I-would-do-it."

From the scientific point of view one may say that a given act is illogical when it is induced by an inaccurate perception of certain relationships, that the actor does not have a socially adequate conception of the consequences of his act, and is to that extent inefficient. People behave in accordance with the meanings they perceive in a situation, and that for them is the logic of their behavior. On this basis we can say that *all behavior is normal for the conditions under which it occurs*. But the behavior may not be normal when referred to certain socially established norms. For scientific purposes a person may be said to behave in a logical manner when he behaves in accordance with scientific facts, as fact was defined earlier.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE SELECTIVE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTS

Everything that has meaning for a person does not have meaning for him in every situation; he does not respond to all of his symbolized experience (knowledge) in every situation. Everyone in college knows the meaning of the class bell, but professors and students frequently come to class late because they did not "hear" the bell. Many a person has gone out into the rain "forgetting" his raincoat, or "thoughtlessly" into the snow without his overshoes. Frequently we look back on an adjustment problem and see by hindsight what we might have done, and we say "that never occurred to me." Such words as "see," "hear," "occur," "absent-mindedness," "thoughtlessness," "forgetting," "preoccupation," "absorbed," and "inattentive" refer to selective responses which "gather-in" or eliminate components of the field as stimuli, in proportion as one is sensitive to them at the time.

<sup>1</sup> Fact was defined as a statement about phenomena empirically verifiable in terms of some conceptual scheme or system, that is, in terms of some formal logic. The validity of a conceptual system is determined on a pragmatic basis, which includes faith, in this case, faith in science. Arnold M. Rose has given some interesting and useful thoughts on this subject in his article "Popular Logic: A Methodological Note," *American Sociological Review* (October 1946), Vol. 11, pp. 590-2. On page 592 Rose says: "When it is commonly said that the masses of people do not think 'logically,' what is meant is that the factual *premises* of their thinking are false [in relation to some system] or that they confuse factual *premises* with value *premises*. Given the premises as they are, group thinking does involve logical deduction from these premises."

We have ample evidence that the concept of forgetting, as an active process, is a function of one's selectors-in-situation. *Anything to which a person does not pay attention in some degree—whatever does not register on him—is not part of his environment.* Nothing is a stimulus unless it is responded to, things are not stimuli merely because they are "lying around." For Mr. Girdler's slum-dwellers the need for soap is not part of their environment, its cheapness is therefore irrelevant. At any given time one can respond to only a small segment of the universe, and those elements to which a person does not respond have no meaning for him and simply do not exist for him—they are not part of his environment. This does not mean that they cannot become such. But all things are defined for us by our responses to them, otherwise they do not exist for us.

A function of a person's selectors is to determine what he responds to. Human environment is a selective and selected environment, fundamentally one's personality, as a selector-system, determines one's environment.

The only environment to which the organism can react is the one that its sensitivity reveals.<sup>2</sup>

#### MEANINGS ARE NOT ISOLATED PHENOMENA

Meanings function as elements in more or less highly organized, integrated systems. Anything that a person perceives at any time is perceived in terms of all his meanings which are relevant to that particular situation. Experience is an organized affair. The meaning of any situation is the configuration of tinsits activated in that situation, hence, *one's environment is the total system of social meanings that answers to one's system of tinsits.*

The implications of this are far reaching. One is never quite sure what a person is talking about when he uses the word environment. For purposes of this book, environment is anything that affects behavior; person's environment is anything that affects person's behavior whether it be inside the skin or outside.

If a person has a tinsit to build castles in Spain, then castles in Spain are part of his environment. As W. I. Thomas has said "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." The practice of singling out one segment of the universe and using

<sup>2</sup> G. H. Mead *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 245.

its name as an adjective to describe a particular kind of environment is a common and useful practice. For example, we opened a book and found this in it:

. . . the psychological environment, especially for the child, is not identical with the physical and social environment. . .

This indicates that one's environment, like any other process, can be broken down into many categories or segments, and each is more or less organized in its own way. The following are some segments making up human environments which we have read about: physical, psychological, sociological, biological, political, economic, linguistic, racial, sexual, geographical, diplomatic, rural, urban, and criminal. . . One could collect several thousand of them. These are categories of human responses—exceedingly useful, practical ways of classifying certain types of organized behavior. Perhaps no one person's environment would include all of these, but those which are included are all more or less integrated into an organized whole, and they thus all play a role in any meaning which a person gives anything.

#### *The Portable Environment*

Environment is a function of an integration of all the categories of influences which operate in all of one's interactional fields. And in all of this a person responds only to that to which he is sensitive. In this sense his selectors create his environment.

It is the sensitivity of the organism that determines what its environment shall be, and in that sense we can speak of a form determining its environment . . . the organism determines the environment as fully as the environment determines the organism . . . An act is an impulse that maintains the life process by the selection of certain sorts of stimuli it needs. Thus the organism creates its environment.<sup>3</sup>

A person thus carries his environment around with him, as anyone can easily verify by noticing the behavior of tourists, anywhere, especially their verbalisms. From this portable environment he selects for response those elements appropriate to a situation as he sees it. Thus when he faces a highly novel situation or crisis, difficulties arise.

<sup>3</sup> G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. 6, 129, 528.

## PERSONIC ENVIRONMENT IS NOT HARDWARE

One of the difficulties still badgering popular thinking is the inability to see environment except as stuff, substance, material, or hardware. "Mind" is to some extent still thought of in such terms. Social behavior will not be adequately understood until people take their eyes off the hardware and look upon environment as behavior. The hardware does exist but hardware finds its way into human behavior among civilized people less rather than more. Man carries his environment around with him in his tinsits. He does not spend his life regulating his behavior by bumping into or dodging hardware. Most of our social environment occurs, such as language and other gestures.

This view is neither mentalistic, nor "subjective." Environment is meaning-structure, meanings are behaviors, environments are behaviors. Once upon a time—to this day in some places—if a man wanted a cow or a wife he drove some sheep over to a fellow who had the desired goods and the two traded according to market values in the mores. But we do not carry these heavy objects around anymore, now we use "currency" which is short for "what-we-are-currently-carrying-around-to-symbolize-economic-value." Many people, however, do not even use currency to any great extent any more, they use "checks" and other promises. Instead of carrying cows around we now just give the other person a promise (response) and most people seem happy about it. The value of U. S. money, or any other, is nothing but an idea (response)—faith, which is a form of behavior. The government promises (predicts) that it will give gold if under certain conditions one does not like the paper, and the government predicts that the gold will make people behave the way we want them to if the paper won't.

But gold is heavy, so we issue promises (behaviors) to pay (behave), that is, we say (behave) we will pay (behave), and the other fellow says (behaves) "O.K." (behavior). This is behavior on the symbolic level, we do not deal with hardware. We use symbols (responses) instead, and they work successfully because they are common tinsits (behaviors). It is a great convenience as well as a bulder of status that we do not have to carry a cow in one pocket and a chunk of gold in another, but merely exchange promises—interact on the symbolic level. Hence our environment is not in cows, sheep, gold, silver, and other stuff; but merely words backed by a few socially established rules and

common tinsits. We buy cows, sheep, and gold, but we do not respond to them, we respond only to their symbols. This is our environment and is part of us.

Under the spell of strong emotional situations, like fear and anxiety, we tend to revert to the primitive and go back to hardware; we have runs on banks, race riots, and wars. The civilized man deals with symbols, not with the hardware they symbolize; he praises and condemns not the people, but what they stand for, he hates, not people, but what they do. The civilized man has a great advantage over the uncivilized, he can lynch an idea instead of a man. The civilized man takes the role of the other, the uncivilized man takes the other. A bully is a man who, unable to win an argument on the symbolic level, regresses to the level of hardware and uses his fists or some equally unintelligent hardware.

Mead's analysis of this phenomenon is brilliant. He calls attention to the fact that the eye has given the world color, the ear has given us sound, the ox has transformed grass into food. And we might add, our selectors have given us our world and all that we call environment.

We pick out an organized environment in relationship to our response, so that these attitudes as such, not only represent our organized responses *but they also represent what exists for us in the world*, the particular phase of reality that is there for us is picked out for us by our response. We can recognize that it is the sensitizing of the organism to the stimuli which will set free its responses that is responsible for one's living in this sort of an environment rather than in another . . . our world is definitely mapped out for us by the responses which are going to take place.<sup>4</sup>

### THE FUNCTION OF HARDWARE

There are, in most general terms, two kinds of reality: physical reality (hardware), and conceptualized reality (symbols). The previous section was not written to cast aspersions upon physical reality. There is a school of philosophy which holds that the second type of reality named is the only reality, that the former is contingent upon the latter. We do not wish to be identified with that philosophy. Physical reality, hardware, has its function in human behavior, and is often the most significant component of the S in

<sup>4</sup> G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 129. (Italics mine)

$S \leftrightarrow {}_rM_s \leftrightarrow R$  Most of man's nostalgias, his sufferings, and his comforts are contingent upon physical reality. If this were not so, soldiers and other perspicacious people would have no need for pin-up girls, artists and musicians would be unemployed, and the movies and bookmakers (not to say bookies) would be out of business. Thoughts alone would have to take the place of all of these, but thoughts fade with time.

The  $S$  in  $S \leftrightarrow {}_rM_s \leftrightarrow R$  must be renewed now and then, for the probability of a *tinsit* declines with the temporal distance from the physical reality symbolized by  $S$ . The early elements in the process symbolized by  $S \leftrightarrow {}_rM_s \leftrightarrow R$  "fade," become less probable, after a passage of time, or in response to certain selectors (forgetting), and need renewal by the original. Presence of the original physical reality intensifies the  ${}_rM_s$ , refurbishes it, gives it new life. Thinking about home is often a poor substitute for being there.

When a person has sloughed off all need for the hardware of his world, he can and does derive his satisfactions and security from revery and the world of fantasy. Such a person is badly in (imputed) need of help. The "other" in human interaction is often a component of a physical field, and it operates, as does the "other" when a person, as a kind of catalyst in the precipitation of behavior.<sup>5</sup> Granting all this, the previous section stands. Our meaningful world is made up of responses which we call symbols, and they become the stimuli to our further behavior. E. W. Morris, in the introduction of the work of Mead which we have been quoting, says that one of the differences between Watson and Mead is that.

Mead, in harmony with Dewey . . . stresses the correlativity of stimulus and response [ ${}_rM_s$ ]. Aspects of the world become parts of the psychological environment, become stimuli, only in so far as they effect the further release of an ongoing impulse. Thus, the sensitivity and activity of the organism determine its effective environment as genuinely as the physical environment affects the sensitivity of the form. . . . Thus, in the case of reflective thinking, which Watson treats quite on a par with the conditioning of the rat, Mead is able to give a penetrating analysis of such reflection in terms of the self-conditioning of the organism to future stimuli in virtue of being able to indicate to itself through symbols the consequences of certain types of response to such stimuli.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The human catalyst, however, cannot be recovered unchanged.

<sup>6</sup> G. H. Mead *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. xvii-xviii.



We indicated in Chapter V, however, that reflective behavior is not a form of magic. The logic of the symbolic process is that a person indicates to himself through symbols the consequences of certain types of responses, but what consequences he indicates to himself depends upon what selectors he has available from his past symbolized experience or knowledge. Parents and teachers, and everyone in his witch-hunting functions, often grow impatient with the behavior of another person and shout "if only he would stop and think!" But he might stop and think until he disintegrates and he will not solve his problem if he does not have the requisite selectors in the form of experience.

Many people (and the courts) assume that if a person knows the difference between right and wrong, that is, if he can indicate to himself the possible consequences of his acts in terms of social approval and disapproval, that therefore he will do right. This, we think, is incorrect. To do right one must have the stimulus to do right. Knowledge of the right is not the same as the stimulus to do right. To do right, a person must have tinsits which select for his environment that field component which will serve as stimulus for such behavior; he must have the kind of selectors that will symbolically make that component a part of his environment. This must be built into him in social interaction and training, so that it is part of his system of selectors.

But, again, we must remember the other side of the picture; everything is not in the man. The structure of the social field must be such that the socially desired selection can take place. Many a respectable man must operate in recurrent situations which do not permit his Sunday tinsits to come into effective action, frequently he cannot behave ethically and survive. This, too, is part of his environment. Environment is what it does. *Environment occurs when, and to the extent that, an organized system of stimuli answers to an organized system of tinsits.* This is the basis of both personal and social stability. Every man's environment is a correlative counterpart of his personality. We see things not as they are, but as we are; not as we "want" to, but as we have to.

#### PERSONAL AND CONSENSUAL ENVIRONMENTS

This section is similar to, but in many ways significantly different from, section 4 of Chapter VI, "The Consensual Field." The

present section is concerned with environments, the total configuration of a person's or a group's recurrent fields. Whether or not a person needs a given thing or needs to perform a given act is contingent upon what it means to him. This, in turn, is contingent upon his environment, the total meaning-structure in which he habitually interacts, much of which is not immediately accessible to consciousness. For a given person a given object or act does not always have the same meaning, it depends upon the relationship of the present situation to his environmental *Gestalt*. This point of view indicates the personal or individual aspect of behavior. But, as stated in Chapter VI, a present situation, as a configuration of meaningful relationships, is always a segment of a larger meaning-structure, both of the person and of his groups.

The extent to which a given situation has the same meaning for all persons in it, or for a group, or for society at large, is a variable quantity. Theoretically a situation involving a number of people could represent meanings that vary all the way from identical to opposite. Most situations in life, however, represent no such extreme variability, or we could have no stable society. This is true of environments also. Just as dictionaries define a word to meet with the widest practical agreement among a wide variety of people, for each of whom a word may have a private, personal meaning also, so the social heritage involves the process of defining situations and environment to meet the widest practical agreement among a wide variety of people, for each of whom a situation and an environment may have a private, personal meaning also.

But almost every type of situation has been more or less defined by some group in society usually before the person concerned was born. The process by which these social definitions-of-the-situation are learned is called socialization, the process by which personality is structured. In this way society equips the individual with the selectors by which it controls the individual's behavior. For this reason great numbers of people of a given society have environments which, for practical purposes, are the same. "Society" sets up systems of meanings which become the individual's choices; they become the individual's choices in proportion to his conditioning to respond to them as choices. His selectors are choice-making devices which operate as a system of tinsits corresponding to socially defined systems of meanings. Within this framework the symbolic process operates as the mechanism by which these

meanings are communicated, by which social adjustments are made; and by which society maintains its control over the person.

These systems of meanings are perpetuated in the form of such social mechanisms as folkways, mores, traditions, customs, legends, myths, institutions, ideals, ideologies, laws, standards, rules, manners, and social expectancies of great variety—patterns of conventionalized ways of doing and thinking. In conforming to these, the individual finds that polarized common tinsits have been built into his behavior structure, largely without his realizing it. The media through which these mechanisms function are the many and varied groups with which the individual identifies himself throughout his life. The tinsits he thus develops, and by which he and others identify him with his group, we call identification-tinsits. Vast numbers of people have such tinsits in common to a degree that enables us to speak of common or consensual environments.

Nevertheless, meanings are functional relationships, and most of us are well aware that members even of the same family do not always see eye to eye despite the fact that "society" has stipulated, more or less, what relationships are supposed to occur in a given type-situation. People differ in varying degrees in the meanings they obtain or give in a given situation. Hence we may speak of the personal definition of the situation as opposed to the social definition of the situation. And when these are all formed into total configurations of life fields, we may speak of personal and consensual environments also. The word "society" is put in quotes in the preceding lines to raise a question in the mind of the reader. What is "society"? We say that people live in the United States, or in Illinois, or Atlanta, or on "the East Side." Such expressions are useful for many purposes, but they do not accurately denote anyone's society. A person's society is the total configuration of situations and fields in which he interacts more or less habitually. This we have called his environment, and, like everything else, these, for a plurality of people, may be measured on a scale of similarity.

When for certain purposes we find it necessary to emphasize differences, even a person's family represents to each of its members different environments contingent upon age, sex, and assigned family roles such as father, mother, son, or daughter. For certain purposes we can say that no two children ever had the same parents, no two students the same professor, nor the same city, state,

nation, or society, and for other purposes we can say they are the same. We often hold people responsible for behavior expected on the basis of what we consider their environment or their society, but frequently these are significantly different from what we judge them to be. A person's society, from the "differences" point of view, is his personal environment, but from the "similarities" point of view, includes also his common or consensual environment. The juvenile courts, for example, emphasize the former, the criminal courts emphasize the latter. In any aggregate of people we can find some central tendency in this matter but we must recognize this as a variable, frequently a significant one.

## 2. Social Groups are Meaning-Structures

### GROUP AS A CATEGORY OF BEHAVIOR

We have insisted upon the propriety of defining, measuring, and classifying phenomena in different ways for different purposes. The meanings of phenomena do not reside in the phenomena but in man's behavior toward them. The terms "group" and "individual" are words symbolizing certain kinds of responses toward certain types of phenomena. A word which refers to types or classes of phenomena is called a "category," so we say that "group" may be thought of as a category under which one classifies certain types of highly probable behaviors as integrative systems. A category, then, is not a part of nature, not a part of one's data, but an invention designed to arrange responses in an orderly way for certain purposes. It is a selector. We present this caution so that if our definition of "group" and "individual" appears different from definitions given by others we will not be accused of missing the point, and of not seeing what group "really is."

For example, we find that people of all societies tend to specialize in many kinds of activities in occupations, religions, the arts, club associations, but they also tend to specialize in certain forms of behaviors because of their sex, their age, and their period in history. Sociologists traditionally refer to the people characterized by the first type of specializations as groups, and they refer to the people who specialize in the second type of activities as categories, social categories. The sexes or four-year-olds are not referred to as groups. Certainly nothing is wrong with such

specialized practices of sociologists. But in this book we have throughout emphasized behavior, not the people who behave. In harmony with this we use the term "group" to refer, not to certain people who have certain specialized behaviors, but rather to the specialized behaviors themselves. We define groups as configurations of specialized behaviors, or configurations of certain polarized common tinsits. Groups arise because many people specialize in the same types of personic behaviors.

If we are talking about rats we may legitimately define them as white, gray, big, little, smart, dumb, clean, dirty, quick, slow, pets, nuisances, or by whatever term or category fits our purpose. We can respond to rats in all these ways, the same is true of groups. We may talk about groups of animals, groups of apples, groups of people, groups of ideas, groups of tinsits, and we may talk about any of them in terms of any of their aspects: size, weight, color, commonality, or behavior. Since we are discussing personality as an action structure, that is, in terms of behavior, we shall discuss groups of personalities in the same terms. Thus we shall speak of the sexes, the ages, or social classes as groups.

#### A DEFINITION OF GROUP

The group in human society represents certain kinds of interactional behavior configurations or relationships. Just as personality is a system of personic tinsits, emergent in interaction, so also is group. Group-ness is an emergent property of a plurality of personalities interacting in recognized forms of association. Group-ness does not reside in people or anywhere else. Like mind it emerges under similar conditions, such as those under which people behave toward each other and toward themselves in terms of certain meanings which they hold in common. Earlier we described "industry" as this kind of phenomenon.

We have referred to habits, attitudes, and traits as generalized tinsits or systems of tinsits within a larger system called personality. "Groupality" is the same kind of "stuff," but of a larger system of systems of common tinsits of a plurality of personalities. Groups, then, will be thought of as patterns of behavior in which certain people specialize and with which they are identified: by themselves, by each other, and by others not so identified. *A group may be said to occur, then, when certain personalities interact in terms*

*of a recognizable system of relatively stable, specialized, polarized common tendencies under similar conditions, and is a configuration of polarized common tendencies of a relatively high degree of probability in which certain people specialize and by which they interact under stated conditions* To maintain conceptual consistency we speak of group as occurring rather than as existing Personality is a system of probable occurrences under stated conditions, so is group, though a larger system, involving a plurality of personalities.

A group is thus a structure of polarized common meanings, ( $rM_s$ ), a structure of meanings which a plurality of people have more or less in common Group is a meaning-structure, primarily a structure of use-meanings. Group is a segment of the social process, a configuration of relationships operating as polarized components in interactional fields. A social group is fundamentally a system of symbols. One can not touch, taste, smell, or hear a social group A solitary person behaving in a given way—using certain symbols—is evidence of a group. This point of view does not require that a plurality of persons be present for group to occur in a given situation Whenever a group's common tinsits are activated, then the group is operating When, as discussed in Interlude III, a Nazi prisoner of war talked to the American chaplain, then we saw the Nazi group operating.

The terms "common," "system," "structure," "organized," and "polarized," all continuous variables, are fundamental to the concept. For example, many men smoke pipes, and they have this tinsit in common, but unless their social interactions are organized around, and directed by, this as a core or pole in a social field we do not call "pipe smokers" a group.<sup>7</sup> "Polarized" connotes also a directional structuration around two opposite poles of ingroup-outgroup relations If we found a "pipe smokers club" with recognized ingroup-outgroup relations, we should call this a group representing polarized common tinsits. This, however, does not represent normally an organized system of meanings in social interaction

Groupality consists of a structure of relationships represented by common tinsits, a phenomenon which occurs as people interact in ways which show a relatively high degree of probability. Liter-

<sup>7</sup> If, however, one is making a study of smokers, "pipe smokers" will obviously be a category, but not a group in our usage

ally thousands of such groups occur, all of which are characterized to a high degree by tendencies of people to act in similar ways in similar situations. On the basis of these social expectancies people are enabled to adjust to each other and to themselves with a relatively high degree of efficiency and predictability in all situations in which the system of relationships is implicated.

### THE SYMBOLS OF GROUPALITY

Such relationships are symbolized by words such as membership, loyalty, responsibility, cooperation, competition, mutual aid, tradition, status, and social distance, rights, duties, privileges, obligations, inhibitions, taboos, interests, manners, folkways, institutions, customs, mores, and many imperatives and restrictions of every description.<sup>8</sup> *When a person is stimulated to the appropriate action by that which these words represent, this is empirical evidence of the presence of his groups in his behavior responding in the form of relatively stable, common tnsits* If this behavior is in the form of reflection, it represents the person's talking to himself as a representative of his groups (for example, conscience). The group consist in, and is concerned with, behavior, some forms it demands, some it encourages, some it permits, some it tolerates, and some it forbids, common tnsits are of varying degrees of magnitude, plus and minus. Relatively few such directives are codified; *they are imported into the personality structure in the use-meanings of language*, and they persist or recur as tendencies of greater or lesser stability in appropriate situations. Situations are events in and are properties of groups or combinations of groups. Hence, as meaning is a function of situation, so situation is a function of group or groups.

<sup>8</sup> All of these terms represent examples of the general term "common tnsit." Abram Kardiner uses the term "institution" in the same sense, and defines it as "any fixed mode of thought or behavior held by a group of individuals . . . which can be communicated, which enjoys common acceptance, and infringement of, or deviation from, which creates some disturbance in the individual or in the group." Abram Kardiner. *The Individual and His Society* New York: Columbia University Press; 1946, p. 7 I believe "tnsit" with its five properties (direction, magnitude, stability, form, and commonality) is a more adequate concept.

### 3. Language, the Substance of Group

Human nature is personic nature, the most distinctly human aspect of which is the symbolic process. Language, then, is the most distinctly and significantly human of all of man's behavior. Every group represents more or less characteristic modes of thought on the various matters and in the various situations in which it is implicated. The group largely constitutes, for its members and for those who deal with it, an integrated system of vocabularies, thought models, perspectives, thought categories, premises, conclusions, and other biases as selectors of approved judgments.

The social sciences have been handicapped by the practice of using terms of too great generality. The term "man," for example, is too large a term for the study of behavior since man is many things, not one, and this whole must be broken down into smaller situational elements, such as *insits*. "Society" is likewise too large and must be broken down into a configuration of situations as suggested in our section on environments. For "social-status" it was suggested that we use "situational-status", and for "social-role," "situational-role." So now with "language," which is also too large a term for purposes of analyzing situational behavior, and which must be broken down into smaller categories which are traditionally called vocabularies.

Men, women, children, lawyers, physicians, professors, architects, mechanics, and gangsters all may speak English, and yet any one of them might have difficulty in understanding any one of the others. Vocabularies are the mechanisms of communication with self and others. All social behavior is more or less mediated by vocabularies, and vocabularies are invariably the properties of specific groups. Cultures, nations, and ethnic groups have languages, the smaller group components of these larger structures have special vocabularies.

Our meanings, which are the implicative tentacles of our groups, are transported into the personality on the vehicle of the group's vocabularies.<sup>9</sup> How important these become in the role of selectors was pointed out in Chapter IV. Vocabularies are the mechanisms by which groups both transmit and stabilize their meanings. A group's vocabularies *are* its meanings. By their distinctive vocabularies groups define and sustain the situations in

<sup>9</sup> See the italicized statement in Chapter IX, p. 305.



which they are implicated. Every group is set apart from other groups by its distinctive vocabularies which enable it to incite, inhibit, interpret, justify, and otherwise control the acts of its members in the various situations in which it is implicated. A group's vocabularies are its primary selectors.

Girls have their own vocabularies, as do men, women, and children. Races, occupational groups, social classes, and ideological constellations such as religions and philosophies, geographical regions, and interest groups of all descriptions provide the requisite vocabularies for motivating the behavior of their members. Girls' vocabularies include such ingroup greetings as "dear," "darling," and "honey"; such fashion terms as "stunning," "smart," "chic," "cute," and "adorable", such terms of disapproval as "catty," "hussy," "vixen,"<sup>10</sup> and many other terms of approval and disapproval of self and others for the girl-roles in all situations. A man communicating to men in such terms would immediately be suspect and the object of ridicule in the special, and perhaps more colorful, vocabularies of men. In humorous situations, however, men may use the vocabularies of the opposite sex, some of our most effective humor consists of such incongruities.

Each of the sexes is provided with vocabularies which are the expected behaviors for ingroup situations, and are also provided with vocabularies for intergroup situations involving the other sex. Perhaps we are not revealing any secrets by saying that girls have special vocabularies which go unchallenged in their own "bull sessions," sewing bees, garden parties, teas, and showers, and that men are also well equipped, at all levels of social interaction. All groups represent relatively restricted ingroup vocabularies for intimate communication with, and motivation of, their members, while they maintain other vocabularies with which their members interact with members of other groups. These ingroup "secret" systems of symbols are often highly emotionally toned, and are highly stable mechanisms by which people identify themselves and others with their groups, and by which group members measure their behavior on a scale of approval. As C. Wright Mills says,

The choice of lines of action is accompanied by representations, and selection among them, of their situational termini. Men discern situations with particular vocabularies, and it is in terms of some delimited

<sup>10</sup> These terms are rather conspicuously dated, but the more pragmatic contemporary terms do not look well on paper.

vocabulary that they anticipate consequences of conduct. Stable vocabularies of motives link anticipated consequences and specific actions. There is no need to invoke "psychological" terms like "desire" or "wish" as explanatory, since they themselves must be explained socially. Anticipation is a subvocal or overt naming of terminal phases and/or social consequences of conduct. When an individual names consequences, he elicits behavior for which the name is a redintegrative cue. In a *societal* situation, implicit in the names for consequences is the social dimension of motives. Through such vocabularies, types of societal controls operate.<sup>11</sup>

"Seeing the consequences of one's acts" is a function of one's selectors in given situations. Consequences are relatively stable definitions of (by) one's groups, and are among the most important meanings that come from our groups, occurring in the form of special vocabularies appropriate to the situation. "When," as Mills says, "an individual names consequences he elicits [in self and others] the behavior for which the name is the redintegrative cue." But the individual does not invent such names for the occasion, the situational vocabularies of his groups provide them. This is the immediate mechanism (temporally the most proximate condition) of control by the group.

Mills points out that people both avow and impute motives (that is, impute needs to self and others within and without the group) in terms of their particular vocabularies, so that whatever motives (needs) people impute depends upon the current vocabularies available to them in the situation. This suggests to Mills that vocabularies are themselves the motives of behavior, and that it is unprofitable to look for something deeper such as desires and wishes "behind" the vocabularies. Social values, then, are ("exist" in the form of) specialized group-created and group-sustained vocabularies. We are in general agreement with Mills's position. Meanings are both stimuli and responses and they operate in the form of symbols, which are words or other gestures.

A person imputes motives (motivators, activators) to self and others in accordance with his vocalized identification-tints which are his vocabularies. The poor impute motives to the rich in the traditional manner of the poor, which is to say, in the traditional vocabularies of the poor. So likewise the rich to the poor—"Let them

<sup>11</sup> C. Wright Mills "Situational Actions and Vocabularies of Motives." *American Sociological Review*, (Dec. 1940) Vol. 5, p. 906. This excellent paper merits careful reading.

eat cake," or the modern version: "Let them eat less." The same vocabularies which group members use to impute needs to out-groupers, or to deny them, contain other words to justify their own behavior to self and others. Vocabularies are relatively dynamic phenomena, changing with time-groups or eras, considerable error in historical interpretation arises from the fact that each age must interpret the past in its own present vocabularies. The implications of this for philosophy are seen in the long quotation from John Dewey in an earlier chapter. The vocabulary of an era represents what Whitehead called the "stock of ideas" current in a particular period of history.

Mills cites the medieval monk who "for the glory of God and the eternal salvation of his soul" gave bread to a very poor but pretty woman. He says that in our day we tend to question the monk's behavior, imputing sexual motives because these are in the vocabularies of our day, while "religious vocabularies of explanation and of motives are now on the wane."<sup>12</sup> We justify and condemn self and others in the vocabularies available to us, and these depend upon our group-identifications. Projection or imputation of needs is the ejaculation of special vocabularies corresponding to what we have called the "use-meanings" of words.

Use-meanings are as objective and as amenable to investigation as any other phenomena. Methodologically all vocabularies may be studied as functions of group-implicated situations. For a science of human behavior then, social fields and situations must be isolated, defined, and classified in terms of the groups of which they are properties and in terms of the vocabularies which mediate the behavior. The norms for all social behavior are established by the relevant groups, and the individual's behavior may be studied in terms of probable deviations from these situational norms. Science, too, is a system of specialized vocabularies, highly restricted but subject to constant test for accuracy and verification by its own perceptual schema.

Language, in the form of specific group-vocabularies, constitutes the enduring substance of social groups, as well as in large measure the substance of personality.

<sup>12</sup> As an indication of the power of this change, we may cite a discussion we had on this point with a male adult. Said the man "the only difference between that era and ours is a matter of accuracy, we *know* that the old boy was sexually motivated." One's own vocabularies are convincing selectors.

#### 4. Group Ethos and the Generalized-Other

As described in Chapter VII every group is represented by an ethos consisting of the group's most probable common meanings and representing its most precise definitions and minimal demands. One of the chief functions of the ethos is defining and placing other groups of the same order (nation to nation, culture to culture, and race to race), one of the universal phenomena of groupality is that the ethos of every group defines others of the same order as backward, queer, naive, strange, funny, and inferior. So far as we know anthropologists and sociologists have never found an exception to this principle anywhere in the world.

Operating as a fence is another universal function for the ethos, keeping members in and non-members out, thus developing what the sociologists call the ingroup and the outgroup. Here we find the emotional basis of group conflict, whether between large numbers of people, a few, or within a single person. Thus in many areas of behavior, we are living in behavioral stockades, and since our incarceration is the "natural" one for us we do not understand those who live outside our stockade. Our ego tinsits operate as selectors leading us to believe that the stockades merely keep others out, blinding us to the fact that anyone in a stockade is likely to be a prisoner.

Many writers believe that as transportation and communication facilities increase, group barriers tend to disintegrate; but we are not convinced this analysis is complete. Certain evidence indicates that with increased mobility many group barriers are strengthened and conflict is heightened. In the United States the South has for years exported one-fourth of its natural increase in population, and this movement is changing many patterns of the industrial North, not the least of which is the tightening of group lines and the increasing of conflict. The ethos of one group does not readily mix with that of another. For the individual the ethos of the group occurs as the "generalized-other."

#### THE GENERALIZED-OTHER

"Mother," cried DOUG, "You know that party dress you gave me for Christmas?"

"Yes, dear."

"May I wear it to school today?"

"Oh, no! Child, what would people say?"

"Well, will you walk part way to school with me?"

"Sorry, dear, I have to go to Mrs. Jones' tea."

"Tell her you had another engagement"

"Why, darling, people don't do such things"

Who are these "people"? Who would "say" something? Who are the people who "don't do such things"? Just other people, people in general, they are the "generalized-other." Badly trained parents (there are no untrained parents) control their children by the imminence of the bogeyman, they control themselves in the same way by the ever present generalized-other. Everybody has one. It is one of the stowaways of language,<sup>13</sup> representing people who belong to our own group but not necessarily people we know. When someone we know plays this role, it is "the other," not the generalized-other.

The very universality and impersonality of thought and reason is, from the behavioristic standpoint, the result of the given individual taking the attitudes of others toward himself, and thus finally crystallizing all these particular attitudes into a single attitude or standpoint which may be called that of the "generalized other." Alternative ways of acting . . . in an indefinite number of situations—ways which are more or less identical for an indefinite number of normal individuals—are all that universals . . . amount to . . .<sup>14</sup>

After one has participated in the social process, regardless of the group structures involved, one develops probable behaviors based upon, and closely resembling, what other people do in given situations. The mechanism by which this is done is role-taking, and after one has done this for a while with a number of people one "gets the idea" of the particular groups to which one feels attached.

The organization of the social act has been imported into the organism and becomes then the mind of the individual. It still includes the attitudes of others, but now highly organized, so that they become

<sup>13</sup> See Chapter IX, p. 305.

<sup>14</sup> G. H. Mead. *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 90. For those who are not familiar with the use of "universal" as a noun, the term represents a highly abstract concept which is applied to all events or objects in a particular category. "The apple" is such a universal. There are apples, but there is no such thing as "the apple." The term refers to apples in general, and enables one to distinguish, symbolically, apples from oranges. Even intelligent dogs cannot do that, at least not in English.

what we call social attitudes rather than roles of separate individuals.<sup>15</sup>

The generalized-other is not a configuration of people, but a powerful system of selectors, a frame of reference in the form of group-conditioned judgments on the propriety of a given behavior in a given situation. It consists of conscience as well as protocol, both of which are the vocabularies of the generalized-other. The generalized-other is the paradigm of propriety, possessing eyes that see through walls, and ears that hear in a boiler factory.

This mechanism is a tremendous convenience and possibly no mind could occur without this selective generalizing and organizing process. One is now not limited to having called out in one's self the acts of specific people (although this continues also on occasion), a situation can now call out in one's self the attitude of the community, even of one's nation or race on given matters, and thus stimulate one's behavior accordingly. A person does not fully participate in mind until this can occur to him. Mind involves norms as anchors or points from which to view and evaluate events (note the use-meaning "point of view") the norms of one's groups are the flesh of one's generalized-other.

The generalized-other is specific and precise largely in proportion as one's groups are homogeneous, but in a culture like ours adequate definition is frequently lacking, which is often valuable because this makes for adjustability in a society with rapid and extensive changes. But this also puts a strain on the individual's choice-making mechanisms. The generalized-other is at once a basis for uniformity and diversity in personic behavior. The probability of a given behavior in a given situation must be stated in terms of the norms for that situation. The size and shape of the generalized-other varies enormously between people under various conditions and in various groups. Doris wanted to wear her lovely party dress to school, Sadie, across the tracks, would probably never get such an idea—nor such a dress, and as for school, she might say "School? I don't go to school."

While we find it necessary in this book, as in daily living, to speak of *the* attitude of the other, accuracy would require us to state that a person probably never takes a *single* attitude of another. In the first place the other does not have any single attitudes. Every attitude one has is part of one's system and is colored, bound and hedged with all sorts of connections, variations, and nuances.

<sup>15</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 178, see also p. 267.

In the second place, what one takes over and incorporates is usually the core of the attitude, one adds one's own trimmings, which means that one's own system is changed in the process. Thirdly, one incorporates new behaviors in relation to the approval and disapproval of one's generalized-other, which is related in part to Freud's "Superego," but is a more inclusive concept. It includes all norms, not merely the ethico-moral norms. The "new" is a variation and extension of what is already there in some form and some degree. Every act has a history.

When people have been living together in a community for some time, it is inevitable that in the process of the conversation of vocal gestures this constant interaction will result in many people's having the same meanings in many areas of behavior. To the extent that people develop common meanings, their behaviors represent a group of some sort. These common meanings select people for specific and general types of association, and continual association on this level strengthens and identifies the bonds represented by common meanings. This gives stability to the structure of common meanings which is the group. This meaning-structure becomes incorporated in varying degrees into each of the many persons involved, and goes to make up part of the generalized-other of each.

Every group to which one is related contributes to the make-up of one's total meaning-structure, which forms the limits of one's environment. The difficulty encountered in the coal miners' strike situation is thus explained. Public opinion operates effectively only when lodged in the generalized-other, and with the miners' attitude toward newspapers no way could be found by which the attitude of the general public could be incorporated into the generalized-other of the miners. We have much to learn yet about the meaning of a "free press." The generalized-other involves attitudes of out-groups or enemy groups only in a negative sense, that is, as symbols of conflict, a person's generalized-other is strictly a property of his own groups.

The resulting generalized-other is very closely related to the self, and we shall attempt to show that there could be no self without this, for the self is known against the background of the generalized-other. We must know others if we would know ourselves.

The generalized other is the internalized audience with which the thinker converses; a focalized and abstracted organization of attitudes

of those implicated in the social field of behavior and experience<sup>10</sup>

In discussing the margin-of-error-in-role-taking in Chapter IX we pointed out that Mead frequently makes extreme statements which suggest that the generalized-other represents the attitudes of everyone in the group or community. This is not possible, but the error in no way lessens the value of the concept of the generalized-other. No group or community is a complete unity any more than a personality is. *The generalized-other represents a selective average of common tinsits distilled in the process of mind.* The generalized-other is imported as an organized structure in the vocabularies of the group, and is reorganized in the process of importation. While a product and actually a part of the community or group, the generalized-other is also a distinct part of the person.

The degree of similarity of the generalized-other of a plurality of people constitutes the coherence and stability of the meaning-structure we call the group. We also stated in the discussion of the margin-of-error that Mead's concept of role-taking should not be thought of as meaning taking the role of the other "for keeps." The generalized-other, however, does represent taking the role of others, with your own, and averaging (synthesizing) them, *and keeping them as your own.* The common tinsit is also, in degree, an instance of "keeping it." The mechanism of the common tinsit (taking the attitudes of the generalized-other and responding to them as members of the group do) makes one a member of a group. Social conformity means taking the role of the generalized-other, and a person is a member of a group only to the extent that the group ethos in the form of the generalized-other controls his behavior in the group-implicated situations.

But the fullest development of the self or personality involves more than taking the attitudes of others toward one's self and toward others, it involves also taking the attitude of others toward their common social activities, standards, and values. A group is what it does, and "doing-likewise" is the only way by which the group can be known. "Doing-likewise" imports the group into one's self. The group is in us when we do what it does. In this manner we identify ourselves with a group.

. the society in which we belong represents an organized set of responses to certain situations in which the individual is involved, and . . . in so far as the individual can take these organized responses

<sup>10</sup> Mills: *Language, Logic and Culture*, p. 627.



over into his own nature, and call them out by means of the symbol in the social response, he has a mind in which the mental processes can go on, a mind whose structure he has taken from the community to which he belongs.<sup>17</sup>

We have stated that mind is not the kind of phenomenon that can be "had," and later we made a concession to necessity in the form of popular usage. In a sense, we must now do the same for group. We have said that the group does not reside in people or anywhere else; and we made this emphasis in order to direct attention toward the idea of groupness as relationships, ways of acting, meaning-structures, and common tinsits. Since groupality consists of a meaning-structure represented by certain kinds of common tinsits, it exists, *in the same sense that tinsits "exist,"* in one's action structure, and in the form of an organized structure of responses which we call the generalized-other. In this sense we may say the group is in us controlling our behavior. A group is what it does, and when we do what it does, it is in us, our doing what it does is what constitutes its being in us.

## 5. The Symbolic Basis of Social Control

The person carries as part of him considerable socially derived equipment. He carries his environment in the form of his selectors, and he carries his groups with him as part of this environment in the form of concepts which make up the generalized-other, which is of course an elaborate selector-system. In proportion as these common tinsits are well defined, he seldom lacks knowledge of what to do in almost any situation that may arise. He has all the answers, so to speak; but the answers are by no means always highly specific and precise, they are often in the nature of a very general paradigm.

In relatively simple and homogeneous cultures, particularly before the spread of the white man, the generalized-other was probably a more simple and precise affair. In non-literate societies all or most meanings are use-meanings, and the homogeneity, with lack of stimuli from the outside, makes for a minimum of deviant behavior. But in a culture like our own the generalized-other is often not nearly so well defined, while constant and rapid social

<sup>17</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 270.

change keeps most of us in difficulty in some areas of behavior much of the time.

A person can run away from his shadow, if he knows how, but he can no more run away from his groups, his generalized-other, than he can run out of his skin. These, in varying degrees, are what he is in the varied situations in which he finds himself. A person can know himself only by assuming the attitudes of the generalized-other toward himself, and by responding to these attitudes as the group does.

. . . to the degree that the self has taken the attitudes of others into itself through the language process, it has become the others, and the values of the others are its own, to the degree that the self assumes the role of the generalized other, its values are the values of the social process itself.<sup>18</sup>

These are the stowaways that watch over us by day and by night.<sup>19</sup> Conscience is the group looking over our shoulder.

The mechanisms so far described are the mechanisms by which our groups define our needs. The person has no needs that are not resultants in the social process. This may seem extreme, probably because all of the sources of our needs have not yet been isolated in the conflicting maze that is our culture, but all of the many sciences which are concerned with human behavior are gradually developing techniques to isolate more and more of these sources. The search for adequate principles is the search for the guides to these sources. Our groups alone can provide the situations which arouse our needs, and our groups alone can respond to these needs in a manner to reduce our tensions and maintain personie equilibrium.

The authority of the group rests upon two sanctions: the power of promise and the power of threat. The power of social control rests not only in the security of the group's promise of personie equilibrium ("satisfaction") but also in its threat to the integrity of the personality. This threat lies in the power of the group to deny the person access to the situations which answer to his needs. The group controls such access by its effective power of approval and disapproval, for a person disapproved by his group cannot find access to the sole situations in which his most stable traits can be

<sup>18</sup> E. W. Morris, in G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. xxxii.

<sup>19</sup> For the significance of the word "stowaways" see the italicized statement in Chapter IX, p. 305.

activated. He is thus deprived of the opportunity to participate in the only process through which his self can be actualized. Man is held in thralldom to society by the very nature of his development. His reward is life itself; his penalty for excessive non-conformity is a living death; he becomes a man without a country, without a class, without a church, without a family, and with no basis for a stable personality or personal security.

Regardless of how much some writers emphasize the "uniqueness of every personality," sociologists, psychiatrists, and every person who lives a normal life knows that

if you live in a group and want to keep from being hurt and to have a chance for some pleasure, you will have to be "Like the group and liked by the group" . . . you have to be like the group you live with if you are to stay alive and be happy.<sup>20</sup>

The assumption that this refers merely to behavior on an ethical and moral level is erroneous. It concerns one's hair-do, where and when one goes fishing; when and where one eats, how often one bathes, the clothes one wears; the music one listens to; the books one reads; the gods one serves; the way one makes a living, how one spends one's money; it concerns in various degrees how one lives from Monday morning through Sunday night.

*In all areas of behavior mediated by symbols* the generalized-other is the arbiter on the continuum represented by the extremes of the right and the wrong way to do anything. The generalized-other in a given situation is the integrated resultant of all linguistic stowaways. But the generalized-other as a "consultant" has a "white-collar job," and is not usually overworked. The person does not consult it in his thousand and one daily acts. Most of us consult it as we consult any other arbiter, only when we are in trouble, only when several of our instincts are almost equally aroused and we are in a dilemma, in an undefined or ill-defined situation, a crisis of some sort.

Regrettably even at this late date in man's history we are not enabled by exact research to tell what proportion of man's behavior is mediated by reflection, but we generally assume that by far the largest proportion of social control is done by the common instincts without benefit of the frustrating necessity of thinking, that is, of paying attention to what our selectors are doing. When one is

<sup>20</sup> George H. Preston: *Psychiatry for the Curious*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940, pp. 28 and 58.

compelled to deliberate, the generalized-other operates as a kind of legal reference book, but for the vast majority of man's behaviors the generalized-other represents common tinsits mostly in the form of group-established concepts operating dynamically as a kind of gyroscope.<sup>21</sup>

Muzafer Sherif in his recent book has a chapter on "The Formation and Effects of Concepts," which he closes with the following words

As he develops, the child becomes able to function psychologically on a conceptually symbolic level. More and more his concepts take on the standardized meanings of the group in which he lives. These meanings are simply generalizations which have been standardized by the group in their past interactions, and which serve to classify or categorize experience, both cognitive and affective. Henceforth, *the individual's psychological functions are regulated in general* by these standardized concepts. And in particular, his reactions to social stimuli—his likes and dislikes, his aspirations and loyalties—are *regulated by norms or values*, which are special cases of the concepts of his group.<sup>22</sup>

Meanings come from our groups.<sup>23</sup>

## 6. Common and Identification-Tinsits

The mechanism of identification was described in Chapter IX. The present section is concerned with terminology. We have considered it unnecessary to offer a formal definition of the term "common tinsit" since the use-meaning seemed adequate. Obviously the term symbolizes the concept of those relatively uniform tinsits implanted in the behavior structures of group members through conditioning and the significant symbol in interaction in one's groups.

The processes of experience which the human brain makes possible are made possible only for a group of interacting individuals; only for

<sup>21</sup> I am indebted to Professor Cottrell, who in commenting on this section suggested the analogy of the gyroscope.

<sup>22</sup> Muzafer Sherif, *An Outline of Social Psychology*. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948, p. 201 (Italic mine).

<sup>23</sup> See Sherif and Cantril, *The Psychology of Ego Involvements*, pp. 68, 72, 251, 289 for convincing analyses and research documentation supporting this idea.

individual organisms which are members of a society, not for the individual organism in isolation from other individual organisms.<sup>24</sup>

The term "identification-tinsits" does not refer to a difference in kind as compared with the common tinsit, rather it refers to a special function of the common tinsit. The function is relatively specific, and situations occur when the two seem very different. Smoking cigars, using profanity, playing tennis, tipping one's hat to ladies, swimming, and eating at twelve and six o'clock are all common-tinsits, but they do not usually, except in a technical sense, identify one with any group in the sense in which certain recognized tinsits identify people with labor unions, specific churches, or the male sex. If in a given situation the magnitude of a common tinsit increases it may assume the function of an identification-tinsit and operate as a vested interest involving the self. We speak of common tinsits as identification-tinsits when they perform the function of identifying one with the same group; it is a functional category. When one's locomotions carry one across group boundaries, as when one travels in a foreign social class or country, or as when a man rashly calls for his wife at a woman's tea, some of one's tinsits function as identification devices, and one's self "sticks out like a sore thumb."

The only other term that has seemed at all adequate for our use besides "identification-tinsit" is the term used by J. F. Brown "membership-character." That this is a powerful concept is evident from what Professor Brown does with it.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless we believe our term is more adaptable to wider use. Professor Brown defines membership-character as

the social-psychological characteristics which accrue to an individual by virtue of his belonging to the group. . . . Membership-character includes those reactions common to members of a group which derive from their membership within the group.<sup>26</sup>

The term "identification-tinsit" covers the same ground and in addition refers to those meaning-structures which are not usually thought of as groups. By the symbolic process people identify them-

<sup>24</sup> G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 133.

<sup>25</sup> J. F. Brown: *Psychology and the Social Order*, referred to in an earlier chapter. Part II, the "Sociological Section" of seven chapters is devoted to the application of this concept. This is an exceedingly impressive piece of work despite the extraordinary vocabulary.

<sup>26</sup> J. F. Brown: *Psychology and the Social Order*, pp. 75 and 129.

selves with widely differing types of structures, and are so identified by others. They become identified with heroes, villains, places, objects, ideologies, and causes as well as with classes, nations, and occupations, and our term covers them all. When we want to be highly specific we merely add a categorical term, as, for example, group-identification-tinsit, class-identification-tinsit, or political-identification-tinsit. Thus the term covers a wide range but remains within our frame of reference and its terminology. We shall on occasion also use the term membership-tinsit. All identification-tinsits represent membership behavior of some sort.

We state as a hypothesis that a person's behavior is determined most by the groups with which he is most intimately identified. This corresponds to Brown's membership-character of "greatest potency." The potency of this function varies with the field structure, as when Brown says

The family as such . . . does not determine the social psychology of its members; this is done rather by the underlying field structure, to which different types of familial organization may be ordered. The difference in the fields underlying rural and urban families is so great that family membership-character in the case of rural families is almost the sole determinant of social behavior and is of practically no importance in urban ones.<sup>27</sup>

## 7. Some Important Functions of the Social Group

The plurality of people, whose polarized common tinsits constitute the group, inculcates these common tinsits into emerging personalities, and guides and controls them by providing relatively well-defined situations in which they can operate with security. People inculcate into others their own common tinsits, and these others are usually, but not exclusively, children. This is done because of the nature of language and the symbolic process. Likewise, these polarized common tinsits are incorporated by these others by necessity as represented by the same process.

Once a person has incorporated and integrated these common

<sup>27</sup> J. F. Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order*, pp. 227-8, Courtesy of McGraw-Hill Book Company. We agree with the principle here but not with the emphasis; the urban family is far from being obsolete, even though it is undergoing a metamorphosis, and many other factors are important in rural life. Among them is "the weather," which for the rural person is a philosophy of life.

meanings, the group has him. Group control thereafter is not something administered externally, the group controls its members by becoming part of the structure of their personalities. Indeed, as we shall see in a work now in preparation, personality can be accurately described as an elaborate permutation of identification-tints with groups, causes, ideologies, heroes, places, odors, colors, persons, traits, and dozens of other phenomena.

The biological processes provide the foundation for, while the social process is the architect and builder of, personality, both the types of foundation and the types of interaction determine its limits. The functions of group, then, are building, guiding, and defining, and these are achieved in interaction through the integration of the symbolic process.<sup>28</sup> In this sense we may now proceed to a discussion of these functions. The numerical position of the functions in the following discussion has no bearing on the importance of the various functions.

#### THE DEFINING OF ENDS AND MEANS IN SPECIALIZED VOCABULARIES

Every group as an operating system of symbols, primarily vocabularies, builds into the behavior structures of its members those common and identification-tints which are known as the group-ways, and which later operate as selector-systems. These include standards, ideals, gods, hopes, fears, life goals, and the ways of achieving them: incentives, beliefs, and hundreds of other tints appropriate to fit all situations in which the group is implicated. These are integrated and emerge as among the most stable elements of the personality.

Every group prepares its members with the appropriate fears as well as hopes. Negroes and whites, as Americans, have certain fears and hopes defined for them by both ingroup and outgroup, but as Negroes and whites these fears and hopes are in many respects very different.<sup>29</sup> The millionaire has fears the laborer never

<sup>28</sup> In the discussion which follows, the participle is used rather than the infinitive; i.e., we say the function of the group is building, defining, etc., not "to build" and "to define." Thus is in recognition of the subtlety with which teleological stowaways sneak into our meaning-structures. When one says that the function of the group is "to define," the immediate suggestion is purposiveness. We do not know what the purpose of group is, we are concerned with what it does.

<sup>29</sup> See Davis, Allison, and Dollard, John. *Children of Bondage*, Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education; 1940.

dreamed of and vice versa. Children's fears are real, but they often make adults smile, and children do not know that they get many of their spankings as a result of group-defined fears of their parents. Women and girls learn fears which are unreal to boys and men and vice versa. Whenever a person joins a group he takes over much of its symbolic equipment. The West Side children know little of the hopes and standards of the East Side children. Jeeter Lester knows what he wants, so does a Boston Brahmin, and neither of them "free-willed" it.

Not only are the polarized common tinsits of the group inculcated with the requisite emotional toning to make them effective, but the five properties of the tinsits are defined for each common tinsit in a manner appropriate to the situations which the group sponsors. Groups differ in the rigor and precision of these definitions, and even though the members of the group differ in efficiency of inoculation, the group still holds the individual person for its norms within the accepted range of deviation. "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." In operation the person is at fault if the group has not properly trained him.

#### THE DEFINING OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES, IMPERATIVES, AND TABOOS

A second function of group concerns the definition of what a person may, may not, must, must not do, give, and take. One's rights, duties, privileges, and obligations are all defined by one's group relationships. The strong have rights and duties different from the weak. On a New York subway age is a number; in China age is a moral symbol in a language that cannot distinguish between the chronological meaning of age and the reverence due it.<sup>80</sup> A newspaper reporter "may go places and do things" denied to others. The very rich and the very poor may get good medical care; the middle class may not. In a Christian society the mentally and physically handicapped are often the fittest to survive, insofar as care results in survival, the strong may perish on the battlefields of war and market place. "Fools may go where angels fear to tread." The worker, but not the banker, may go to church in overalls; while at the formal dinner, women must wear fewer clothes, men more. Property owners frequently have rights that are more important

<sup>80</sup> I. A. Richards *Mencius on Mind*, 1932. Cited in C. Wright Mills, *Language, Logic and Culture*, p. 680.



than the lives of others. One's needs are either specifically defined by one's groups or are limited by such definitions.

In times of epidemics priests, physicians, and nurses must remain while others flee. On the sea, children are saved first, then women, then men; quite properly the captain may go down with the ship. The policeman and the fireman must risk their lives, the civilian must save his. Some may eat meat except on Friday, others may eat some meat but not pork or beef. Some may drink, but not wine or other spirits. Some may marry once, but no oftener, others may marry as often as the situation requires. Everyone knows more or less what is expected of him, his groups have told him.

### THE DEFINING OF THE GENERALIZED-OTHER

All of these make up the individual person's deviation from the group ethos which we call the person's generalized-other. Conscience, ubiquitous and imperious, is the voice of the group in the form of the generalized-other. The ethos of the group can and does make anything—anything—right or wrong. There is not one of the Ten Commandments which some group has not defined as wrong and successfully violated. The Thugs of India, eventually destroyed by the British, were a religious cult with a female God who enjoined her followers to kill, but with a highly specialized ceremonial technique, and no member was really respectable until he could unemotionally garrote a traveler with one twist of a special scarf.

Since truths or facts are the creatures of conceptual systems, we expect that the truths established by religious conceptual systems should differ from the viewpoint given here. The ethos of a religious group defines for its members what is right or wrong. This is true of all groups, whether political, economic, aesthetic, athletic, or scientific.

### THE DEFINING OF THE SELF

The self is to a person what his groups have led him to believe it is. Science knows of no other way by which a person could get a conception of his self. This proposition, brilliantly analyzed by Cooley, Mead, and others, may appear difficult for some people to accept because no person is a product of only one group. Every one

of a person's groups shares in this process, as in all the others, and this makes for difficulty in putting one's finger on the source of any person's concept of himself.

Self criticism is essentially social criticism, and behavior controlled by self criticism is essentially behavior controlled socially <sup>31</sup>

#### THE DEFINING AND ASSIGNING OF SITUATIONAL STATUS-ROLES

One's status is a group phenomenon and has no meaning apart from groups, for by definition it is one's relative position in a group in relation to prestige. This, in large measure, defines one's relations to all the other functions we are discussing. Status is a way of describing what one's needs are, status determines an enormous area of one's behavior, from such widely separated phenomena as whether one's babies shall live, and for how long, to such matters as what one's wife shall wear on Thursday afternoon. A man's house may be fifty feet from the railroad tracks; but his status is a measure of, and determines, how far he is from the tracks. A person's status-roles are probably the final arbiters of his needs in the configuration of social fields which is his environment. These status-roles in his accustomed fields constitute a powerful frame of reference in terms of which his somatic and personal satisfactions are determined, and they both define and provide his fundamental securities.

Only one's meanings need security, and they define one's significance in the minds of self and others. The only source of security is the groups which provide and sustain one's social status. The farther one deviates from one's group norms, the greater becomes the individualization of one's security symbols which are the individual's interpretations of what his needs are in terms of his status demands.

#### THE DEFINING OF THE CRITERIA OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

A sixth function of group is the task of providing the person with a basis of knowing and proving who he is. One's very identity is impossible to describe without reference to one's groups, which is empirical evidence that a person is a permutation of his group

<sup>31</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 255.

identifications If a person should find himself in a strange city and should be asked to identify himself, how would he do it? First he would give his name, a symbol conferred and sustained by certain groups (family, church, and courts) He would then probably tell what community he is identified with, and that community's characteristics would immediately be imputed to him and help to define him. Bostonian, New Yorker, San Antonian, Oshkoshian, Tobacco Roader, and, by extension, Northerner, Southerner, Easterner, or Westerner

After this one would probably tell one's occupational group, and other significant matters of one's social status, including one's bank if any In all instances one would get the immediate advantages and disadvantages inhering in the stereotypes implicated in one's group-identifications In a strange city one would not likely wait passively to be identified, one would look up one's own groups—Masonic, Methodist, Rotarian, Pi Phi Lambda, C C, or scouts,—and take advantage of one's identification-tinsits The integrity of the human personality is in the keeping of one's groups.

#### THE UNIFYING OF SIGNIFICANT SYMBOLS ( $\text{M}_s$ )

To the extent that the structure of a personality deviates from his structures of polarized common tinsits, the person increases his individuality as against his commonality. Individuality varies inversely with the social structure of common meanings In a society as diverse and heterogeneous as ours the occurrence of any common meanings is a source of wonder. Yet we could have no society otherwise. A specific function of social groups is to unify the significant symbols ( $\text{M}_s$ ) of a plurality of people, and a society in which this function is failing is to that extent a society in the process of disintegration.

#### THE DEFINING AND SPONSORING OF SITUATIONS

Finally one's groups not only build these prepared designs into one's tinsit structure, they also provide the situations in which they can be activated. One of the disadvantages which the European peasant encounters when he comes to the United States is that our groups frequently cannot provide adequate situations for

the activation of his most stable tinsits. Common tinsits are "custom built" and polarized within a range of group-approved tolerance.

From a social psychological point of view, a great tragedy of our time is that modern science and industry have prematurely advanced the means of communication and transportation throughout the world "Prematurely" in the sense that this has occurred before we have discovered how, on a world scale, to unify significant symbols and the common situations of which they must be functions. Peace in this world seems scarcely possible until we learn how to apply mass production techniques to such phenomena. "One world" does not mean goose-stepping regimentation any more than one nation does, it does mean that all men everywhere can go with security anywhere and find hospitable situations for the activation of their most stable common tinsits, no matter how "outlandish" they may be. Great and wonderful will be the day when we can say without qualification

Animals live in a world of events; man lives in a world of common meanings<sup>32</sup>

### 8. The Relative Precision of Group Definitions

The previous section describes those areas of stability on the basis of which people predict the behavior of others with sufficient accuracy to adjust to the exigencies of daily living in groups even as large as cultures. Whenever one joins a new group one sets about learning the group's definition-of-situations, *presumably, then, such definitions are sufficiently precise* to be distinguished from other definitions and used as guides to behavior. Apparently we have a cue here for sciences of human behavior to formalize this knowledge through the analysis and classification of situations. Possibly situations can be classified and analyzed in terms of the degree of precision of the definitions which they involve. Groups vary tremendously in this respect and a given group varies in the relative precision of its own definitions in various situations.

Neither the bases nor extent of these variations have yet been studied and measured. Generally the precision of a group's definitions of various types of behaviors varies directly with the degree to which those behaviors involve the welfare of the group. On this

<sup>32</sup> Morris, in G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. x.

basis Sumner differentiates folkways and mores, but sociologists and anthropologists frequently use these terms with about the same degree of precision as journalists in our daily papers. Lack of precise definition by the group means a relatively unstructured situation for the individual, and is an important source of deviation or variation in individual behavior. Tinsits toward uniformity seem to vary directly with precision of group definitions, and tinsits toward uniqueness seem to vary inversely with precision of group definitions. If one keeps one's attention on the more precise definitions, one tends to see relative uniformities, but if one attends to the less precise definitions, one tends to see "unique" personalities. The degree of precision of group definitions has not been subjected to scales, and we are at present reduced to the poverty of using such innocuous statements as "some situations are defined to allow a relatively wide range of response."

We hope that future research will investigate the relationship between group definitions and those highly stable tinsit constellations called traits, such as introversion-extroversion and ascendancy-submission. Possibly, if not probably, various groups under certain conditions encourage, discourage, limit, require, and forbid these types of behavior thus inculcating them and setting their limits as stable forms of behavior. We already know that groups do define acceptable and required degrees of aggressiveness, ascendancy, and submission, in certain situations. Extrovertive behavior in situations calling for introvertive behavior leads to the definition of the behavior as abnormal.

These experimental studies of prediction which pay attention to the degrees of clarity and ambiguity of the situational field and the correlated degrees of projection by the subjects of private "definitions-of-the-situation" are very significant for the study of any act-in-the-situation, since every social act involves a "prediction."<sup>33</sup>

At present we have little or no empirical data which might give us reassuring knowledge of the nature of ambiguity in group definitions. Lack of precision scarcely means that the group "doesn't care." The informal testing of relatively large numbers of students in courses in social psychology leads us to believe that no social situation is truly undefined. But rather, that many situations

<sup>33</sup> Cottrell and Gallagher: *Developments in Social Psychology, 1930-40*, p. 45, referring to Hadley Cantril: "The Prediction of Social Events," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, (1938), Vol. 33, pp. 364-89.

suffer from multiple and conflicting definitions in our heterogeneous society.

Inferences drawn from studies in cultural anthropology indicate that this confusion is not normal, or at least is much less frequent, in simpler societies. We shall attempt in the next chapter to canvass the groups with which most of us are necessarily identified. This will provide us with a conceptual orientation toward the complicated structure of contemporary personalities. The structure of the individual personality is an integration of an elaborate permutation of group-identifications and of many other identifications.

As our groups in contemporary society become increasingly diluted and weakened by horizontal and vertical mobility, the identifications seem to become greater in number and weaker in magnitude, direction, stability, and degree of commonality. In this sort of milieu even our most stable social institutions tend to disintegrate, social fields tend increasingly to be ill-structured, and the human personality tends increasingly to become unstable and insecure. Not that situations are no longer group-defined, rather the problem seems to be a surplus of alternate definitions for most significant situations. The resulting "wear and tear" on the nervous system is one of the more obvious facts of contemporary life. Our selectors seem to be fading out.

## Chapter XI

### THE RELATIVE POTENTIALITIES OF GROUPS AS MEANING-STRUCTURES

1. *Some Differentials of Groups as Meaning-Structures*
2. *Some Typical Meaning-Structures at Work*
  - Table 6 Some Representative Meaning-Structures*
  - A *Cultures as Groups*
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  - B *Race as Group*
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  - G. *Urban and Rural Meaning-Structures as Groups*
  - H. *Age Levels as Groups*
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  - K. *Occupation as Group*
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  - M *Congeniality Cliques as Groups*
  - N *Family as Group*
  - O *Time Eras as Groups*
3. *Meanings Come From Our Groups*

#### 1. Some Differentials of Groups as Meaning-Structures

The sophisticated urbanite is often proud of the great city in which, as he says, he lives—proud of its bigness, a bigness with which he identifies himself. But if he had the conceptual tools, the perspective-giving selectors, to analyze his own living space, he would probably be surprised at the highly restricted meaning-structure in which he actually lives. The size of a population aggregate is not a good measure of the meaning-structures in which people live.

The author has long been impressed by the remarkably small meaning-structures in which most of the world's people live. Paradoxically the tremendous developments in transportation and communication in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have in many ways led to restriction and contraction of normal environments rather than to broadening and increasing them. The facts wait upon research, but apparently highly homogeneous groups are either disappearing or becoming smaller, as people are being driven for security to less and less complicated and diverse configurations of relationships.

Cultures, for example, are still recognizable, but they may not be so in another hundred years. The growth of intense and militant nationalism as well as of self-conscious minority groups is highly correlated with these changes, and future research may reveal a maximum heterogeneity to which a people can successfully adjust at a given level of the symbolic process. While education may be presumed to enable people to incorporate and integrate more heterogeneous environments, we shall probably discover limits of heterogeneity to which people can adjust emotionally. Probably with the growth of heterogeneity we shall find people resorting to smaller and smaller groups with increasingly intense participation and identification for the actualization of their hierarchy of needs, not the least of which is emotional security. Thinking of a sociopsychological group as a system of symbols, we might try to measure its size not in terms of the number of its members, but as a function of the heterogeneity of its system of meanings. Groups vary enormously in this respect. The meanings which define a person's life vary all the way from negative common tinsits like prohibitions and taboos to tinsits of all degrees of the permissible and approved, up to and including all degrees of common tinsits representing social imperatives, the "musts" of one's groups.

Not only do all these vary from time to time under changing conditions; they vary between different types of groups, substructures of the larger meaning-structures. Hence an environment as the total configuration of a person's habitual fields may be an immensely complex phenomenon, even for a "simple" personality. We should not be surprised to find large numbers of people in large population centers fleeing to smaller groups for the preservation of personal integrity. Groups vary markedly in the properties of the stimuli they represent to their members. Such stimuli may vary in



direction, magnitude, volume, variety, stability, and commonality. If we compare the common environments of populations in such places as New York City and the open stretches of Tobacco Road, to use extremes, we note that these general environments differ in all the above mentioned ways.

The child of a metropolitan area is bombarded with an enormous volume and variety of stimuli as compared with the child Jeeter Lester on Tobacco Road. The class structure, the competitive interaction, and the socially defined goals of the former are powerful stimuli to the expenditure of energy in socially approved and disapproved directions, but Jeeter Lester has few such gadflies. The former is in almost continuous interaction all day long in relation to a great variety of meaning-complexes—race, class, nationalities, politics, occupations, possessions, schools, churches, clubs, recreations, theatres, libraries, museums, mechanical marvels, hospitals, great stores, corporations, banks, newspapers, magazines, books, “bums,” and elegant women—an endless procession of threats and promises. But Jeeter Lester in his slow motion about his barren acres encounters none of these—indeed, he seldom encounters another human being except the lethargic members of his family, products of the same meaning-structure as Jeeter Lester himself.

We have been describing very general life-environments. Admittedly some situations in the city induce dullness, illness, weariness, and stagnation, and on Tobacco Road some situations are thoroughly moving—religious revivals, a bag of turnips, a likely gal. We have stated as a hypothesis that the groups with which a person is most intimately identified have the greatest influence in determining his personality structure. What a person may become will depend upon what identifications are available to him. A boy born and reared among the Southern hill folk has practically no possibility of ever behaving like an electrical engineer or a symphony orchestra conductor, and a girl so reared will never marry a duke or be the executive secretary of the American Federation of Women’s Clubs. The probability of a boy born on Park Avenue becoming a “hill billy” is extremely tenuous. These are extreme cases but they serve to illustrate the importance of the potentialities for interaction and identification available in various meaning-structures of our culture.

As one travels about the world, or about one’s nation, or even

about one's community, one constantly notices not only that people do the same things differently in manner and degree, but that in terms of behavior the people of one large population may be surprisingly similar and yet differ greatly from other such populations. It is an enlightening experience to set out from New England and come down the Eastern seaboard through the large cities, on down the Shenandoah valley through the villages and hamlets of the Southern Appalachians, through Georgia to the Okeefenokee swamp, then west through the bayous and delta areas, through the lush Rio Grande valley and on to the great Texas plains and so on around the periphery of the United States. What an incredible variety of group and individual environments under one flag, what extremes of dynamic meaning-structures, what amazing difference in levels of aspiration, what similarities and what differences! Can anyone doubt that these differential stimulus areas play a tremendous role in determining the personality structure of the people involved?

Recalling our definition of personality as an emergent system of personic tinsits we can see that this personic system represents a kind of central tendency of one's region or stimulus area—limited, of course, at any moment by one's somatic selectors and by whatever personic selectors one has developed up to that moment. But we fall prey to a great error when we assume that man's biological potentialities, such as native abilities or capacities, vary by geographical areas or by any other meaning-structures larger than persons. They vary only between individuals, not between races or social groups. Read Bain remarks that when we find a person who is by common consent a sow's ear, one cannot be certain that he was not potentially a silk purse. One might encounter in the vast primeval wonderland of the Okeefenokee swamp an expert "'gator" hunter, a twelve year old girl, ragged, dirty, hard, and happy, with an estimated potential I.Q. approaching 150. What a great "'gator" hunter!—what a potential scientist, artist, or stateswoman!

Doubtlessly this girl is a segment of the meaning-structure in which she lives, and bright as she is she would probably have some difficulty adjusting to an urban culture. The kind of interactional situations one's environment provides is a limiting factor on what interaction one can participate in, and this is fundamental in determining one's level of aspiration and achievement, regardless of one's somatic potentialities. Basic needs are defined as a statistical

central tendency, that is, relative, but the meanings around which this central tendency clusters are social definitions. Nothing is basic for a member of a group unless that group, or some group, says it is.

Even at this late date in the development of man we know relatively little about the relationships between the variations in the direction, magnitude, volume, variety, stability, and commonality of social meanings.<sup>1</sup> Changes involving these variables represent the dynamics of fields in all environments. As personality changes, so must one's environment and *vice versa* they are phases of the same thing, growing and changing together. Cause and effect represents a type of thinking that is not only useless in such an analysis, but actually harmful and misleading. All we know is correlation and change. What a person becomes is a function of many variables, determined by what country he is born in, what part of that country, into what family and when, into what social class, what race, what sex—there are many determinants, all components in a complicated configuration of changing relationships.

## 2. Some Typical Meaning-Structures at Work

The task of classifying groups which the sociologists undertake is no part of the present work. A survey of such classifications is the clearest evidence that any classification is justified by what it does

TABLE 6. SOME REPRESENTATIVE MEANING-STRUCTURES

cultures	social classes	occupational groups
racess	urban-rural life	neighborhoods
nations	age-groups	congeniality groups
regions	sex-groups	families
ideologies		eras (time-groups)

for an investigator; any classification that serves a purpose is justified by the results or not at all. There is no "correct" classification of groups.<sup>2</sup> We propose to give a paragraph or so on each of the struc-

<sup>1</sup> See F. Stuart Chapin: *Contemporary American Institutions, A Sociological Analysis*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935. This book and the studies relevant to it offer some information and some excellent leads for further research.

<sup>2</sup> See E. E. Eubank: *The Concepts of Sociology*. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1932. Chapter VIII, "Concepts Pertaining to the Human Plural" which is a good survey. See also Lundberg: *Foundations of Sociology*, Chapter IX. These references give a review of the various types of group classifications.

tures in Table 6, which are roughly arranged in descending order of size of the population aggregates involved, but Table 6 is not given as a classification of anything, it is merely a reference list.

### CULTURES AS GROUPS

Each of the items in Table 6 represents a category of common tinsits, ways of behaving, each is a field of interaction, a meaning-structure, a plurel representing a system of identification-tinsits of a high degree of probability. Earlier we defined "group" in such terms. Culture is one of the most inclusive of all the configurations we call interactional fields—the way of life of a whole people like that of China, western Europe, and the United States. Culture is to a population aggregate what personality is to the individual, and the ethos is to culture what self is to a personality, the core of most probable behaviors.

The infant does not have a culture, but culture very soon has the infant, and by means of the mechanisms already discussed the culture molds the growing child in terms of the ethos.<sup>3</sup> No one ever participates in all phases of a culture, as Table 6 indicates, for culture is the overall pattern of a whole people and may include hundreds or thousands of smaller configurations. A culture provides the organized stimuli which answer to the organized tinsits which the social process builds into the action structure of its people. A culture defines the range of permissible behaviors of its members, and provides the appropriate situations for their arousal.

One's culture, operating through the many smaller configurations which it subsumes, determines one's needs, fears, hopes, values, ideals, loves, hates, ambitions, religions, gods, and many other common tinsits, including one's concept of right and wrong, of the good, the beautiful, the moral, and the immoral. These behaviors of one's people constitute one's culture, they are imported into the personality like laryngeal infections, their media being the structure of language. They are perpetuated in the form of the social heritage whose elements are those constellations of common tinsits called the folkways, mores, traditions, customs, and institutions of all descriptions.

Cultures differ from one another in terms of the variables mentioned earlier. Some, like that of the Trobriand or Andaman islands,

<sup>3</sup> For ten illustrations of how this is done, see J. K. Folsom, *Social Psychology*, pp. 506 ff. "How Culture Channelizes Social Interaction."

are relatively isolated, static, and homogeneous; they provide a relatively small variety of stimuli, but usually of great magnitude (strong convictions and ingroup loyalties) and usually of high frequency, since the people live close together. Cultures like those of the United States and the polyglot Hawaiian are dynamic and heterogeneous, and provide a relatively great variety of stimuli.

In the former cultures the ethos has relatively high visibility, in the latter, especially in the United States, an investigator has to hunt for the constituent elements. These observations suggest the hypothesis that within a group the magnitude of stimuli varies inversely with variety, and directly with frequency. If this generalization stands up it may help to explain the so-called "backward" people, for intense stimuli, observed as strong, uncompromising convictions, represent resistances to the diffusions of meanings from other cultures, reluctance to change, powerful ingroup loyalties, religious, political, and racial bigotry and fanaticism, suspicion and hatred of outlanders. When American troops landed in North Africa they were provided with handbooks of instructions on how to interact with Arabs, they were told not to pass the mosques if possible, not speak to Arab women, etc.

#### *The Ethos of Culture.*

Seeing how a culture determines the behavior of its people, or how a culture is the behavior of its people is not easy, but one can understand the process better if one can see it working in one's self. This can be done by examining the ethos of one's own culture. The core of dominant common traits of a culture is relatively easy to recognize when the group is homogeneous, isolated, and highly stable. The culture of the United States belongs to what is called Euro-American, but when the anthropologists so informed us they did not tell us how long we should keep on repeating this to ourselves and others. United States culture is accustomed to such rapid change that it may some day be regarded as a separate culture. In any case, we can, if we search diligently, find a core of dominant behaviors which is our ethos. Ogburn and Nimkoff suggest that our ethos consists of the following constellations of common traits: 1) technology, 2) glorification of financial success, 3) a high standard of living, 4) a fast tempo of life, 5) a pleasure philosophy, 6) faith in democracy, 7) universal, free, and compulsory education. But later in the same volume these authors say that "Common mental

conflicts in our culture have to do with sex, money, religion and social status"<sup>4</sup>

Theoretically, at least, we can see a close relationship between personic conflict and the ethos of culture, but these authors do not include religion and sex as dominant interests in our ethos. A reasonable hypothesis however is that there is a marked correlation, positive or negative, between the ethos and the directions of mental conflict, especially in relation to those meanings in the ethos which are undergoing most rapid change. On this basis, and on much evidence, we should add common traits of great magnitude and stability toward matters of sex and religion as prominent elements of our ethos.<sup>5</sup> Like the above authors, Kimball Young suggests seven common traits as constituting our ethos: 1) belief in individual material success to be achieved by personal competition, 2) general national progress, 3) an amazing faith in universal literacy and education for all as a means of solving our social and personal problems, 4) belief in the virtue of sheer size or bigness, 5) rapid movement through space or increased mobility of our population and enhanced means of communication and transportation, 6) novelty and the constant stimulation of exciting events—sensational news, drama, speed racing, or crazes and fads; 7) craving for power, especially in terms of physical bigness and monetary success.<sup>6</sup> Here is a fertile field for research.

#### *The Romantic-Individualistic Complex*

The elements so far mentioned have not included specifically what we believe to be one of the most visible and significant behavior systems within the American ethos. We may call it the romantic-individualistic complex, a trait of western European culture most highly developed in the United States.<sup>7</sup> Mowrer cites Irving Babbitt's *Rousseau and Romanticism* to the effect that an

<sup>4</sup> W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Sociology*, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940, pp. 49 and 220.

<sup>5</sup> Advertising men make their living by keeping in close touch with the ethos, and we find them advertising everything from snow shovels to baked beans by the ubiquitous female figure in various degrees of glorification. The Bible is still the best seller in the United States.

<sup>6</sup> Young, *Personality*, p. 131.

<sup>7</sup> For sources of this extraordinary development, see E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939, Chapter VII; Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930; R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936.

event is romantic when it is wonderful rather than probable, "when it violates the normal sequence of cause and effect in favor of adventure." The romantic is described by such words as wonderful, strange, unexpected, superlative, extreme, and unique. The people of the United States like to think of romanticism as being almost exclusively associated with their love life, but it pervades their religious, political, and recreational life as well.<sup>8</sup>

Through a fascinating development, described in the works cited, extreme or rugged individualism has become integrated with romanticism to produce an element which many writers, including the present one, believe to be fundamentally related to our present social convulsions and those of the past few decades. Individualism, often stowed away in the language of poets and politicians as the nobility of freedom, is a continuous variable whose upper extreme is a form of anarchy. Mowrer describes it as "the tendency toward the complete freedom of the individual from social restraint," and he quotes W. I. Thomas to the effect that individualism "means the personal schematization of life—making one's own definitions-of-the-situation and determining one's own behavior norms." In less academic language it means "every-man-for-himself-and-to-hell-with-them-all-except-me," or as one of our leaders expressed it recently, during World War II: "My country 'tis of me." This romantic-individualistic complex is a potent element of our ethos, which means, of course, a potent tintin-system in the personality structures of the people of the United States. Its relative uniformity honors not diversity or individuality, but one's self.

Kingsley Davis in a convincing study describes how a social movement (the mental hygiene movement) combines what we have called the romantic-individualistic complex with an outmoded biological theory of human nature to produce a movement which interprets mental health as conformity to this aspect of our cultural ethos. "Protestant individualism finds here [in the mental hygienist's biological concept of human nature] a scientific rationalization. The philosophy of private enterprise, personal responsibility, and individual achievement falls easily into an interpretation of human nature in individualistic terms."<sup>9</sup> Professor Davis describes our mobile (open) class system and its world philosophy which he

<sup>8</sup> In our Chapter VIII we saw how this operates as a cultural definition of the functions of the autonomic nervous system in certain situations.

<sup>9</sup> Kingsley Davis: "Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure" *Psychiatry*, (1938), Vol. I, pp. 55-65.

calls "The Protestant Ethic" under six heads 1) it is democratic, it stands for equal opportunity for all to rise by merit rather than by family, 2) it is worldly, with worldly values of wealth and status and the sacredness of one's calling, 3) it is ascetic, it encourages sobriety, thrift, industry, prudence, and physical abstinence, 4) it is individualistic, it holds that the individual is personally responsible for his economic, political, and religious destiny and therefore encourages personal ambition, self-reliance, private enterprise, and entrepreneurial ability, 5) it is rationalistic, and is empirical in assuming a world order discoverable through sensory observation of nature, 6) it is utilitarian, it demands the pursuit of practical ends with the best means, conceiving of human welfare in secular terms, attainable by knowledge and action <sup>10</sup>

*Personal and Consensual Variations*

To the extent that the reader recognizes any of these complexes as part of himself he has empirical evidence that he is a segment of the social process, and that his behavior is to that extent determined by his culture. He may even recognize that some of these constellations of probable behaviors in his action structure are in direct conflict with others of his potent constellations, the complex represented by the Christian teaching of the brotherhood of man. If he should find such a conflict in himself, he may even see that his culture has inculcated conflicting tinsits in his own behavior, a circumstance for which he is in no way responsible. And he may further see that this last phrase is in direct conflict with # 4 in the Davis list <sup>11</sup>

Literally thousands of attitude tests have been conducted in this country, and countless polls on every conceivable subject, but we are not aware of any research attempting to synthesize them, or to use the technique to measure our dominant tinsits as a people. Such research would be of value not only in isolating empirical data on common behaviors, but as a device for setting up a norm or accurate base for the periodic measurement of social change. Such a base may be increasingly necessary in view of the

<sup>10</sup> Davis "Mental Hygiene," p. 56. The work of Weber and Tawney is visible here, but it is probably not wise to call this the Protestant Ethic. While it had its origin in the Protestant Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, the Romantic Movement and the rise of capitalism, yet it might be difficult for a Roman Catholic or a Jew to realize that a major portion of his personality structure is the Protestant Ethic.

<sup>11</sup> On the subject of culture conflict see Karen Horney *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1937.



growing tendency toward social planning at many levels in our culture.<sup>12</sup>

We can see from this informal presentation that the ethos forms a considerable part of the generalized-other, the form in which the social process determines individual behavior by entering as a selector-system into the individual's behavior, reflective or otherwise.

This setting of the broad activities of any given social whole or organized society as such within the experimental field of any one of the individuals involved or included in that whole is . . . the essential basis and prerequisite of the fullest development of that individual's self only in so far as he takes the attitude of the organized social group to which he belongs toward the organized, cooperative social activity or set of such activities in which that group as such is engaged, does he develop a complete self or possess the sort of complete self he has developed.

And on the other hand, the complex cooperative processes and activities and the institutional functionings of organized human society are also possible in so far as every individual involved in them or belonging to that society can take the general attitudes of all other such individuals with reference to those processes and activities and institutional functionings, and to the organized social whole of experiential relations and interactions thereby constituted—and can direct his own behavior accordingly.<sup>13</sup>

Since, as Sumner says in his classic *Folkways*, the ethos of a group furnishes the standpoint by which people criticize and judge other groups, here we shall find in large measure the basis of much international diplomacy, our attitudes toward Russia, Japan, Germany, Spain, South America, and Great Britain—attitudes ready-made for the use of the present and coming generations, who will, of course, assume that they have made up their own minds on such matters. Our common scapegoats, like our common friends, are often defined in the ethos of our culture.

<sup>12</sup> A clear account of the ethos of one community is given by R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd: *Middletown in Transition*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company; 1937, Chapter XII. The study called *Middletown*, made some ten years earlier, formed a base for measuring many changes. See the article by Svend Riemer: "Individual and National Psychology: A Problem in the Army Area Study." *Social Forces*, (Mar. 1944), Vol. 22, pp. 256, 361. This article is pertinent to any research on ethos. The article contains excellent references, see particularly those of K. Lewin and Margaret Mead.

<sup>13</sup> G. H. Mead. *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 155

*The Selective Nature of Cultures*

There are perhaps as many as a thousand cultures in the world today, possibly ten times that many in the course of history. While sufficient similarities in cultures occur to enable the anthropologists to classify them, likewise enormous differences occur among them. And we have great similarities and differences within a given culture at a given time. Cottrell and Gallagher refer to culture as a measure of central tendency in a range of behavior.<sup>14</sup>

These authors suggest that in the development of anthropology two interpretations of culture have emerged: culture as a system of norms, and culture as a measure of individual deviations from these norms. The first concept is that of an ideal type, the second represents what people actually do. The second concept emerged largely as a reaction to the traditional practice of interpreting "type" as a discrete phenomenon (whether type of culture or personality type) instead of as a well-defined range of a continuum.

Cultures, like personalities, are dynamic, and like all change, culture-change is selective. Culture-change is deviation in time, the actual behavior is the deviation from the norm at any moment in history. But deviation, being a continuous variable, always includes the possibility of measurement on all ranges of the scale. The deviations of a large number of group members will represent a central tendency so that, generally speaking, there is a high positive correlation between culture as a type and the normal deviations of its members. Even where this is not true, normal deviations are necessarily relative uniformities, and we find this in all groups—rather, this is what constitutes groups. These relative uniformities (behaviors measured on the upper range of the scale of similarities) are the most visible selective properties of groups. As Margaret Mead says,

. . . every human being has had some of his potentialities selected by culture for elaboration, other potentialities ignored, and others suppressed.<sup>15</sup>

The incorporation and integration of one set of common tinsits by an individual necessarily represents the failure to incorporate some other set of symbols. And the set or system that is incorporated

<sup>14</sup> Cottrell and Gallagher *Developments in Social Psychology 1930-40*, p. 12.

<sup>15</sup> Margaret Mead "The Concept of Culture in the Psychosomatic Approach" *Psychiatry*, (Feb. 1947), Vol. 10, p. 60.

has a potent voice in determining subsequent incorporations. Hence, this process is highly selective, and definitely determines one's behavior. Speaking in such terms in no sense represents a reification of culture. The ethos of a culture is, by definition, what most people of this culture do, see, feel, think, hope, or fear—in the normal situations of that culture. For the people of a culture, culture constitutes their largest and most inclusive meaning-structure (barring one-world), and these meanings are mediated by their language and the operational vocabularies within their languages.

### RACE AS GROUP

Fifty years ago the phenomenon of race was "well understood," but so much has been learned about it in the last quarter century that authorities are now very much in doubt about whether the concept represents anything but a folk definition. The concept of "race" does not stand up under scientific analysis, but the importance of the folk definition can hardly be exaggerated.<sup>16</sup> There are no pure races, but people behave as if there were. If people define a situation as real, it is real to them, and they behave accordingly.

We have seen that the ethos of a group tends to define out-groups as inferior, and usually refers to them as minority groups. Minority groups, however, are not necessarily made up of smaller numbers than the majority groups. Some Southern counties in the United States are 70% Negro, but this numerical majority is defined and treated as a minority group. Minority groups, regardless of size, are defined as such by the dominant groups of a culture, and any stigmata or outer signs, like skin color, serve merely to accentuate the visibility of the phenomenon defined. One of the main theses of this volume is that visibility is a function of one's selectors; if one is supposed to "see" something called race, it assists considerably if the presence of the phenomenon is announced by easily recognizable signs.<sup>17</sup> The effectiveness of any social definition is

<sup>16</sup> For an excellent brief statement of the fallacy of race and the nature of race prejudice, see Otto Klineberg: *Social Psychology* New York Henry Holt and Company; 1940, Chapters XI and XIV. See also the exceptionally good 30-page work, Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish *The Races of Mankind*, Public Affairs Pamphlet # 85, 1943.

<sup>17</sup> After World War II a colleague remarked that after a month in Hawaii he lost his color perception, he no longer "noticed" color differences in people. He had lost his "race" selectors.

dependent on the perceptibility of the differentia which isolate the thing defined, but regardless of how "objective" (consensually visible) the differentia are, they will not be "seen" or "noticed" if one's selectors are not appropriately organized in that direction. Klneberg quotes the following incident

Pearl Buck tells an interesting story about being informed by her little daughter that a lady wished to see her "Is it a Chinese lady or an American lady?" she asked "I don't know, mother," was the reply, "I didn't ask her"

The ethos of the little girl's group of most importance at her age, her family, had not defined certain anatomical differentia as stigmata for racial discrimination, so her selectors had passed them by *Stimuli are meanings, and meanings come from our groups*

The stigmata of minorities serve to accentuate group definitions, they are symbols of high visibility to which the group can point and say. "Be thou not like that" or "Be thou like that," as the case may be (Whiteness is also a skin color, as the tragic captives of Bataan once learned) The stigmata of race are continuous variables, and many a "light" Negro passes as white Only the extremes of such variables serve as stigmata.<sup>18</sup> The violence of discrimination against any minority group seems to vary directly with the capacity of the minority group to challenge the definition of itself in the ethos of the dominant group (The Negro ethos defines "white" and the definition is not flattering)

The stigmata of race are biological phenomena, but race or racism is a socio-psychological phenomenon The inferiorities (and superiorities) associated with "race" are not determined by the stigmata, or by any other biological phenomena, but by social definitions The superiorities of whiteness depend exclusively upon the Marines, that is, on the white man's ability to "prove it," which is a variable of time and place The way in which this statement affects the reader is a measure of the power of his groups to determine his attitudes, that is, his probable behavior in relation to race

The phenomena of racism are of great importance to social psychology because not only do racial groups determine large areas

<sup>18</sup> If the slave in the United States had been white instead of black, there would be no Negro-white race problem in the United States today. What has become of the descendants of the white skinned slaves of the Greek and Roman empires? They have become "lost," many of them as parents of the dominant groups The Ethiopians are "wise", they pick their slaves from their own color, and they will have no difficulty if they are compelled to emancipate.

of the behavior of their members, but the racial group itself attains its status by imputations from the dominant groups in the culture. These are all distilled in the socialization process of the Negro child as described in the works by Davis and Dollard and the Gardners cited in Chapter X. We also find them distilled in the socialization process of the white child who, often to his surprise and often to his hurt, learns from his parents the "differences" between the "races."<sup>19</sup>

The biological phenomena of racial groups have no bearing, as determinants on the behaviors of the different racial groups, the differences in behavior are all functions of personic interpretations of other groups. The biological differences operate merely as signs which other groups interpret to their own advantage, largely in the realm of status. The needs of all the groups, in this respect, are determined by the groups themselves, and by their position in the scheme of things. *Needs are meanings, and meanings come from our groups.*

#### NATION AS GROUP

Once an infant is born into a nation a huge area of his future behavior is determined long before he is able to say "uncle," "taxes," or "bureaucrat." One can predict a large number of probable behaviors by which he and others will identify him with his nation under various conditions. We know that some emotional attachments are practically inevitable, others are of high probability, and others are of less probability.

Think of the tremendous differences in the types of identification-tints built into the action structure of infants born in the United States, Russia, Germany, Mexico, and China.<sup>20</sup> These meaning-structures show enormous differences and at the same time great similarities, similarities sufficiently great to enable a normal person born in one to make a reasonably good adjustment in any of the others under appropriate conditions. The most diffi-

<sup>19</sup> LaPiere and Farnsworth. *Social Psychology*, pp. 155-9. A discriminating treatment of this subject, with excellent references. As an example of the proposition that "one carries one's environment with one," and that "once you learn the use-meanings of a group, the group has you and you will never completely escape," see the 30 page pamphlet by Earl Brown *Why Race Riots, Lessons from Detroit*. Public Affairs Pamphlet # 87, 1914.

<sup>20</sup> See J. P. Brown. *Psychology and the Social Order*, Chapter VII, "The Effect of National Membership-Character."

cult would probably be for the United States citizen transplanted to Nazi Germany, where he could find relatively few situations to arouse his more stable positive tinsits, but plenty to activate his negative ones

These groups vary in all of the variables mentioned earlier. Due to the relatively unintegrated heterogeneity of the United States-American behavior patterns the stimuli representing nation are of relatively great variety, of no great stability, and of little magnitude under normal conditions. Our individualistic ethos directs the citizen's activities and loyalties toward the welfare of himself and his small groups, and he shows little interest in the welfare of the nation as such. The "New Deal" was in some respects a revolutionary movement against this aspect of our ethos. When the field changes, as in time of war, the picture changes, but our point is demonstrated by our apparent inability to achieve a marked national unity even in time of war.<sup>21</sup>

A generally recognized sociological principle is that when a group is threatened from outside the effect is to unify the ingroup by greatly stimulating the members' identification-tinsits. The performance of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany in this respect in World War II showed some remarkable extremes. Nation identification-tinsits of United States-Americans are not well formed, as one might guess from glancing at estimates of the ethos of our culture. Our romantic-individualistic culture trait directs our emotional attachments to much smaller units than nation. With the seemingly endless difficulties of capitalism in the United States the Federal government is playing an increasingly important role, and if this continues, as seems likely, our nation-identifications may

<sup>21</sup> Unity is a matter of degree whether it refers to groups or personalities, but both do exhibit tinsits of a high degree of similarity. The following report is from *Time*, Nov. 1, 1943, p. 46: "Brigadier G. B. Clisholm, brilliant head of the Canadian Army's medical service . . . called soldiers' 'mental breakdowns' a 'disability of the English-speaking peoples' . . . A whole generation has been taught not to fight. From earliest childhood a boy is trained not to run risks so as not to break his mother's heart. The result is that in the Army there is an emotional attitude toward getting hurt." Brigadier Clisholm recommends drill as one safeguard against nervous breakdowns because 1) it gives a man a feeling that he is part of a group 2) it reduces him temporarily to the condition of a child for whom all decisions are made. After a good dose of drill [drill is a common tinsit] a man can be rebuilt to use the special fighting asset resulting from the English-speaking way of life: individual initiative. . . more than 45% of the Army medical discharges are neuro-psychiatric."

be greatly developed in the future, while our state-identifications and those of smaller structures may recede in importance.

In Nazi Germany, however, the nation-identification-insists of members were frequently, indeed constantly, aroused, with very little variety permitted, and as a result the stimuli were intense to a degree of fanaticism; nation was the "be-all and end-all of life." Nazis would have great difficulty in finding in any other nation the appropriate situations to activate their most stable common insists. This poses a difficult problem for the United Nations Organization. Since the meaning-structures of the Nazis were of a highly uniform direction, with practically no variety, the resulting intensity was revealed in a narrow, provincial, regimented, and goosestepping people.

However, great frequency of stimuli, long continued, tends to dissipate the strength of the stimuli, and German propaganda lost much of its hold over its people before the end of the war. Victories were good substitutes, but as these diminished the ubiquitous secret police had to take over, presenting a different kind of stimulus. Outsiders, like United States-Americans, can readily see how the Nazi's and the Communist's behavior is determined by his groups; for United States-Americans this process in themselves is less visible, but is the same in principle, whether in peace or war.

### REGION AS GROUP

Within practically every nation there are regions in which the behaviors of people deviate considerably from the norms of the nation and from those of the culture as a whole. Within the United States there are many such regions, the most accurately drawn probably being the six regions outlined by the North Carolina studies.<sup>22</sup> To the tourist some of these regions are probably more visible than others, but everyone will recognize the Old South or Deep South, which *Southern Regions* refers to as the Southeast, made up of eleven states. By disregarding state boundaries one may divide this region into a large number of subregions, each well demarcated by the behavior patterns of the people, some of which have already been mentioned.

Common as these phenomena are, the stability of these mean-

<sup>22</sup> Howard W. Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936.

ing-structures in a culture as dynamic as that of the United States constantly amazes us. To be born in the Southeast is to be destined to a personality structure very different from that, say, of people born in the Northeast. The author has heard more than one educated Southerner seriously question whether the Southeast is legitimately a part of the United States-nation, but one could never question that in time of war.<sup>23</sup>

While a large area of one's personality is determined by one's culture and another area by one's race, another large sector of one's behavior-structure is determined by the region in which one is born and bred. One of the most remarkable phenomena of the 20th century is the enormous migration of Southerners, both black and white, into other regions of the United States.<sup>24</sup> Equally impressive is the stability of these personality structures. They have changed but are recognizable regardless of how long they have been in the North, and the places to which they have migrated have also been changed by their coming. Detroit is a spectacular example. While millions of these people have remained in the regions to which they migrated, thousands of them have not been able to make the adjustment and have returned to the South. The author knows a Southern professor who taught in the North for a few years, but whose maladjustment forced him to return south. The new region can not provide situations in which such people can consistently activate their most stable common traits.

There are many Northerners in the Southeast, and after a few years they are not easily identified. What can this mean? In heterogeneous regions like the North, region-identifications are not usually well formed, and are relatively easily modified in the migrant by interaction in a homogeneous region like the South. This phenomenon is highly correlated with certain permutations of such variables as the magnitude, direction, and frequency of stimuli. The Southeast is largely rural, and the lack of variety and frequency of certain types of stimuli tends toward stimuli of increased magnitude—strong emotional attachments to regional values, a marked ethnocentrism on regional lines.

<sup>23</sup> Some time before the U. S. entered the last war a graduate of the University of Georgia, later in the armed services, told the author that whatever happens he is a Georgian first and an American second. See LaPiere and Farnsworth. *Social Psychology*, pp. 159-62.

<sup>24</sup> See Carter Goodrich. *Migration and Economic Opportunity*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; 1936.



A person who has not traveled far tends to be ethnocentric in his outlook. Usually such a person has a narrow outlook and strong convictions, he holds to his beliefs with great tenacity, is sure of what he wants, and what he stands for. His region-identifications are relatively rigid and highly stable. But when one has traveled and has lived in a wide variety of situations in many regions, one tends to have a "broad" outlook, is not likely to be sure of what he believes, and is therefore more tolerant of "strange" behaviors in others. Often such a person is more efficient in role-taking regardless of where he is. Meanings become transformed in the dynamics of the social process, but the rate of transformation is limited by the stability of the common tinsits and the relative intensity of the interaction.

Great differences occur in the variety and frequency of stimuli to which people are exposed in various regions, isolated and homogeneous groups being at one extreme ("hill billies," rural villages, or the South) and congested secondary groups at the other extreme (the sophisticated city dweller or the suave and worldly-wise British upper classes). The extremes are enhanced by schools or the lack of them, for a school or a college exposes people to a large variety of stimuli with great frequency in a short space of time.<sup>25</sup>

### IDEOLOGIES AS GROUPS

In every culture highly stable ideologies are built into the attitude structures of its members. So successfully is this done that the members seldom question them, these common tinsits become so much a part of the personality that men defend them with their lives. Men could never be induced to suffer the tortures of war in defence of anything but their common tinsits organized in the form of an ideology or a combination of ideologies, religious, political, economic, philosophical, scientific, or romantic like "adventure."

Although most of the millions of men who fought and died in World War II had little or nothing to do with the development of the ideologies they were defending, this did not prevent them from risking life and fortune in defending these ideologies. And quite properly so, for these ideologies "are us" in large degree, and are among our most stable common tinsits, and to destroy them is

<sup>25</sup> These variables, however, are not absolute. Many New Yorkers are intensely provincial and many Southerners are men of the world. We must always consider all the fundamental "conditions under which."

literally to destroy us. A man fighting for his ideologies is fighting for his life, especially if the ideologies are surrounded by very strong emotional conditionings. At one time men would "willingly" die to defend "free will," which is another way of saying that men's behavior is so completely determined that they will die to "prove" that it is not determined. But such people were in no sense irrational, they fought to defend the stuff of which their personalities were made. Take from a man his system of beliefs and not much is left.

What a picture of our contemporary world do Palestine and India provide. Here, certainly, we see the nature of the relativity of truth and the danger—the tragedy—of absolutes. Within a few months after India had attained "freedom," her component ideological groups, mostly religious, had driven their members to kill each other to the extent of some 300,000 persons. These killings were not accomplished by great impersonal machines like artillery and atomic bombs, but were personal brutalities—each motivated by the politico-religious vocabularies of the Moslem, Hindu, and Sikh meaning-structures. *Meanings are stimuli, meanings are human needs, meanings come from our groups*

The importance of thinking in terms of "tints" rather than "tendencies," that is, of relating "traits" to situations, is indicated in a recent statement about the brutalities in India. Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, reported by the Associated Press, made the following statement:

Discussing generally the disorders that have upset Northern India for the last month, the Prime Minister asserted that they would be "extraordinary anywhere and certainly are extraordinary in India."

"Yet I do claim to say," he declared, "that India is a more peaceful country than any other in the world. Indians have behaved with ferocity and brutality that is astonishing. *Yet the average Indian is mild and gentle, hesitates even to kill a snake*"<sup>26</sup>

What the Prime Minister, like the trait enthusiasts, should say is: "The average Indian is mild and gentle in most of our life situations," that is, under normal conditions, in normal situations. Obviously mildness and gentleness are not traits for anyone "regardless of situation."

Ideological meaning-structures are among the most noble emergents in the life of man, but under certain conditions can be

<sup>26</sup> The *New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1947, p. 46 (Italics mine)

the most vicious of all social phenomena. Generally speaking, that is, in normal social fields, the arts and sciences as ideologies tend to unify men, political and religious ideologies tend to divide them. Ideologies are highly stable over long periods of time, but can be among the most dynamic of social groups in their situational magnitude and dominance. Even in the same society structures of the social fields change in a manner to make first one ideology dominant, then another. When religious ideologies are dominant they direct toward their own ends the political, economic, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical ideologies of a people. In India we see a political ideology directing the powerful religious ideologies toward political ends. In the last war political ideologies almost everywhere directed all others, including science, toward political ends, and the scientists are now "sitting in sack cloth and ashes." Religions periodically direct ideologies toward religious ends. The structure of the field is the controlling factor. Of all the tinsits of man, his ideologies are probably the most potent and stable and valued; they are the truths he lives by, the most powerful meanings his groups can give him.

#### **SOCIAL CLASS AS GROUP**

After considering all the behavior determined by culture, race, nation, region, and ideologies, apparently any remaining group would be but an insignificant determining factor, but the human personality is an immensely complex integration. Regardless of a person's culture, race, nation, region, and ideologies, he behaves in these respects as a member of a social class and at the same time as one identified with many other groups. A Southerner, for example, does not behave merely as a Southerner, but as a Southern white, upper class, adult, male, poll-taxer, of an old, rural, American family of a given neighborhood, and everyone of these groups plays some part in determining the structure of his personality. Everyone of these groups represents a cohort of common tinsits for him to incorporate and integrate as his system of most probable behaviors.

Everyone of necessity belongs to some social class, and his behavior is generally governed accordingly. Each class represents a fairly well-defined system of meanings and probable behaviors,

which define the actions of its members and non-members<sup>27</sup> The class ethos defines and enforces standards and norms for all sorts of behavior—for dress, diet, recreation, education, political activity, place of residence, manners, etiquette, types of occupation, ambitions, extent of ambition, care of the person, health, housing, types of home furnishings, relations of the sexes, ages, races, courts, and frequently to what church one must belong, as well as the expected range of punishments and rewards for all situations in which class is important And for each of these, one's social class provides the shibboleths in the form of appropriate vocabularies These pronouncements are not usually bound up in books, but are part of the tinsit structures of the group's members.

Next to ideologies, perhaps more than any other group, one's class determines one's general and specific needs, even though they may appear abnormal to members of other classes Social class inculcates certain types of common tinsits and sponsors the situations in which alone they can be activated with security and rewards The power of class is the threat of withholding access to these situations, and to the rewards of approval Here we see the imminent power of the secret police of group operating inexorably as stowaways in the vocabularies of social appraisal Here is man's most sensitive instrument for the imputation of needs Here are hiding those threatening bands of leering imps that shatter the ego with sneaking hints of inferiority; here the refuge for the frightened and weary heart longing for the warmth of belonging And here dwells the arrogance of pride and the superiorities hatched from desperation and fear

#### *The Concept of Status*

Status refers to one's position in a group in terms of social appraisal on the prestige continuum The group defines the person for himself and others through status A person is what his groups say he is, for the decision has a sanction more powerful than the decisions of the United States Supreme Court The decisions are binding but not always final Since every social act involves complex group relationships, every social act is in some degree status-fixing.

All societal behavior is by definition status-fixing behavior That is, it

<sup>27</sup> See J F Brown *Psychology and the Social Order*, Chapter IX, "The Effect of Social Class Membership-Character" See also LaPiere and Farnsworth. *Social Psychology*, pp 162-6

involves movement in societal space. . . . The societal position or status of anyone in a situation, is, then, merely the static aspect of his behavior (function) in that situation, or more especially, the group's appraisal of that function according to the standards which are accepted by the group. An appraisal of the status of any individual or group will usually be influenced not only, or even mainly, by their actual position at the time of the appraisal, but perhaps primarily by the *degree of probability that this individual or group will in the measurable future attain a given position*<sup>28</sup>

Following this statement Lundberg cites Alpert's operational definition of social class as "... a group of persons having equal probabilities of reaping social rewards," and later cites T. N. Marshall, a "group with similar social chances" This of course refers to punishments as well as rewards. Society is a profit and loss system regardless of its politico-economic structure.

Status, however, is not confined to position in a societal class, but refers to position in any group.

As a banker or a realtor Babbit may stand high, though as a golfer he may be a dub, his church status may be low and his club status high, and so on through the list. The movements, vocabularies, habits and emotions he employs in these different roles are all accessible to careful study and accurate record, but the point can hardly be obvious, since it is so widely neglected, that the explanation of these habits and phrases and gestures that accompany the several roles is to be sought chiefly in the study of the group traditions and social expectations of the several institutions where he belongs. No accessible inventory of his infantile impulses would enable a prediction of the various behavior complexes concerned in the several personal roles.<sup>29</sup>

When presenting our concept "every act has a history," we stated that the history of an act does not necessarily go back to childhood; but the footprints of acts are frequently lost in the dynamics of integration. In so far as class status is concerned, class-identification-limits in a relatively open-class society like ours may not have a long history as such, although they do in the sense that they are modifications of previous identifications, and we find it difficult to

<sup>28</sup> Lundberg: *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 312. Copyright 1939 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission. See the whole Chapter (VIII) "Societal Integration and Status," an excellent piece of work.

<sup>29</sup> Elsworth Farris. *The Urban Community* (edited by E. W. Burgess). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926, p. 22. This is Farris's well-known essay "The Nature of Human Nature."

see how these components can be separated. In a caste-structured society, however, the limits of one's development are narrow, and the potential changes are relatively meager.<sup>30</sup>

The margins of class are not well defined in a society like ours. Lives are not judged as wholes, but in terms of situations. If a person in a given situation identifies himself with a given status, or is so identified by others, the identification is real in its consequences. The symbols of class and status differ in various societies, and if, in a given situation, a person behaves efficiently toward these symbols in the prescribed manner, then he "belongs." Status is a continuous variable in a mobile society, and the symbols are defined in the ethos of the group concerned in terms of probability.

A person "belongs" where his most stable traits fit. As evidence of the extent to which one's traits are group phenomena, one need only momentarily transgress the probable boundaries of one's groups. Let a person visit across the tracks, across racial, sex, age-group, educational, and occupational lines and he is immediately aware that his traits do not fit; he feels like a "fish out of water." Stimuli are meanings, and our meanings come from our groups; they are the common traits which those groups have built into our action structures. The margins of our groups are the boundaries of our lives.

#### *The Concept of Social Distance*

The measure of social distance is the operational definition of one's status in any situation, and is often revealed in class, sex, and age group vocabularies. Any attempt to explain why people do what they do is handicapped if it fails to take this factor into consideration. In Chapter IX we stated the hypothesis that the ability of a person to take the role of another varies inversely with the social distance between them. A corollary holds that man's capacity for brutality to man varies directly with the social distance between them. Social distance is a relatively stable phenomenon, but it varies with the dynamic field structure.

Social distance is important in all conflict situations, especially those involving atrocities in war, race riots, labor strikes, lynchings, and all types of mob actions, as well as the relatively more calm social brutalities toward "criminals," the lower classes, and minor-

<sup>30</sup> The social class structure of the Southern Negro, however, appears to be much more complex than that of the white population. See Allison Davis and John Dollard, *Children of Bondage*, and John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*. New Haven. Yale University Press, 1937.

ity groups generally.<sup>31</sup> Itated is an index of, and an instrument for creating, such distance, as our own times so unhappily illustrate. Apparently a long-time trend toward democratic collective behavior is in the offing, and we hear much about the era of the common man. Such trends may lessen the social distance between components of social situations in the fields of the large corporation, nationality, race, social class, and religious and political groups, thus reducing the areas of conflict. People are able to adjust to each other with a minimum of friction because of common traits, particularly common identifications and vocabularies. But trends in the opposite direction have also made themselves felt. Many writers believe that our mobile or open class system is changing in the direction of more impermeable class boundaries. Then we are in for more class conflict, since the open class ideology remains in the ethos of our culture and nation in the form of the romantic-individualistic complex, and is given stability and continuity in the teachings of our public schools.

If the trend is toward a rigid class structure, the resulting restriction in access to the means of personal advancement will clash head-on with the democratic ideologies of the slowly changing national ethos. Leaders will be increasingly drawn from the upper classes, and the activities of workers will be increasingly directed toward strengthening labor organizations rather than toward rising out of them.<sup>32</sup> In the United States a surprisingly large proportion of the occupations of sons are determined by their father's occupational status. Davidson and Anderson give data to the effect that about 42% of the sons of our unskilled workers are also unskilled workers, and that about 72% never rise above skilled workers in the social scale.<sup>33</sup> During most of our history the cultural ethos has cut across class lines and made for a high degree of similarity in some types of behavior, all classes have sought pretty much the same things but in different degrees or amounts. Thus the

<sup>31</sup> "Criminal" is here used in the popular sense of prisoners who, statistics indicate, are almost exclusively persons of lower class status, due to the selectivity of our courts, laws, and patterns of enforcement, as well as to many other culture patterns.

<sup>32</sup> See Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," *American Sociological Review*, (Oct. 1938), Vol. 3, p. 679, and the Lynds' *Middletown in Transition*, pp. 72, 448, 455-7, 471-2, 485-6.

<sup>33</sup> P. E. Davidson and H. D. Anderson, *Occupational Mobility in an American Community* Stanford University Press, 1937, cited in Ogburn and Nimkoff, *Sociology*, pp. 32 and 321.

romantic-individualistic complex has represented cultural, not class, identification-insits, but presumably this would change with the passing of the open classes. One is impelled to believe that such trends are significant field conditions related to the New Deal movement and the tremendous growth of organized labor which was a relatively weak movement so long as men could rise out of the laboring class with relative ease.

Thus many of the meanings which direct our behavior are resultants of vast changes in social fields affecting large groups, and frequently inducing conflict between them. Under such conditions finding the source of the meanings in any specific group is difficult. Nevertheless the meanings we live by are those of our groups, whether they arise in conflict, rapid social change, or long-time evolution. To develop the techniques by which these meanings and their sources can be isolated and identified should be a fertile field of research to the student of behavior.<sup>34</sup>

Psychiatrists do not, as a rule, record the role of secondary symbols in relation to the personality structure which they observe. It is important to record the basic data about the position of the person in the social stratification of the community, as well as to report the symbol connections themselves.<sup>35</sup>

#### URBAN AND RURAL MEANING-STRUCTURES AS GROUPS

Studies in sociology indicate that in normal times large numbers of people migrate gradually from rural areas to villages to small towns to cities. They usually go progressively to larger and larger places until they end up in the large city or its satellite cities. Large cities represent meaning-structures of great heterogeneity and ill-defined social meanings with many conflicting definitions for many of the most important behavior norms. One would expect

<sup>34</sup> See the study of social classes as "learning environments for children" in Martha C. Ericson, "Child-Rearing and Social Status," *American Journal of Sociology*, (Nov. 1946), Vol. 52, pp. 190-2. The study investigates such matters as weaning, thumb-sucking, cleanliness, training, environmental exploration and control, and age, and sex roles. "The differences to be found between middle and lower class families are clearly group differences. Middle-class children are probably subjected to more frustration in learning and are probably more anxious as a result of these pressures than are lower-class children." (pp. 191-2)

<sup>35</sup> Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychiatry*, (1938), Vol. 1, p. 37.



to find a minimum of uniformities in such societies, yet the city creates its types, and the rural man has no difficulty in spotting the "city slicker." Cities produce an urban type, a recognizable system of common urban tinsits. City people are, in their own way, provincial and ethnocentric, which suggests that few people, if any, really live in a large city. The urbanite does identify himself with the city in a vague post-office sort of way, but most city people live in, and are intimately identified with, only relatively small groups. Their significant groups are related to business, politics, religion, neighborhood, and congeniality cliques. City people interact with only a small fraction of the people around them.

Observed from an airplane the large city is an area of highly uniform behavior patterns, but when one gets down into the city one sees differentiated neighborhood groups and other small groups into which people fit as comfortably as do those in small towns. The impersonality and anonymity of the larger aspects of city life with its diversity of group definitions drive people to identify themselves with these small personal meaning-structures. But the very diversity of groups, the constant bombardment of a variety of stimuli, the intensity of interaction, and the impersonal nature of relations determine for the city man a personality structure which can be recognized as urban. His hardness and sophistication are highly stable protective behaviors but are highly specific to certain competitive situations. The sentimentality, which some writers have accused him of, may represent a conflict between his secondary-group protective tinsits and his security feelings generated by his early primary-group training. Exact knowledge of these matters waits upon research.

These protective behaviors are valuable adjustment mechanisms in the dynamic impersonal life of the city. People reared in the isolation of rural areas are at a disadvantage in such a dynamic world. For the fullest development of a person's potentialities exposure to a wide variety of stimuli may be socially advisable, up to a point of diminishing return—a point not now known. Presumably such exposure is one of the functions of formal education. The locomotions of the city man bring him into contact with a large number of groups, but he seems to identify himself strongly with few. These many groups develop different means for the attainment of culturally defined ends. The delinquent, criminal, business, and professional man are all directed toward pretty much the same

ends, crime is the use of means disapproved by the dominant groups which control the approved means. Crime is crude, as are all common tinsits not identified with the dominant groups.<sup>36</sup>

Rural man is differentiated from the urban man by behavior patterns which pursue culturally defined ends by a different system of means, and he, too, is defined as crude by urban groups. Even the press, radio, and movies have not been able to unify the urban and rural meaning-structures, the conflict is apparently becoming more severe. Both use the same language but different vocabularies, and vocabularies are fundamental in the structuring of social fields. The rural man's vocabulary symbolizes a well integrated family enterprise built around a natural world of living objects, while the urban man's vocabulary symbolizes an individually competitive enterprise built around ephemeral manufactured objects and their artificial noises. Each of these large meaning-structures precipitates its own general personality types, and each is ethnocentric in its own way. Each has its own types of mores, folkways, traditions, and other expected biases. Each has its rewards and threats to keep its members in line. Each provides its own situations and guards its definitions with vigilance.

#### AGE LEVELS AS GROUPS

The rapidly changing age structure of the population of the United States, with its rapid decline in the proportion of youth and a similar increase in the proportion of older people, makes it easier for all to perceive the immense influence of age-groups in determining one's behavior. Age, like sex and race, is marked by highly visible outward signs, and the behavior defined for age-groups is therefore easily controlled in cultures where the norms for such behavior are well defined. A few years ago a popular expression was, "Be your age"; such injunctions will have more force in the future. Our population has been unusually young for so long a period that old age has been looked upon with distaste. As we approach a stable population, probably sometime before 2000 A.D., old age will gain in prestige and advantage and will unquestionably change many patterns of American behavior.

<sup>36</sup> An honest attempt to be objective often gives the impression of cynicism. See the Lynds' *Middletown in Transition*, p. xiv, and E. H. Sutherland *Principles of Criminology*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939, p. 180.

Although ageing is inevitable, its very gradualness makes it a kind of lubricant smoothing the frictions of social dynamics. The very obviousness of this fact seems to destroy its visibility. A population like ours contains large numbers of people in practically every age group from 1 to 70. One generation flows into another practically unnoticed. A generation is usually thought of as thirty years, but from the point of view of behavior, much smaller intervals show significant relative uniformities. Probably significant behavior differences could be shown to occur by ten-year intervals, and if that is true, most of us interact with about seven significant age groups for our lifetime. The jolt-absorbing capacity of such overlapping does for the group what prolonged infancy does for the individual. An infant can become human precisely because it has time, and the group survives the shocks of change on the same basis.

Every age group has an ethos of its own, its prescribed patterns of behavior, its rewards, restrictions, advantages, and disadvantages, defined by culture, race, nation, social class, and many other groups. Since we all interact daily with a variety of significant age-groups, it remains a problem why the different age-groups display so little understanding of each other's ways. Recent sociological studies indicate that even the younger age-groups tend to build up a kind of sub-culture of their own, a culture form intelligible only to those identified with it.

The youth-groups, for example, have their own standards of morals, dress, forms of recreation, and expected behaviors within and between the sex groups, attitudes toward their elders and toward all forms of authority, tests of excellence for types of dancing, music, and art, and above all a system of vocabularies frequently incomprehensible to members of either younger or older groups. *Needs are meanings, and meanings come from our groups.*

### THE SEXES AS GROUPS

Sex, like race and age, represents social definitions whose signs are characterized by high visibility and serve to accentuate the definitions. As in the behavior of the races, so in the sexes, the extent to which behavior is group-determined is relatively easily recognized. Every girl, woman, and lady, and every boy, man, and

gentleman<sup>37</sup> has much of his behavior "cut out" for him before he is born. These six terms are positively correlated with "male" and "female," but clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, and anthropologists have shown that the correlation is not as high as was once assumed, a finding to which "sissies" and "tomboys" can bear witness. The "masculine protest," the Oedipus and Electra complexes, and other Freudian mechanisms are social, not biological, phenomena. None knows better than the girl, woman, or lady what she may do and may not do, what she must do and must not do. The paths of every boy, man, gentleman are perhaps less restricted, but they, too, learn and obey the rules of the game. The rules are not written, they are part of one's behavior-structure, one's personality, and when conflict occurs, a potent generalized-other is available for consultation. "Be a man, be a gentleman!"

Such rules vary enormously with social class, race, nation, and culture, but in each instance they define situations for both sexes in their own vocabularies. That the easily verified similarities of each of the sex groups are highly stable and due to something besides "chance," is well illustrated by an advertisement for *Time* magazine. In a recent two-page spread *Time* announced:

Each week 1,500,000 women and 1,800,000 men read *Time*. Studies among equal numbers of *Time*-reading men and women show the intensity of readership by sex for each *Time* department. The readership figures reported here for each department are based upon 1600 personal interviews.

Some of the extreme differences in interests are indicated: department of art, 128 women readers for 100 men readers, business, 59 women to 100 men, international, 74 women to 100 men, music, 117 to 100, radio, 107 to 100; science, 73 to 100; and sport, 55 to 100. *Needs are meanings; meanings are group phenomena.*

### OCCUPATION AS GROUP

Some of the groups we have been discussing, such as occupation, will be treated in more detail in a later work. At this point we want to mention only two factors to illustrate how occupational groups determine behavior. In the first place, when a person enters an occupational group he makes one of the sharpest turns in the

<sup>37</sup> These terms are used rather than "male" and "female" because the latter are biological rather than social definitions.

path of his life. Identification with an occupational group involves the incorporation and integration of a whole series of new loyalties, attitudes, prejudices, obligations, restrictions, and selectors of all sorts. The friends of the occupational group become his friends, its enemies become his enemies, its competitors become his competitors. He adopts new fears, new hopes, and new life viewpoints. Occupation is one of the fundamental and final determinants of the structure of personality.

In the second place, the preceding change is largely accomplished by the necessity of adopting a new vocabulary. Cultures and nations have languages, smaller groups, especially occupational groups, have vocabularies. Every science, every profession, every skilled trade, every business, and every job has its own specialized vocabulary. And all sorts of etiquette and manners go with these forms of speech—the “bedside manner” of the physician and priest, the loquaciousness of professors and lawyers, the “schoolmarm manner” of the teacher, and the aggressiveness of the salesman. An occupation, if pursued until one is reasonably efficient in it, marks one for life, and in many respects reduces a person to a type, custom-made to fit comfortably into highly stable situations in which the occupational group is implicated.

The following excerpt describes neatly how a man is compelled to walk a straight occupational line.

Few people realize that science is merely a human institution. As such, it consists of a set of norms or rules to guide the behavior of men called scientists. Some of these rules are matters of simple logic, called scientific method. Among these are. Hold constant all factors except the one you wish to study. Quantify and measure wherever possible. Test facts, test accuracy, test samples, test hypotheses, test for biases, etc. Any textbook on the logic of scientific method states these rules which must govern a scientist. Science also has its mores, and the success of science as a social institution depends as much on its moral as upon its logical rules. These mores are unwritten, but inviolable, rules of behavior which the apprentice scientist absorbs unconsciously from his teachers, the violation of which, though he may never have formulated them, shocks him to the core. The most important of these moral virtues demanded of and inexorably enforced upon scientists are humility, honesty, co-operativeness, self-sacrifice, integrity.

The peculiarly dull literary style of scientific reports reflects the humility demanded of scientists. There must be no showmanship, no star billing, not even personal pronouns. There must be elaborate

presentation of the limitations of the method, of the sample, of the procedure. Great emphasis is placed on the underlying assumptions. There are careful warnings against unwarranted generalizations and an annoying—from the point of view of the outsider—hedging in all conclusions. "Probably means that," "tends to show that," "may be taken to suggest that," are used instead of forthright declarations of results. Incidentally, this rigorously impersonal and colorless style, without personalities, obscures the fact that all along personalities are operating and gives a curious illusion of science as being outside of human beings. Scientists are not supposed to cater to popular interest. A scientist who is also a popularizer is suspect. The true scientist should be above that. Few things disturb a scientist more than a dogmatic statement about anything. He is so accustomed to modifying every statement that a clear-cut declaration automatically leads him to challenge the author. He knows how frail is the factual underpinning of most generalizations. He is very humble about his own. If he were not, he would lose standing in his guild. He knows, furthermore, that his own contributions, however great, are possible only because of the work of many predecessors and contemporaries, which also helps to make him humble. . .

As every scientist knows, science is a co-operative undertaking. Scientists are truly co-operative. They share their findings. Every scientist is expected as a matter of course to publish the results of his studies. Cases like that of Dr. Dubois, the Dutch physician who secreted his prehistoric human skeletal remains for thirty years, are rare. The scientist abhors secrecy, as the atomic physicists have just taught the politicians. He wants to tell his colleagues all over the world what he has, he wants to know what they have. Scientists may and often do compete with one another or race to get there first, but they never fight one another. That would be destructive of their deepest values. Witness the indignation of scientists at the destruction of the Japanese cyclotrons. . .

The scientist is thus bound by mores more strict, more rigorous, more inviolable than most religious denominations would dare to require in the conformity of their members. The phenomenal success of science is due as much to the moral character of scientists as it is to their intellectual and logical acumen. Whatever evil use it may be put to, science is, within itself, the most profoundly moral of all institutions. Try to imagine what would have happened to the development of science if instead of being guided by the mores of humility, honesty, co-operativeness, self-sacrifice, and integrity scientists had been guided by the norms of exploitation and conflict. Suppose every great scientific discovery or scientific invention had been patented, kept from others, suppose scientists had tried to get rid of their competitors.

Suppose they had been secretive and suppressive. Suppose they had misled one another. Suppose, in other words, that the mores of capitalism had been their guide.<sup>38</sup>

The reader will recognize that the statement is an example of social control through the use of the significant symbol. No police are needed here—the vocabularies are impregnated with them. The control of behavior, its guidance, and its determination differ for other occupations and other groups only in direction and degree, the method is the same in all. Any competent person in any occupation could write a similar description of the selectors which that occupational group inculcates in its members.

### NEIGHBORHOOD AS GROUP

To argue that we find differences between city slums and upper class neighborhoods would be supererogatory. But equally absurd is the suggestion that the big difference between these two types of neighborhoods consists merely of the types of real estate. Even the most ardent "free-willer" admits that these two types of neighborhoods produce different types of human behavior, but strangely enough, many believe that others can raise themselves out of the slums *if they want to*. Obviously many do move, sometimes whole groups move out under varying ecological conditions and some have become highly successful in the larger city and nation. The advocate of free will in explaining why the others did not move out has no argument but free will—the others stay in the slums by an exercise of free will—or by failing to exercise it.

The impressive series of studies by Clifford Shaw and his associates shows the influence of neighborhoods on personality structures. A good summary of the studies, known as the Chicago delinquency studies, is presented by Professor E. H. Sutherland:

**The Neighborhood.** It has been evident for many decades that juvenile delinquents were much more numerous in some neighborhoods than in others. Shaw and his collaborators have amplified this information and organized it in relation to the general pattern of the American city. By an analysis of twelve series of statistics of juvenile delinquents in Chicago they reached the following conclusions. First, the rates of delinquency vary widely in different neighborhoods. No boys are

<sup>38</sup> This convincing statement is taken from a paper by Dr. Jessie Bernard: "Social Salvation Through Science." *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, (Jan. 1947), Vol. 46, pp. 46-9.

arrested in some areas, while in others more than one fifth of the boys are arrested in one year. This variation has been found in each of fifteen cities which have been studied in this manner. Second, the rates are generally highest near the center of the city and decrease with the distance from the center of the city. Also, the rates are high near large industrial or commercial sub-centers of the city and decrease with distance from those sub-centers. Third, the areas which have high rates of truancy also have high rates for all juvenile court cases, for all boys' court cases, and for all adult commitments to the county jail. The areas which have high rates for boy delinquencies also have high rates for girl delinquencies. Fourth, the areas which had high rates in 1930 had high rates, also, in 1900, although in the meantime the national composition of the population of the area had changed almost completely. When Germans and Swedes occupied an area near the center of the city their children had high rates of delinquency, when they were replaced by Polish, Italian or other national groups, the juvenile delinquency rates in the area were essentially the same. Fifth, the delinquency rate of a particular national group such as German or Polish shows the same general tendency as the delinquency rate for the entire population, namely, to be high in the areas near the center of the city and low toward the outskirts of the city. The juvenile delinquency rate of Negroes on the South Side of Chicago decreases regularly by square mile areas from 19.4 per cent in the area adjoining the center of the city to 3.5 per cent in the area five miles from the center of the city.<sup>30</sup>

This behavior stands out because we define it as delinquent, but it is still behavior and the processes by which it occurs are identical with the process determining what the larger ethos defines as normal behavior. The ethos of these neighborhoods defines what is normal for its members by age, sex, and class.

In a different type of neighborhood (field) the same processes lead to different types of behavior. The neighborhood is a child's world. Here his most intimate identifications are built into his action structure, and that is why the vast majority never "escape" from the slums any more than the vast majority never "escape" from high status neighborhoods. Slums are perpetuated by exactly the same mechanisms by which high status neighborhoods are perpetuated. By no means do all of the children in slum neighborhoods become delinquent, any more than do all children of "good" neighborhoods become good citizens. Our definition of environment teaches us to expect this. The most important element in any per-

<sup>30</sup> E. H. Sutherland *Principles of Criminology*, pp. 138-9



son's life is what other people think of what he does, especially the people to whom he is emotionally attached, or with whom he is most intimately identified. The attitudes of others toward a person are his most important meanings—the roles he daily imports and integrates into his self on the vehicles of the neighborhood vocabularies. Between him and the others is the least social distance, here he finds his status in most of his significant life situations.

### CONGENIALITY CLIQUES AS GROUPS

Every age-group, every sex-group—every group—is defined in the incorporated common meanings of its members. The most subtle nuances of commonality and difference are measures of the identifications which emerge in the highly intimate relations and dependencies of those social clusters we call congeniality groups. Here the person finds his most potent securities, the unstrained situations in which can dependably occur the smooth unchallenged emergence of a person's most complete self-actualizations. Even to sense a hint of being snubbed, jilted, or rejected by these groups often induces a serious traumatic experience. These are the groups whose identifications control much of the selectivity of the urban mind, and help it to endure, and often enjoy, by contrast, the high impersonality of secondary meaning-structures. This, even more than the family, is the final refuge from the "hurly-burly-buzz" of the world's indifference. Here occur the direct contacts with members of one's own class.

### FAMILY AS GROUP

After all that has been said we see no need to press the point in relation to this intimate and important group. Indeed, the facts here are so obvious that we should perhaps stress differences rather than similarities, that is, stress the differences in selectors and environments. Despite the high degree of commonality, no two children have exactly the same experience in the same family; differences in age and sex would account for this even if the different situations children and parents "get into" were not important. Although we cannot go as far as the Freudians in stressing the importance of the early years of family life as formative of the personality structure, we are not certain where the line should be

drawn. The future of this problem awaits technical research, as we shall see. The differences between urban and rural, northern and southern, white and negro, and upper and lower class families are great—many are the variables in the study of man.

### TIME ERAS AS GROUPS

We bring this series to a close by a suggestion about a meaning-structure of another dimension. Anyone who reads the history of the development of thought or of schools of thought is impressed by the extraordinary capacity of one's time or era to determine one's reflective and attitudinal behavior.<sup>40</sup> Each era has a dominant stock of ideas within the framework of which social interaction takes place.<sup>41</sup> In our own country's history the unseen hand of the social process can be observed determining the area of activity of the men of great ability of different periods; first it was land, then merchant shipping, and then government.<sup>42</sup> During our own time great talents are widely distributed, but they are largely engaged in the great industries, the professions and in the sciences, while government frequently flounders in the hands of rather ordinary men, many of whom are demagogues and mediocrities. We have some indications that the second half of the twentieth century may find great talents returning to government as the economic systems of western culture are everywhere threatened.

This does not mean that leadership is something apart from field structure. No one performing the functions of leadership can accomplish anything in disregard of the structure of the social fields in which he operates. The significance of great talents is their sensitivity to the most significant components of contemporary fields, to the emerging trends in the social process of which contemporary fields are dynamic segments.

<sup>40</sup> Such books are legion—the books by Parrington, Mead, Lichtenburger, Bogardus, and Randall are well known. See Henry Osborn Taylor: *The Medieval Mind*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1919, 2 vols.

<sup>41</sup> See Alfred North Whitehead. *The Function of Reason*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1929. This little book presents an interesting comparison of the stock of ideas available to the tenth and thirteenth centuries in western Europe.

<sup>42</sup> See Gustavus Myers. *A History of the Great American Fortunes*. New York: Random House, Inc. Modern Library Edition.

### 3. Meanings Come from Our Groups

In the above section we intentionally presented only some of the more obvious facts about how groups determine people's behavior. We cannot see how human nature can be understood without taking into consideration at least these relatively few groups, from which no one escapes. Yet the few are a considerable number, and they impress one with the nearly incredible nature of the process of integration, and of the nature of personality as system. Different personalities vary tremendously in the degrees of influence which these various groups play in personality formation, or in the determination of any specific behavior. The number of groups is great and since each group represents a continuous variable, the possible permutations are beyond calculation.

That meanings come from our groups refers to the fact that meanings are social products, symbols belonging to systems which we call our groups. Even when a meaning cannot be identified with a specific group, yet as symbol it has its genesis in interaction, and people are not divorced from their groups while they perform their acts. Groups are the cornerstones of one's apperceptive frame of reference, the bonds and substance of one's behavior structure. While one is not, in every interaction, officially appointed to represent any group, and while one may not be conscious of acting as a group representative, yet one cannot fully avoid that role. If others see a person as Catholic, Jew, Republican, Southerner, sportsman—that is what he is to them. Every adult, American, man is much more than these three sets of symbols, he is also middle-aged, male, Philadelphian, urbanite, Smith, East-Sider, middle-class, Protestant, businessman, sports fan, Rotarian, and dozens of other symbolic identifications. He needs no calculating machine or memory book; the integrators are built-in features of his action structure.

Symbols are highly prized properties of groups, and one never addresses another in interaction without using the appropriate group symbols, even though one may not be conscious of the fact that one is at the moment making allowances for specific group-identification-transits of self and other. One addresses another in some degree as friend, acquaintance, stranger; infant, child, adult, woman, lady, boy, man, gentleman; white, black, yellow, brown; Protestant, Catholic, Jew, agnostic; United States-American, foreigner; Northerner, Southerner, Easterner, Westerner; upper class,

middle class, lower class, rich man, poor man, beggarman, thief, doctor, lawyer, merchant, chief. All of these slip by our selectors so easily that we are not aware of having made allowances for every one of them. We take them for granted, and adjusting to others is in large measure "take-for-grantedness." When people complain that those who love them take them for granted, they miss a great truth. When a person takes you for granted it may seem painful, but is the highest compliment he can pay, he thereby demonstrates that you are essential to his existence. Only gods, sweethearts, and one's own people are objects of so great trust.

The closer we approach the smaller group, the groups with which we are usually most intimately identified, the closer we come to the central structure of one's personality. Man's behavior is determined by his groups in proportion as he is intimately identified with them. The control of a person's behavior varies in efficiency inversely as the size of the groups with which he is identified. The power of group to control the individual varies directly as the intimacy of his identifications.

This cannot be exactly the same for any two people or any two groups. Some personalities are habitually directed into such interactional situations that they identify themselves with a relatively broad community, others are narrowly organized. As one takes on new symbols from more and more differentiated groups, one's previous insights tend to weaken, while the fewer the probabilities one develops, the stronger they become.

As societies become more and more complex, meanings become increasingly uncertain and less specific, and the possibilities of group and personality conflict increase. A combination of circumstances seems to drive a person back to smaller groups where he can, to a satisfying degree, predict how his behavior will be determined. Large-scale human association like cities seems hardly more than an experiment. We cannot be certain that they will succeed. As we go from the small to the large group we seem everywhere to encounter less successful living, as this is measured by indexes of personal and social maladjustment.

## Chapter XII

### THE SOCIAL BASIS OF INDIVIDUATION

1. *The Social Mechanisms of Individuation*
  - A *Differential Permutations of Group-Identifications*
  - B *Differential Precision of Group Definitions*
  - C *The Margin-of-Error-in-Role-Taking*
  - D *The Cumulative Function of Error*
  - E *The Reorganizing Function of Emergence*
2. *Patterns of Intragroup Deviation*
  - A *A Tri-Modal Hypothesis*  
*Figure IX Tri-Modal Distribution of Social Behavior*
- 3 *Some Implications of Behavior as Emergent*
  - A *Everything is Product in an Emerging Universe*
  - B *The Concept of Personal Responsibility*
  - C *The Fallacy of Blame*  
*Blame Inhibits Understanding*
  - D *The Concept of Accountability*
  - E *The Inverse Relationship between Punishment and Correction*
  - F *Pride and Guilt*

The previous chapter emphasized commonality or relative uniformities in human behavior. This emphasis indicated the enormous areas of highly similar behaviors in people, now our task becomes not only to emphasize the behaviors measured on the lower ranges of the similarity continuum, but also to account for these deviations. The problem of similarity and difference was raised in the first section of Chapter III, and both of these areas of the similarity scale have played a part in much of our discussion. Among the members of a social group—any group—a measurable central tendency occurs in every kind of behavior. An individual's behavior will vary up and down the similarity scale with more or less uniformity, from one situation to another. The human personality is thus a dynamic structure whose components are all continuous variables on this scale. Those areas of behavior measured on the upper ranges of the scale we have referred to as one's commonality; those areas of behavior measured on the lower end

of the similarity scale we have referred to as one's individuality. The personality is a compound of these two, but the two are not entities, not two kinds of phenomena, they are different degrees of the same phenomenon, merely greater or lesser degrees of deviation from social norms.

## 1. The Social Mechanisms of Individuation

Why "social" mechanisms? Because a conspiracy of silence seems to blanket the subject. Western culture has a strong bias toward individualism, and this in large measure accounts for the skewed emphasis on the investigation and measurement of individual differences. Although these differences have not been accounted for exclusively in biological terms, yet the emphasis in the West has been highly organocentric, that is, individual differences in behavior have been largely attributed to differences in hereditary and constitutional factors of the human organism. The enormous volume of ingenious research in that area is so well known it would be presumptuous to attempt to review it here.

Recognizing the value and importance of that work, social scientists have long been convinced, and have generally urged, that social bases of individual differences or individuation are also present. But most of them have been content to account for this phenomenon merely by reference to such vague and broad concepts as "social conditioning" or "socialization." Other writers have doubted whether any true social, or extra-biological mechanisms of individuation could be isolated at all.<sup>1</sup> The weight of opinion, however, is to the contrary.

Owing to individual differences in characteristics such as temperament, ability, or energy there are enormous and important differences in the manner, persistence, and intensity in which ego-striving proceeds. And the relative position which will be regarded as personally satisfying to an individual is determined by such individual differences, *as well as* by the specific values he has learned. However, the important fact for social psychologists to remember is that these individual differences all function *within* the framework of norms prescribed by the reference or membership groups. Equally healthy, energetic, intelligent, resourceful people, endowed with similar tem-

<sup>1</sup> See W. L. Kolb "A Critical Evaluation of Mead's 'I' and 'Me' Concepts" *Social Forces*, (March 1944), Vol. 22, pp. 291-6.

peramental characteristics and with similar glandular structure would inevitably manifest different, perhaps quite opposite, ego-strivings according to the differing or contrasting referential frameworks in which their strivings took place.<sup>2</sup>

The present section is an attempt to isolate at least five of the actual mechanisms or specific means by which the social process induces such individuation.

### DIFFERENTIAL PERMUTATIONS OF GROUP-IDENTIFICATIONS

From what has been said about groups we know that we are born into them, or we are driven into them, or we are drawn into them, or we more or less fortuitously wander into them. Besides the permutation of groups discussed in the previous chapter, groups which no person can escape, most people come eventually to identify themselves with many more. People do not merely "belong" to a list of groups. It has been our position that these groups are configurations of symbols or polarized common meanings, and that every personality is an almost inconceivably complex integration of these many complex configurations. If a person could incorporate without integrating a configuration of symbols identified as a group, this would almost inevitably be a source of maladjustment. Integration is relative, a continuous variable, but for normal people, it is a matter of more rather than less.

The probability of any two persons representing identical permutations of group-memberships is so small, that we can safely say as a hypothesis that no two people could constitute identical permutations. The reason for this will be evident when we examine some of the conditions. In the first place, four of the properties of the tinsit are magnitude, direction, stability, and commonality; and each of these is a continuous variable functional to a situation or type-situation. In the second place, every group represents a large number of such tinsits, and in the third place, every personality represents a large number of groups. For practical purposes the number of possible permutations of values of these continuous variables is infinite. Anyone who wishes to take the trouble can

<sup>2</sup> Reprinted by permission from Sherif and Cantril: *The Psychology of Ego Involvements*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1947, p. 115.

quickly convince himself of this truth by reading Prof. Samuel A. Stouffer's "Notes on the Case Study and the Unique Case."<sup>3</sup>

Stouffer presents a hypothetical "simple" illustration of predicting success of a person in some activity for two separate time periods, each described by four mutually exclusive variables. This gives us twenty-four variables. The possible number of "static configurations" here is four to the third power equals sixty-four. "If ten traits were to be considered simultaneously the number of configurations would be four to the tenth power equals 1,048,576." Professor Stouffer cites a discussion on this point by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and comes out with the suggestion that an example using ten traits of a person would represent dynamic configurations to the extent of  $(4^{10})^2 = (1,048,576)^2 = 1,099,511,627,776$ .

With such an astronomically large number of different complex dynamic configurations possible from a relatively small number of trait categories and with only two time periods, it is evident how easy it is to make classifications which put every individual in the world in a different configuration. This is the general principle, of course, by which a small number of traits are used, in configurational analysis, to identify an individual from his fingerprints.<sup>4</sup>

Since we are talking about possibilities, let us consider the following. Let us say that a person is identified with fifty groups, and that each group represents one hundred common traits (a social class alone would probably represent several thousand) and that each of these common traits varies in magnitude, direction, stability, and commonality, each on a scale of 0 to 100. We should also realize that every group represents at least one vocabulary, usually several, that each group varies in degree on the organization-disorganization scale, and that each group is differentially selective, as Margaret Mead says, encouraging some traits, ignoring others, and suppressing still others in each individual.<sup>5</sup> The number of possible configurations here is probably an improvement on astronomy for sheer quantity. Groups put order into such a universe, but these numbers indicate how the very nature of the

<sup>3</sup> S. A. Stouffer in Paul Horst and others, *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment*, Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 48, 1941, pp. 240-9.

<sup>4</sup> S. A. Stouffer in Paul Horst and others, *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment*, Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 48, 1941, p. 242.

<sup>5</sup> In addition to all this, we should not overlook our common schizoid traits as represented by intra-culture conflicts. See Read Bain, "Our Schizoid Culture," *Sociology and Social Research*, (Jan.-Feb. 1935), Vol. 19, pp. 266-76.



social process operates to differentiate as well as unify. A human personality is a more complicated pattern than a fingerprint or a snowflake, but men can invent categories to create order out of such diversity. Nevertheless, this discussion indicates the impossibility of two persons ever representing identical permutations of group-memberships, a strictly social phenomenon.

### DIFFERENTIAL PRECISION OF GROUP DEFINITIONS

A second general social mechanism of individuation is the relative precision with which various groups define the behavior norms for their members in the many situations in which the groups are implicated. No group defines all of its situations with equal precision or rigor, and groups differ in this as wholes. All groups inculcate in their members those common-tinsets which we call groupways or folkways, the most precisely defined of which are the mores.<sup>6</sup>

#### IMPERATIVENESS AND PRECISION OF DEFINITION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES

100	Taboos	0	Compulsives	100
Forbidden	Discouraged		Encouraged	Demanded

All situations of all groups are structured more or less on such a scale as the above. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, would distribute all of its definitions along this scale, as would, say, a political party, but great differences would be apparent. As a hypothesis we may say that imperativeness of a behavior varies directly with precision of definition or with the distance from the point of origin, or zero on the above scale. If a behavior is going to be absolutely forbidden or demanded, one must know exactly what constitutes that behavior; it cannot be left in doubt; the minima must be known. Presumably deviation, or individuation varies inversely with the degree of precision of definition-of-situation; the less well a situation is defined, or structured, the greater will be the observed differences of behavior of group members in that situation. Predictability, then, will vary directly with degree of precision of definition or structuration.

Normally gentlemen are encouraged to tip their hats to ladies in appropriate situations, and this can be done acceptably in many

<sup>6</sup> See section 8, Chapter X.

ways, even by touching the brim with a finger. But on formal occasions, the hat must come off, and in a relatively well prescribed manner. Little deviation occurs in the latter. One need but relate this to our first mechanism, and an elaborate pattern of possible individuation appears as normal in any society. Add to this that particularly in a highly dynamic society, every group is constantly acquiring new members, whose facility in the groupways varies considerably at first, and we immediately complicate the picture.

### THE MARGIN-OF-ERROR-IN-ROLE-TAKING

This mechanism, explained in Chapter IX, is possibly the most elaborate of the social mechanisms of individuation. We shall discuss it under several heads. In the first place, ability to take the role of the other depends upon the degree to which one is paying attention. This may be determined by many social conditions as well as by numerous psychological (personic) conditions. The particular set of selectors with which one is equipped in a situation will be an important factor, as will distracting noises, sights, smells, and "differences of opinion."

Secondly, the *degree of emotionality* (emotions are meanings) will play a fundamental role in one's ability at role-taking. One does not do well in role-taking when one is afraid, angry, or jealous. In the third place, selector bias, apart from its influence on one's paying attention, will determine role-taking ability in very large measure. A capitalist finds it difficult to take the role of a Communist, and *vice versa*. The difficulty arises also between extreme personality types, introvert and extrovert, for example, or between Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, generally speaking, or between rich and poor, young and old, upper and lower classes, congressmen and professors, and professional people and laymen.

A fourth factor leading to a margin-of-error-in-role-taking is selector-conflict, or personality conflict as it is usually called. Such conflict can lead to errors so great as to represent failure to take another's role at all. But frustrations and inhibitions may also, in some situations, be facilitating devices. A fifth factor in this type of deviation is social distance. When a mistress and her maid have a "difference of opinion," the difference may be final, but this varies in degree. Labor and management might be able to settle their differences more satisfactorily if it were not for this factor. Social

distance occurs between groups as well as between individuals, and people representing such groups find it difficult to take the role of the other. A sixth factor is vocabulary. This may be involved in the five previous factors or may be a factor by itself. The layman and the professional man frequently have vocabulary difficulty. In addition to differences in vocabulary, the individual differences in facility in vocabulary are an important factor, and this is as frequently social as physiological—stuttering, for example, or accent.

Finally, we may state as a hypothesis that role-taking can be characterized as a general ability.<sup>7</sup> Whatever the reasons may be, people do seem to differ (and resemble each other) in general role-taking ability, in all sorts of situations. Possibly this factor is important in the determination of an individual's type, if not specific, occupation. There is reason to believe that people who under normal conditions are good role-takers find their way into the professions and other occupations which are intimately concerned with people; the poorer role-takers showing more interest in the manipulation of things, in business or in laboratories. Certain "tough," "hard" executive types (William James' "tough minded") seem to be poor role-takers in normal life situations. "A man who seriously humiliated others proved to be a person who could not easily be humiliated."<sup>8</sup> However any attempt to find types on this basis, as on any other, by generalizing regardless of situation, will fail dismally. People probably differ in this capacity as a function of the age continuum, and possibly by sex, under certain conditions.

### THE CUMULATIVE FUNCTION OF ERROR

Even if one made no errors after the first one, the first one itself would, by its cumulative effect, develop into a considerable final deviation. All men continually exhibit a margin-of-error-in-role-taking. The ease with which this occurs is demonstrated in studies of rumor. As a rumor spreads it frequently changes in shape and content, adding or substituting some elements and dropping or transforming others.

During World War I the author participated in training de-

<sup>7</sup> I hope, in a future work, to present data and analysis suggesting the possibility of isolating personality-types based on this general ability. To what extent this ability is based on social and on biological factors is not yet known.

<sup>8</sup> Folsom: *The Family*, p. 324

signed to enable combat soldiers to carry verbal messages. Eight to twelve men would be stationed about one hundred yards apart. The first man was given a verbal message and made to restate it until he had it correctly. He then walked the hundred yards and relayed the message to the second man, and so on down the line. By the time the message reached the fourth man it was significantly changed, and by the time the twelfth man got it, it was frequently unrecognizable. Error is cumulative, affected by the subtractive function of forgetting and the additive function of embroidering. Remembering is highly selective behavior.

### THE REORGANIZING FUNCTION OF EMERGENCE

As we have seen in our discussion of emergence, every thought, every act, involves in some degree a reorganization of the personality. We learn (change) by doing, we learn by what emerges. Thus we have a margin-of-error when we act out an attitude as well as when we incorporate it. Once a person has performed an act he is never again exactly the same, and frequently he is significantly different, over a long period he is inevitably significantly different. This, then, is a fifth social mechanism of individuation.

These five mechanisms operating in social interaction are some of the sources of individual differences among men. Probably as the science of human behavior loses its extreme organocentric bias, other social mechanisms will be isolated and analyzed on a high level of abstraction. If all human organisms were born identical, these five continuous influences alone would probably differentiate men socially almost to the extent that they are now socially differentiated.

With reference to the first mechanism mentioned, modern cultural anthropology apparently does not need to consider somatic phenomena in determining the basis for cultural variation throughout the world. And sociologists have apparently not found such a reference necessary in accounting for intra-cultural group differences. When we contemplate these five mechanisms operating together reciprocally, probably the cumulative effect distributes man in various clusters all along the many continua of social deviation and conformity. These mechanisms, and probably others, induce the emergence of differential selector-systems, while the selector-systems maintain the stability of the deviations.

## 2. Patterns of Intragroup Deviation

In section 1, we stated that *differential precision of group definitions of situation* is one of the chief social mechanisms of individuation. The hypothesis was suggested that a close positive correlation occurs between the degree of precision of a situation's definition and the degree of predictability of member behavior in that situation. If we assume that the social as well as the somatic mechanisms of individuation operate in such a manner as to induce a normal distribution of deviations, and if we assume further that the precision of a society's definition is also normally distributed, then probably the behaviors of members of a society would follow a normal curve. The predictability of a person's behavior would then be a function of such conditions. Normally defined or structured situations would elicit behaviors patterned in the form of a normal curve, and taking the situations on the extreme ranges of the curve we would find situations so well and so badly defined as to elicit maximum uniformity and predictability.

This hypothesis suggests that situations not fortified by any visible symbols of group definition would elicit behavior in the form of a true J-curve, those fortified with normally expected symbols of definition would tend to elicit behaviors in the form of the normal bell-shaped curve, and those situations heavily fortified with symbols of definition, rigorously defined situations, would tend to elicit behaviors in the form of what F. H. Allport called the J-curve, really the reverse J-curve.<sup>9</sup> As we move from what appear to be the most clearly defined to the least clearly defined or structured situations, behavior would progressively take the form of left modal, normal, and right modal distributions.

For illustrative purposes we may consider the following gradation of situations differentially structured in relation to the precision with which they define the expected behavior of motorists. Beginning with the center of a city and going out into the open country, the motorist goes from very precisely defined traffic situations, through traffic situations normally defined, and on into situations which at first appear to be undefined *but which are actually*

<sup>9</sup> Those not familiar with the work of F. H. Allport and his students on the J-curve may find a good short review in Katz and Schanck, *Social Psychology*, Chapter III.

*precisely defined in a negative way by the very absence of social symbols of traffic regulation.*

1. A central urban cross-street fortified with many highly visible social symbols of definition, stop signs, traffic lights, and traffic police, both pedestrian and motor.

2. A cross-street fortified with stop sign and traffic lights, with foot police standing on the corner sidewalk

3 A cross-street fortified with stop sign and traffic lights.

4 A cross-street fortified with traffic lights

5. A cross-street fortified with stop sign

6 A cross-street fortified with a caution sign.

7. A cross-street not fortified with any visible defining symbol.

8 A suburban cross-roads with high visibility in all directions, fortified with a stop sign.

9 A country cross-roads fortified with a caution sign

10 A country cross-roads of high visibility in all directions and not fortified with any visible symbol of group definition of the situation.

#### A TRI-MODAL HYPOTHESIS

The preceding gradation of social situations appears to represent a progressive movement from a well-defined situation highly fortified with social defining symbols, through normally defined traffic situations, to situations which appear at first to be undefined situations in so far as traffic signs or other defining symbols are concerned. The apparent undefined nature of number 10, however, is an illusion, for operationally it is as well defined as number 1. The high visibility of the cross-roads with the obvious absence of fortifying symbols operates as a powerful configuration of fortifying symbols practically inviting the motorist to disregard the cross-roads, since if there were any danger, there would be a sign of warning. The absence of markers defines the situation practically as open road. In the absence of research data on this type of situation, practical experience and certain studies suggest the hypothesis that perhaps about 90% of motorists would not slacken their pace at all, a few might slacken a little, and a very few might even slow down; but probably none would stop.

Most motorists, or more accurately, motorists most of the time,

do not drive on any such complete gradation as that illustrated; they spend most of their driving time on some segment of the continuum. But if social behavior were customarily distributed on a complete gamut, the distribution would probably be tri-modal, as illustrated in Figure IX.




Figure IX. Tri-Modal Distribution of Social Behavior <sup>10</sup>

The hypothesis drawn from the gradation of ten traffic situations and Figure IX is that the skew toward uniformity and predictability of social behavior of this type varies directly with precision of definition of situation. Nothing need be said about "motives" or "fear of police" or "conscience," or any other conative phenomena; we merely observe that certain relative uniformities occur in the presence of certain degrees of precision of definition. The extremes of the continuum represent highly fortified consensual patterns, while the center represents personal definitions.

<sup>10</sup> Situations 5 and 7 of the gradation given above are approximations of the situations measured by M. Dickens in F. H. Allport, R. L. Schanck and M. Dickens: *Psychology at Work* (ed by P. S. Achilles). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1932, Chapter 7, p. 228. Situation 10 is hypothetical.

normally distributed in accordance with somatic and social mechanisms of individuation.

We are not suggesting that all social behavior takes this tri-modal form. The example is a complete pattern, and presumably all social behavior is distributed in patterns representing some variation of this whole.<sup>11</sup>

### 3. Some Implications of Behavior as Emergent

As this book draws to a close, fatigue and misgiving color one's thoughts. Possibly some things have been said that ought not to have been said, some things that ought to have been said that have not been said. The prospect of setting out to map human behavior is awesome, and perhaps only the foolish attempt it. Whenever we pick up a new book and look at the table of contents, we wonder how the book's author happened to draw that particular map of his materials. Every act, indeed, has a complicated history. A table of contents looks so neat and orderly that it appears to be the natural way to tell the story, yet of the thousands of books on human behavior, no two maps are quite the same. The potential paths through the universe are numberless, and from each we get a glimpse of something more or less familiar and something more or less new.

### EVERYTHING IS PRODUCT IN AN EMERGING UNIVERSE

Fortunately for those who have to talk or write—and more so for those who have to listen and read—some semblance of order and logic, eventually illuminates the process if continued long enough. But periods of anguish and despair crop up as well as of hope and confidence. The author, relentlessly pressed by the necessity of organizing himself before critical audiences, gradually through the years found himself saying something like this: 1) since behavior is action, the unit of which is tendency, and 2) since personality, or human nature, seems to be a system of such tenden-

<sup>11</sup> The author's researches during the war as Chief of the Research Section, Division of Social Protection, F. S. A., indicate that sexual behavior in the army followed the pattern of Figure IX. The army endeavored to fortify known situations to induce the left modal pattern. The Kinsey report indicates that the right modal pattern is standard for the general unmarried male population.



cies, and 3) since the system is aroused only by stimuli, and 4) since stimuli are meanings, and 5) since meanings come from interaction in one's groups, therefore 6) personality or human nature is an emergent product of interaction in one's groups.

Such is hope, that this simple series of statements at first looked like a fairly adequate logic of behavior, but the insistent phenomenon of emergence soon changed that. Anyone who ever sets out to investigate any problem soon discovers that categories are not part of nature or of one's data, they have to be manufactured, and a table of contents is a more or less orderly arrangement of categories, revealing its maker intellectually undressed before the world. The present table of contents emerged out of the six propositions stated above.

We hold the universe, of which the social process is a phase, to be an ongoing process without beginning or end in so far as science is concerned. Science is but one type of conceptual system among others, and it creates its own types of facts. Metaphysics, philosophy, theology, and aesthetics are other types of conceptual systems, and they create and manipulate facts within the framework of their own definitions and logic. They may be concerned with the beginning and end of process, but science cannot be, with its present limitations.

Within the limits of scientific systems the social process is quite as natural as any other organic or inorganic process. In this ongoing affair everything is a product of interaction, an emergent in a total system of becoming. Meaning-structures, which are the environments of human living, are as much products as are personalities. Cultures and all other groups are dynamic products of interaction; the human organism, of which personality is an emergent property, is a dynamic product of interaction; all are emergent, even human nature.

Because of this point of view we have not been able to use the traditional dichotomous concept of heredity-environment. Some readers may feel that we have given undue weight to meaning-structures, or to personic selectors as distinguished from somatic selectors which are traditionally referred to as biological or "hereditary" factors. The general place of somatic selectors was indicated to a degree considered sufficient in an outline of a conceptual formulation. Our viewpoint has been that the influence of the biological factors, like the influence of any other set of field conditions,

must be measured by the extent to which they influence meanings, for meanings are the stimuli to human behavior. Whatever influences the manner in which a person perceives a situation is, to that extent, a field condition operating to determine his behavior.

We have indicated that personality is a phase of the organism, that it is activated and formed dynamically by its meaning-structures, as limited and directed by all types of selectors, that meaning-structures are selective aspects of personality, and that the only concept which can comprehend such dynamic processes is the concept of emergence in interaction. In such a system of thinking it seems to us unrealistic to speak of "hereditary" factors as opposed to "acquired" factors, for everything emerges in interaction. All is process, a continuous, changing, and emerging system of becoming. Processes do not acquire things; they just go on and on under conditions which are for us to investigate. The conditions are other aspects of the total process.

At various moments in the never-ending process we take photographic or stroboscopic stills, as it were, and analyze the results up to that point. The results at any given time we call product, but an emergent product is not a finished thing. The individual as product is a momentary segment of the general process, aspects of which are studied by various scientific disciplines at various levels of behavior. Hence we prefer not to speak of somatic and personic acquisitions, but of somatic and personic phases of the process. Both are aspects of one process. Aspects of natural phenomena are not parts of the phenomena but parts of methodologies by which phenomena are defined and studied; they are selective responses of differently trained scientists approaching the study from different angles. Accuracy is a function of the methodology, and varies inversely with the breadth and inclusiveness of concepts.

How odd to look upon the nuclear structure of the atom as something to be studied in relation to the total process we call the universe, and at the same time to look upon *that which* studies this nuclear structure as something to be studied apart from its relationship to the universal process! Man is as much a part of nature as is an earthworm or an atom. And everything in the universe to which he can give meaning is a potential stimulus to his behavior in the total process.

The thought that everything in the universe may, under proper

conditions, be a stimulus does at first raise doubts about the possibility of making a science of human behavior in what appears to be a "chaotic" situation. Such doubts arise under various conditions, two of which are. 1) the fact that people generally believe "all the phenomena of the universe" to be free in the same sense in which people believe they themselves are free, indeed that would be chaos, 2) our schools do not explain the process by which people respond selectively and to only one segment of the universe at a time *The mechanisms for the orderly manipulation of phenomena do not reside in the phenomena, they reside in conceptual systems and their tested devices* Concepts bring the universe "to heel" Concepts make a "universe" out of a "multiverse" When we say we have reduced the universe to order, we mean we have reduced to order our symbolic behavior toward that which we call the universe.

In order to maintain contact with one's time one must resort now and then to such statements as "organism determines environment and environment determines organism," but we hope this practice will not have to be continued many more years. Both are simultaneous aspects of one unity Anything that occurs in the somatic phase or in the personic phase cannot possibly be unrelated to the other, but the relationship is a continuous variable The purely organic and the purely personic are purely conceptual But since we are dealing with relationships of different phases of a process, we designate an event of phase X as significant for phase Y only when the event of phase X is transformed and observed in terms of the level of behavior represented by phase Y By this we mean that interactional phenomena customarily studied on the organic level (for example, the behavior of the endocrine glandular system) are significant for the personic level only when such changes at the organic level are transformed into behavior usually studied on the personic level, and *vice versa*.

Changes in glandular balance may be correlated with changes in behavior on the personic level (some instances of deep emotional depression or euphoria), but the search for "which-causes-which" is not a profitable pursuit, and psychosomatic methodology approaches the problem as a whole, studying the conditions under which such correlations occur. The so-called hereditary capacities such as the capacity for intelligent behavior, motor coordination, temperament, and emotional stability should be approached from

the same point of view.<sup>12</sup> No phase of the interactional process operates as a unilateral cause.

### THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

From the thought processes developed in this book emerges a logic which compels one to believe that, since personality is an emergent product, people cannot logically be blamed for what they do or fail to do, or for what they are. Since personality is a system of tinsits of varying degrees of stability, time is needed for personality to emerge as system. When the child becomes aware of his own behavior as system, the self has emerged as his core of consistency, and he behaves toward that configuration of probable behaviors as object, just as he behaves toward other such systems. When the child knows with a high degree of probability what he will do in a given situation, he has become aware of his system of tinsits. By behaving toward this system in the same manner in which he does toward other such systems (other people), he unwittingly becomes a participating component of the social process. From then on, any person's tinsit of his own system can be directed toward the system of which it is a part.

Self when it first emerges is a relatively simple affair, but since self is selective, it will determine, usually unconsciously, what subsequent selectors will be incorporated in its interactional fields. What this relatively simple self means to the child, and what the mature self means later to the adult, is mirrored in the behavior of others who see it and are involved with it in social interaction. One learns to know one's self by taking the role of others toward that self as a system of meanings or probable behaviors in highly stable (recurring) situations. Meanings come from our groups, where the self and the larger personality come from. Every normal child is destined either to die or become human, but he is absolutely impotent to shape the process. His merging with social process is as inevitable as the rising of the sun. The child is not an additive summation of anything, he is a product; not a passive receiver, but a selective interactor. The social process is not something laid on like an appliqué, it is an integration. He is in his groups and his groups are in him. He is an integral part of the social process.

We shall have to find a new and socially acceptable substitute

<sup>12</sup> See Lewin: *Personality*, Chapter VII, on feeble-mindedness.

for the conventional concept symbolized by the word "responsibility," for if personality is product, one cannot be held responsible for one's actions in the sense in which the term "responsible" is popularly used. The child and the adult in our culture are motivated by the illusion of free choice because free choice is part of the ethos of their culture which has been built into their action structures. With an ethos like ours the individual normally holds himself responsible for his acts. *But when a person holds himself responsible for the social process, there can be no greater confirmation of the thesis that he is an integral part of it.* For a person to hold himself responsible for his behavior is evidence of man's diseased ego, and a brazen effrontery to the majesty of the universe. Many, but not all, cultures inculcate this kind of ego in their victims. Nevertheless, just as a person can find significance only in his groups, so mankind can find significance only in its proper niche in the universal scheme of things. The thought that it could be otherwise is one of nature's errors.

If man did "fall," we offer as another guess that the fall consisted of his early apostasy in thinking of himself as an independent variable having reality apart from the universe, and that the emergence of the symbolic process so filled him with the error of arrogance that he structured his thought about himself and the universe in the exalted dichotomy "man *and* nature." But he treated nature more as a poor relation than as an equal, until he began to be lonely and afraid in the vastness of the void. This pervading fear, coupled with his colossal pride, led him to reconsider and grant even a hesitant partial acceptance to what he interpreted as an invitation to become the child of God. Indeed, he eventually claimed this divine power as his birthright, for was he not, after a fashion, a deity too? He compromised by forming his deities in his own image, and claimed "Sonship" by biological inheritance, the thought of which has filled him with a permanent anxiety neurosis. Having gone this far, his extreme individualism was but a further step in the same direction, and this led him to believe that he could repudiate his groups with impunity, unmindful that this latest apostasy is the catalytic agent in the decay of his social institutions.

The doctrine of free will is, from the scientific point of view, the ultimate arrogance, the original and final blasphemy. But man's apostasy and pride are not attributable to his being endowed with

freedom from the laws of the universe, but rather to error, enhanced and perpetuated by the cumulative property of error.<sup>13</sup> Man must recognize his age-old error, and accept the security and humility of being, like all other natural phenomena, subject to the laws of the universe of which he is an integral part.<sup>14</sup> He must learn that his behavior, like that of all the rest of nature, is determined by the conditions under which it occurs.

### THE FALLACY OF BLAME

We look upon the theory of personal responsibility as a function of this error of belief in free will in man's relation to the universe. The theory of personal responsibility has had disastrous results as a selector-system preventing man from investigating the various conditions under which he behaves. Since he sees no relationship between these conditions and his behavior, he falls back on invective, scapegoating, and the general concept of blame. Blaming is by no means restricted to behavior involving ethical judgments; people apply it daily to all acts which they do not like. Legal processes and other institutions function to fix blame for the violation of social definitions, but relatively few people in relatively few situations make any serious effort to obtain the facts before passing judgment on others.

The act of blaming is probably the most frequent of all human acts in our culture, even among Christians, who are officially enjoined to hate sin but not sinners. The act of blaming varies all the way from blaming one person for accidentally bumping into another, to the imprecations of the man on the street in blaming the commanding officers for the debacle at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The tinsit to blame seems to suffer no embarrassment over the lack of facts in a situation; if we don't like something, the thing to do is to blame someone, or even something. Parents blame their children; children blame their parents; and friends and enemies blame each other for everything. If a person can live a full day in our culture without blaming or being blamed for something, it

<sup>13</sup> As we stated on our first page error is everywhere manifest in this imperfect universe. Witness the wonders of the buds and flowers of spring, and the late frosts and storms which kill them. The components of the universe are not perfectly correlated. Error is a function of physical, as well as social, fields. Science deals with probability.

<sup>14</sup> See Chapter I, pp. 3 and 4.

probably means that he is not doing anything significant. The basis for blame is always the same, namely, the assumption that the person blamed freely chose to act so, no other justification for blame is possible.

If a child is reported "delinquent," almost everyone feels free and competent to pass judgment and assess responsibility for the act. In any such act almost everything and everybody in the community may be blamed by someone—the child's parents, his teachers, the school system, the police, the courts, the churches, the legislature, the capitalist system, the New Deal, the "race problem," and even, on occasion, the weather. Presumably people are in such instances attempting to determine the "cause" of the act, and the majority probably find it in the child himself, but judgments are usually diverse enough to cast blame in all directions. This action has been going on for generations, while social maladjustment has been increasing along with the variety of conditions and persons blamed for it. In order to condemn an act or a social condition people feel they must blame some *person* or some *group*. This is the fallacy of blame, for it is possible and scientifically logical to condemn a behavior without condemning or blaming the person behaving.

Blame is a need in a free-choice system of thinking. But what does it accomplish? 1) It enables people to clear their systems, temporarily, of some of their aggressive tinsits, 2) it provides tacit approval for our present state of ignorance about the person blamed and about the "causes" of behavior, 3) it creates personal satisfaction for having done what people are socially expected to do—express their disapproval of such acts, and of whoever or whatever was "responsible" for them; 4) it reinforces the errors of scapegoating in our culture; 5) it efficiently frustrates the efforts of trained workers to apply their knowledge, and finally 6) it effectively operates as a substitute for, and thus prevents, the investigation of, relevant conditions under which behavior occurs.

Blaming is easier and quicker than investigating and trying to understand. Blaming has contributed nothing to understanding, and little to the prevention of, delinquent behavior, or to facilitation of any other kind of behavior. The act of blaming serves merely as a safety valve for the release of the displaced hostilities which are themselves the logical resultants of the theory of personal responsibility. Society can protect itself by condemning behaviors without

also condemning the person. Granted that society could do so, why should it? What are the advantages? Let us take, as an example, some form of behavior usually called "aggressive."

*Blame Inhibits Understanding*

Delinquent behavior is usually interpreted as aggressive action, but blame is also aggressive action. People take aggressive action against each other under two general conditions which may be described as emotional and rational, for want of precise terms. Both of these are, of course, phases of a continuous variable. The important point is that *each effectively inhibits the other*, the more violent the emotion, the less understanding, and *vice versa*. Blame represents emotionally toned aggressive action and inhibits understanding, just as understanding inhibits the tinsit to blame. A parent or a society may spank a child as a measure of correction, or they may spank a child as a measure of punishment. These two spankings have entirely different meanings, both to the spanker and the spanked.

To counter aggressive action with aggressive action when the latter is based on blame accomplishes several possible results. 1) it inhibits both the desire (stimulus) and the ability to understand—in both parties, 2) it reinforces and strengthens in the person blamed the very aggressiveness for which he was blamed, 3) it tends, to the extent of the problem, to destroy instead of to improve the social effectiveness of the personality of both, 4) and perhaps most important of all, it operates as a substitute for the study of the field structure which induced the behavior for which the person was blamed.

This volume is an attempt to understand behavior, and the principles presented here are, we believe, fundamental for three classes of people—those in pursuit of a scientific understanding of behavior for its own sake, those upon whom other people are dependent, including teachers, parents, counselors, social workers, lawyers, and therapists of all kinds; persons in various positions of authority whose judgments involve the well-being of others to a high degree, and lastly, those seeking a comprehensive conceptual system as a frame of reference for the investigation and interpretation of behavior.

No one, to our knowledge, has as yet been able to erect anything approaching a science of human behavior on the basis of free-choice, a necessary corollary of which is the philosophy of



blame and praise.<sup>15</sup> Psychiatrists, trained social workers, and counselors recognize that one cannot understand, and therefore cannot cope with, the behavior of others unless one expertly divests one's self of all tendencies to pass judgment on the person or group whose behavior is involved, no matter what the situation is.<sup>16</sup> And what is good for the professional person is good for the layman. Professor D. B. Klem calls this the "detached attitude," of which he says

Not to praise, not to blame, not to accept or reject, not to look for moral implications, but just to understand, is the essence of this attitude.<sup>17</sup>

Passing judgment need not be verbal, nor as visible as scapegoating; frequently more subtle gestures reveal it. We recall a statement by a psychiatrist whose rules for the interview consist of four don'ts. don't convict, don't condemn, don't compare, and don't condone.<sup>18</sup>

That is the way a mechanic deals with a disordered motor. The behavior of all living things, and of all dynamic phenomena, has a history; it is an integral part of some pattern or system, and can be understood only in terms of that system. All behavior is normal for the conditions under which it occurs, if we would understand behavior, we must understand the relevant conditions under which it occurs, and we usually find that the stimuli (meanings) involved are the primary conditions. The conditions may be abnormal, but the behavior, never.<sup>19</sup> Acts occur only as part of a system of tendencies-in-situation. That a trait is not highly stable does not make it irrelevant, unstable acts are correlates of unstable situations, but they represent the personality in such situations. An act cannot, without violence and error, be torn from the situation of which it is a part.

<sup>15</sup> See Jessie Taft "The Catch in Praise" *Child Study*, Feb. 1930

<sup>16</sup> Psychiatrists, however, often abet this popular error by the practice of looking for the sources of maladjustment in the individual quite apart from the conditions in the social fields in which he behaves.

<sup>17</sup> Klem *General Psychology*, pp. 80-1

<sup>18</sup> Herbert E. Chamberlain, M.D., formerly Psychiatric Consultant, Children's Division, State Department of Social Welfare, Sacramento, California. See also Trigant Burrow *The Biology of Human Conflict* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937, Chapter III, "The Behavioral Fallacy of Right and Wrong."

<sup>19</sup> We do not suggest that the conventional technical use of the concept of normal behavior be abandoned; the above statement merely offers a point of view for the study of behavior, not a classification of behaviors.

Blame almost invariably involves anger, hatred, and the idea of punishment. Punishment induces the need for retaliation. Understanding involves sympathy and efficient role-taking, and induces the thought of correction and cooperation. The same disciplinary act may be given (and received) either as punishment or as correction, depending on its meaning to giver and recipient. For either society or parent to spank as correction is by no means the same as to spank as punishment. Both acts are aggressive, but one is based on blame, and the other on understanding.

### THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY

One must grant the nobility of the Christian ideal of hating the act instead of the actor, but observation indicates that the ideal does not work under present conditions, for blame and praise are logically inevitable under conditions represented by a free-choice methodology. If a person is what he does, then hating what he does, under a free-choice "setup," requires blaming him for doing it, or for "being that way." And this is the fallacy of blame, blame is always directed against persons, while disapproval may be directed at acts. The idea of punishment logically follows from blame; blame logically follows from the concept of personal responsibility; personal responsibility logically follows from the concept of free-choice. Therefore we substitute the concept of *personal accountability* for the concept of *personal responsibility*. For the sequence responsibility-blame-punishment we substitute the sequence accountability-understanding-correction.

People do what they do in any situation because of the meanings they receive (give) in that situation, and these meanings are correlative to the tinsits built into their action structure in their groups. When we blame people for what they do, we are actually blaming them for not giving (receiving) the same meanings we do, and we assume that our own meanings are the consensual meanings. But if a person does not find consensual meanings in a given situation, by what magical formula can he be held responsible? Is the child free to pick his own selectors?

If, however, we deny personal responsibility and offer no substitute, we deny the possibility of human society. If a person can be held responsible at all, he is responsible only within the limits of his selector-system, but such an imputation of responsi-

bility is gratuitous since a person's selector-system is an emergent product. We can, however, hold a person accountable, and we therefore substitute the concept of accountability. When a person's behavior threatens its welfare, society must hold him accountable and reserve the right to deny him access to the larger social process—for repairs, as it were, but not for punishment. He must be corrected, reconditioned, and retrained at the expense of society whose product he is. We cannot blame the social process, but we can recognize its errors in terms of its norms.

Most behavior, however, involves not whole societies but relatively small groups, relatively small aspects of society, such as schools, families, and play groups, all of which have their own control devices. We may use these same devices for correction or punishment, but the effects are quite different in each case, for the meaning is different. Highly skilled parents who correct their children's mistakes instead of punishing their misdeeds are aware of the difference. Social distance as it appears in correction is a positive source of security, whereas in punishment it negates and destroys security. Cool and thoughtful aggressive action is directed toward accountability and correction, highly emotional aggressive action is directed toward blame and punishment.

Praise is often assumed to be a corollary of blame, but this is not a logical necessity. When skillfully used, praise is justified on pragmatic grounds as an effective device for social conditioning, for facilitating role-taking, and for defining situations by calling attention to socially approved models as stimuli to behavior. Praise is an important device in learning, for it confirms and reinforces our most stable insights. Praise is effective even for animals which, presumably, are not endowed with free will. We approach the mechanism of praise and blame not ethically or sentimentally but from the point of view of efficiency in understanding and coping with human behavior. Our approach attempts to discover and to understand the conditions under which behavior occurs. Behavior of whatever sort must be accepted as a natural phenomenon, and all the sciences have demonstrated that in the search for accurate knowledge, the less emotion the better. Blame is behavior which is so emotionally toned that it inhibits the search for relevant conditions, and is as destructive of the search for knowledge as it is of mental health.

The concept of free-choice does not *cause* the ubiquitous

search for scapegoats, but it does sensitize the personality to that kind of stimuli. French culture is in some respects more mature than ours, and its language has an idiom "tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner." We go a step further; not merely "to understand all is to forgive all," but that to understand all leaves nothing to forgive<sup>20</sup>

Understanding a situation means, from the operational point of view, discovering familiar elements and correlations between them<sup>21</sup>

But one cannot accurately observe such correlations when under the influence of the kind of emotion that accompanies blame.

### THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION

Age-old folk wisdom states that it is often not so much what one does but how one does it that is important in human relations. We can illustrate this by the types of attitude that accompany, or are represented by, the two approaches, punishment and correction. The following propositions are intended to point out some of the interactional differences in these two approaches.

1. Punishment increases social distance, correction brings understanding, through role-taking, and decreases social distance.
2. Punishment is a threat to the integrity and security of the self; correction is the assurance of the interest of others in the recognition and strengthening of the self.
3. Punishment is evidence of inability to understand, correction is evidence of sympathetic appreciation.
4. Punishment is evidence of hostility; correction is evidence of cooperation.
5. Punishment creates a victim who cannot participate in the process; correction creates a recipient who participates in the process.
6. Punishment induces the feeling of indignity and humiliation; correction acknowledges the individual's dignity and his importance as a person.
7. Punishment induces resentment and retaliation, correction induces an evaluation of self.
8. Punishment is an outgroup act; correction is an ingroup act.

<sup>20</sup> See Lundberg: *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 276, to whom I am indebted for this.

<sup>21</sup> Lundberg *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 7.

9. Punishment is directed toward persons, correction is directed toward behavior.
10. Punishment is negative; correction is positive.
11. Punishment elicits violent emotion; correction elicits tender emotion.
12. Punishment emerges from vengeance, anger, and hate, correction emerges from consideration and love

Responsibility-blame-punishment are the natural offspring of the doctrine of free-choice embodied in our romantic-individualistic cultural ethos; accountability-understanding-correction are the offspring of the scientific doctrine of contingency. This point of view will be immensely effective when people learn how to use it, as evidenced by the truly remarkable change of public attitude toward the mentally ill who were once punished, now they are objects of sympathy and understanding, and are encouraged to participate in the correction of their behavior disorders. The pragmatic power of this point of view is likewise manifested in the contemporary professional point of view of criminologists, social workers, and psychiatrists.

#### PRIDE AND GUILT

Psychiatrists never tire of telling us that pride and guilt are two great destroyers of the human personality. Pride and arrogance are introjected praise; guilt and anxiety are introjected blame. Guilt tinsits are evidence that the individual is taught to hold himself responsible for the social process as it operates in relation to himself. Guilt and inferiority tinsits are blame directed toward the self, and as a person behaves toward his self, so he behaves toward others.

It is not that as ye judge so shall you be judged, but as you judge yourself so shall you judge others, strange but true so far as I know, and with no exception.<sup>22</sup>

The child (and the adult) can appraise his self only as he is able to evaluate the behavior of others toward that self, the meaning of self is mirrored in the behavior of others toward it. If the persons who are most important to Billy are constantly telling him or insinuating that he is a little gentleman or a very superior person, then

<sup>22</sup> Harry Stack Sullivan on the "hostile-derogatory self" in *Psychiatry*, (1940), Vol. 3, p. 7.

Billy will soon come to think that way about himself, that is, he will behave toward himself in those terms. If carried to extremes, this becomes inordinate pride, and he behaves toward self and others pridefully. If he is constantly punished, criticized, condemned, belittled, and humiliated, he will come to behave in those terms toward self and others.

Humility comes from taking the role of others when their behavior toward us tends to ennoble us, and is the integrated response toward the behavior of him whose appraisal of us exceeds our own evaluation of self. But humiliation is the integrated response when we are compelled to take the role of him whose behavior toward us tends to degrade us. He who degrades another by punishment or by any other device which imputes ignobility to his behavior, compels him to take a role toward himself which his integration rejects as unjust, and the resultant response to this is hatred and vengeance. He who exalts another to his face by imputing nobility to his behavior, compels him to take a role which his integration rejects because he feels unworthy of so high an appraisal, and the resultant response to this is humility.

We develop the self by behaving toward self and others as others behave toward us. If this is humiliating, we tend to humiliate self and others, if this is humbling, we tend to behave humbly toward self and others. Whatever we habitually do to ourselves we habitually do to others, and what we habitually do to others we do also to ourselves. If we find ourselves blaming others, we will find ourselves blaming self, and this is guilt. Guilt feelings are closely related to various forms of mental illness, Mandell Sherman has expressed doubt about whether psychoses ever develop without pronounced guilt tendencies.<sup>23</sup> The individual tries to keep his wickedness to himself as if he were the inventor and exclusive possessor of these common tinsits. Self-blame is like taking credit for some behavior on which one holds a copyright, but as George Preston says:

You have to be a real genius to think of any original "Goodness" or "Badness."<sup>24</sup>

Pride and guilt are the twin destroyers of men, and they are the twin offspring of the doctrine of free will as transmitted in the

<sup>23</sup> Mandell Sherman: *Mental Hygiene and Education*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; 1934.

<sup>24</sup> Preston *Psychology for the Curious*, pp. 51-2

romantic-individualistic complex of our ethos. When men learn to take neither credit nor blame for the doings of the social process, humility will increase in the world, as will consideration for others; arrogance and the tortures of guilt will decrease. When one holds the social process responsible for one's good fortunes, one gives to society in proportion to one's ability, and when one holds the social process responsible for one's misfortunes and injustices, one can take socially approved action for the redress of wrongs without being inhibited by the symbols of inferiority.

Hatred and intolerance of self, which is guilt, will endure as long as hatred and intolerance of others, and *vice versa*. To preserve one is to preserve both, to destroy one is to destroy both.

... hatred and intolerance can never be banished, together with the wanton miseries they provoke . . . until we can understand that the real enemies of humanity are not human beings—not members of sects, races or nations—but social systems which breed and perpetuate injustice and exploitation.<sup>25</sup>

If it is true that to understand behavior whether of individual or group, one must understand the conditions under which it occurs, then it follows that to change behavior one must change the conditions under which it occurs. This is the essence of the scientific method. Hatred, intolerance, and brutality will never correct hatred, intolerance, and brutality. Nor will the individual's behavior ever be corrected by hating and blaming and punishing the individuals. If we would correct crime and delinquency, economic and political corruption, nationalistic wars, social-class antagonisms, the discrimination and exploitation of minorities, and all other social "booby-traps," we will not correct them by taking highly emotional aggressive action toward the individuals who so behave. We shall change these forms of behavior only by correcting the errors of the social process in the social systems where they occur.

Whether we are dealing with normal or abnormal behavior, consensual or personal definitions of the situation, we cannot correct an ailment by punishing the patient. Treatment without diagnosis is charlatanism. To understand and to correct is the ideal of the man of knowledge; this is the creative life.

<sup>25</sup> M. Lowenthal, *The Jews of Germany*, 1936, cited by Klineberg, *Social Psychology*, p. 398.





## APPENDIX ONE

*See Chapter III, page 84*

The following paragraph follows immediately after Katz and Schanck's definition quoted in the text as number 6. Numbers have been placed before the sentences for quick reference. This passage helps to clarify our position.

- 1) For example, if a child is tardy to school because there was a fire along the way and he tarried too long in the crowd watching it, this tells us very little about his personality.
- 2) If, however, he is tardy almost every morning because he seeks out distracting situations, then we can call tardiness a personality trait.
- 3) Similarly, the action of people in conforming to police orders may be largely a function of the compulsive nature of the situation.
- 4) If, however, conformity is characteristic of a man in many situations in which there is little external sanction for obedience, his conformity is an expression of his personality.
- 5) Personality refers to the ideas and actions which become interiorized within the individual.
- 6) It does not refer to roles which are lightly assumed for the moment but which do not characterize the person.
- 7) Everything that people do is not necessarily significant for an understanding of their personalities.

We have questioned whether any act of a person can be considered an isolated, unlinked, unrelated, or uncharacteristic part of a "heterogeneous grab-bag of fortuitous events." We were referring to the kind of behavior illustrated by sentences 1, 3, 6 and 7 in the preceding passage. The child's behavior in sentence 1) must be assumed to have a history, must be considered characteristic in some degree. This child is the kind of person (verifiably) for whom this kind of act has some degree of probability, he is the kind of person who in the appropriate situation may be expected, with some degree of probability, to act in this way, the kind of person for whom this act in this kind of situation indicates a tinsit of some degree of stability.

Number 2 represents behavior which is merely more accessible to the observer and befogs the issue by adding an irrelevant phenomenon called a motive.

Sentence 3 is untenable in view of the nature of social fields; all relevant tinsits are "compulsive" (highly probable) in the appropriate situation. If this kind of situation is compulsive for a person, then he has a tinsit in that direction. It is none the less his tinsit be-

cause practically everyone else has such a common tinsit. Furthermore, for many people such a "setup" is not a compulsive situation. A "compulsive situation" is not something that exists in itself, it depends upon what the symbols of the situation mean to the person at the time.

With sentence 4 we agree, but if this sentence implies that people cannot have tendencies specific to one type of conforming situation, we could not agree. A person may not be "characteristically" a conformer, and may still be a "stickler" for some type of conformity, like obeying traffic rules, in which case his conformity is an expression of his personality-in-situation. The term "interiorized" (5) and "lightly assumed" (6), are not antithetical, a role lightly assumed does not mean uncharacteristic or not interiorized. If a person lightly assumes roles in such (or many) situations, the behavior may be highly characteristic (probable) for him. In any case he has a tendency of some degree of probability to do that in that kind of situation.

As for sentence 7, "everything people do is not necessarily significant" is valid for all purposes of investigation, but ruling out that area of behavior *a priori* means it is *never* significant. How is one going to know whether or not behavior is significant unless it is included in the personality, that is, included in the area conceptually permissible to be studied? One behavior is part of the whole, part of the system. It is *his* act. If one eliminates such behaviors conceptually as a class, then one says in advance that such behaviors cannot be significant, and by so doing one conceptually excludes consideration of the slapping by the general referred to in the text. We examine an act and if it does not contain significance for our purpose, we disregard it. But conceptually we must examine it. If one is going to define personality on the basis of the behavior which one believes *a priori* to be significant without reference to situations, can men agree on what behavior is involved? Are we not thus creating another dichotomy (significant-nonsignificant) to serve as the battleground for the next generation? We already possess scores of definitions because scholars cannot agree on what is *characteristic*. This new test of "significance" will add another score of definitions. Everyone will have his own list, like the old lists of instincts, the sum total of which will include all behavior anyway. No doubt the best way to describe "total definition" is to say that it is the sum of all partial definitions.

The practice of taking only a partial area of behavior as constituting personality is the equivalent of everyone having his own alphabet and his own system of mathematics, and then trying to communicate his measurements. We believe it conceptually necessary to assume that every act has a history, that every act may be in some degree significant for some purpose of investigation, that every act is

a determined resultant, that every act indicates a tendency of some degree of probability in given situations, that every act is subject to law, that no act is irrelevant merely because it has been observed only once.

A sound conceptual system cannot be built upon the more accessible or more interesting behaviors exclusively, with each investigator leaving out that in which he is not interested. This may do for practical purposes, where one buries one's mistakes, but it will not do for a conceptual system which must be closed at both ends. If it is personic behavior, it is personic behavior, and must be included, each investigator may choose within that universe the area in which he wishes to work. Even if a given act is not significant for a given investigator in a given research, yet the act may have significance for the personality in other respects. The assumed insignificant act in sentence 1 might, on investigation, reveal a highly significant system of established or incipient tinsits. Placed together with other information in a life history the act might indicate an incipient interest in fire, arson, crowd behavior, or indifference to authority. We do not suggest that we must investigate every act, but that such acts must not be conceptually excluded from possible investigation. To pronounce that act, or any act, insignificant *a priori* is merely to confess one's ignorance of the conditions under which it occurred. Nothing "just happens." Similarly the artful dodge "complexity of human behavior" is nothing more than a measure of our ignorance.

Isolated acts do not occur in personic behavior; every act has a history. To accept field implications for some behavior and not for others can hardly be called the scientific method. One cannot assume one part of a field lawful and another part not lawful. We believe that a sound theory of human nature must be able, on demand, to account for all personic behavior. We disclaim that the present work is *the* sound theory, rather we call it an appeal for a genuine, integrated conceptual system on a high level of abstraction and synthesis, it is an attempt at such a system.

No doubt one of the conditions under which writers have excluded the infrequent or lone act from personality is, as Lewin suggests, the tendency of scholars to question the lawfulness of the "psychical" or personic world. Under such conditions we might more safely confine ourselves to the study of the more stable constellations of tinsits like habits, attitudes, and traits; and cast aspersions on more comprehensive concepts by referring to them as "omnibus," vehicles calculated to frighten anyone not reared in a metropolis. Lewin points out (*Personality*, pp. 13 ff.) that behavior study is affected with the Aristotelian tendency to see lawfulness only in high frequency. "Tend-

ency" here has so far been postulated on a twofold basis. Inference from frequency and from system, plus the assumption that every act has a history. Thus a tinsit of relative stability is inferred from any act, whether it displays a high measurable frequency or not. Stability, as a property of tinsit, is dependent on frequency for measurement only as related to the frequency of the situation of which it is a function, and possibly one can believe that methods of measuring this may be developed from clinical and other types of data, as well as correlations of group data. (See *A Handbook on the Anecdotal Behavior Journal* by L. L. Jarvis and Mark Ellington, University of Chicago Press, 1940. The bibliography contains some thirty titles.)

Interestingly enough in our daily adjustments in social living we are constantly compelled to judge the probability of another's behavior, and we all do this very well. Scientific procedure involves formalizing the knowledge by which this is done. Even if, to begin with, we merely assign rough index numbers instead of more refined calculations to indicate probability, we should have a beginning. To say that a technically trained person cannot approach formally what the most uneducated person does informally every hour of the day is absurd.

When one makes statements to the effect that habits, attitudes, and traits account for "practically all" behavior, we feel it incumbent upon such a person to investigate by taxonomic or any other means, what proportion of behavior "practically all" includes, and the nature of the residue. For us the question is of no particular significance, for we assume that behavior represents a continuum, from a hypothetical single tinsit up through progressively generalized tinsits to the highly generalized constellations of tinsits called traits.

Since this form of argument is most likely to be misinterpreted, we shall state our position in terms of what we wish to demonstrate by its use. Why should we include these peripheral acts? The point may be simply stated:

- 1) Every act is to be thought of as subject to law; every act is determined in an orderly manner, nothing just happens; lawfulness is not assumed to apply only to those acts which are characterized by high frequency, or appear to be so characterized.

- 2) In the second place we wish to unify thought about personality by sloughing off the ragged edges which constitute the areas of great differences represented by the endless varieties of definitions. We want to know with what we are dealing and therefore want accurate boundaries. If we cannot agree on what to leave out, let us leave everything in.

- 3) In the third place, and this is an implication of the first point, we want people to see that nothing is done without a reason. If one

says he can agree to this for significant acts, but not all acts, then we have gone off the point again, for men cannot agree on what is significant, primarily because significance is a function of the situation which includes the apperceptive frame of reference of the observer

4) We do not maintain that every act is significant for all purposes, nor necessarily for any specific study, but we must recognize that it may be. But if that area of behavior is ruled out *a priori* from our conceptual formulations, then any act in that area is ignored as insignificant *a priori*. Where is the margin of difference between the child's being tardy for school once and a general's slapping a soldier once? The margin of difference is the visibility of their *ex post facto* relative significance, but no one can define this margin. The general's act may have been of no significance to his friends, but Senators "were calling for his head." The child's act might likewise be of no significance to his friends, but it might be to a teacher who disliked him. Shall significance, then, be determined by one's friends and enemies? Or is there a more objective basis?

Spies piece together various bits of apparently insignificant remarks in different places, and the pieces when put together result in the sinking of ships. So with the child's act, the mental hygienist or the psychiatrist pieces together all sorts of clinical data representing such "insignificant" acts as mentioned in sentence 1. Investigators have defined personality to exclude the "lone" act because they have not known how to handle it with their Aristotelian concepts, the conditions under which it occurs are not sufficiently visible.

5) Finally, we deny that an isolated act could occur in the sense that it cannot be classified within a category represented by some tint. But we do not contend that under present conditions we may draw generalizations from a single act, although our attention must be directed toward that end, we must always search for the conditions under which behavior, all behavior, occurs. No other kind of data can determine the significance of any act.

## APPENDIX TWO

*See Chapter VIII, page 275*

### THE SYMPATHETIC SYNDROME AS A CONTINUOUS VARIABLE

The statement that the visceral patterns in both the bear and princess situations are "practically" the same raises the question of what is meant by the word "practically." As indicated in Table 5 the sympathetic division of the autonomic represents the operation of numerous organic functions which come into play as a pattern or syndrome. Each of the functions listed in Table 5 operates as a continuous variable, as an activity measured on a scale. This is indicated even in the idiom of our vocabularies: we speak of fear and terror, or of anger and rage, indicating different degrees of intensity of the emotional response. In Table 5 we see such terms as low-high, fast-slow, active-inhibited—all indicating that these functions occur in degrees.


Research indicates that the sympathetic syndrome is very much the same in all of the "violent emotions," even though some of them represent these functions operating at different degrees of intensity. Indeed, the research indicates not only that different emotional situations activate all of these functions in different degrees to some extent, but that even in one emotional situation—for instance, one of fear—these visceral functions constituting the syndrome vary in intensity from moment to moment. It is as if the eleven functions mentioned in Table 5, plus others, were a series of little thermometers all going up and down at different rates and in various degrees with each emotional experience.

I have tried to indicate this in Figure X. The five small circles represent five emotional situations, each of which activates the sympathetic syndrome. Each of the eleven functions in Table 5 is represented in Figure X by a little scale like a thermometer. While each of the eleven functions varies on its scale for each of the five emotional situations, for practical purposes the pattern is much the same in all. How much difference in how many functions would be necessary for us to say that each emotional situation represents a "different" pattern? This question probably cannot be answered at present.

The significant difference between one emotion (fear) and another (anger) appears to be a difference in a person's perception of

the situation which arouses the syndrome rather than differences in the visceral syndrome itself.

Figure X Visceral Syndrome-in-Situation



The suggestion was made earlier that "a difference that makes no difference is no difference." We do not now know how big a difference a difference in these functions has to be to "make a difference." Nevertheless, for purposes of the theory of emotions presented in this book, the theory would still hold even if it could be demonstrated that each of the five emotional situations in Figure X activates a totally different syndrome. The viscera are not little men and cannot make their own perceptions. Perception is a function of the total integration called the person, and the viscera cannot respond until the person has made a perception ( $M_s$ ) of the situation. The viscera then respond in the pattern appropriate to the perception regardless of how small or great is the deviation of this perception from the norm for such situations. This is indicated by the hierarchy of operations described on page 279. It does not appear to me that this position is altered by reference to "automatic" behavior, or to unconscious perception of subliminal stimuli.





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A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN WHICH  
THIS BOOK IS SET

*The text of this book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face designed by W. A. Dwiggins. This type belongs to the family of printing types called "modern face" by printers—a term used to mark the change in style of type-letters that occurred about 1800. Caledonia borders on the general design of Scotch Modern, but is more freely drawn than that letter.*

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